

VOLUME 22

NO LEND

NUMBER 1

16 JUN 1978

SPRING 1978

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs



AFTER PANAMA: Latin America and the United States

(See Contents)



American Center
International Communication Agency
Ibis House, 183 Hereford Street
Christchurch, 1

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GRADUATE GROUP
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS, A Journal of World Affairs

Published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
in association with
The International Relations Graduate Group
University of Pennsylvania

Editor:	William R. Kintner
Managing Editor:	Richard E. Bissell
Assistant Managing Editor:	Charles B. Purrenhage
Assistant Editors:	Margaret M. Capotrio, Alan H. Luxenberg
Circulation Manager:	Alan H. Luxenberg
Advertising Manager:	Charles B. Purrenhage

Editor Emeritus:	Robert Strausz-Hupé
-------------------------	---------------------

EDITORIAL BOARD:	Adda B. Bozeman, Inis L. Claude, Jr., Alvin J. Cottrell, James E. Dornan, Jr., Frederick W. Frey, William E. Griffith, Don D. Humphrey, J. C. Hurewitz, David C. Jordan, Morton A. Kaplan, Roy U. T. Kim, Lawrence B. Krause, Thomas Naff, Covey T. Oliver, Norman D. Palmer, Stefan T. Possony, Uri Ra'anana, Franklin R. Root, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Robert A. Scalapino, Paul Seabury, W. Scott Thompson, Frank N. Trager, William R. Van Cleave, Richard L. Walker, Arthur P. Whitaker, J. K. Zawodny.
-------------------------	---

EDITORIAL INTERNS:	Margaret Cain, Adam M. Garfinkle, Joanne S. Gowa, Richard Harris, Nimrod Novik, Kevin O'Keefe, William Perry, Karen Pesavento, Scott M. Pinkus, L. Joseph Woods, Stephan B. Yost.
---------------------------	---

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the University of Pennsylvania, or the Editors of ORBIS.

Copyright © 1978 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Delaware nonprofit corporation. Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden.

ORBIS is published four times a year by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. **Editorial and business offices:** 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. **Subscription rates**, per year: \$12.00 for individuals, \$20.00 for institutions. (Plus \$2.00 per year, overseas.) Single copy, \$5.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editor. Address correspondence relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP).

ISSN 0030-4387

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

American Center

VOLUME 22

NUMBER 1

SPRING 1978

International Communication Agency
Orbis House, 183 Hereford Street

Christchurch, 1

Reflections on the Quarter by Robert Strausz-Hupé	3
Europe and the "Structure of Peace" William C. Cromwell	11
Societal Values, Military Institutions and the Western Dilemma Alan Ned Sabrosky	37
Conciliation and Confrontation: A Strategy for North-South Negotiations Simon Serfaty	47
West European Foreign Policies: The Impact of the Oil Crisis Werner J. Feld	63
Israel in NATO: Basis for a Middle East Settlement? Alvin Z. Rubinstein	89
Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean: Yugoslavia and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine Aurel Braun	101
AFTER PANAMA: LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES	135
Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America: Toward a New Conceptualization Howard J. Wiarda	137
Regional Restraint: U.S. Nuclear Policy and Latin America John R. Redick	161
Oil in Mexican-U.S. Relations: Analysis and Bargaining Scenario Edward J. Williams	201
The Technology of Modern Weapons for Limited Military Use John W. Cane	217
African International Politics: Underdevelopment and Conflict in the Seventies Raymond W. Copson	227
Reader Feedback	247
Review by George Ginsburgs	249
Publications Received	255

SPRING 1978 • 1

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

ORBIS welcomes articles that examine problems in international relations. All correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, ORBIS, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

Manuscripts

- ☐ Authors should submit an original and two clear copies, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if return of the manuscript is desired.
- ☐ The entire manuscript (*including footnotes and tables*) should be typed double-spaced. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page. Tables should be typed on separate sheets, and all internal rules should be omitted. Articles that do not follow this format will be returned for retyping.
- ☐ Care should be taken that footnotes contain complete bibliographic information. For the proper footnote form — and all matters of style — please consult the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago Press).
- ☐ The title page should include only the article title, author's name, and a fifty-word biographical statement (positions held, area of specialization, publications, and research-in-progress).

Figures

- ☐ Illustrations should be submitted as glossy photographs. The ideal sizes are 4- $\frac{3}{8}$ " $\times$ 7" (full-page) or 4- $\frac{3}{8}$ " $\times$ 3- $\frac{3}{8}$ " (half-page), but in no case should photos be larger than 8" $\times$ 10". Prints should not be stapled or clipped, and author's name, figure number, and top of figure should be marked *lightly* on the back.
- ☐ Legends should be typed double-spaced on a separate sheet.
- ☐ If an illustration has been published previously, the author must get permission to reproduce it.
- ☐ ORBIS will prepare maps and graphs for authors if they cannot provide camera-ready artwork, but some production costs will be passed on to the author.

reflections

ON THE QUARTER

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMITMENT

No U.S. commitment in post-World War II international politics has been more enduring, nor rested on a wider national consensus, than has membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. In April 1976, President Ford explicitly reaffirmed the Republican administration's pledge to uphold this commitment. The president's words had the authority of action: he had obtained congressional approval for real increases in our defense budget, thus demonstrating concretely our readiness to match Soviet military power and bear our share in strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, not the least of the Ford administration's contribution to alliance resolve has been the convincing evidence provided by our intelligence estimate of the Warsaw Pact's massive build-up. So accurate have been these estimates that, in the course of time, the Carter administration has made them its own. The example set by the Ford defense budget, together with the information on the increase in Warsaw Pact forces that the United States shared with its allies in close consultation, persuaded our fellow NATO members to keep up their defense spending — and this notwithstanding heavy domestic pressures and the economic backlash of increased energy costs. If some have fallen short of the goals agreed on in the North Atlantic Council, others have kept to their commitment and some have surpassed it. As a result, President Ford bequeathed to his successor an alliance invigorated by American leadership, confident of its ability to meet all challenges and animated by a spirit of mutual cooperation and close consultation.

Never since its inception has the Atlantic Alliance been trouble-free. It has suffered from the familiar shortcomings inherent in a peace-time alliance of sovereign nations. The fifteen sovereign member-states have not always found consensus easy to reach. All the more remarkable is the fact that the alliance, notwithstanding its troubles, has held together. It has maintained the balance of power within the treaty area and, thus, has kept the peace. Even some of our ideological opponents — the rulers of the Chinese People's Republic and some of the communist leaders of Western Europe — now concede these beneficial contributions.

REFLECTIONS

Suffice here that the Republican administration succeeded in disengaging American power from Southeast Asia, closing the breach between our Atlantic and our other global commitments and channeling our resources, material and moral, into the building of a stronger Western alliance. Hence, the Nixon/Ford administration can claim to have restored the "Atlantic priority," the cornerstone of U.S. and Western security. On this score, the successors will not find it easy to fill the Republican shoes.

Contrary to some hasty and ill-considered allegations, the Ford administration, on alliance-relevant issues, proceeded in closest consultation with our allies. This is as it should have been, for consultation is at the heart of alliance solidarity. What matters about alliance consultation is not only the frequency and the level of representation — from permanent delegations to the North Atlantic Council up to ministers and heads of state — but also the depth of trust and understanding that the consultation process needs to engender if it is to enlist the cooperation of free peoples in the search for solutions to common problems. On some — perhaps on most — of these problems, a broad consensus exists: their solution can be left to the workings of the bureaucracies at alliance headquarters and at allied capitals. Yet, in other cases, there are profoundly different views rooted in differing national experiences and perceptions. Among individual member-states, there are vast differences in size, population, wealth and sociopolitical configuration. Geographically, the European segment of the alliance occupies a narrow rim on the Eurasian land mass, its forward defenses facing Warsaw Pact forces at the range of cannon shot. The United States is situated on the yonder shores of the Atlantic Ocean, strategically accessible only to the nuclear power of its potential adversary. Resource limitations and unalterable facts of geography compel our European allies to rely for their penultimate security on the efficacy and reliability of America's nuclear and conventional power. The presence of U.S. forces, nuclear and conventional, on European soil and in European waters has betokened the American commitment to the defense of Europe. Indeed, our European allies have viewed and still view this presence as the indispensable component of allied strategy.

It would have been surprising if the political and technological changes that, in the lifetime of the Atlantic Alliance, have profoundly altered the international environment would have failed to affect the alliance itself. The advent of nuclear parity (or a condition approximating it); the evolution of new weapon systems; the

changing economics of energy; and the massive expansion of Soviet military power and global reach — these and other momentous developments have challenged the ability of the alliance to adjust to systemic change. In the round, the alliance has shown itself remarkably adaptable, confounding its critics and retaining the support, solid though unsung, of Western public opinion.

It must be conceded, however, that the alliance's past record of finding answers to crucial questions is not necessarily a promise for the future. Thus far, for example, the evolution of allied strategic doctrine has managed to keep pace with technological innovation and the increase of Warsaw Pact capabilities. Here and now (dire warnings notwithstanding), pact forces cannot, without incurring terrible punishment and the even more terrible risk of escalation, overrun Europe. The strategy of "flexible response," the modernization of which the Republican administration has furthered in a lasting way, still appears to be the most plausible and feasible option for coping with all foreseeable events. In essence, this strategy meshes the strategic forces of the United States with the allied forces deployed in Europe and ensures the employment of all available means, as appropriate, necessary to contain the full range of the adversary's challenges. Above all, it ensures the indivisibility of allied defense. It precludes the "decoupling" of the defense of Europe from the defense of the continental United States.

It should not shock our sensibilities that the indivisibility of allied defense is of profound concern to our European allies. The anxiety of our allies is aggravated by the widely held belief that, were war to erupt in Europe, they would have only one choice — to fight — whereas the United States would have two options: to employ its strategic weaponry or to withhold it. In brief, according to this dismal view, the two nuclear superpowers might refrain from damaging one another's home base and confine, or "limit," the ravages of war to European lands. Improbable and unattractive as seems this scenario, it agitates a good many European minds, including some highly intelligent ones and some by no means unfriendly to us. Needless to say, it is being widely publicized by communist propaganda.

The Carter administration has made a laudable start by way of declaratory policies. It has affirmed its commitment to the alliance. It is pursuing the improvements to the alliance's combat readiness and logistics that were proposed and initiated by its predecessor. It has not failed to avail itself of extant procedures for alliance consultation. The conclusive test of the administration's

REFLECTIONS

stewardship, however, will be the care it takes to sustain alliance solidarity.

America's policies toward the alliance cannot be sealed into a compartment marked "NATO." There is hardly one major U.S. foreign policy that does not impinge, directly or indirectly, on the fortunes of the alliance. Most obviously, the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control are fraught with fateful implications for the defense of Europe. In principle, these negotiations are — and have always been — consistent with the dual purpose of the alliance: (1) to mount the collective defense of its members against aggression and (2) to seek the improvement of East-West relationships, leading to a state of affairs (*viz.*, a position of strength) that will end the necessity for mounting defense against aggression. Arms-control agreements between Washington and Moscow, insofar as they diminish the danger of general war and enhance the security of the alliance as a whole, will be welcomed by our allies. Indeed, they have acclaimed the progress made thus far; notably, the successful negotiation of SALT I by the Nixon administration and of the Vladivostok agreements by the Ford administration. It needs to be understood, however, that our allies will judge the future results of these bilateral negotiations by precisely the same criteria: the diminishment of the danger of general war *and* the enhancement of alliance security. As our allies see it, the one cannot be decoupled from the other: a SALT II that merely cements in place U.S./Soviet parity is not sufficient to consecrate the strategic parity of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

The negotiations that go by the name of SALT deal with weapon systems. By definition, these systems are "strategic," *i.e.*, possessed of intercontinental range. By definition, those that do not possess intercontinental range are excluded from the purview of SALT. Yet, among the latter, quite a few are regarded as strategic by our allies: some weapon systems, wherever deployed in Europe, have sufficient range to hit targets anywhere in Europe, though not in the United States. Were the Soviet Union to achieve an appreciable superiority in any of these systems, then the stabilization of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship would be of small comfort to our European allies. It would be of even smaller comfort if the Soviet conventional build-up were to continue at its present pace, topping the build-up of Soviet intermediate-range missilery.

The disparities in the strategic relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, on one hand, and

between the United States and its European allies, on the other, are embedded in geography. These geographic disparities are weighted by economic and technological ones: our European allies have not succeeded in matching our bountiful defense technology. Hence, they depend on us for the supply of a wide range of "sophisticated" weapon systems. Some of these, so it appears to our allies, are particularly suited to countering Soviet capabilities in the "gray" area of SALT, i.e., Soviet missiles having a very long range yet not long enough to qualify it for inclusion in SALT. Whether these "intermediate" systems in the Soviet arsenal are or are not "strategic" is a matter of debate nearly as abstruse as the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. However the Soviet systems might be classed, they are capable of wreaking havoc throughout NATO Europe. Indeed, our European allies perceive this to be their explicit purpose.

As can be seen, the manner in which we manage the SALT negotiations bears on the most vital interests of our allies. The Carter administration cannot be faulted for failure to keep our allies abreast of developments in SALT. Yet, ultimately, it will be the position taken on such issues as the transfer of technology and the basing of "intermediate" systems in Europe, especially those novel ones now looming on the technological horizon, that will determine — and determine with considerable finality — the future of the alliance.

The Atlantic Alliance is vowed to common defense and to the quest for detente. Yet the alliance has never found it easy to reconcile these two purposes: to prepare for war and to parley for peace. In order to keep the two purposes in balance, the alliance needs to be informed by a realistic appraisal, not only of the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, but also of the "inwardness" of the confrontation between those states under communist rule and those under democratic government. Indeed, the cohesiveness of the alliance depends on the accuracy of this assessment. It is here that the United States, the leader of the alliance, bears a heavy responsibility: our analysis of threat and promise cannot but sway the allied governments and their publics.

Hence, the present administration, whether addressing domestic or foreign audiences, must set forth clearly and consistently its understanding of Soviet intent. For the Western alliance, the last best hope for a rational policy of detente lies in a sober appraisal of Soviet intentions and capabilities — of the Soviet Union's goals in world politics and its contingent foreign and military policies.

Such an appraisal cannot but start from a premise that has not been controverted in sixty years of Soviet history. As with all totalitarian governments, Soviet rule has been marked by one indelible characteristic: the unpredictability of arbitrary power and, hence, of policy. Today, the nature of totalitarianism sets the same narrow limits to the workings of detente that, in the past, withered its several predecessors. For a totalitarian state, the denial of human rights is not an aberration that can be corrected by moral persuasion, however elevated and fervent, but an indispensable prop of the political system.

Even if the objectives of Soviet strategy were now a great deal more modest than the Kremlin's efforts in all categories of armament now seem to portend, the *fundamental instability* of its coercive political system would still leave the Western democracies with no choice but to maintain their armed vigilance.

If the unfolding story of Soviet repression of internal dissent has made anything clear, it is that coercion by threat of force is at the root of Soviet domestic rule. Is it not conceivable that the same sort of coercion might be the ultimate weapon of Soviet policy abroad? Even if Moscow were as loathe to unleash a war as it says it is, it does not follow that the immense Soviet armament effort is merely a defensive reflex, that it has not been otherwise rewarding. The Soviet Union has succeeded spectacularly in transmuting, in several places on the globe, military power into political influence. If the Western alliance fails to match the aggressive potential deployed by the Soviet Union, then will not the mere presence of Soviet military power suffice to coerce NATO Europe into accommodation and, eventually, surrender? For such an outcome there exists a precedent: the blackmail policies pursued forty years ago by Nazi Germany. It is conceivable that the purpose of Soviet military power is to overawe Europe, not to overrun it in a shooting war.

This threat has become all the more ominous as the reach of Soviet strategic power has grown. The emergence of the USSR as an ubiquitous world power, reaching deeply into what were once the hinterlands of the North Atlantic Community, poses challenges to the Atlantic Alliance that circumvent the area and the provisions of the 1949 Washington treaty. Do strategic arrangements that, so far, have safeguarded Western Europe against aggression from the East also suffice to protect the allies' extended flanks and global life lines? Has the time not come to re-examine the strategic premises

of allied defense, which date back to the age of “linear containment”? And, does not the change in the strategic environment — a change placing the West more and more at risk militarily, politically and economically — point the Western alliance toward novel institutional forms, more cohesive and authoritative than those devised twenty-eight years ago? Plainly, the North Atlantic Alliance needs to achieve that closer political union which corresponds to the already existing community of strategic, economic and cultural interests — a community increasingly in danger.

Let it be conceded that the Carter administration faces a formidable task in clearing away the cobwebs of “detentism” — an ideology as obnoxious as those ideologies it pretends to replace — and in keeping public attention focused on the hard core of international problematics: immense and relentlessly growing military power at the order of a handful of rulers who are accountable to no one, least of all to their own people.

The historical vista is forbidding. Yet, in the discourse of domestic politics throughout democratic lands, there will always be plenty of seductive arguments for riveting public attention on more pleasing prospects. Of late, the Soviet Union has become more sensitive to the introspective character of Western democracy, and Soviet policy toward the West has therefore grown more subtle. Perhaps at no time in the history of Western democracy has the task of leadership been more exacting than it is now: the ship of state must be steered coolly between the treacherous reefs of complacency and panic. Only the steadiness of American judgment and purpose can sustain the will of the West to face the common danger and do great things together.

It is not always easy for Washington, when it “thinks aloud” about the nature of the communist threat and the promises of detente, to gauge the repercussions of its musings in allied capitals or to heed the sensitivities of European publics that, so to speak, hang on every word that drops from the mouth of American leadership. It is in this realm of intra-alliance communication — the sober disclosure of America’s understanding of the necessities and opportunities confronting the Atlantic Alliance — that the Carter administration will find ample scope for exercising its capacity for insightfulness and empathy.

American leadership is the bedrock of the Atlantic Alliance. The alliance thrives on the American input (material, intellec-

tual and moral) and without it, would speedily wither. The alliance is the product of a commitment conceived and sustained by America's creative statesmanship. Its future will be determined by the enduring vigor of the source from which it has drawn its strength in the first place.

ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPÉ
Editor Emeritus

THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

A journal of scholarship and opinion publishing articles in the fields of philosophy, political science, economics, literature and social criticism. THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW is made available free of charge to faculty and students four times during the academic year by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Subscriptions are invited from those outside the academic community: one year, five dollars; two years, nine dollars; three years, twelve dollars. Subscriptions and inquiries should be addressed to: ISI, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010.



Contributors to recent issues:

Hanson Baldwin	Gerhart Niemeyer
Louis I. Bredvold	Robert Nisbet
Goetz Briefs	Stefan T. Possony
Yale Brozen	Peter Stanlis
George Carey	Frank N. Trager
John Davenport	Stephen Tonsor
Roger Freeman	Ernest van den Haag
Henry Hazlitt	Eliseo Vivas
Will Herberg	Robert Penn Warren
Russell Kirk	Francis G. Wilson
Thomas Molnar	Donald Atwell Zoll

Contributors to previous issues:

Raymond Aron	Willmoore Kendall
William Bark	William R. Kintner
Andre Beaufre	Wm. Oliver Martin
Karl Brandt	Ludwig von Mises
Colin Clark	Leo Strauss
Donald Davidson	Robert Strauss-Hupé
Lev E. Dobriansky	Eric Voegelin
M. Stanton Evans	Richard M. Weaver
Lawrence H. Gipson	Simon N. Whitney
Otto von Habsburg	Frederick Wilhelmsen
Arthur Kemp	David McCord Wright

EUROPE AND THE "STRUCTURE OF PEACE"*

by William C. Cromwell

The Nixon-Kissinger approach to foreign policy was dominated by the search for a stable "structure of peace" which was to rest upon a network of agreements, understandings and tensions among the major powers, reflecting an underlying equilibrium in their relations. A stable structure would depend upon arrangements of roughly balanced satisfactions and restraints in an overall framework at least tolerably acceptable to the major powers. As elaborated by Kissinger in *A World Restored*: "Stability, then, has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy. 'Legitimacy' as here used . . . means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers."¹ It is worth noting that the gist of this passage was summarized in a State Department booklet, published in 1975, on U.S. foreign policy.² Moreover, during a broadcast interview in 1975, Kissinger remarked that a peaceful world requires that "those countries that have the greatest capacity to determine peace or war — that is, the five major centers — be reasonably agreed on the general outlines of what that peace should be like."³

The diplomatic application of this design entailed bringing about a new relationship with the Soviet Union which would both restrain and recognize Soviet power. At the same time, it would build a network of bilateral ties which would confer advantages to domestic groups in both societies, thereby stabilizing the new order

* This article was adapted from a paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association/South, Columbia, South Carolina, October 1977.

¹ Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), p. 1.

² U.S. Department of State, *United States Foreign Policy: An Overview*, May 1975.

³ Secretary of State Kissinger's interview for "Bill Moyers' Journal: International Report," Public Broadcasting Service, January 16, 1975. (Department of State press release.)

William C. Cromwell is Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at American University, where he has also served as Associate Dean. He is a specialist in European international relations and is the author of *The Eurogroup and NATO* (FPRI Monograph no. 18) and editor of *Political Problems of Atlantic Partnership* (College of Europe Press, 1969).

through shared “stake in the system” benefits and providing sources of domestic restraint and moderation as buffers against political crisis. China was to be integrated into the new order by (a) the reopening of diplomatic, commercial and cultural contacts, (b) recognition of China’s great-power status through acceptance of UN membership, (c) pledges of eventual U.S.-Chinese normalization and resolution of the Taiwan issue, and (d) a subtle, necessarily unstated U.S.-Chinese alignment to restrain the Soviet Union in Asia. In this context, “Vietnam,” however much it overshadowed the first Nixon term, was essentially a problem of *sauve-qui-peut* liquidation; and it related to the central task of building the new structure of peace only to the extent that the manner of the U.S. withdrawal would affect the domestic and international image of the American world role in the post-Vietnam era. Thus, the Nixon Doctrine sought to strike a balance between a retrenching America in Asia and a continued, if more residual, U.S. security role in the region. Strategic withdrawal from Vietnam was balanced by instances of tactical assertiveness (the invasion of Cambodia in 1970, the mining of Haiphong harbor and the Christmas bombings of 1972). The administration believed that an America perceived to be in broad global retreat could hardly establish credibility as architect and balancer of a new triangular equilibrium.

The place of Europe in the administration’s structure-of-peace diplomacy was somewhat ambiguous. During President Nixon’s visit to Paris in early 1969, a major effort was exerted to bury past differences with De Gaulle and to stress that the means of building European unity were for the Europeans themselves to determine. Pouring effusive praise on De Gaulle as “the greatest leader of our time,” Nixon appears to have embraced the Gaullist view of European political unity and of an independent role for Europe in world affairs. In a subsequent press conference, Nixon stated his approval of a revisionist concept of Atlantic relations, endorsing the idea of a unified Europe as a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was a sharp break from the traditional concept of Europe as a component of the Atlantic pole in a bipolar (or tripolar) balance: “He [De Gaulle] believes that Europe should have an independent position in its own right. And, frankly, I believe that too. . . . the world will be a much safer place and, from our standpoint, a much healthier place economically, militarily, and politically, if there were a strong European community to be a

balance, basically a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union."⁴

Later, during Nixon's apparently brief flirtation with a pentagonal vision of power relationships, Europe was to play a similar balancing role in a global context. Equating prolonged periods of peace with the existence of a balance of power, Nixon observed: "I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance."⁵

Yet it is difficult to reconcile Nixon's rhetorical support for an independent, unified Europe with his extravagant embrace of De Gaulle, whose policies had blocked the European Community from acquiring the very capability for action which would enable it to play such a role. De Gaulle's meeting with British Ambassador Soames, just prior to the Nixon visit, had once again demonstrated his disdain for the community in its existing form and his apparent advocacy of a looser economic association, including Britain, with a four-power political directorate at its core.⁶ It is possible, though, that Nixon was speculating about a hypothetical future which had little immediate relevance for U.S.-European relations.

It is probable that De Gaulle's concept of a loosely unified Europe appealed to Nixon and Kissinger since it would provide more access points and greater opportunity for U.S. influence than could be expected in dealings with a single European political authority. In *The Troubled Partnership*, Kissinger had written favorably of the Fouchet Plan, arguing that it would "permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than the 'twin pillar' concept now in vogue. A confederal Europe would enable the United States to maintain an influence at many centers of decision rather than be forced to stake everything on affecting the views of a single, supranational body."⁷ Elsewhere, Kissinger was critical of the American disposition to equate a united Europe with supranational institutions, and he disputed the relevance of the American federal experience to a

⁴ President Nixon's press conference, March 4, 1969; in *Department of State Bulletin*, March 24, 1969.

⁵ *Time*, January 3, 1972.

⁶ Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy Under de Gaulle and Pompidou* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 401-403.

⁷ Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1965), p. 244. Also see Kissinger's statement in *United States Policy Toward Europe, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June-July 1966* (Washington: GPO, 1966), p. 175.

Europe composed of deeply rooted nation-states. Moreover, wrote Kissinger, "a separate identity has usually been established by opposition to a dominant power," and the European sense of identity was unlikely to be an exception to this general rule. A united Europe, Kissinger believed, "is likely to insist on a specifically European view of world affairs — which is another way of saying that it will challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy."⁸ Though Kissinger suggested that this might be a worthwhile price to pay for European unity, American policy had suffered by its failure to acknowledge that there was a price to be paid. In the Nixon administration, Kissinger was even less prepared to pay such a price than were his predecessors.

Appearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1966, Kissinger had advocated a "greater degree of political and military autonomy for Europe"⁹ and suggested revitalizing the Western European Union (WEU) for this purpose. However, whatever European structure might emerge, it "would continue to be protected by the United States militarily"¹⁰ and would operate in the NATO framework. Somewhat at variance with the concerns expressed in *The Troubled Partnership*, Kissinger suggested: "To the extent that Europeans are made to face their problems in a European context they are more likely to be driven to Atlantic cooperation than the opposite."¹¹ He expressed confidence that if Europeans thought seriously about their political and security interests, they would reach conclusions similar to those of the United States. He was not opposed to a European nuclear force, though the United States should not actively promote it, and he speculated that "nuclear autonomy is the least divisive form of European unity."¹² Yet such autonomy in military matters would be circumscribed by "the closest association between Europe and the United States," from which Europe had the most to gain.

Thus, a fully integrated and independent Europe might be injurious to American interests. Kissinger believed that "a federal Europe is likely to have the greatest incentives for a policy which we tend to identify as a Gaullist policy, while a confederal Europe would permit us to maintain an influence at many centers and it would probably be, in the long run, less likely to pursue such a policy."¹³

⁸ Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, p. 40.

⁹ *United States Policy Toward Europe* . . . , p. 135.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

Interestingly, Kissinger's conclusions were precisely the opposite of those of both orthodox Atlanticism and Gaullism. Contrary to the traditional American view of Atlantic partnership, Kissinger feared that European separatist tendencies would be magnified by full political union. And, contrary to the Gaullist vision, he believed that De Gaulle's model of a loose, intergovernmental European grouping would (a) preserve opportunities for U.S. influence within an Atlantic framework and (b) provide expression for, while delimiting, the emergent European identity. One gains the strong impression that Kissinger's support for limited European unity represented a necessary concession to an incipient European consciousness in order to preserve Atlantic cohesion.

Whatever the conceptual ambiguities of the Nixon-Kissinger view of Europe, it hardly mattered during the first Nixon term. For an administration preoccupied with Vietnam and the cultivation of ties with the Soviet Union and China, there was little urgency to deal with a Europe that seemed increasingly absorbed by its own affairs and which posed few compelling problems to command the government's attention.

The big exception, of course, was growing Senate pressure for a reduction of U.S. troops in Europe. Yet the administration's handling of this issue offered few additional clues as to its long-term view of U.S.-European relations. Opposition to Senate troop-withdrawal pressures was a necessary corollary of the requirement for dealing with the Soviet Union. The evolution toward U.S.-Soviet strategic parity had strengthened the need for conventional forces in NATO. The "decoupling" — via mutual deterrence — of strategic nuclear forces from a credible military role in Europe, together with continued escalation uncertainties associated with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, argued against reductions in European conventional-force levels. Moreover, the administration insisted that prospects for mutual force reductions in Europe would be jeopardized if the United States embarked upon unilateral withdrawals. Both arguments reflected the view that the United States required a stable East-West military relationship in Europe to underpin its strategy of detente with the Soviet Union. In this case, U.S. alliance policy and detente policy were mutually reinforcing.

The administration's chief response to the Senate proponents of troop withdrawals was the exertion of pressure upon European NATO members to increase their own defense efforts. Given a "similar approach" by our allies, Nixon pledged in 1970 to maintain and improve U.S. forces in Europe and not to reduce them

except in the context of reciprocal East-West withdrawals. In 1971, modest defense improvements coordinated by NATO's Eurogroup, together with the announcement of Warsaw Pact readiness to negotiate on mutual force reductions, combined to assist the administration in defeating Senate troop-withdrawal efforts in several key votes. By 1973, however, persistent pressures upon the U.S. balance of payments produced a Senate coalition which overwhelmingly passed the Jackson-Nunn Amendment to the defense procurement bill. The amendment provided for a percentage reduction of U.S. forces in Europe equivalent to the percentage failure by NATO Europe to offset the U.S. balance-of-payments cost of deploying forces in Europe during FY 1974. In effect, the amendment shifted to the European NATO members responsibility for determining future U.S. force levels, depending upon how they responded to the offset requirement. Subsequently, the Eurogroup countries provided adequate offsetting arrangements, thereby obviating application of the amendment's troop-withdrawal sanction.

Nato's Eurogroup represented the chief European response to pressures from the administration and Congress for an increased European contribution to alliance defense. The formation of such a group had been suggested by Secretary of State Rusk in 1967 and seemed consistent with ideas advanced by Henry Kissinger at about the same time. Indeed, President Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress in 1972 asserted that "political and defense cooperation within Europe will be the fulfillment of European unity." Yet the development of a European nucleus within NATO was never given significant encouragement by the Nixon administration. Though Eurogroup's defense-improvement programs were officially welcomed, the group was seen chiefly as a vehicle for more equitable alliance burden-sharing. For if the administration was to sustain a domestic consensus for maintaining the U.S. NATO commitment, it was important to demonstrate that Europe was paying its way. Despite Kissinger's previous support for "another force as a balance to ours" in NATO and Nixon's own speculations about a European pole in a new global balance of power, the administration never encouraged Eurogroup's evolution in such a direction; nor did it show interest in other approaches toward the same end.

In view of France's chosen absence from Eurogroup, efforts to encourage its development as the nucleus of a future European defense community may have been shunned as divisive. However, given Washington's growing reservations about European unity and the increasingly irritable character of U.S.-European Com-

munity relations, it seems likely that the administration's measured support for Eurogroup reflected an unwillingness to encourage beyond modest limits a defense organization which could add another problematical dimension to its relations with Europe. In the defense-procurement field, for example, Eurogroup agreed to principles of equipment collaboration entailing efforts to coordinate replacement schedules, achieve maximum standardization, and develop common procurement and follow-on service plans. Though such projects have included joint European purchases from the American defense industry (e.g., Lance and the F-16), a major purpose has been to restore vitality to European defense industries and to reduce the predominance of U.S. suppliers in the NATO defense market. Thus, a report of the North Atlantic Assembly's Military Committee cautioned that "American support for the Eurogroup may wane if the efforts made by European countries to achieve co-operation in armaments production succeed to the point where U.S. equipment sales to Europe suffer. . . . When the Eurogroup starts to bite, may not U.S. reaction to it be similar to current American criticisms of the European Community for alleged discrimination and distortion of trade?"¹⁴

Though relations with the European Community were essentially peripheral to Nixon's global policy during his first term, the administration's actions contrasted with its ritualistic affirmations of support for European unity. Indeed, the administration had inherited from the Johnson years a growing malaise in U.S.-European Community relations, attributable to changes in attitude on both sides of the Atlantic. The romanticized view of European unity and Atlantic partnership characteristic of the Kennedy period had, by the late 1960s, given way to growing American impatience, annoyance and frustration. De Gaulle's predominance (if only negative) over the European unity process left little scope for an active American policy. With European unity indefinitely stalled and with U.S. foreign policy energies increasingly absorbed by Vietnam, the vision of partnership became replaced by Atlantic estrangement, mutual indifference, and bickering over trade issues. The Kennedy Round tariff negotiations contributed to a new American view of the community as a tough trade competitor, even an adversary.

The Nixon administration did little to reverse the deterioration of U.S.-European Community relations. A predilection for bilateral diplomacy and the cultivation of improved ties with France

¹⁴ *The Eurogroup—An Experiment in European Defense Co-operation*, a report by the Military Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, November 1972, pp. 13-14.

found its counterpart in devalued relations with community institutions. J. Robert Schaetzel, U.S. ambassador to the European Community from 1966 to 1972, asserted that "Washington searched for some alternative approach, for ways of bypassing the Commission and of dealing directly with the member governments."¹⁵ During Nixon's 1969 visit to Europe, Schaetzel recalled that "it was touch-and-go whether during his Brussels stopover he would even meet with the European Commission."¹⁶ The administration's studied neglect of community institutions, Schaetzel suggested, resulted from a desire not to offend the French and from a view of world politics wherein it would be "folly" for a major power "to assist in the organization of what could become an independent coalition of otherwise subordinate European states."¹⁷ The problem became compounded as the Department of State and its European missions became isolated from the White House-centered policymaking machinery of the Nixon administration. The monetary shocks of 1971, the tariff surcharge, and the Connally method of peremptory demands upon European finance ministers for trade concessions further aggravated already strained Atlantic relations.

II

The so-called Year of Europe, initiated by Kissinger's proposal for a new Atlantic charter in April 1973, in fact gave rise to an unprecedented period of acrimony in U.S.-European relations and revealed a wide chasm between the essentially traditional American Atlanticist outlook and the testy assertiveness of the new European consciousness. Despite Kissinger's earlier support for increased European autonomy, his diplomacy identifies him as a partisan of the very hegemonic attitude toward Europe which he had earlier criticized as harmful to Atlantic cohesion. The years of neglect in U.S.-European relations, the isolation of State Department "Europeans" from the administration's policymaking process, and the often confusing signals from Europe led to undervaluations by Washington of the European mood following De Gaulle's resignation. The growth of the European Community's political consultations since the 1969 Hague Conference, the completion of the membership-enlargement negotiations, and the ambitious (if ill-fated) commitment at the 1972 Paris summit to achieve union by

¹⁵ Schaetzel, *The Unhinged Alliance* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 49.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

1980 had produced a Europe whose attitude on Atlantic issues could no longer be taken for granted. The Nixon administration was so unprepared for the European reaction that Kissinger later acknowledged: "it took us a long time to accept that there was a serious argument going on."¹⁸

Kissinger's Atlantic charter proposal aimed at developing a set of principles to redefine and revitalize U.S.-European relations in order to face the economic, political and strategic circumstances of the 1970s. Conceived as a rather unproblematical undertaking, it was proposed that the declaration be completed for signature in conjunction with President Nixon's European trip, planned for the fall. The proposal was deliberately meager in substance, in order to allow for European input and avoid the appearance of American dictation, yet its overall tone met a skeptical and suspicious European audience.

For one thing, the administration had apparently consulted in advance only with British Prime Minister Heath before launching a major diplomatic initiative embracing the full spectrum of U.S.-West European relations. The State Department was not involved in the drafting of the speech, and Secretary of State Rogers had no advance notice of its contents.¹⁹ U.S. missions abroad were uninformed about the address and could not answer questions about its meaning. Further, the proposal that the declaration be completed in time for President Nixon's planned trip displayed ignorance or disregard for the problems such a schedule would pose for the cumbersome decisionmaking process of the community. Moreover, at a time when Europeans were enjoying a heady self-confidence, Kissinger's condescending reference to Europe's regional interests (contrasted with America's global interests and responsibilities) proved insensitive and irritating. And, at a time of renewed European optimism and commitment to achieve union by 1980, Kissinger seemed to subordinate the goal of European unity to the requirement of Atlantic solidarity: "For us, European unity is what it has always been: not an end in itself but a means to the strengthening of the West. We shall continue to support European unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partnership."²⁰ Though such lan-

¹⁸ Secretary of State Kissinger's press conference, March 28, 1974; in *Department of State Bulletin*, April 22, 1974.

¹⁹ Wilfrid L. Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relations: Patterns of Policy Making," *World Politics*, October 1975, p. 16.

²⁰ Address by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, before Associated Press editors, New York, April 23, 1973; in *Department of State Bulletin*, May 14, 1973.

guage has limited meaning in the abstract, it implied conditional U.S. support for European unity, whose practical significance became clear during the sharp Atlantic exchanges in the aftermath of the October 1973 Middle East war.

Moreover, many Europeans suspected that the administration sought their agreement to the general principle of "linkage" among economic, monetary and security issues, which could then be used by Washington to support demands upon Europe for trade concessions and increased defense expenditures under threat of U.S. force reductions. Since the linkage approach had been frequently asserted by U.S. officials beginning with President Kennedy²¹ (and actually applied in the Jackson-Nunn Amendment), there was reason for European concern as to Washington's intentions. Indeed, Kissinger's April speech strongly implied that the recent European defense-improvement efforts coordinated by Eurogroup, amounting to \$4.2 billion in budget increases for 1972 and 1973, were still insufficient. Noting that alliance defense burdens must be equitably shared, Kissinger pledged: "When this is achieved [emphasis added], the necessary American forces will be maintained in Europe." In addition to suggesting new U.S. demands for European defense-budget increases, Kissinger (with an eye on the Senate) spoke only of maintaining the "necessary" American forces in Europe, thus qualifying previous U.S. assurances which stated or implied that forces would be maintained at current levels.

Finally, Kissinger alluded to problems of alliance defense "in radically different strategic conditions," the full implications of which had yet to be faced. The administration had previously acknowledged the declining credibility of nuclear threats in the context of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity.²² In June 1973, President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev concluded the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War,²³ further clouding the atmosphere for the Atlantic Declaration negotiations. Article 4 of the agreement committed both sides to "urgent consultations with each other" should a risk of

²¹ In a major address to the National Association of Manufacturers, on December 6, 1961, President Kennedy warned: "Unless our balance of trade, and our surplus, is sufficient . . . then we have no remedy but to start pulling back. . . . I don't want the United States pulling troops home because we are unable to meet our problems another way." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* [Washington: GPO, 1962], pp. 1042, 1045.) Also see Secretary of State Rusk's press conference, July 12, 1962; in *Department of State Bulletin*, July 30, 1962.

²² See *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s—The Emerging Structure of Peace*, a report by President Nixon to the Congress, February 9, 1972; in *Department of State Bulletin*, March 13, 1972.

²³ See *The Washington Summit: General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the United States, June 18-25, 1973*, Department of State publication no. 8733, August 1973, p. 30.

nuclear conflict result from their bilateral or third-country relations. Article 4 also stated that the agreement did not affect or impair the obligations of either party toward its allies.

Notwithstanding the formal reassurance that U.S. alliance obligations remained unaffected, the agreement produced serious misgivings in Europe — not least because of the manner of its conclusion. Though it had been a subject of U.S.-Soviet discussion for more than a year, NATO ambassadors were informed of the agreement only six and a half hours before it was signed. Though Chancellor Brandt, President Pompidou and Prime Minister Heath were informed two and a half days earlier, they were pledged to secrecy; thus, there was no opportunity for full consideration by their respective foreign policy and defense establishments. Later, French Foreign Minister Jobert challenged Kissinger to reconcile the requirement for NATO consultation in a nuclear crisis with the U.S. pledge to consult with the Soviet Union in similar circumstances.²⁴ The agreement provoked concern that the availability of U.S. nuclear weapons in a crisis might depend upon the uncertain outcome of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, which might take precedence over alliance consultations. Ironically, Kissinger ignored his own earlier warning and thus contributed to a European separatist mood which his admonition had been intended to prevent: "Bilateral dealings with the Soviets, from which our Allies are excluded or about which they are informed only at the last moment, are bound to magnify Third Force tendencies."²⁵

The European reaction to Kissinger's address crystallized early around French and British resistance to linking trade, monetary and security issues in a single forum and declaration. Moreover, Heath and Pompidou agreed in May 1973 that an Atlantic summit meeting was premature in advance of agreements on the specific issues to be included in any common declaration. There was a general European reluctance to negotiate a set of principles which could bind the future at a time of major intra-European change and when American intentions (in regard to linkage) were widely suspect. The inclination in Europe was to accept the U.S. proposal as the beginning of an extended Atlantic dialogue which could result in summit agreements, depending upon the outcome of substantive negotiations.

The European determination to avoid linkage contributed to a decision by European Community foreign ministers (in July

²⁴ See the account by Robert Kleiman in the *New York Times*, December 11, 1973.

²⁵ Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, p. 26.

1973) to agree among themselves on a proposed declaration on relations with the United States embodying areas of the community's competence and excluding security issues. This decision, about which Kissinger claimed the United States was not consulted, had the immediate effect of subdividing the dialogue into areas of U.S.-European Community relations, on the one hand, and Atlantic security issues, on the other. The proposed declaration, approved by community foreign ministers in September, was highly general in substance. Its chief value lay in its very existence as the first agreement among the Nine on proposed principles of their relations with the United States.²⁶ Kissinger accepted the two-level approach on the assumption that the two declarations would be signed "essentially simultaneously" so as to maintain a common approach in total effect.²⁷ Ironically, then, the short-term result of Kissinger's proposal for a declaration of Atlantic principles was to stimulate increased European cohesion which altered the context of the original initiative. In form, the European response was a model of the Atlantic-partnership expectations of growing political unity and structure in Europe, in accordance with Kissinger's own public positions. But the manner and context of its emergence set the stage for protracted Atlantic acrimony which, for Kissinger, vindicated his earlier reservations about the partnership's evolution.

III

The October 1973 Middle East war disturbed and severely damaged the already strained atmosphere surrounding the dialogue on the Atlantic declarations. Kissinger expressed annoyance at Britain's refusal, during the first week of the war, to sponsor a Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire. Britain had made independent soundings and had determined that Egypt would not accept a cease-fire and that the Soviet Union would veto the measure. Thus, according to one official, Britain decided "not to play the fall guy for the U.S."²⁸ Later, following Prime Minister Heath's demand for a "cover story" in connection with Kissinger's request for use of a base in Britain or Cyprus (from which to conduct aerial reconnaissance of battlefield conditions), Kissinger ordered a

²⁶ For the text of the proposed declaration, see the *New York Times*, September 24, 1973.

²⁷ Secretary of State Kissinger's news conference, January 3, 1974; in *Department of State Bulletin*, January 28, 1974.

²⁸ *New York Times*, October 31, 1973.

ban on U.S. intelligence reports to Britain.²⁹ Kissinger also showed resentment at the British-French refusal to support the United States in its opposition to sending in a joint Soviet-American police force, which had been proposed by Moscow. Kissinger's irritation deepened when the European NATO members balked at Ambassador Rumsfeld's request that they chill their political and trade relations with the Soviet Union as a means of pressure.³⁰ Reportedly, the Europeans felt that East-West relations had not deteriorated to the point that such measures were warranted.

Moreover, a rare public breach with Bonn occurred when the West German Foreign Ministry requested that the United States cease loading military supplies aboard an Israeli freighter in Bremerhaven. Though Bonn had tacitly acquiesced in previous U.S. supply activities from West German territory, press reportage of the loading of an Israeli freighter embarrassed Bonn, spotlighting a seeming compromise of West Germany's avowed neutralist position. Additionally, the United States was piqued at the refusal of nearly all European NATO members to permit landing or overflight rights for American aircraft engaged in resupplying Israel. Only Portugal was singled out as having been fully cooperative with the United States throughout the crisis.

On the other hand, Europeans were disquieted over the United States' calling of a military alert (to forestall possible Soviet intervention) without prior consultation or notification of the NATO allies. Though European leaders did not publicly challenge the action itself, their isolation from a decision which could have impacted upon European security only increased their sense of impotence in the crisis. The European reaction was most sharply expressed by Foreign Minister Jobert, who complained that Europe was "treated like a nonperson, humiliated all along the line" while the United States and the Soviet Union armed their respective allies and then pursued secret negotiations toward a cease-fire.³¹ American spokesmen countered that the need to respond quickly to a possible Soviet military move precluded consultation. In any case, it was argued, the NATO allies should have understood the basis for the American action vis-a-vis Middle East stability and a threat which "would have fundamentally altered the East-West political and

²⁹ Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Middle East Crisis: Implications for the European-American Relationship," a paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 20-September 2, 1974, p. 6.

³⁰ *Washington Post*, October 31, 1973.

³¹ *New York Times*, November 13, 1973.

military balance, with incalculable results.”³² Kissinger ventilated his own frustration over Europe’s crisis behavior in an aside following testimony before a congressional committee: “I don’t care what happens to NATO, I’m so disgusted.”³³

The deeply strained Atlantic dialogue reached a climax in the aftermath of the Washington Energy Conference of February 1974 when the European Community countries announced plans for developing long-term economic, technical and cultural cooperation with the Arab states. Though the plan did not include oil-access provisions, the Nixon administration chose to interpret it as contrary to the spirit of the conference communique, which had pronounced the need for a “substantial increase of international cooperation in all fields” relating to the energy problem. Moreover, the administration felt that the community’s initiative could undermine Kissinger’s delicate negotiations toward an Israeli-Syrian cease-fire agreement. Though West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel had informed Kissinger of the community’s plan before it was announced, this was not regarded as affording adequate opportunity for the registering of American views prior to the decision.

In the American view, the European Community initiative culminated a long series of adverse European actions since October 1973 — nonsupport of U.S.-Israeli resupply efforts, uneven cooperation in shaping UN cease-fire resolutions, the pro-Arab tilt of the community’s position on the Middle East, and the scramble for separate oil and cooperation agreements with Arab states — all of which demonstrated fundamental U.S.-European divergencies in responding to the crisis. In an apparent vindication of European apprehensions about U.S. linkage diplomacy, President Nixon delivered an unusually harsh public assessment following the European proposal to the Arab states:

Now the Europeans cannot have it both ways. They cannot have the United States participation and cooperation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political fronts. . . . it is the time when the Europeans as well as we must sit down and determine that we are either going to go along together on both the security and economic and political fronts or we will go separately. . . . In the event that Congress gets the idea that we are going to be faced with economic confrontation and hostility from the Nine, you will find it almost impossible to get Congressional support for continued American presence

³² Statement by Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, before a joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 19, 1974; in *Department of State Bulletin*, March 18, 1974.

³³ *New York Times*, October 31, 1973.

at present levels on the security front. . . . we are not going to be faced with a situation where the Nine countries of Europe gang up against the United States—the United States which is their guarantee for their security. That we cannot have.³⁴

The immediate effect of the Middle East crisis on European unity was mixed — though, on balance, negative. Manifestations of unity in abstract declarations and spasmodic appeals were often dissipated by countervailing pulls at the national and Atlantic levels. Thus, the community's position statement on the Middle East issued in November contrasted with the spectacle of European Community countries failing to aid the Netherlands when it was subjected to a complete Arab oil embargo for its alleged pro-Israeli attitude. Community members argued that to have aided the Netherlands would have risked a total embargo against the Nine, which the Arabs had threatened and which would have created a far worse situation. The Dutch crisis was mitigated through the rerouting by oil companies of non-Arab shipments to Rotterdam, and by the Dutch threat to cut off supplies of natural gas to its European partners. Nevertheless, the crisis demonstrated the fragility of European unity when critical national interests were held to be at stake.

The crisis spurred completion of the European Community's agreed declaration on the European identity, published in December 1973, following the decision in July to produce such a statement in connection with parallel negotiations with the United States on a joint statement of principles. Though generally an unexceptional document, it reflected European concerns developing out of the recent crisis: "International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with a single voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world."³⁵ The Nine reaffirmed that they "should progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy" and pledged themselves to "increasingly act on the basis of agreed common positions." Yet the declaration's homage to the need for unity and a distinctive European world role contrasted with the acknowledgment that "in present circumstances there is no alternative to the security provided by the nuclear weapons of the United States and by the presence of North American forces in Europe." In light of Europe's military vulnerability, "the

³⁴ President Nixon's nationally televised remarks, Chicago, March 15, 1974; in the *New York Times*, March 16, 1974.

³⁵ *New York Times*, December 15, 1973.

Europeans should, if they wish to preserve their independence hold to their [alliance] commitments." Thus, the reaffirmation that European security would continue to depend upon the alliance and U.S. military power signaled limits to the quest for a distinctive European identity and an enhanced European role in world affairs.

On the level of European defense action, differences in approach quickly became apparent. West Germany, determined to minimize the repercussions of the Middle East crisis on the alliance, preferred to strengthen cooperation within the established Eurogroup-NATO framework. France remained unprepared to join Eurogroup, thereby limiting its potential as a coalescing European entity within NATO. Foreign Minister Jobert's suggestion for intensifying European defense consultations within the Western European Union met with little enthusiasm elsewhere.³⁶ Jobert's specific proposal for utilizing the WEU's Standing Armaments Committee "as a privileged framework for European cooperation in arms manufacture" must be viewed as a challenge to Eurogroup's activities in this field and a manifestation of French concern for its position in the European arms industry.

The February 1974 Washington Energy Conference again tested the strength of European unity, and again the overall result was mixed. In his December 1973 speech to the Pilgrims Society in London, Kissinger had proposed the creation of an energy action group (including the countries of Europe, North America and Japan) "with a mandate to develop within three months an initial action program for collaboration in all areas of the energy problem."³⁷ Yet in an apparent rebuff to the Kissinger proposal a week before the conference, the European Community foreign ministers adopted a position stating that "the Washington conference cannot, above all in its present composition, be transformed into a permanent organization and . . . it should not serve to institutionalize a new framework of international cooperation reserved for the most industrialized countries."³⁸ The European Community should "reserve its total freedom" to decide the form of its energy policy and its relations with producer countries.

The statement bore the strong imprint of the French view that oil-producing countries should be involved at the outset to avoid polarization between producing and consuming countries

³⁶ Address before the Assembly of the Western European Union, November 21, 1973. (French Embassy, Press and Information Service, 73/245/H.)

³⁷ *New York Times*, December 13, 1973.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, February 6, 1974.

which might further jeopardize European oil supplies. Moreover, Jobert professed to see American hegemonic designs behind an organization of industrialized countries in which American economic strength and greater energy self-sufficiency would necessarily make its influence preponderant. He proposed little more than a "flexible exchange of information [as] the best solution to our current problems" within the OECD. Payments problems arising from oil-price increases should be dealt with, he said, through the IMF; and a world consensus should be sought on relations between energy importing and exporting countries through a UN-sponsored conference.³⁹ The French position lacked any sense of urgency about the need for international energy cooperation. In particular, it was opposed to any collective action which could serve as a restraint on the establishment of bilateral oil and cooperation arrangements with oil-producing states (which France had already begun to develop). Thus, French opposition to the U.S. proposals was matched by resistance to meaningful cooperation at the European Community level which also might tie French hands.

Nevertheless, the facade of European unity crumbled quickly at the Washington conference when community members, with France alone dissenting, agreed to the establishment of an energy coordinating group, substantially along the lines of the Kissinger proposal. The rigid and blatantly self-serving French position, rejecting virtually any form of cooperation as proposed by Washington, contributed to the breakdown of the community's fragile front, the isolation of France, and the alignment of the conference with the American position. The U.S. proposal to share its own oil supplies in the event of emergency or prolonged shortages contrasted sharply with France's go-it-alone approach and helped build support for the American position. Moreover, the increased global importance of the American economy, less afflicted by the oil crisis than were the European and Japanese economies, provided added incentive for cooperating with Washington. Finally, the security issue was an underlying reminder of Washington's trump card in any negotiation on interdependence with its allies. President Nixon pointedly told the conference that "security and economic considerations are inevitably linked and energy cannot be separated from either."⁴⁰ Though the European Community's open division in Washington was partly healed by the subsequent agreement on

³⁹ Statement by Foreign Minister Jobert, February 11, 1974. (French Embassy, Press and Information Service, 74/24.)

⁴⁰ *New York Times*, February 15, 1974.

the plan for cooperation with Arab states, even this was to be made contingent on the improvement of consultations with the United States.

IV

The effect of the Middle East crisis on the negotiation of the two Atlantic declarations was dramatic, if slow to unfold. In the aftermath of the U.S. military alert and American criticism of European behavior during the crisis, European NATO members chose to suspend temporarily work on the Atlantic security declaration. However, the consequences for the proposed U.S.-European Community declaration of principles were ultimately more profound. The Atlantic discord generated by the crisis increased the French-led European resistance to inclusion of any reference to partnership, interdependence or the Atlantic Alliance in the declaration, as proposed by the United States.⁴¹ The European draft stressed the separateness of the European entity and confined its substance to areas of European Community competence. Potentially entangling Atlanticist references, with their implications of linkage among security, trade and monetary issues, were avoided.

By December 1973 the cumulative effects of Atlantic declaration diplomacy, the Middle East crisis, and Europe's persistent, if impotent, assertiveness had produced a marked change in the Nixon administration's attitude toward European unity. In his address to the Pilgrims Society in London, Kissinger warned: "Europe's unity must not be at the expense of Atlantic community. . . . I would be less than frank were I to conceal our uneasiness about some of the recent practices of the European community in the political field. To present the decisions of a unifying Europe to us as *faits accomplis* not subject to effective discussion is alien to the tradition of U.S.-European relations." Explaining the United States' occasional failure to consult adequately as "a deviation from official policy and established practice—usually under pressure of necessity," Kissinger observed: "The attitude of the unifying Europe, by contrast, seems to attempt to elevate refusal to consult into a principle defining European identity. To judge from recent experience, consultation with us before a decision is precluded, and consultation after the fact has been drained of content." Kissinger argued that "as an old ally the United States

⁴¹ For the text of the European Community's proposal for the joint declaration, together with proposed U.S. emendations, see the *New York Times*, November 9, 1973.

should be given an opportunity to express its concerns before final decisions affecting its interests are taken." Then he warned that the United States "cannot be indifferent to the tendency to justify European identity as facilitating separateness from the United States."⁴²

Whereas Kissinger's Pilgrims speech reaffirmed U.S. support for European unity "in all its dimensions, political as well as economic," it was also made clear that such a Europe "must strengthen trans-Atlantic ties." Thus, not just any unified Europe would do — but one that would (a) remain accessible to American influence prior to the taking of decisions, (b) acknowledge a debt for U.S. military protection in its security, trade and monetary policies, (c) accept American leadership in the management of East-West crises, and (d) commit the cause of European unity to the higher loyalty of Atlantic solidarity. Kissinger appeared astonishingly blind to the contradiction of supporting European unity and independence so long as such independence was exercised in harmony with U.S. interests. Following U.S. complaints over the European proposal for cooperation with Arab states, Kissinger said at a meeting of congressmen's wives: "The United States has no objection whatever to an independent European policy. It does have an objection when independence takes the form of basic hostility to the United States. It does have an objection when, in a crisis which can only be dealt with cooperatively, the Europeans deliberately adopt a competitive posture."⁴³

By March 1974, the administration had ceased to press for completion of the declaration on relations with the European Community. Officials let it be known that they believed Europe was drifting toward Gaullism and that the domestic weakness of most European governments prevented them from effectively opposing French policies. Whereas the administration would be prepared to support "the right kind of united Western Europe," a White House official explained that "we made a pragmatic judgment that this was not achievable as a practical matter."⁴⁴

After Washington's complaints about the European Community's initiative toward the Arab states, and in view of apparent American indifference over the conclusion of the Atlantic declarations, Bonn sought to repair the damage. Addressing a key complaint voiced in Kissinger's Pilgrims speech, West Germany proposed that

⁴² *New York Times*, December 13, 1973.

⁴³ *Washington Post*, March 12, 1974.

⁴⁴ Quoted by Leslie Gelb in the *New York Times*, April 9, 1974.

the community's Political Committee consult with U.S. officials on all proposals affecting American interests, prior to the adoption of recommendations to be considered by the Council of Ministers. While Kissinger gave Bonn a green light to explore the plan with other community governments, France predictably opposed the idea on grounds that it would facilitate U.S. interference in the community's decisionmaking process and perpetuate American dominance over Europe.

The newly elected Labour government in Britain, however, more inclined to conciliate the United States than Prime Minister Heath had been, insisted that its approval for implementing the community's plan for cooperation with the Arab States would be contingent upon the establishment of adequate consultation provisions with the United States. Defining the approach of the new government, Foreign Minister James Callaghan echoed many of Kissinger's criticisms when he told the House of Commons: "We repudiate the view that Europe will emerge only out of a process of struggle with the United States."⁴⁵ Professing to be "very much concerned" about "the political direction the Community is taking," Callaghan pledged that Britain would resist political consultations within the European Community that take on "an anti-American tinge." Faced with a British veto of the French-inspired plan, Foreign Minister Jobert indicated France's acceptance of a modified form of the West German proposal for community consultation with the United States. As approved by European Community foreign ministers in June 1974, the agreement provided that any member government could request consultation with the United States at any stage of the community's decisionmaking process. Holding such consultations would require unanimous consent of the member governments, though reportedly a gentlemen's agreement was reached to treat requests for consultation with a "maximum of good will."⁴⁶ Moreover, any member government would be free to take up questions bilaterally with the United States or with other countries.

The negotiations for a statement of Atlantic security principles had encountered less difficulty from the start, and a declaration on Atlantic relations was concluded by NATO foreign ministers meeting in Ottawa during June.⁴⁷ Drawing heavily from a French draft submitted in November 1973, the declaration was unexcep-

⁴⁵ *Washington Post*, March 20, 1974.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, June 11, 1974.

⁴⁷ For the text of the declaration, see the *New York Times*, June 20, 1974.

tional in that it reaffirmed familiar alliance verities at a level of abstraction which committed the signatories to little beyond good intentions. Nevertheless, to an unprecedented degree the declaration reflected a distinctive European presence as a component of the alliance. Thus, whereas an indivisible common defense was reaffirmed, it was recognized that the near equilibrium of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship had caused European defense problems to assume "a different and more distinct character." For the first time in a joint alliance statement, the French and British nuclear forces were alluded to as "capable of playing a deterrent role of their own contributing to the over-all strengthening of the deterrence of the alliance." The United States furnished reassurance that its relations with the Soviet Union would not be at the expense of Europe, reaffirming "its determination not to accept any situation which would expose its allies to external political or military pressure likely to deprive them of their freedom." Nevertheless, the alliance members stated that "a major aim of their policies is to seek agreements that will reduce the risk of war [though] such agreements will not limit their freedom to use all forces at their disposal for the common defense in case of attack."

V

The 1973 Middle East crisis resulted in divergent U.S. and West European assessments of its significance and implications for their own interests. The Nixon administration viewed the conflict not only in Middle East regional terms but also as a major East-West crisis, which risked an abrupt increase of Soviet influence among the Arab states that "would have fundamentally altered the East-West political and military balance, with incalculable results."⁴⁸ European leaders, on the other hand, generally did not fully share this view, particularly since the alleged threat of Soviet military intervention had eased by the time they were informed as to why the United States had found it necessary to alert its forces. Different U.S. and European perceptions of the nature of the crisis were compounded by widely differing U.S. and West European dependencies on Middle East oil. The Europeans were naturally inclined toward policies least likely to offend the Arab states and toward a posture resentful of unilateral American measures in support of Israel which might alienate the Arabs and implicate Europe.

⁴⁸ Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hartman. (See fn. 32, above.)

Divergencies on such substantive issues led to recriminations on the procedural level. The United States, arguing that the rush of events precluded consultations before calling the alert, also appeared to have assumed that the Europeans would concur with the American version of the crisis and accept U.S. leadership in crisis management. When this did not occur, invectives were rapidly traded — against the United States for not consulting, for acting unilaterally, and for failing to take into account European interests; against Europe for obstructing U.S. efforts to support Israel and for not consulting prior to undertaking its own Middle East initiatives.

The bickering over lack of consultation was also symptomatic of different perceptions of the respective U.S. and European roles and interests in the Middle East. Kissinger had already piqued European sensitivities in his Atlantic charter speech when he referred condescendingly to the global interests and responsibilities of the United States, compared with Western Europe's regional interests, the implication being that on issues outside of Europe the West Europeans should follow the American lead. During the Middle East crisis, Kissinger reportedly expressed the view that the behavior of the West European countries had vindicated his earlier assessment. Moreover, Kissinger learned that consultation itself provided no assurance that underlying differences could be overcome. Noting that there was no automatic relationship between consultation and agreement, Kissinger observed: "It is a root fact of the situation that the countries that were most consulted proved among the most difficult in their cooperation and those countries that were most cooperative were least consulted."⁴⁹

The American assumption that Western Europe would fall in line with U.S. policy in the Middle East came at an untimely moment in view of Western Europe's own recent stirrings toward political cohesion. The European Community had been buoyed by completion of the membership-enlargement negotiations and the conclusion of free-trade-area agreements linking the remaining members of EFTA to the expanded community of the Nine. The community was in the process of consolidating and extending its procedures for political consultation, and at the 1972 Paris summit meeting the Nine "affirmed their intention to transform the whole complex of their relations into a European union by the end of this decade." Responding to U.S. Atlantic initiatives in 1973, moreover, the Nine became obsessed with defining their own identity as a

⁴⁹ Secretary of State Kissinger's news conference, November 21, 1973; in *Department of State Bulletin*, December 10, 1973.

distinct economic and political entity. The seeming revival of the community's momentum had not yet been dashed by the oil embargo, prolonged recession and monetary disruptions which were to paralyze the *relance* of the early 1970s. In such a setting of optimism and confidence, Europe was in no mood to be leaned on and taken for granted by U.S. attitudes and behavior which many felt had not adjusted to the European Community's new consciousness and strivings toward unity.

Ironically, 1973-1974 witnessed dismaying European impotence and disarray, yet never before had Washington been so annoyed at Europe's attempted displays of unity. The deterioration in Atlantic relations forced a moment of truth as to the compatibility of U.S. notions of Atlantic partnership with the direction of West European unity as perceived by the Nixon administration. The harder the United States pushed its ideas of partnership and their incorporation in statements of Atlantic principles, the harder Western Europe pushed back with expressions of its own identity and independently developed positions. And in cases where the community proved able to forge a common position, thereby fulfilling a long-standing *abstract* goal of U.S. policy, its efforts met with mounting U.S. suspicion and President Nixon's charge that Western Europe was seeking to "gang up" against the United States.

The European Community agreement on consultations with the United States and the conclusion of the declaration on Atlantic relations were facilitated by leadership changes in Britain and France during the first half of 1974. A new Labour government in Britain declined to support France in its policy of confrontation with the United States and predicated its support of the Euro-Arab initiative on the improvement of Atlantic consultations. The death of President Pompidou in April, the narrow Gaullist victory in the spring elections, the departure of Jobert from the Foreign Ministry, and the more pragmatic leadership style of Giscard d'Estaing led to a new flexibility in French diplomacy on Atlantic relations. Nevertheless, both agreements bore strong marks of a salvage operation to rescue some measure of consensus from months of Atlantic discord. Neither marked a significant *démarche* in U.S.-European relations.

Moreover, the community's growth optimism, typified by the 1972 Paris summit communique, proved unable to withstand the economic and monetary shocks brought on by the oil crisis and the upheaval in Atlantic relations. The community's embryonic monetary snake was an early casualty as the French and Italian

economies, in the face of pressures on their reserves from higher import costs, proved incapable of sustaining their currency parities. Wide disparities in the effects of inflation, recession and unemployment among member countries militated against community-level measures and tilted governments toward national solutions. The global scope of the energy problem argued for approaches transcending the membership and competence of the European Community. With evident relief, Kissinger remarked: "The period in which Europe was attempting to define itself is at least temporarily over. We are now closer to the Atlantic partnership that we envisaged with the year of Europe in 1973."⁵⁰

Other factors have not augured well for increased political unity in Western Europe. As the European Community's internal momentum dissipated after 1972, major domestic changes in Europe's southern tier resulted in a second phase of enlargement diplomacy intended to stabilize and anchor the newly established democratic systems in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Yet, as suggested by the community's first enlargement experience, it will be difficult to reconcile the horizontal broadening of membership with the achievement of deeper vertical integration.

Moreover, the West European position in the wider setting of East-West relations poses other issues which operate to retard unity. Whereas the earlier concern over possible U.S. troop withdrawals produced wary calls for a more concerted European approach to defense problems, there is now little talk of this and the acceptance of European security dependence on the alliance has been reinforced. In a reversal of the French emphasis on the need for West European defense unity, in 1973, Giscard d'Estaing has repudiated such efforts as (a) premature in the absence of political unity and (b) provocative to the Soviet Union and thus damaging to detente.⁵¹ Furthermore, prolonged uncertainties over the outcome and implications of the SALT and MFR negotiations militate against structural change in the alliance. West Germany's potential role as a catalyst for unity is tempered by its own distaste for such a role, for historical reasons, and by wariness among the Nine as to the implications of the Federal Republic's economic preponderance in the community. Moreover, West Germany's role in the West is partly mortgaged to its interests in the East, where Bonn remains

⁵⁰ Department of State summary of Secretary Kissinger's remarks at a meeting of U.S. ambassadors in London, December 1975; in the *New York Times*, April 7, 1976.

⁵¹ Press conference by President Giscard d'Estaing, May 21, 1975. (French Embassy, Press and Information Service, 75/78.)

essentially a supplicant. West German aims in the East — including normalization with East Germany, safeguarding the position of West Berlin, and facilitating emigration of ethnic Germans to the Federal Republic — render it vulnerable to pressure should it be inclined to assume a more vigorous role in the promotion of West European unity.

VI

The traditional U.S. policy of support for West European unity within an Atlantic partnership was developed at a time when Western Europe remained politically divided, essentially impotent and (France excepted) generally accepting of American leadership. Under the Nixon administration, U.S. attitudes changed when the European Community began to behave in a more cohesive and autonomous manner and became more resistant to the American lead. In light of the seeming emergence of a Gaullist Europe, further efforts to consolidate a "partnership" Europe seemed pointless and likely only to exacerbate tensions.

The Nixon administration's handling of Atlantic relations suggests that U.S. support for West European unity was regarded as a necessary part of the political foundation of Atlantic ties, but not to be taken too seriously. As in the early-1950s debate over West German rearmament and the proposed European Defense Community, Europe in 1973 was faced with external pressures which strained its fragile unity. In the latter period, however, there was an established context of Atlantic trade rivalry and a real movement toward the development of a distinctive European political personality, and these posed challenges to the Nixon administration's concept of partnership. This concept, as former Ambassador Schaetzel observed, assumed "a docile, client-Europe whose proxy would be in the hands of American officials as they went about their negotiations, whether with the Russians or the Arabs."⁵² As West European unity progressed from the abstract to the concrete, it forced to the surface the hitherto mostly latent contradictions of the American concept of partnership. Kissinger's Atlantic charter initiative and the oil crisis were external stimuli which both accelerated and confused the European unity momentum that had been slowly under way. Despite Europe's spasmodic and labored assertiveness, the effects of the crisis dealt a setback to European unity, while

⁵² Schaetzel, p. 78.

Atlantic political relations remained fundamentally unchanged. However, the United States was put on notice that in cases where the European Community proved able to muster a common position, its alignment with the American point of view could no longer be taken for granted.

The foregoing discussion suggests that the Atlantic crisis was as much a product of conflicting approach, style, timing and situational political constellations as it was the result of differences over issues of substance. The substantive areas of difference in themselves did not compel the escalating pyrotechnics that resulted. Yet the sheer simultaneity of the Atlanticist and European political initiatives was bound to generate debate over the compatibility of the two visions. The Middle East conflict and the oil crisis furnished a highly charged arena conducive to the amplification of what had been only moderately energized differences. The Nixon administration was the first to confront a Europe attempting to speak with a single political voice — and thus a Europe in a position to vindicate or challenge traditional American assumptions about Atlantic partnership. The administration's emphasis upon U.S.-Soviet ties, its secretive diplomatic style, its lapses in alliance consultation at key points, and its tendency to take European concurrence for granted all encouraged responses that aggravated the latent rivalry between the Atlantic and European ideas. In effect, the Nixon administration unwittingly helped to create, if only briefly, the very kind of Europe that was antithetical to its own notions of partnership.

SOCIETAL VALUES, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE WESTERN DILEMMA*

by Alan Ned Sabrosky

Contemporary civil-military relations are confronted by a fundamental problem: military institutions must reconcile the value preferences of their societies with the imperatives of modern war. It is generally recognized, of course, that a society's values are reflected to some degree in its military institutions, as well as in the way that institution views, and is viewed by, the larger civil society. Certainly, no military institution may stray too far from the values of the society it serves without losing its legitimacy and, eventually, its effectiveness.¹ The French and American experiences in the First and Second Indochina Wars, respectively, underscore this point.

On the other hand, military institutions sometimes come so close to the values of their societies that they are unable to carry out their essential military missions. The dictates of the battlefield, after all, are independent of the preferences of civil societies, although the latter — by shaping their military institutions — can influence the prospects for battlefield success. If the divergence between the imperatives of war and the value preferences of civil society become too great, the military becomes as ill-suited to deal with the demands placed on it as were the professional armies of Europe when confronted with the *levée en masse* of the French Revolution.

This is the problem which now appears to confront the military institutions of the West, in general, and the United States in particular. Few would deny that major changes in the value systems of the Western advanced-industrial societies have been under

* This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Third Colloquium on Western Military Institutions, held at Sorèze, France, in July 1977. An edited translation is being published concurrently in *Nation Armée*, no. 8, April 1978.

¹ See, for example, Robert G. Gard, Jr., "The Future of the Military Profession," in *Force in Modern Societies: The Military Profession* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 103, 1973), p. 4; and Richard F. Rosser, "A 20th Century Military Force," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1973, p. 199.

Alan Ned Sabrosky is Assistant Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America and a Research Associate at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His *Defense Manpower Policy: A Critical Reappraisal* is forthcoming (FPRI Monograph no. 22).

way for some time. Many of these changes are commonly associated with the quest for greater "human dignity," perhaps best defined as the enhancement of the political and personal well-being of individual citizens. At the same time, considerable attention has been given to the presumed need for Western military institutions not only to reflect and defend the value systems appearing in the West, but also to conform to them. It has become commonplace to speak of the changes taking place in Western military institutions as they attempt — even though it may entail a significant departure from traditional military values — to adjust to changes in their respective societies.

One hears much less discussion, however, of the possible consequences of such a departure for the functional effectiveness and political responsiveness of Western military institutions. Yet it is this point which must be addressed. A military institution can only be judged according to the congruence between (a) its institutional values and (b) its ability to carry out required missions in defense of its nation's foreign and domestic interests. It is therefore necessary to examine how this linkage will be affected by the adjustment of Western military institutions to the value systems now emerging in the West. Only by doing so can one comprehend the nature of the dilemma now confronting those institutions.

II

Two principal developments in the values of Western advanced-industrial societies have been reflected, in varying degree, in their military institutions:

First, the pursuit of "human dignity," as it is generally understood in Western democracies, has often produced a corresponding interest in improving the well-being of military personnel. The military unionism movement in several West European countries, as well as in the United States, is but one manifestation of this interest.² Coupled with the widespread appearance in Western societies of what Jacques Van Doorn has described as "individualism, subjectivism and hedonism,"³ the belief has arisen that it is

² Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., *Blue-Collar Soldiers? Unionization and the U.S. Military* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1977), esp. chaps. 2, 6 and 8; and Ezra S. Krendel and Bernard L. Samoff, eds., *Unionizing the Armed Forces* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), esp. chaps. 1, 8 and 9.

³ Van Doorn, "The Decline of the Mass Army in the West," *Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 1975, p. 151. Also see Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies," in Janowitz, ed., *Military Conflict* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 85.

either politically expedient or socially desirable to make the human burden (if not the financial one!) of military service as light as possible. The general (but not exclusive) reliance in the West on armed forces composed either entirely of short-term volunteers or largely of conscripts is indicative of this belief. The belief is also reflected in the general attention given to reducing peace-time stress on the individual soldier in all but elite units.

Second, questions about the legitimacy of military force as an instrument of policy, disdain for the art of war, and doubts about the possibility of victory in the modern world seem to be enhancing the appeal of one form or another of the "constabulary" model. The concept of the constabulary force is complex, but one may safely say that it (a) emphasizes a pragmatic approach to international relations; (b) defines its goal more as peace-keeping than war-fighting; (c) assumes that, in the modern world, only limited wars for limited political objectives can be waged if deterrence fails; and (d) gives precedence to the managerial style of military leadership over the traditional "heroic" model.⁴ A constabulary force, then, is inclined toward the maintenance of the status quo in world politics, compatible with the managerialism prevalent in other sectors of advanced industrial societies, amenable to a welfare-oriented approach to military service, and often rather disdainful of traditional appeals to military honor.

What effect will these developments have on the functional effectiveness of military institutions in the West? Ironically enough, perhaps none at all in the long term. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the abundance of inexpensive resources on which the Western advanced-industrial societies are based simply may not be accessible in the future. If the age of abundance which has been the cornerstone of those societies should give way to an age of scarcity, they could well evolve into less democratic societies in which the pursuit of "human dignity" has given way to emphasis on greater social discipline.⁵ This evolution would clearly have a significant effect on how those societies would view their military institutions, as well as on what those societies would expect of their armed forces. At the very least, such a development would entail a reversal of the liberalizing trends now apparent in the armed forces of most Western countries.

⁴ See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 272-277, 418ff; and Georges Vilalta, *Les Casques Bleus* (Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, 1977), pp. 67-69.

⁵ See my "Human Dignity in the Post-Industrial Military: A Critical Appraisal," presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, Missouri.

Moreover, even in the short term, it must be acknowledged that all Western military institutions have not been affected in precisely the same way, or to the same degree, by the developments discussed above. There are a number of similarities in their general situations, of course, but there exist important differences, as well. The military unionism movement, for example, has progressed far more in certain West European countries than it has in the United States. On the other hand, the "managerialism" characteristically associated with the constabulary force is probably more widespread in the U.S. armed forces than in the military institutions of other Western countries, although the latter may well have to come to terms with the phenomenon in the future.

Whatever changes occur in Western societies, it is important to understand that Western military institutions are likely to be compelled to act in an increasingly demanding political-military environment. The essential strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union has changed significantly over the past decade, and this has raised concern in many quarters about the future stability of global and regional balances of power. In addition, the 1973 Middle East war made it quite clear that a general war on the Continent (or elsewhere, for that matter) would be a high-intensity conflict probably entailing numerous casualties and great destruction within a short time. If such a war occurs, no military institution will have the luxury of adjusting gradually to the rigors of war. Furthermore, in the aftermath of major defeats in Indochina, Algeria and Vietnam, limited wars are more likely to occur and more difficult for the West to contemplate waging. Finally, internal-security and counterterrorist missions are distinctly likely to become characteristic features of Western military institutions in the years ahead. All of these missions would be socially divisive: their moral legitimacy would often be uncertain, and it would be difficult either to measure or to attain success.

Meeting the demands of general war, limited war and internal security, as discussed above, will require extremely cohesive military institutions composed of highly trained and disciplined personnel. Unfortunately, it is equally true that the value systems which seem to be developing in the West are in many ways incompatible with the requirements for fielding a military organization capable of meeting those demands. To be sure, military institutions which mirror those value systems certainly will be compatible with the needs of peace-time service. They might well retain the ability to deter nuclear war, or threaten nuclear destruction if deterrence

fails. They will probably be appropriate for countries which do not expect to ever have to fight, or which can depend on fighting alongside a stronger nation. They might even be suitable for waging a war of national liberation, a resistance against a foreign invader, or a crusade drawing on the active support of the entire populace. But such institutions are not suitable for waging the types of conflicts that the West, in general, and the United States in particular may have to confront. Moreover, the continued adjustment of Western military institutions to value systems emerging in the Western advanced-industrial societies can only result in the continued erosion of those institutions' ability to meet the demands likely to be placed on them.

III

Military institutions in the West thus face a classic dilemma: a balance must be struck between what Western advanced-industrial societies might prefer their military institutions to become, and what those institutions must be in order to win the wars they will likely have to fight.⁶ To become too much like those societies risks defeat; to become too unlike them risks rejection.

No matter how much effort might be required, this dilemma must be resolved as soon as possible. Those charged with the direction of Western military institutions cannot ignore the existence of that dilemma in the hope that matters will improve or that they will not have to fight. The challenges and constraints with which those institutions must come to terms exist in the present, and they must be dealt with accordingly. To meet those challenges will not be an easy task. Nor will each country face the same challenges, act under the same constraints, or have to make the same choices. Still, some recommendations, bearing on the general situation in which all Western advanced-industrial societies find themselves, can be given.

(1) The value systems of Western military institutions simply cannot become more like the value systems which seem to be emerging in their respective societies. To do so, as some have suggested,⁷ risks undermining those institutions' ability to perform their essential missions. This is particularly true with respect to the conduct of extensive internal-security or counterterrorist opera-

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 2.

⁷ See for example, Rosser.

tions,⁸ but it applies to other kinds of warfare, as well. As John Keegan recently observed, both the stress of modern warfare and the socialization processes of Western society "[have made] the ability of modern man to sustain the stress of battle increasingly doubtful."⁹ The ability of Western man to endure battle is not enhanced, however, by requiring military institutions to reduce the demands placed on their personnel in peacetime. Yet this is precisely what must follow a continued liberalization of Western military institutions. If the risk of military failure is to be minimized, that process must be avoided.

(2) Under no circumstances must Western military institutions allow themselves to be judged according to their ability to perform social-welfare functions, nor should they adopt a welfare-oriented approach to the management of their personnel. In some instances, such an approach has resulted in justifiable elimination or reform of questionable practices within the armed forces. In other cases, however, it has resulted in "civilianization," which in turn has led to a relaxation of the traditional standards of training and discipline. An emphasis on individual well-being, rather than on institutional cohesion, can only be counterproductive.¹⁰ No adversary that the West might have to face will care about the progressiveness of our defense manpower policy, the extent to which first-term soldiers acquire civilian-related job skills, or the socio-economic representativeness of our military. The only consideration will be how well the West can fight. We cannot afford to ignore the fact that, as Alfred Vagts put it in his classic *History of Militarism*, "the acid test of an army is war. . . . The rest is advertisement."¹¹ Concern for individual welfare, at the expense of rigorous training and discipline, will not produce the cohesive and responsive military institutions needed by the West to meet the ever-greater demands likely to be placed on it.¹²

⁸ Katharine Chorley, *Armies and the Art of Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973; reprint of 1943 ed.), p. 136.

⁹ Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), pp. 325ff.

¹⁰ As the late Associate Justice Hugo Black, a liberal member of the Supreme Court, put it: "In the military, by necessity, emphasis must be placed on the security and order of the group rather than on the value and integrity of the individual." (*Reid v. Covert*, 354 U.S. 1 [1957].)

¹¹ Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, revised ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 16.

¹² The tragic irony here is that those who advocate "progressive" manpower policies are indirectly responsible for increases in the "butcher's bill" paid by the armed forces in wartime and, moreover, that those who pay the bill come largely from the ranks of the working class and the poor — those whom the progressive policies were intended to help in the first place. See Lt. Col. David S. Rilling, "Who Killed PFC Mort?," *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 1975, pp. 41-42.

(3) Western military institutions must reject the constabulary model in any form. With few exceptions, a constabulary is intended primarily to deter, secondarily to defend, and virtually never to take the offensive. Yet, this defensive mentality concedes the strategic initiative to the opponent and, with it, the prospects for success. What is most significant about the constabulary, however, is not what such a force is supposed to accomplish or when it is to do so; rather, it is how that force is led. The military managers of a constabulary may suit the preferences of the civilian managerial class, but, in practice, they will perform poorly against an opponent committed to the use of maximum force to achieve victory. Military managers, moreover, have proved to be singularly ill-equipped to lead fighting armies — even to the limited goals posited in limited war.¹³ In all cases, men simply do not fight and die well under the banner of cost effectiveness, however much that concept may have appealed to Robert McNamara and his intellectual successors. Military institutions which have at their foundation managerial officers and welfare-oriented soldiers cannot be reliable instruments of policy or successful guarantors of Western security.

(4) Western military institutions should rely on long-term volunteers, rather than on short-term volunteers or conscripts. It may be that, as Morris Janowitz has argued, “there is no basis for arguing the moral superiority of [an all-volunteer] manpower system,”¹⁴ though some would disagree with his contention.¹⁵ True, conscription and “national service” do perform a legitimate social and political function in a number of Western nations, but the key issue is neither moral nor social nor political: it is military. And all things being equal, disciplined, long-term volunteers do tend to make more willing and more efficient soldiers than do conscripts.¹⁶ This is particularly apparent when one contemplates the challenges that Western military institutions will be facing in the coming years. After all, one can always hire or conscript soldiers to perform some missions for a short period of time. But one cannot hire or conscript

¹³ Paul L. Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1976, pp. 340-376. Also see Anthony L. Wermuth, “A Critique of Savage and Gabriel,” *ibid.*, Spring 1977, pp. 481-490.

¹⁴ Janowitz, “U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft,” in Janowitz, ed., *Military Conflict*, p. 282.

¹⁵ It has been argued that in the Anglo-American juridical tradition, conscription is a form of indentured servitude to which a democracy should resort only under the most extreme circumstances.

¹⁶ See Jerald G. Bachman and John D. Blair, “‘Citizen Force’ or ‘Career Force’? Implications for Ideology in the All-Volunteer Army,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Fall 1975, p. 91; and M. Meron, *Conventional Warfare in Europe — Imagination or Reality?* (London: Royal College of Defence Studies, Seaford House Papers, 1976), p. 30.

the kind of soldier needed to wage the politically divisive and militarily frustrating wars which the West is likely to face in the future. To be sure, reliance on long-term volunteers necessarily means accepting lower manpower levels than might be procured with another system (such as conscription). Yet it may well be that the value systems emerging in the industrial societies of the West are not compatible with the maintenance of large standing armies, regardless of the recruiting system employed.¹⁷ In any case, it is better to have a smaller force whose reliability and competence are assured than a larger force whose reliability and competence are uncertain.

IV

The internal and external demands being placed on Western military institutions are indeed great. Ideally, those institutions perhaps ought to approximate a modern variant of what Stanislaw Andreski has called a "restricted professional" force.¹⁸ Such a force would include a rather small number of personnel with a high degree of organizational cohesion; training and discipline would be rigorous. Unlike the constabulary force, which is inappropriate for wars in which one's adversary rejects the notion of compromise, such a force would define its mission in terms of victory rather than as maintenance of the status quo. Localized wars would still be possible; only such wars can seriously be contemplated in the nuclear era. But the West should reject any doctrine or institutional model which concedes to an adversary the right, should conflict occur, to use its armed forces in pursuit of military victory. The rejection of nuclear war as an instrument of policy need not entail acquiescing in stalemate or defeat in other kinds of war.

It is by no means certain that Western military institutions will be able to transform themselves into such a force — whatever the objective merits might be. Nor is it certain they will prove equal to the demands being made of them, where what is acceptable to Western societies might differ so much from what is needed to wage war successfully. One thing, however, is certain. Forced to choose between high-risk alternatives, Western military institutions would

¹⁷ M. D. Feld, "Military Professionalism and the Mass Army," *Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 1975, esp. pp. 210-212; Van Doorn, "The Decline of the Mass Army . . ."; and Michel L. Martin, "Conscription and the Decline of the Mass Army in France, 1960-1975," *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1977, esp. pp. 355-356.

¹⁸ Andreski, *Military Organization and Society*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 122, 141-142, 224.

be well advised to risk societal rejection rather than battlefield defeat. A defeated army is likely to be rejected by its society in any case; whereas an authoritarian, spartan military establishment will be applauded *if it wins*, regardless of the divergence between its value system and that of society at large. What must be understood clearly, however, is that accepting the recommendations described above does not entail a rejection by Western military institutions of the fundamental values held by the societies they serve. It would simply reflect an acknowledgment that the traditional military virtues of Duty, Honor, Country¹⁹ are most likely to produce military institutions capable of safeguarding the essential democratic processes of Western societies.

The value systems of the Western advanced-industrial societies are changing, and that process cannot be totally ignored by the West's military institutions. Yet, at the same time, those institutions must give greater attention to reinforcing the traditional modes of leadership, discipline and training essential to the maintenance of a professional military establishment. No alternative approach can provide Western military institutions with the ability to deal successfully with those conflict situations which are likely to arise — and whose outcomes will determine in large measure the future of the Western societies themselves.

¹⁹ These are not militaristic (in the sense of "warlike") values. In fact, classical military values such as these are antithetical to the values of militaristic institutions. (Vagts, pp. 13-17.)

CONCILIATION AND CONFRONTATION: A STRATEGY FOR NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS*

by Simon Serfaty

Within the Atlantic Alliance, unity of views between the United States and Western Europe cannot be taken for granted because convergence of interests cannot always prevail. What is in a sense true of physical security is true of economic security as well: the security of the Atlantic area is divisible, and the balance of interests between the two sides of the Atlantic remains a delicate balance to achieve. Western Europe is very dependent on raw materials from the developing countries (as well as from industrialized countries) and is heavily involved (relative to the national product) in international trade. Consequently, Western Europe, more than the United States, would appear to be dangerously vulnerable to economic pressures applied from selected developing countries.

Western Europe's trade dependence is well known: in 1973, exports amounted to 22.09% of the GDP of the Nine, as compared with 5.5% and 9.1% for the United States and Japan respectively. Following the substantial nominal growth of world trade in 1974, the United States accounted for only 12% of world trade against the EEC's 34%. In addition, during the 1973-1975 period, there has been a reorientation of Western European trade away from its former Western partners and toward the newly discovered "Southern" states. Thus, the OPEC countries have replaced the United States as the EEC's major trading partner, taking 16.7% of EEC exports and providing 26.3% of EEC imports (vs. 11.5% and 16% for the United States in 1976).¹

For countries so dependent on exports, recessionary impulses abroad mean a fall of demand at home unless the decline of external demand can be compensated from within through the

* The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Mark Sobel for invaluable research assistance.

¹ "The EEC-Third World Trade Picture," *The Courier* (Brussels), no. 45, September-October 1977.

Simon Serfaty is Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

classic instrument of deficit-spending. In London, during May 1977, the leaders of the "not-so-magnificent seven" (United States, Japan and West Germany) promised their not-so-rich partners (France, Britain, Canada and Italy) to stick to their growth targets (5.8%, 6%, 7% and 5%, respectively) and "take action" if these were not met.

Similarly, Western Europe depends more than the United States on imports of raw materials. In February 1975, in a communication to the Council of Ministers, the European Commission described this problem as "real and serious." "The dangers for Europe in its high degree of dependence on other continents," the commission warned, "has been consistently growing during the past four decades." ² Thus, since 1970, the share of raw materials in the overall nonoil imports of the EEC has been between 15% and 20%, depending on price fluctuations, with a clear majority (58.8% in 1975) coming from other industrialized countries, while the LDCs themselves supplied 31.5% of their needs.³ Western Europe's import dependence for ferrous and nonferrous metals amounts to 58% and 70% respectively (with 65% and 54% of these coming from the LDCs), as compared with 35% and 32% for the United States. In 1973, the European Community imported \$1.55 billion worth of nonferrous metal ores, as compared with \$518 million for the United States.⁴

For countries so dependent on raw-material imports, there can be no doubt of the vital importance of orderly and stable commodity trade. A recent EEC report stated that "given both its sources of supply and its outlets the Community depends more than other industrialized countries on the existence of a propitious climate in relations between developing countries and developed countries." ⁵

Indeed, the question of Western Europe's economic security deserves to be raised in specific terms — but security from what, and against whom? Surely enough, Western Europe is not threatened by mass starvation: the self-sufficiency ratios of the EEC are more than 100% for edible grains and about 85% if feed grains are included; the Nine are also essentially self-sufficient in potatoes, sugar, all vegetables, dairy products and meat. Nor is there an ex-

² Quoted in "The Raw Materials Dossier" (background paper), Commission of the European Communities, 1976, p. 46.

³ "The EEC-Third World Trade Picture."

⁴ Wolfgang Hager, *Europe's Economic Security: Non-Energy Issues in the International Political Economy* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Atlantic Paper, 1975), *passim*.

⁵ "Development and Raw Materials — Problems of the Moment," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, supp. 6/75, p. 12.

PLICIT threat of industrial collapse: Europe's interests are preserved by the very inability of the producers to undertake effective cartel action. (The notable exception is oil, in which case the absence of quickly available substitutes and the inadequacy of current stocks — 90 days — make the European bargaining position especially weak.)

EEC experts generally predict that "there is no immediate sign of a critically dangerous supply situation developing for any of the raw materials."⁶ For instance, there are abundant possibilities of substitution for vegetable oil (percentage dependence: 78%). The same is true of wool (percentage dependence: approximately 90%), for which "EEC experts forecast a stable supply situation in the future, even taking into account exceptional circumstances like droughts, epidemics, or a decline in the importance of livestock."⁷ For wood, not only is the percentage dependence small (17%) but the product types are too diverse for cartels to be effective. As the EEC Commission reports, the list of raw materials for which cartel action by developing countries would be possible scarcely extends beyond such products as bauxite, tin and (perhaps) copper and manganese, with a European dependence of 51%, 96%, 93% and 100%, respectively.⁸

In the above examples the prospects of OPEC-like cartels are highly questionable, in view of (a) the lack of political cohesion of the countries involved, (b) those countries' lack of worldwide control of the commodities and (c) their lack of financial staying power in the event of short-term credit losses or loan interruptions. The availability of possible substitutes, of course, sharply reduces the prospects for the formation of cartels. In short, European dependence on external sources of raw materials would not be as serious as a mere reading of the statistics involved might indicate — were it not for the *political* disruptions which can result from the manipulation of external economic factors over which Western Europe no longer has any control.

Fuels, of course, are the obvious and vital exception. They accounted for 30.7% of total imports in 1976 (compared with 16.5% in 1970), and in this case the economic and the political costs of supply interruption and price increases are equally significant. With an EEC oil-import bill of approximately \$50 billion a year, a price increase, however minimal, has a multibillion dollar impact

⁶ See "Raw Material Supply and the EEC," *European Report*: "Part I: The EEC's Supply Situation in the World Context," no. 142, May 25, 1974; "Part II: The World Price Spiral and EEC Supply," no. 146, June 8, 1974.

⁷ "The World Price Spiral . . .," p. 12.

⁸ "The Raw Materials Dossier," p. 12; Hager, p. 43.

that will remain substantially more significant in Europe than in the United States (where the advent of Alaskan oil may reduce, at least temporarily, the consequences of further price rises). Possible exceptions include Britain and Norway, whose North Sea oil is expected to sell at OPEC price levels.

Indeed, Europeans must take Kissinger's occasional emphasis on U.S. independence from external pressure at face value — and agree with his assumption that "the United States, better than almost any other nation, could survive a period of economic warfare. We can resist confrontation . . . if other nations choose that path. And we can ignore unrealistic proposals and peremptory demands."⁹ It is precisely because Western Europe could not so easily survive a confrontation with OPEC, and because the credibility (and motivation) of America's commitment to the economic protection of Europe is in question, that some European countries may find it necessary, especially in time of crisis, to consider even "unrealistic" demands from the oil-producing countries. As Claude Cheysson, the EEC commissioner in charge of aid and development, recently put it: "Europe imports 75 per cent of the commodities it consumes, the U.S. only 15 to 17 per cent, including energy. Europe needs to enter into the kind of integrated way with the Third World which the U.S. is not ready to accept."¹⁰

An EEC report in 1975 included a ruthless diagnosis: "As a matter of history the continent became the leading industrial power in the world, primarily because it could draw from its own soil the coal, the iron ore, the copper ore, the zinc ore it needed. When it was coming closer to exhaustion of its mineral resources, it was obliged to import the raw materials required for its industry. . . . [Today, it is] a region engaged in processing raw materials imported from other continents, and re-selling them as finished goods."¹¹ Not surprisingly, the EEC would have liked to emerge as a "third force" able to mediate the extremes — "the U.S. on the one hand and Algeria on the other," as one of its reports simplistically put it. But such a moderating role is not an easy one to play — within the EEC, national perspectives cannot always be reconciled.

Let us now turn to the question of how the West European countries and the United States stand on North-South negotiations.

⁹ Address before the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of UNCTAD, Nairobi, May 6, 1974.

¹⁰ "Cheysson on Record," *European Community*, March-April 1977, p. 16.

¹¹ "The Raw Materials Dossier," p. 46.

West Germany, least sympathetic to the LDC position, often determines the final negotiating stance of its occasional co-hardliner, Great Britain. But Bonn is also influenced by Washington, which usually can shape West German concessions more effectively than can the EEC (as seen at Nairobi in May 1976). Closest to the LDCs are Holland and the Scandinavian countries. A small, trade-minded country highly dependent on external supplies of raw materials (but less so for energy than its European neighbors), the Netherlands is especially outspoken in its calls for a new international economic order. On May 23, 1975, the Dutch prime minister said: "We have witnessed failures as a result of today's system [namely] the uneven distribution of income between States and within countries . . . increasing destruction of our environment . . . and a threatening scarcity of resources, caused by unlimited exploitation." Accordingly, the Dutch support such "extreme" LDC demands as indexation and even a temporary (one to two years) debt moratorium. The Nordic Council (of which Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Iceland are members) seeks rapid implementation of the UNCTAD IV integrated program, including the establishment of a common fund, the further stabilization of export earnings, a sustained and accelerated transfer of resources to poor countries, and (if not a debt moratorium) arrangements to lessen the weight of debt for the poorest countries. (Hence the recent decision by Sweden to cancel its loans to the LDCs.)¹² Given this mosaic of national perspectives, it is of course difficult for the EEC to speak with one voice. Its claims of decisive action notwithstanding, the role of the EEC as a unit has been uneven and ineffective. When a common position has been reached, it has been the result of such hard bargaining that no further flexibility remained possible at the negotiating table.

The danger of economic disruption for Western Europe is therefore threefold. First, the failure to meet the key goals of today's welfare state (price stability, full employment and growth) would be politically significant, as it tends to encourage the rise of extremism. Second, economic disruptions might encourage unilateral action — resort to a renewed wave of protectionism or a return to the beggar-thy-neighbor atmosphere of the thirties. Third, it may force the Europeans into unwanted choices — between the United States and the Arab states, between American dominance or West German dominance. In all cases, economic disruptions sharpen the already existing political, monetary and strategic divergencies of

¹² See, for instance, the speech made by Ola Ullsten, minister for international development and cooperation, Riksdag debate, May 4, 1977.

the Atlantic Alliance. They raise additional questions in Western Europe about the alliance: Whom should the alliance confront — Moscow, Tripoli, or the MNCs? Whom should the alliance benefit — Tel Aviv, Washington and Bonn? or the MNCs? Ultimately, the disruptions threaten the very credibility of the alliance.

II

The West German perspective on the new international economic order is based on two fundamental principles:

First, there can be economic growth for the developing countries only if there continues to be economic growth in the industrialized countries. As Hans-Dietrich Genscher put it, “a redistribution of existing wealth in a stagnating economy will not get us any farther; in the long term, development can be speeded up with lasting effect only within an expanding world economy.”¹³ An expanding world economy means additional demand for raw materials and, consequently, increased export earnings for the LDCs. These can then be converted into the technology and the grain which LDCs can only acquire from industrialized countries. Conversely, a contracting world economy reduces demand for raw materials and their prices, which, in turn, lower LDC export earnings and hamper the availability of capital, technology and even grain from the Northern countries. No less significantly, declining export earnings upset development plans, which are inevitably projected over long periods of time.

Second, such simultaneous growth must be achieved along the lines of a free-market economy. Bonn is weary of dirigistic, international government institutions, especially in view of its experience with some of the European institutions, above all the “massive misguidance of resources” of “that white elephant, the Common Agricultural Policy.”¹⁴ Should such proposed schemes as a Common Fund for commodities lead to price increases, West Germany fears that she, along with other major raw-materials importers (such as Japan), would in fact be subsidizing not only LDC producers but also, and more significantly, competitors from the industrialized world which are themselves heavy exporters of raw materials. “With the integrated raw-material program,” Minister of Economic Cooperation Marie Schlei warned in March 1977, “the raw-material-rich countries will get constantly richer and the raw-

¹³ Speech on September 2, 1975; in *The Bulletin* (Bonn), September 9, 1975.

¹⁴ Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, speech of June 4, 1975, *The Bulletin*, July 15, 1975.

material-poor ones, especially the raw-material-poor developing countries, even poorer.”¹⁵

West Germany, therefore, would prefer to see the stabilization of export earnings for LDCs take the form of compensatory finance facilities. “We do not believe,” reasserted the German chancellor in early October 1975, “that world-wide dirigism and bureaucracy can ensure a more equitable distribution of world prosperity, let alone increase it. We trust in the tested principles of division of labor, competition and the free exchange of goods and services.”¹⁶

For West Germany, a global “Stabex” system could include as many as 25 raw materials representing about 74% of exports of the base products of all developing countries (with the exception of oil).¹⁷ Unlike the Lomé-Stabex, this system would tabulate export shortfalls on a worldwide basis (all products to all other countries). Determination of the shortfalls would follow the IMF procedure, with the “reference level” defined as the average of the shortfall year, the two previous years, and an estimate of the two succeeding years. Like the Lomé-Stabex, the “activation threshold” would stand at 7.5% of the reference level (2.5% for the poorest countries). This German-sponsored, global Stabex would therefore have the character of a bank, with a fund of up to \$5 billion that would be financed by governments (including the oil-rich governments) and the capital markets on a fifty-fifty basis.

Generally satisfied with the national and international experience of the past 30 years, and with no former colonial ties to manage, West Germany dismisses demands for a new international economic order. The old order, it is argued, has worked well for the benefit of all: “It . . . enabled not only the industrialized countries but also the developing countries to achieve . . . growth.”¹⁸ All that is required now are a few adjustments defined within the framework of a renewed commitment to the “steering principles” of the free market, a free hand to the multinationals, and unhindered raw-material supplies.

To the French, however, the old order has been neither rational nor just. It has been unjust, since the “remarkable economic development” of the postwar era has been more favorable to some than to others as, in Giscard’s words, “the gap between the rich

¹⁵ *The Bulletin*, March 16, 1977.

¹⁶ Speech on October 2, 1975; in *The Bulletin*, October 17, 1975.

¹⁷ *The German Tribune*, May 22, 1977.

¹⁸ Genscher, address on September 2, 1975. (See fn. 13, above.)

countries and the poor widened during this period," given the proportional nature of economic growth in both areas. (As it happens, Giscard headed the French delegation at the first UNCTAD meeting.) In the face of this "injustice," and on the basis of the monetary and the oil crises of the early seventies, the French argue that "the rules and balances on which the old economic order was built cannot and . . . should not be restored in their existing forms." In other words, "the world must move toward a new world economic order" based upon a restored equilibrium of trade, economic activity, currency and revenues.¹⁹

How this new rationality is to be achieved was best explained by Giscard d'Estaing in his speech to the Ecole Polytechnique on October 28, 1975. Like most national leaders, the French president is in favor of stable prices for raw materials and stable export earnings for LDCs. But, unlike West Germany and, up to a point, the United States, Giscard advocates "mechanisms for storage or regulating production," that is to say, buffer stocks meant "to keep . . . prices within certain brackets." As to the stabilization of earnings, Giscard, not unlike Schmidt, favors a Stabex-like agreement whereby a joint fund would be created to compensate inadequate earnings in cases of severe fluctuations.

The equilibration of economic activity will follow the developing countries' ability to modernize their agricultural production, upgrade and process their raw materials from within, and attract technology and additional investments. While fine in theory, such a program does not go far in coping with the problems of practical implementation. Thus, the French position on the question of tariff removal is, in practice, far more restrictive than that of West Germany, which, if for no other reason than consistency, is more comprehensive in its opposition to tariffs. Said Giscard, "there are sectors such as the textile industry . . . where direct access by foreign products would put an additional strain on our national market and would have consequences on the employment situation. So there must be some limits on protective clauses." Thus France, together with Great Britain, stalls the renewal of the GATT Multi-fiber Agreement on International Trade in Textiles (MFA), which the United States (and West Germany) want to see confirmed quickly.²⁰

France is in favor of an "organized free trade" that would introduce protection where competition is not sufficiently balanced, whether because of excessive technological advances (for instance,

¹⁹ Speech on October 28, 1975, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris.

²⁰ *The Economist*, July 9, 1977.

in aerospace, nuclear power and computers, where the United States dominates world markets), various forms of dumping, or manufacturers paying low wages. In this last instance, that such limits would primarily be drawn for labor-intensive items (those items most likely to be exported by the LDCs) is one of the many practical difficulties overlooked by Giscard's presentation of the new "rationality." But regardless of its motivation, the logic of "organized free trade" is indeed protectionism against (a) other rich countries temporarily doing better and (b) poorer countries whose main hope of servicing their growing debt is to export larger quantities of goods, produced with assets procured through loans and with their natural advantage in cheap labor.

The equilibration of the monetary situation requires, in Giscard's view, the fulfillment of France's old demand for a return to stabilized parities, which would reduce exaggerated price fluctuations while permitting the degree of flexibility achieved through such schemes as the European "snake." In addition, equilibration requires, as Giscard sees it, the linkage of international-liquidity formation with development aid. In opposition, West Germany continues to fight such a linkage primarily because, in Bonn's view, it would mean an increase in global demand (stemming from the LDC's added purchasing power) without a corresponding increase in global productivity, thereby creating further inflationary pressures.

Finally, balanced revenues require additional aid efforts on the part of the industrialized countries as well as those countries having "resources which have been upgraded in value," i.e., the oil-producing countries. This, of course, is supported by Bonn, which favors increased public and private financial flows toward those LDCs that do not produce raw materials themselves. The French, however, prefer to see their aid program limited to a few countries with which they have direct political links, rather than to spread their funds thinly around the world. Consequently, they have consistently blocked all attempts by the EEC to provide for a regular aid program to non-EEC associates.

III

A joint EEC position often implies a member-state's refusal to be isolated and is thus followed by an explanation negating much of the joint position.²¹ West Germany (whether at the EEC or

²¹ Sidney Weintraub, "North-South Dialogue at the United Nations, *International Affairs*, April 1977, pp. 188-201.

in a truly international forum) is a frequent user of this technique. France, on the other hand, is the country most likely and most willing to differ when its EEC partners agree. Thus, at Lima (UNIDO II, March 1975) there was only one vote against the final resolution (sponsored by the United States), but West Germany added an explanation which all but rejected the resolution. (Japan, Great Britain and four other states, not including France, abstained.) With votes taken on nine specific paragraphs, only two of these saw France voting in the same manner as the United States and West Germany, which voted identically on all nine paragraphs.

Yet the French and German approaches are much closer than is suggested by their rhetoric and voting behavior. Thus, where the Germans offer explanation, the French often offer contradictions. In Lima, for instance, the French government, together with the other European governments, voted against Paragraph 32 of the final resolution, but (together with Italy only) in favor of Paragraph 59j — even though both paragraphs, rhetorical technicalities notwithstanding, similarly referred to the right of nations to control their resources and to nationalize (“exercise their sovereignty” over) foreign properties without facing international retaliation. Again in Lima, on the question of cartel formation, the French voted on both sides of the issue (against Paragraph 47, but for Paragraph 60e). Finally, France was the only European country other than Portugal which voted in favor of Paragraph 19 of the final resolution — even though that paragraph seemed to favor the principle of indexation, which French officials have repeatedly attacked.

In other instances, Paris’s hedging takes the more constructive form of intermediate proposals which adopt a Third World perspective without compromising the essential features of Northern strategy. Thus, at Nairobi in May 1976, the French proposed a central fund to back up individual commodity arrangements. The French proposal upstaged Kissinger’s call for a new international resources bank to finance the exploitation of raw materials in the world’s poorest countries — despite Kissinger’s last-minute suggestion that the bank might finance buffer stocks as well.²² Paris was calling for a case-by-case negotiation of four or five unspecified commodities agreements, each with its own individual fund. Only then could a central fund be set up as a kind of clearing house for these individual funds. Such a central fund would be financed by surpluses accumulated in the individual funds, and by contributions from such existing international organizations as the World Bank. While a

²² See, for instance, Reginald Dale, “French Upstage U.S. on Commodity Deal,” *Financial Times*, May 7, 1976.

far cry from the LDCs' request for an immediate "common fund" linked to 18 (or 10) commodities and rising ultimately to nearly \$11 billion (or \$6 billion), the French proposal was opposed by West Germany on the familiar grounds that producers and consumers should not be made jointly responsible for market stabilization. This gap was subsequently bridged early in 1977 as the EEC finally adopted a joint position which no member-state is expected to abandon without prior consultation with its partners.

However broad they may appear to be in theory, differences between France and West Germany remain minimal in practice. The Fourcade Plan would not have done away with Schmidt's concern that negotiations related to each market should precede funding, so that buffer stocks (to which he was not irreversibly opposed) would not be created when or where unnecessary. In Schmidt's words, "the Federal Government . . . is willing, where appropriate, to conclude commodity agreements. But it is essential . . . to think twice in each specific case whether such an agreement is justified and will bring benefits in the long term."²³ Essentially, neither the French nor the Germans (nor the Americans) want financing to be created before an agreement is reached on what is to be financed — and by whom. But, in addition, the Germans and the Americans explicitly want "talks about talks" on this very question, rather than immediate negotiations, for they further fear that such a fund might be used for such purposes as diversification or the manipulation of markets, rather than being restricted to stabilization of commodity markets.

Similarly, differences between Bonn and Paris over whether or not liquidity formation and aid should be linked are now of limited significance. Robert Triffin has estimated that during 1970-1975, gross international monetary reserves (measured in SDRs) increased by 132%, from \$78 billion to \$181 billion. The need for additional liquidity creation is, to say the least, a remote one at this time. In any case, international reserves are needed to a greater extent under conditions of fixed exchange rates. Under conditions of floating rates, payment adjustments are more automatic (the foreign exchange market better equalizes the supply and demand for foreign currency) and thereby reduce the need for international liquidity. So, however politically significant Giscard's endorsement of an SDR linkage may be, it remains irrelevant practically. As to other issues, Paris and Bonn generally see eye to eye — against in-

²³ Speech on June 4, 1975. (See fn. 14, above.)

dexation, against a debt moratorium, in favor of additional capitalization of multilateral financial institutions, and against automatic transfers of technology.

IV

The energy crisis dramatically emphasized the differences in economic and military power between the United States and Europe. It also considerably altered the distribution of economic and political power in Europe. In brief, it meant both a measure of renewed European unity (albeit under West German dominance) and a measure of renewed Atlantic cooperation under American direction.

In late 1974, Giscard's and Schmidt's visits to President Ford, in order to request that the United States act as a boom leader for the rest of Europe (a role which the French could not, and the Germans would not, assume), reflected the conviction among the new European leadership that cooperation with the United States was still a precondition for successful international diplomacy, healthy domestic economic management and, not to be neglected, effective electoral politics. Events under the Carter administration, including the London summit meeting, have confirmed this trend. Similarly, Giscard's progressive submission to Schmidt in 1974-1976 implied the recognition in Paris that French resources permit neither a global hegemonic role, in competition with the United States, nor even a Europe-wide hegemonic role in competition with the growing economic strength of Germany.

Even without an effective interruption of the oil supply (by slowdown or embargo, neither of which could Western Europe face for long), the OPEC states can now affect Europe's political future through periodic price increases. Thus, a large increase in the price of oil in December 1977 would have influenced, in ascending order, the outcome of the March 1978 legislative elections in France, the newly elected government's performance, and the following presidential elections (1981 or earlier). In Italy, such a price increase would have further diminished Premier Andreotti's ability to cope with his country's economic problems and would probably have accelerated the entry of the Communist Party into the Italian government (in order to legitimize much-needed austerity programs).

Should such openings to the far left ever take place, both France and Italy will move closer to the Dutch and Scandinavian positions on the North-South questions. Explicitly deter-

mined, in François Mitterrand's words, "to encourage everywhere in the world people's yearning for more independence and more justice," a Socialist France would add ideology to Gaullism in its efforts to regain a "historic role of avant-garde, which is to fight against oppression in its economic, military, or political forms."²⁴ This would leave the United States essentially alone with West Germany, since, in the meantime, Great Britain might move closer to some of the positions of the South as she too becomes an oil-exporting country. This "bigemony" between Washington and Bonn could not fail to have damaging consequences in Europe, for reasons all too easy to uncover in modern European history.

Whether or not Europe would have much to gain from either conciliation or confrontation with the OPEC states is highly debatable, and convincing arguments can be presented for either option. Yet, everything else being equal, an American policy — any American policy — which could guarantee a stable oil supply at reasonable prices would probably gain Western Europe's support. That such support would not be forthcoming until the policy has actually succeeded reflects Western Europe's illusory search for a no-risk policy. In the meantime, Western Europe questions America's will and ability to define and implement a policy (any policy) whose failure would, in any case, have to be paid for primarily by the Europeans and the Japanese. Western Europe, then, needs an American policy firm enough to force moderation (if not submission) from OPEC, yet weak enough to avoid any risk of confrontation with OPEC. Consequently, whatever policy is ultimately pursued by Washington — with or without consultation — is likely to meet with sharp criticism as being either too harsh when it was meant to be soft (France) or too soft when it was meant to be harsh (Germany).

An American strategy of conciliation should address itself not so much to OPEC as to the LDCs in general. Neither developed enough to belong to the OECD, nor poor enough to belong truly to the South, OPEC can afford neither to destroy the OECD (economically or politically), nor to damage further the LDCs (again, economically or politically). Concessions by the United States within the framework of the North-South negotiations, therefore, might help legitimize, within the OPEC group itself, the positions of the more moderate OPEC states (e.g., Saudi Arabia) vis-a-vis more radical OPEC states (e.g., Algeria) anxious to preserve their Third World

²⁴ See Michael Harrison, *A Socialist Foreign Policy for France?* (Bologna: Bologna Center Discussion Paper no. 14, 1975).

credentials. Conversely, if no compromise is reached — especially on the commodity question — the more radical OPEC countries may force higher oil prices as a sort of punishment of the West. The search for such additional proceeds might be further legitimized within the South if they are used (in part, at least) to finance the proposed UNCTAD integrated program for commodities, thereby leaving the LDCs with the understanding that they are not paying on all sides. In any case, Northern refusal to make any concessions to the South will probably bring about fewer OPEC concessions to the North.

At Lomé, in early 1975, Western Europe attempted to pursue a policy of conciliation toward the South. The EEC/Stabex system, however, hardly does more than stabilize temporarily a few (12) exports to the Nine by a few (57) countries. In cases of sustained price reductions, today's low receipts would in fact become tomorrow's norm, since the Lomé reference level (average of earnings for the preceding four years) changes constantly. As such, the fall in prices is not contained — it is at best spread out.²⁵ In addition, of course, the product coverage remained selective: all minerals (with the exception of iron ore) have been excluded from the agreement, and the funding remains small (\$413 million in five yearly installments of approximately \$83 million a year). Thus, a 10% decline in the EEC demand for wood and iron ore (50% in value of the 12 commodities covered) would have absorbed all of the \$83 million available in 1976.

The argument is made that OPEC is not sufficiently committed to the LDCs to exchange cooperation on energy for a commodity agreement. Should this indeed be the case, the bargaining strength of the South is significantly reduced because, questions of justice and equity aside, the legitimacy of the LDCs' claims reflects the First World's fears of an OPEC which is still the South's key weapon. Obviously enough (however regrettably), the discovery of the issues raised by the LDCs and the sudden willingness to discuss them were not born out of humanitarian wisdom. To deny a structural linkage between OPEC and the LDCs is to withdraw the case for an immediate consideration of the North-South issues.

A more compelling question is whether or not the industrialized nations should boost the prestige and influence of the OPEC states by accepting such a trade-off. Relieved of an additional financial burden in the short term, the industrialized countries

²⁵ See Guy F. Erb, "North-South Negotiations and Compensatory Financing" (background paper), Overseas Development Council, June 8, 1977.

would discover in the long term that, while they were paying for a new international economic order, they enhanced OPEC's cohesion and influence to such an extent that it would be even easier for OPEC to impose higher prices at a later time.

In truth, conciliation and confrontation must go hand in hand, for they help draw the boundaries of acceptable OPEC behavior — from pressure by proxy (through concessions to the South) to direct pressure (through muted references to the possible use of force). The failure of the policy pursued during the past four years relates not so much to what was done as to what was *not* done: viz., a determined conservation program for the United States and other OECD states; the development of alternate sources of energy; a working program of financial solidarity which, if effectively implemented, would distribute the burdens of higher energy bills among OECD countries. The future that Western Europe will pick out of this current "simultaneous presence of all futures," to use Paul Valéry's phrase, will be shaped substantially by the choices made in Washington. Left alone, Western Europe unfortunately lacks both the will and the power to enforce any decision it might make.

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

In the last survey conducted by the American Political Science Association, a nationwide sampling of political scientists rated WORLD POLITICS "first for quality." Celebrating its 30th year of publication, WORLD POLITICS continues to offer research articles on the frontiers of scholarship—in history, geography, economics, international relations, military affairs, foreign policy, sociology, and political theory.

Articles from recent issues include:

Cooperation under the Security Dilemma *by Robert Jervis*

Compulsion and Social Change: Is Authoritarianism the Solution to India's Agricultural Development Problems? *by Francine Frankel*

Integration Theory and the Growth of Nationalist Minority Movements *by Anthony H. Birch*

Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failure of Deterrence *by Jack Snyder*

A New Brezhnev Doctrine: The Restructuring of International Relations *by R. Judson Mitchell*

Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management *by Steve Chan*

Enter your Subscription now.

WORLD POLITICS

Subscriptions

Princeton University Press

Princeton, N.J. 08540

U.S.A.

____ One Year (\$10.00)

____ Two Years (\$17.50)

____ Three Years (\$25.00)

Foreign Postage \$1.25
per year

Name _____

Address _____

Sponsored by the Center of International Studies, Princeton University

WEST EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICIES: THE IMPACT OF THE OIL CRISIS*

by Werner J. Feld

When we speak in this paper of "West European" foreign policies, three kinds of legal and political sources for these policies are conceivable. *First*, there are the individual foreign policies formulated by the national governments in Western Europe in pursuit of their particular interests. *Second*, the member states of the European Communities (EC) have instituted since 1970 a foreign-policy coordinating mechanism outside the provisions of the EC treaties which has produced significant results in the form of common policy approaches to selected issues such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In some cases other West European countries outside the EC have joined the common EC stand. *Finally*, the EC treaty system itself provides legal bases for common policies. The European Economic Community (EEC) treaty stipulates the formulation of common commercial policies toward third countries and offers to the nine member governments the unusual foreign policy instrument of "association," which has been successfully employed on many occasions, particularly to affiliate most African Third World countries with the EC.¹

The formulation and, to a lesser degree, the implementation of specific EC policies is entrusted to a substantial number of civil servants of the European Community. Most of these "Eurocrats" are assigned to Directorate-General (DG) I of the EC Commission, but they cannot act with full autonomy. The member governments keep close tabs on European Community activities in external affairs through (a) directives by the EC Council of Ministers, representing mainly national interests; (b) liaison committees² composed of

* This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association Convention, New Orleans, November 3-5, 1977.

¹ See Werner J. Feld, *The European Community and the World* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Alfred Publishers, 1976), pp. 103-160.

² For example: "Committee 113," named after Article 113 of the EEC treaty which authorizes its establishment.

Werner J. Feld is Professor of Political Science at the University of New Orleans. Among his publications are *The European Community in World Affairs* (1976) and *The Foreign Policies of West Euro-Socialist Parties* (1978). Dr. Feld's current research focuses on multilevel decisionmaking in the European Community and the relationship between multinational enterprises and the UN.

national officials; and (c) the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR or COREPER). This unit, which is headed by the ambassadors of the member states accredited to the EC, prepares the Council of Ministers sessions and has become very influential in all EC decisionmaking processes.³

In the foreign-policy coordinating mechanism of the European Community member governments, then, the EC officials of DG I play only a very limited role. Coordination is carried out through periodic meetings of the foreign ministers of the Nine. The spadework for these meetings is handled by the political directors of the foreign ministries of the member states who, with their staffs, constitute the Political Committee. This body convenes at least four times a year, but in recent years it has met much more often.

The major task of the foreign ministers at their periodic sessions is consideration of important foreign policy questions. The member governments can suggest for consideration any issue pertaining to general foreign policy problems or to such matters as monetary affairs, energy and security. Whenever the work of the foreign ministers or of the Political Committee impinges on the competence and activities of the European Community, the commission is requested to submit its own position on the matter under consideration and is invited to send a representative. It is interesting that during the discussion in the Political Committee regarding the preparatory Conference on European Security and Cooperation (Helsinki), it was felt that the conference was likely to deal with problems affecting the activities and competences of the European Community in the international trade field. Therefore, a European Community representative was invited and Franco Malfatti, then president of the commission, participated in some of the sessions.

The foreign-policy coordination activities of the Political Committee are supplemented by periodic sessions of staff members in the embassies of the Nine, located in different capitals of the world. Such meetings had already taken place prior to the creation of this committee when European Community affairs affecting third countries needed to be discussed and coordinated; but their scope has now been expanded.⁴

³ For details, see Feld, pp. 19-42.

⁴ See Ralf Dahrendorf, "Possibilities and Limits of a European Communities Foreign Policy," *The World Today*, April 1971, p. 161. The commercial counselor of the embassy of the member state holding the presidency of the EC Council of Ministers prepares a report on these meetings. The reports are addressed to the president of the council and are distributed to the permanent representatives in Brussels and to a

Since the EC countries contain the bulk of the West European population, our major concern will be with the European Community's external policies proper and those foreign policies evolved under the coordination mechanism described above. In this article, I will examine the impact of the oil crisis on those policies. First, however, a brief survey of present and future energy resources is necessary.

The Oil Crisis and Alternate Sources of Energy

It is not necessary to belabor the consequences, on the balance of payments of consumer countries and on international trade, of the more than fourfold increase of crude-oil prices on the world market. Suffice it to say that balance-of-payments deficits have not been as severe as predicted in 1974. Some countries, such as Italy, suffered much more than others (e.g., West Germany) that managed to accumulate and maintain surpluses. Clearly, direct and portfolio investments by Arab oil producers in North America and Western Europe, as well as large-scale purchases of manufactured goods (civilian and military) by these countries, account for the differences and have blunted the dismal forecasts.⁵

Despite the North Sea petroleum resources which are gradually coming "on stream," Western Europe must seek to lower its dependence on oil and assure maximum security of its supplies of this commodity and other imported energy sources. In 1974, the commission, assuming a growth in the GNP of 4.5 per cent per year, estimated the European Community's primary energy needs for 1985. (See Table I.)

number of national governmental agencies. If no objections are raised by a member government within eight days, a copy of the report is furnished to the commission. When European Community affairs are discussed in embassy meetings, EC officials participate if the commission has an office in the capital where the meeting takes place. In such cases, the EC officials make a direct report to the president of the commission. Policy-coordination meetings have also been held in the United Nations to ensure maximum cohesion in the votes and policy positions of the member states. The influence of the commission staff at these meetings may well have been increased when the EC was granted official observer status by the UN. (See *Agence Europe Bulletin*, September 18, 1975.)

An interesting study by Leon Hurwitz, regarding voting cohesion by the member states in 518 General Assembly roll-call votes from 1948 to 1973, shows wide variation in cohesion. On a 0-100 scale, the Netherlands and Luxembourg scored the highest (92), while France and Italy scored the lowest (72). The original EEC members had a cohesion score of 84, and the three newest EC members had a score of about 80. (Hurwitz, "The EEC in the United Nations: The Voting Behavior of Eight Countries, 1948-1973," a paper prepared for the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 29-September 2.)

⁵ See, for example, Werner Ungerer, "Consequences of the Oil Crisis," *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1974, pp. 213-226.

TABLE I
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PRIMARY ENERGY NEEDS * IN 1985

	1973 Estimates		1985 Initial Forecasts		1985 Objectives	
	million t.o.e.	%	million t.o.e.	%	million t.o.e.	%
Solid fuels	227	22.6	175	10	250	16
Oil	617	61.4	1,160	64	655	41
Natural gas	117	11.6	265	15	375	24
Hydroelectric power and others	30	3.0	40	2	35	2
Nuclear energy	14	1.4	160	9	260	17
TOTAL	1,005	100.0	1,800	100	1,575	100

* Internal consumption + exports + bunkers.

Source: *Bulletin of the European Communities*, supp. 4/74, p. 12.

In Table I, "1985 Initial Forecasts" are the projected needs if the EC countries could be sure of receiving needed resources on a "business as usual" basis. In a realistic evaluation of the changed conditions resulting from the oil crisis, the "1985 Objectives" column reflects a 10 per cent reduction of oil consumption from the "Initial Forecasts" level and a substantial increase of energy consumption flowing from nuclear facilities. If these goals were attained, dependence on foreign petroleum resources would be reduced by about 25 per cent in 1985, and internal production would be increased substantially. Moreover, the production of natural gas within the European Community would have to be expanded, the production of coal maintained, and nuclear energy generating plants increased so that 50 per cent of the community's electricity needs would be met from nuclear sources.⁶ This would cut dependence on imported energy from an estimated 64 per cent projected for 1985 (without the above special measures) to an optimum of 40 per cent. (See Table II.)

The EC Commission's forecasts and plans were approved by the Council of Ministers in December 1974, but implementing measures have been lagging and no comprehensive common energy policy has yet been evolved. Moreover, some of the projections themselves were sharply modified by reality. The greatest disappointment was the slow expansion of nuclear facilities for elec-

⁶ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, supp. 4/74, p. 13, provides full details about energy calculations and rational use of energy.

TABLE II
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENERGY DEPENDENCE * IN 1985
(per cent)

	Initial Forecast	1985 Objectives	
		50 per cent dependence	40 per cent dependence
Solid fuels	10	17	17
Oil	64	49	41
Natural gas	15	18	23
Hydroelectric and geothermal power	2	3	3
Nuclear energy	9	13	16
TOTAL	100	100	100

* Internal consumption + exports + bunkers (figures rounded).

Source: *Bulletin of the European Communities*, no. 12, 1974, p. 15.

tricity generation, owing to vociferous resistance by environment-minded groups and to the high cost of construction. As a consequence, the commission reported in 1977 that if nuclear capacity were limited to the 95 gigawatts (billions of watts) already operating, under construction or firmly planned, the energy gap could be closed only by increasing imports of oil to the level of approximately \$60 billion at *current* prices, a doubtful assumption for the next eight years.⁷ In the meantime, natural-gas imports from non-EC countries have increased considerably over the objectives set by the community, and the prices of oil and gas have risen since 1974. Internal coal production has been and may continue to be lower than expected, mainly because of increased costs.⁸ Proposals made by the EC Commission for financial aid, in order to encourage the use of coal in electricity-generating stations, have not been approved by the council so far, partly because Germany, the United Kingdom and France fear that this might benefit third countries which export coal more than it would help the employment picture in the EC countries.⁹ As a consequence, despite a reduction in energy consumption of 2.5 per cent in 1976, the commission is fearful that in 1985 the energy-import dependence would still be 55 per cent instead of the hoped-for 48 per cent.¹⁰ Of course, oil imports into

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 2, 1977, p. 50.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 9, 1976, p. 42; EC Commission, *Tenth General Report* (1976), pp. 219-222; *Agence Europe Bulletin*, August 4, 1977.

⁹ EC Commission, *Eleventh General Report* (1976), pp. 193-194.

¹⁰ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, no. 2, 1977, p. 50.

individual countries will vary considerably: the United Kingdom will be self-sufficient, and Norway is likely to be a net oil exporter; but Spain, Italy and France will still need large quantities of petroleum products.

Oil-Related External Policies of EC Countries

Between 1969 and mid-1973, some small steps were taken to initiate a general energy policy. For example, maintenance of a minimum level of crude oil and petroleum products was made compulsory.¹¹ In 1972, the Council of Ministers adopted regulations notifying the commission of all hydrocarbon imports and of investment projects in the oil, natural-gas and electricity sectors that would be of interest to the European Community.¹²

In April 1973, the commission forwarded to the council a memorandum in which a number of precise guidelines and actions were proposed for future relations with energy exporting and importing countries. In addition, suggestions were made for organization of the EC oil market and for policies in the atomic energy, coal and natural-gas sectors, as well as for environmental protection. As reserves were being depleted, and as rumblings of forthcoming oil shortages were heard, the council requested, on May 22, 1973, that the commission prepare concrete and comprehensive policy proposals by the end of the year.¹³ To deal with nuclear fuels, the council set up a Standing Committee on Uranium Enrichment (COPENUR), which was charged with ensuring the sufficiency of the community's uranium supply, most of which had been coming from the United States.¹⁴

In the aftermath of the October War, the use of the oil weapon by the Arab petroleum-producing countries, whereby oil production was progressively reduced and embargoes imposed on selected consuming nations considered too friendly toward Israel, brought EC plans for comprehensive energy policies into disarray. Where solidarity among EC member states should have been the order of the day in the fall of 1973, each member state sought to safeguard its own interests first, presenting a rather contemptible demonstration of naked national egoism. The Netherlands' defiant sympathy with the cause of the Jewish state caused it to become the victim of a complete Arab embargo on oil shipments. Holland's

¹¹ EC Commission, *Fourth General Report* (1970), p. 208.

¹² EC Commission, *Sixth General Report* (1972), p. 235.

¹³ EC Commission, *Seventh General Report* (1973), p. 327.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 328.

EC partners, which did not display the same pugnaciousness, refused to help. This prompted the Dutch to exert pressure on their neighbors (Germany, France and Belgium) to offer EC political support against the Arabs and engage in some oil-sharing arrangement or else face the cutoff of Dutch supplies of North Sea natural gas.¹⁵ But little immediate support was received as higher gasoline prices, which necessitated gasless Sundays and other emergency measures, induced individual EC member countries to seek special favors and oil deals from the Arabs.

The ultimate in fawning at the feet of the Arab leaders came during the Copenhagen summit meeting of December 1973. This meeting of EC heads of state was called to give new impetus to the European union, to make progress in the movement toward economic and political union, and to work toward a common European voice in world affairs. Despite a charitable face-saving communique at the end of the meeting, things did not quite work out as planned. On the eve of the conference, the foreign ministers of six Arab oil-producing countries arrived at the Danish capital, and these unexpected arrivals replaced European Community business as the center of interest at the conference. An editorial in the *Agence Europe Bulletin* for December 15, 1973, asked this question: "Is it a European Summit in which the Arab powers are allowed to participate, or a case of an Arab Summit being held in parallel? We may ask from where this initiative came, which has clearly caused some surprise. In Algiers it had been decided to address a 'message' to the European Summit, but it was not known that the 'bearers' of this message would be either so numerous or so high-ranking." The words written into the Copenhagen communique on energy policy were in diametric opposition to the actions taken by the heads of state of the EC member states. The Nine allowed themselves to be ruled by the oil-producing countries, which had divided them into friendly and not-so-friendly countries. Two states, France and Britain, sold their dignity for the Arab favors. The most badly affected member of the European Community, the Netherlands, was forgotten—even though the Dutch had been among the most vociferous champions of British entry for years. Solidarity in the community was certainly nothing more than a sham.¹⁶

Despite the Copenhagen debacle, the EC Commission pushed on in seeking a common approach to energy problems, rather than passively tolerate the development of bilateral deals

¹⁵ See *Time*, December 3, 1973.

¹⁶ *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), January 11, 1974.

between member states and the Arab oil-producing countries. The United States was also in favor of a common approach and wanted it to include Canada, Japan and Norway. After various delays, the U.S. government succeeded in convening a thirteen-nation Washington Energy Conference in February 1974. The purpose was to work out a common program for easing the energy crisis. In the end it was agreed to set up a coordinating group, which was to decide how to organize most efficiently the coordination program. In particular, the Energy Coordinating Group (ECG) was charged with the following tasks: (1) conservation of energy and restraint of demand; (2) setting up a system for allocating oil supplies in times of emergency or severe shortage; (3) acceleration of the development of additional energy sources in order to diversify energy supplies; and (4) acceleration of energy research-and-development programs through international cooperative efforts.¹⁷

France declined participation in this coordinating group, and perhaps because of the French resistance to identify with the general aims of the conference, no agreement was reached on the proposed "code of conduct," which was to regulate the efforts several governments were making to work out special deals with Mideastern oil producers. France, for example, was negotiating pacts with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya that would guarantee it millions of barrels of oil in return for stepped-up deliveries of French weapons and technology to the producers. These efforts later obtained results and set an example that other participants in the Washington conference were to follow.

Despite U.S. opposition to bilateral agreements with Arab oil-producing countries (because such agreements appeared to signal defection from existing alliance systems), Washington itself concluded a series of bilateral accords on trade, investment and technology.¹⁸ The first of the American agreements was signed with Saudi Arabia. U.S. justification for this and other bilateral accords was their link to a Middle East settlement and an eventual moderation of oil prices.¹⁹

¹⁷ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, no. 2, 1974, p. 21.

¹⁸ For a summary review of these agreements, see Treasury Secretary William Simon's testimony before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, August 12, 1974.

¹⁹ See Henry R. Nau, "Diplomatic Uses of Technology in U.S. Energy Policy," paper presented at the Convention of the International Studies Association/South, Lexington, Kentucky, October 22-25, 1974; also, Nau's *National Politics and International Technology: Nuclear Reactor Development in Western Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

French suspicions that the Washington conference had been called to reassert U.S. leadership over disintegrating alliance affairs, and to create some new interlocking machinery to tie European energy plans and activities to American resources, were not entirely unfounded. Not only were American science and technology used to solve energy problems per se, they were also to be a means of achieving diplomatic ends. Commercial gains from the supply of American nuclear generating equipment and enriched uranium may also have been motivating factors. To reinforce the proposed technological ties in the energy field, President Nixon reminded European statesmen, during a White House dinner held on the occasion of the Washington conference, that they could not be independent of the United States in economic and political affairs and at the same time expect to rely on American support in security areas. Nixon declared that "security and economic considerations are inevitably linked, and energy cannot be separated from either."²⁰ As Henry Nau points out, the energy crisis was to supply practical proof to the Europeans that they could not do without U.S. leadership in alliance affairs and that U.S. leadership could not be accepted exclusively in security areas.²¹

After the Washington conference, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, together with experts from the Council of Ministers, examined the possibility of implementing the common energy proposals made earlier by the EC Commission. They hoped that France could be induced to join the other member states in the deliberations of the ECG, also known as the Group of Twelve,²² so that progress toward all objectives could be made.

Concurrently with the development of the European Community energy objectives, the Group of Twelve had been formulating and activating the so-called International Energy Program (IEP), essentially a resource-sharing scheme, in the event of future oil-supply crises. The principal trigger for international action and the sharing of oil supplies is to be the decrease of oil deliveries below 90 per cent of normal.²³ In addition to oil-sharing, the Twelve obligated themselves to continuing energy-saving measures and to cooperation in the field of energy research and development.²⁴

²⁰ *Department of State Bulletin*, March 4, 1974.

²¹ See Nau, "Diplomatic Uses of Technology. . . ."

²² Eight EC members plus the United States, Canada, Norway and Japan.

²³ *Agence Europe Bulletin*, July 29-30, 1974.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, July 11, 1974.

During the development of the IEP, the Group of Twelve was transformed into the International Energy Agency (IEA), which now operates under the auspices of the OECD.²⁵

Although the French government was again urged strongly to join the IEA, it declined official participation. Paris wanted to avoid the impression that the oil-consuming countries were forming a cartel, but perhaps more important, it wished to preserve its freedom for dealing with the oil producers.²⁶ Norway, a full member of the Group of Twelve, had a change of heart and became only an "associate" of the IEA. Other IEA members, besides the eight EC countries and the United States, today include Austria, Canada, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. The IEA remains the principal vehicle both for energy cooperation among the industrialized countries and for the coordination of national programs of energy conservation, development and reduced dependence. Specific IEA tasks are wide-ranging and include (a) the organization of international cooperation in the field of enriched uranium production; (b) the creation of economic and monetary coordination measures, to be implemented when needed to cope with the multiple effects of price rises; and (c) relations with the non-energy-producing developing countries (hard hit by the oil-price increases).²⁷ Although the EC Commission holds only observer status in the IEA, it has worked hard to develop common positions for the eight EC countries which are full IEA members and then to bring those positions in line with the French. Although there is now general agreement in the Council of Ministers that everything possible has to be done to forge common attitudes, it is not only France that from time to time expresses divergent attitudes. Britain does not neglect its own interests (springing from the increasing flow of its North Sea oil), and other EC states often show a primary concern for protection of their own national interests.

In order to find a solution to the problems facing the petroleum consumers and producers, a preparatory meeting for an international energy conference was convened in April 1975. The consumer participants were the EC, the United States and Japan. The producers were represented by Algeria (as leader) and by Iran,

²⁵ *Ibid.* The first head of the IEA was a high-ranking Belgian foreign service official, Vicomte Etienne Davignon. Since February 1977, the IEA chief has been German Under-secretary of State for Economic Affairs Rohwedder. The four assistant directors are from Canada, Denmark, Austria and Japan.

²⁶ See Carl A. Ehrhardt, "Europe and Energy Policy at Top Level," *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1975, p. 6.

²⁷ *Agence Europe Bulletin*, July 11, 1974.

Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. Since the Third World would be affected by any conference of this type, India, Brazil and Zaire were invited. The IEA, OPEC and the UN were represented by observers.

The formulation of an agenda for the preparatory meeting proved to be troublesome. The United States wanted the conference to be strictly limited to petroleum issues (prices, harmonization of supply and demand, petrodollars), whereas the developing countries wanted to extend it to other raw materials and to "North-South" relations in general. Of the EC member states, Great Britain and the Netherlands did not object to a fairly extensive agenda, but France, leaning toward the U.S. position, favored separate conferences for each product or group of products.²⁸

Fruitless disputes on the title, scope and procedures of the planned conference marked the preparatory meeting from the beginning. The rigid attitude of the oil-producing and other developing countries could not be overcome by any of the compromises offered by the consumer states, and the emerging deadlock killed the meeting.²⁹

Despite this failure to initiate a useful dialogue between the oil consumer and producer countries, an IEA ministerial meeting at the end of May 1975 suggested new initiatives for the resumption of the preparatory meeting. Secretary of State Kissinger proposed that a number of committees be established for such a new meeting. These would explore problems related to raw materials other than petroleum, noted Kissinger, but substantive negotiations would have to be conducted in other forums.

After the IEA meeting, an exploratory "Euro-Arab" dialogue was initiated in Cairo in June 1975 to discuss ways of more fruitful cooperation between the European Community and its member states, on the one hand, and Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa, on the other. Conceivably, these could include the promise of oil deliveries in return for technological and economic assistance. No concrete results emerged from this meeting, however, because the Arabs insisted on a general political context and the Europeans were interested in a few specific projects.³⁰ Nevertheless, the dialogue was resumed later and can be seen as part of a broader initiative on the part of the EC to cement its relations with the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. We shall return to this subject later.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, April 5, 1975.

²⁹ For an analysis of the reasons for failure, see editorial, *ibid.*, April 17, 1975. Also see *ibid.*, April 10, 1975, for the community's compromise proposal.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, May 28-29, 1975.

Deliberation within a forum broader than the Euro-Arab dialogue commenced in December 1975 when a Ministerial Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) was convened in Paris at the invitation of France. Delegates from twenty-seven countries participated, of which nineteen were Third World countries.³¹ Canada and Venezuela furnished the co-chairmen for the conference. Following Kissinger's suggestion, commissions were set up on the following topics: energy; raw materials; development problems; and financial affairs. Each commission had fifteen members — ten from the developing countries and five from the industrialized world.

During 1976, eight meetings of these four commissions were held, but progress in reaching agreement was very slow and often impossible. The European Community, either on its own or with other industrialized countries, submitted position papers to the four commissions on nearly all topics. Despite the opposing positions of the industrialized and developing countries, there had been some hope that before the end of 1976 a meeting at the ministerial level might wind up the North-South negotiations successfully. However, the positions not having moved much closer together, it was decided to postpone such a meeting to 1977. This meeting was finally held in Paris from May 30 to June 2 and will be analyzed in the next section.

Oil-Related Policy Initiatives: An Analysis

(1) The North-South Dialogue

As we have seen, the North-South dialogue was initiated by the industrialized countries as a means to enhance the security of crude-oil supplies and was later expanded to include other raw materials and development problems, at the insistence of the Third World. Nevertheless, for Western Europe, crude oil remained the primary reason for these very difficult negotiations, although in many European countries, the supply of other essential raw materials was also a salient motivation for participation in CIEC. We must note, however, that for most Third World representatives, the significant aspects of the dialogue were quite different. The Third World was mainly interested in stabilization of the indexing of

³¹ The following countries participated: *Developed Countries*—United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the EC, representing all its member states. *Developing Countries*—Venezuela, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil, Iran, Zaire, Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Zambia, Argentina, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan and Yugoslavia.

raw-material prices, general development problems, and such financial support as debt moratoriums or cancellations. Many of these issues already had a powerful forum for discussion in UNCTAD. Indeed, some of the issues debated and bargained over at UNCTAD IV (Nairobi, April-May 1977) were also topics at the CIEC meeting in Paris a month later.

The EC countries' long-standing preoccupation with the oil crisis and with coordinated action on a solution became a matter of record in the communiqués issued after the meetings between the EC heads of state and the president of the EC Commission (Paris, December 1974; Dublin, March 1975).³² The preparatory work for the dialogue was carried out under the authority of the EC Council of Ministers by a high-level *ad hoc* committee, composed of representatives of the member states and the commission. In CIEC itself, the European Community was a full-fledged participant and was represented by a single delegation, the president of the Council of Ministers (Dr. David Owens of Great Britain) and the president of the commission (Roy Jenkins) acting as spokesmen for the community. The commission member in charge of EC relations with developing countries, Claude Cheysson, also played a prominent part. In the work of the four CIEC commissions, the EC spokesmen were assisted by delegations composed of representatives of the member states.³³

The strategies to be pursued at CIEC were worked up in the commission and the council in April and early May 1977. In keeping with their chief concern for oil-supply security and control over runaway prices, the main priority was the establishment of a permanent organization in which countries exporting and importing oil and gas could consult on supplies and prices. This body would also deal with energy investment. In order to obtain agreement on this goal from the nineteen developing countries, three spectacular proposals³⁴ were made:

1. *Special emergency action* in favor of the world's poorest countries, perhaps to solicit their support for the EC's main energy objectives. This action was to provide \$1 billion for those countries whose economic status some of the EC member states (Germany and the Netherlands) thought to be too low. These funds would be in addition to existing programs and could be channeled through the IDA (International Development Agency).
2. *Discussion of establishing a "common fund" for raw materials*

³² See *Bulletin of the European Communities*, no. 5, 1977, pp. 9-10.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³⁴ *Agence Europe Bulletin*, April 22 and May 3-4, 1977.

as part of an integrated program for price stabilization and, perhaps, indexing. Since some of the EC countries had been hesitant about this fund, EC agreement to discuss the matter was seen as an important concession to the Third World.

3. *Expansion of the Stabex system* (developed for the EC affiliates under the Lomé Convention) to all Third World countries. This system of commodity-price stabilization is more limited than the "common fund" concept inasmuch as it does not cover all commodities and makes only rather small amounts of money available; but as an innovation, it provides outright grants for price-stabilization purposes to the poorest Lomé affiliates.³⁵

The results of the spring 1977 CIEC meeting, which had to be extended by two days in order to come up with some minor agreements, certainly did not fulfill the hopes of the European Community and its member states, despite encouraging statements by community heads to conceal their obvious disappointment. The EC's key goal — institutionalization of the oil dialogue, and of the energy dialogue in general — was not achieved at the Paris meeting. For the Third World representatives, the problem of technology transfers appeared to be most important, and insofar as oil prices were concerned, OPEC's autonomy was not to be touched.

Regarding the other EC strategies, some initial consensus was reached. The conferees expressed satisfaction about the emergency aid offered by the EC and other developed countries to the very poor countries, leaving details about donor coordination to be worked out later. The establishment of a common fund for an integrated commodity program was agreed upon, and an increase of public aid to the target of 0.7 per cent of GNP was accepted as a goal toward which all industrialized countries should work. No conclusion was reached on the debt issue.³⁶ Further negotiations on all these problems were to be undertaken in UN forums at New York and Geneva.

There can be little question that the strategies of the EC and the other industrialized countries were unsuccessful. A diplomat who attended all the negotiations characterized the results as follows: "The industrialized countries had embarked on negotiations in which they saw a 'plat de resistance' which was of the greatest interest to them, i.e. energy, and a series of 'side dishes', more or less important, which interested the other party. The result was that

³⁵ For a concise description of Stabex, see Carol Cosgrove-Twitchett, "From Association to Partnership," in Kenneth J. Twitchett, ed., *Europe and the World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), pp. 140-142.

³⁶ For details, including texts of statements made by Roy Jenkins and Claude Cheysson, see *Bulletin of the European Communities*, no. 5, 1977, pp. 11-17.

the 'plat de resistance' remained on the table, and the interlocutors obtained the side-plates. One must draw the conclusion that it was a bad deal."³⁷

Perhaps it is an exaggeration to label the whole project a "bad deal." The industrialized oil-consuming countries' hope of obtaining a measure of control over oil prices, in exchange for the "goodies" they were offering, was unrealistic. It was a mistaken calculation because the main priorities of the Third World representatives were in quite different areas, and they seemed to be convinced that they could obtain satisfaction of their interests and demands in due time through the UN forums — without making concessions. The Third World countries, however, may have underestimated the permanence of the oil crisis and its impact on the industrialized countries which can make generosity onerous; for in the view of the latter, the increases in the price of oil and gas have already led to a redistribution of global wealth and are a major cause of the sluggish world economy.

It was evident in the negotiations that the solidarity of the developing countries was very high despite differences in particular interests. Clearly, they did not want to give up the "oil weapon," regardless of the adverse implications for their economic development that are likely to flow from even higher oil prices. One of these implications may be greater reliance by the industrialized world on substitutes for raw materials traditionally imported from developing countries in order to save foreign currency. Manmade fibers instead of rubber or cotton products are an example. Indeed, the representatives of the Third World asked the industrialized countries to impose limits on the production of substitutes, at the same time demanding the transfer of technologies that would enable them to manufacture oil-base synthetic products.

The diversity of interests, motivations and political orientations make the future of the North-South dialogue highly complex. The Third World might rightly feel that CIEC has made progress over the results achieved at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi (especially regarding its common-fund demand) and that further progress is possible in future UN sessions in New York and Geneva (UNCTAD). For the EC countries, the "single voice" approach evident during the CIEC meeting at Paris may well be a precondition if the forthcoming UN-sponsored negotiations are to be successful. While in Paris there were occasional differences of views and evaluations, these

³⁷ Quoted in *Agence Europe Bulletin*, June 6-7, 1977.

seemed to be overcome without much difficulty. Indeed, the EC Council of Ministers has already issued general guidelines for the upcoming negotiations. In 1978, initiatives have again been launched by the community in order to implement the Special Action Program for the poorest developing countries, and a draft convention has been drawn up with the International Development Association for this purpose.³⁸ The developing countries' debt problem is also going to be raised again in forthcoming talks, but the outlook there is very bleak.³⁹ Basically, the coordinating procedures employed at Paris are being used at Geneva and New York, and the substantive positions adopted in April and May of 1977 constitute once again the lines of departure for the negotiations. A new body in the energy sector, within the UN framework, may be a salient goal. It may also be helpful to use the OECD, or even bilateral contacts, in order to coordinate policies among the industrialized countries.⁴⁰

(2) The Euro-Arab Dialogue

As the phrase indicates, the Euro-Arab dialogue is geographically more limited than the North-South dialogue. For the EC countries, however, it serves the same basic purpose: the creation of relationships and mechanisms to enhance the security of crude-oil and natural-gas supplies.

From the EC perspective, the procedural aspects of the Euro-Arab dialogue are interesting inasmuch as the dialogue is conducted as an operation combining the EC external-relations system and the intergovernmental foreign-policy coordinating system of the member states. The European delegation is led by the government chairing the Political Committee meetings and by the EC Commission.⁴¹ The delegation representing the members of the Arab League is led by the country holding the rotating presidency of the league.

The areas of cooperation with which the dialogue deals include industrialization, basic infrastructure, agriculture and rural development, financial cooperation, trade, science, technology, culture, labor and social questions. Several working groups study these areas of cooperation, identify worthwhile projects and make proposals for action to a General Committee.

It is difficult to make a judgment about the concrete

³⁸ *Ibid.*, February 10, 1978.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, January 30-31 and February 8, 1978.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, July 27, 1977.

⁴¹ EC Commission, *Ninth General Report* (1975), pp. 260-261.

results of the dialogue thus far. Plans have been made to establish a Euro-Arab Center for the Transfer of Technology, but so far, no specific action has been taken to construct the center. Commercial cooperation is talked about, as are measures for the encouragement and protection of investment, yet specific proposals are lacking. The situation seems to be the same in other areas,⁴² except for agricultural development, where a project in the Juba Valley of Somalia is taking shape. The European Community has allocated \$120,000 for a feasibility study and expects an Arab contribution of more than \$1 million. This unequal distribution is in accordance with EC policy, which requires that Arab countries, in view of their large oil revenues, should bear the heavier financial burden for all products.⁴³

While undoubtedly it is desirable from the European point of view that more concrete results be achieved within the framework of the Euro-Arab dialogue, the framework of contacts and interpersonal relations that has been built up within the context of the dialogue has an enormous political value in itself, promoting or supporting West European foreign policy goals. In this connection, it is important to point out that of the total EC world trade, the Arab countries' share is very substantial, amounting to 13.5 per cent of EC exports and 20 per cent of its imports. Even more impressive is the share of global Arab trade which the EC enjoys: 40 per cent of Arab exports go to the EC, and imports from the EC amount to 43 per cent. The comparative figures for the United States on the four types of trade flows are 12, 16, 9 and 13 per cent, respectively.⁴⁴

Another advantage of the Euro-Arab dialogue is less obvious. If the network of contracts established by the dialogue can be presented as a possible means to obtain benefits and concessions for the EC member countries, benefits that might be denied other Western industrialized states, then the dialogue might provide the EC countries with a modicum of leverage against the United States.

From the political point of view, it is noteworthy that during the second meeting of the General Committee, held at Tunis in February 1977, the Europeans felt constrained to reiterate the concerns of the Nine over continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories since 1967, and to restate that a solution of the Middle

⁴² *Agence Europe Bulletin*, May 20-21, 1977.

⁴³ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, no. 2, 1977, pp. 64-78. The Arab side would like to obtain a preferential trade agreement with the EC for all Arab states, but that has been consistently rejected by the EC. See *Agence Europe Bulletin*, September 14, 1977.

⁴⁴ *Agence Europe, Selected Statistics*, June 13, 1977.

East conflict will be possible only "if the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact."⁴⁵ The Nine also opposed any move by Israel to alter unilaterally the status of Jerusalem. According to the final communique, the Arabs expressed their appreciation for this attitude. Later meetings of the General Committee have been more relaxed, but the position of the Nine was expressed again, perhaps more forcefully, to a much wider public during the meeting of the "European Council" (heads of state of the Nine) in London at the end of June 1977. A "Declaration on the Middle East" issued at that time re-emphasized the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation maintained since 1967 and requested that Israel be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their need for a "homeland."⁴⁶ Although, not surprisingly, this declaration aroused a very negative reaction in Israel and a vigorous diplomatic protest, it simply confirms and continues a policy line drawn by the nine member states, individually and as a group, which began with the Copenhagen summit in December 1973. The deep official sympathies for Israel held by most EC governments were abandoned as a result of the oil debacle and powerful pressures from the Arab oil producers. National interests, perhaps even survival, were the motivating forces for this change in policy by the Nine. Yet the damage done to the economies of Western Europe by the sharp rise of crude-oil prices has not been repaired by the policy shift, as evidenced by continued high unemployment and rampaging inflation in nearly all West European countries. Most likely, though, things could have been worse, and from this point of view the Euro-Arab dialogue may be seen as a useful damage-control mechanism.

(3) EC Commercial Relations in the Middle East

Despite the support given by the European Community and the governments of the Nine to the positions of the Arab countries in the Middle East, there has been a clear effort by the community to take an evenhanded approach in commercial relations with all the Middle East countries bordering the Mediterranean.

For many years, the community has pursued a systematic policy under which preferential agreements have been concluded with all countries (except Libya) rimming this re-found *mare nos-*

⁴⁵ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, no. 2, 1977, p. 65.

⁴⁶ *Agence Europe Bulletin*, July 1, 1977.

trum. The rationale has been the existence of historical relationships, the responsibility to extend to these countries a helping hand, and the need to develop a spirit of solidarity. Between 1960 and 1970, trade with this area has almost tripled and represents a hefty share of EC total trade with third countries, including, of course, large amounts of oil.⁴⁷

Israel has had a regular trade agreement since 1964, but was given preferential treatment in 1970 in line with the above-described Mediterranean policy. The agreement was modified and extended in 1975 into a "cooperative" accord, which encompasses the industrial, scientific and trade fields and establishes a joint committee to identify opportunities for cooperation and to help in the realization of joint ventures. We should note that cooperation going beyond the mere regulation of trade relations is now the aim of all bilateral negotiations by the EC with third countries.

Of the Arab countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, Lebanon was the first to sign a trade accord with the EC (in 1965). This accord became a preferential agreement in 1972, and in that year, Egypt signed a similar accord. Since 1977, these countries and Syria have become parties to a broad cooperative agreement, emphasizing economic, technical, financial and commercial collaboration through a suitable institutional mechanism.⁴⁸ Similar agreements have been in force with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia since 1976.⁴⁹ In all these countries, the EC will open information offices.

Iran has also been interested in a preferential cooperative agreement with the EC. Since Iran does not border on the Mediterranean, however, the EC has not given Iran the same preferential treatment. A far-reaching cooperative accord is likely to be concluded, however. A West European market for Iran's manufactured goods is necessary for the fulfillment of high aspirations regarding industrialization. Iran would like the joint cooperation committee to be established on a ministerial (political) level rather than only on a more technical level.⁵⁰ The EC is likely to accept, perhaps thereby increasing leverage on oil delivery for its member states.

It is obvious that this extensive network of EC economic

⁴⁷ Feld, pp. 149-150.

⁴⁸ For details, see *Agence Europe Bulletin*, January 19, 1977.

⁴⁹ All agreements permit duty-free entry of industrial products from the Mediterranean countries into the EC. This benefits Israel especially, but only Israel must make reciprocal concessions by 1980; the principle of reciprocity does not apply to the Arab agreements. (*Agence Europe Bulletin*, July 4-5, 1977.)

⁵⁰ See *ibid.*, April 20 and May 14, 1977.

and political relations with the Middle East and with North African Arab countries may well further the attainment of West European policy goals: viz., to ensure optimal petroleum-supply security and to influence price development and balance-of-payments patterns. In addition, individual EC countries seek to bolster links with the oil producers and to gain balance-of-payments benefits through sales of major capital goods and military hardware. Iran, for example, has ordered nuclear power stations from Germany and France, and the latter country has agreed to supply Egypt with jet fighters and to build an aircraft industry funded by the Arab oil producers.⁵¹

The Search for Non-Arab Oil and Uranium Supplies

(1) The Lomé Convention

The West Europeans have also been preoccupied with petroleum resources outside the Middle East and with uranium supplies to fuel the growing number of nuclear energy plants that may compensate for Europe's gradually declining oil reserves. Oil and uranium resources are both available in Africa within the territories of the EC-Lomé affiliates. (Nigeria and Zaire are examples.) It would therefore not have been surprising if the Lomé Convention had been used by the EC as some kind of lever to obtain preferences for the supply of these raw materials. The convention, however, does not contain any delivery guarantees for these commodities in periods of shortage and thus does not discriminate against other countries buying on the world market. Of course, some concealed favoritism toward EC countries under conditions of supply shortages cannot be ruled out. Indeed, it should be anticipated.

In this regard, the foreign-policy coordination meeting of the EC foreign ministers, held in July 1977, is interesting. The discussion dealt with African matters and sought to determine whether a "Euro-African" doctrine, which could be used as a basis for policy toward Africa, should be elaborated. Although the ministers' concern was prompted mainly by instabilities arising from South African problems and the situation in the Gulf of Aden, thoughts about oil and uranium must not have been far away. After the meeting, it was stated that Europe should bring all its influence to bear to ensure that changes in Africa come about in a peaceful manner: "Europe must be Africa's lawyer in its legitimate demand to be free of any foreign influence."⁵² What this may imply, specifi-

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, June 23, 1977.

⁵² *Ibid.*, July 13, 1977.

cally in terms of oil and uranium supply, is difficult to judge. The Political Committee has been instructed to draw up a text regarding a policy which Europe should pursue vis-a-vis Africa, and when that becomes public, it may be possible to draw more definite conclusions.

Preparations are now under way for a renewal of the Lomé Convention (Lomé II) which will come into force in March 1981. The commission has proposed as an initial negotiating stance that the principles of the Lomé Convention will be continued. Commercial and industrial cooperation is to be strengthened, however, and greater emphasis is to be placed on regional cooperation. It is interesting that France is seeking to enhance Euro-African solidarity and that the European Community might underwrite private investments in the Third World, especially insofar as the supply of specific commodities is concerned.⁵³

(2) Other Supply Possibilities

Substantial crude-oil resources in Southeast Asia and parts of Latin America are also of interest to policymakers in the European Community and its member states. During the first industrial-cooperation conference between the EC and ASEAN countries, held in April 1977, future cooperation in energy was given major emphasis.⁵⁴ The procurement of energy sources is likely to be an important factor in cooperative agreements with Mexico and Brazil as well. During the past few years, Mexico has announced the discovery of new oil reserves, and extensive exploration for oil is under way in northern Brazil, especially in the Amazon River Basin. In northern Brazil, considerable deposits of uranium have also been discovered.⁵⁵

Since the United States has not been the most reliable supplier of uranium, and since its nonproliferation policy could cause difficulties for the future supply of enriched uranium, the EC countries have cast about for alternate sources of supply. Although Canada also has large uranium deposits and has been a major supplier of uranium to Western Europe, Ottawa suspended shipments at the beginning of 1977. The reasons for this step included France's refusal to submit to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the fact that reprocessing plants could produce plutonium, used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

⁵³ *Die Welt* (Bonn), January 27, 1978; *Agence Europe Bulletin*, February 17, 1978.

⁵⁴ *Agence Europe Bulletin*, April 7, 1977.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, May 7, 1977.

Interruption of the uranium supply became the subject of negotiations in July between German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. Those negotiations have led to a temporary relaxation of Canadian restrictions on uranium supplies, especially to Germany, but a final agreement between the Canadians and the EC may have to await further discussion of the nonproliferation issue between the Canadian and U.S. governments.⁵⁶

Australia, another source of uranium, has also announced export restrictions, for the same reasons as Canada. This, too, has caused concern among the EC countries, and efforts are being made to reach agreement with the Australian government on this matter.⁵⁷

Because of what the European Community considers (a) the "growing politicization" of the question of nuclear fuels, (b) "exorbitant" demands with respect to safety, formulated by the community's main suppliers of uranium, and (c) the continuous rise in prices, intensive prospecting for uranium has begun within the EC territory. Prospecting ventures have been initiated in Britain, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Greenland and Germany. The EC Commission has provided grants for this purpose, but the results are not known.⁵⁸

The Nonproliferation Issue

As noted above, the oil crisis has stimulated extensive plans for the use of nuclear energy to generate electricity. Although the projections made in 1974 have not been realized thus far, President Carter's policies on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (policies already initiated by President Ford toward the end of his term) have caused much consternation in West European governmental circles. The U.S. desire to halt the sale of reprocessing plants, promoting instead the transfer of other, "appropriate" technologies to countries not now possessing reprocessing facilities,⁵⁹ have especially affected West Germany and France. Bonn had signed a multibillion-dollar contract with Brazil for delivery of nuclear plants including reprocessing facilities, and France had formulated a similar undertaking with Pakistan. Although all participants in the London summit agreed to a pause in the production of "sensitive" installations, Germany declared it would proceed in the fulfillment

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, July 14, 16-17, 1977.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, May 27, 1977.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, July 21, 1977.

⁵⁹ For details, see Andrew J. Pierre with Claudia W. Moyne, *Nuclear Proliferation: A Strategy for Control* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1976).

of its contractual obligations with Brazil, regardless of American arm-twisting. Chancellor Schmidt insisted that Germany must be faithful to the contract and that, besides, thousands of German jobs were at stake. France, at first more hesitant to defy American policy, later joined Germany.

Potential conflict with the United States has been largely defused, at least for the time being, by an agreement among fifteen countries which have been major exporters of nuclear technology or which are on the threshold of joining that group.⁶⁰ Future sales of sensitive nuclear technology are to be subject to tough controls, and lax safeguards such as those found in the German and French contracts (possibly there to provide a competitive advantage) are to be avoided.

In order to ensure nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States has also indicated the need for a gradual suspension of shipments of highly enriched uranium and has strongly opposed the construction of fast-breeder reactors. These positions have given rise to serious concern in Western Europe, although it may not be fully understood that Washington does not object to fast breeders per se, only to those models that cannot be safeguarded under the IAEA inspection program. The EC Commission has come out strongly against the American policies and is determined to continue the fast-breeder pilot program, now close to reaching the industrial stage. It also persists in a policy of reprocessing nuclear waste, pointing out that fast-breeder reactors are sixty times more efficient than light-water reactors and that reprocessing will save up to 20 per cent a year in uranium costs. At the same time, the commission seems to realize that in view of the tough attitudes of the United States, Canada and Australia, perhaps the Euratom inspection methods will have to be tightened up to satisfy the strong nonproliferation interests of those countries.⁶¹

The EC Council of Ministers has not yet given its approval to all commission proposals. It may in the future, however, although minor modifications may have to be made. France and Germany have signed a cooperative agreement for improving R&D work on the fast-breeder reactors, and other member governments have agreed on the need to work toward construction of various demon-

⁶⁰ United States, Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, Japan, West Germany and Canada. The newcomers are Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland. See *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), September 23, 1977.

⁶¹ See *Agence Europe Bulletin*, June 30 and July 28-29, 1977.

stration plants. Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands are in the forefront of those pushing ahead with these projects.⁶²

Meanwhile, France has perfected a new uranium-enrichment process which can produce weakly enriched uranium to feed nuclear power stations (light-water). This process excludes high-concentration enrichment, which is indispensable for the manufacture of atomic weapons, and would therefore help dissipate anxieties over the proliferation of atomic weapons. Adoption of this process would demonstrate France's determination not to encourage nuclear-weapons proliferation and would permit an independent nuclear policy that meets French energy requirements. France, however, will continue its program for the construction of Super-Phénix fast-breeder stations, as well as its reprocessing of nuclear fuels at La Hague, near Cherbourg.⁶³

Tensions in EC Foreign Relations

The oil crisis has injected new discussions and potential sources of conflict in the foreign relations of Western Europe, both with other industrialized countries and with developing nations. A pervasive and very serious concern with economic well-being has been the motivating force behind the formulation of policies that seek to ensure needed sources of energy. These policies have made it necessary, at least for some governments, to jettison traditional sympathies toward Israel. They have also affected Atlantic relations. New links with developing countries have been constructed, in an effort to secure the continued goodwill of the oil producers, which, despite their new-found wealth, remain essentially part of the Third World. The intensive search for alternate energy sources has produced tensions with the United States, which retains its dominant position in uranium technology and is eager to implement a new nonproliferation policy perceived by most Europeans as severely harmful to crucial West European interests.

How successful have the oil-related external policies of the EC countries been? What are the prospects for the future? As a policy instrument, the North-South dialogue may have expanded and reinforced useful contacts, but despite major concessions to the Third World that could also have been made in the UN forums, no guarantee for oil delivery or price restraint has been obtained from the Arab oil producers. Indeed, as pointed out above, future

⁶² *Ibid.*, July 2, 30, 1977.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, May 6, 1977.

negotiations may take place within the UN proper or in UNCTAD — a draft resolution to this effect was introduced in the UN General Assembly in September 1977.⁶⁴ Thus, the North-South dialogue as a separate mechanism might be abandoned entirely, or at least lose much of its value.

The Euro-Arab dialogue has also strengthened the network of relations between the EC countries and the Arabs, but how much it has concretely enhanced the security of oil supplies is difficult to say. It may be prudent to be skeptical of any plan that would hope to sway the oil producers to a decisively more favorable attitude toward Western Europe in times of crisis.

Greater leverage for the EC countries may be available under the Lomé arrangements, at least insofar as oil supplies from Africa are concerned. The Lomé connection has become increasingly important for the affiliated countries, and the economic and political influence of the community has been on the rise. How much impact these relationships might have, directly or indirectly, on oil producers in other parts of the Third World, especially in the Middle East, one cannot say with any certainty; but most likely it would be rather minor. On the other hand, individual economic-cooperation agreements with Mexico or ASEAN countries may help keep the oil flowing to Western Europe. Here, it must be kept in mind that Great Britain may well achieve oil sufficiency by 1980⁶⁵ and that Norway will become a net exporter of oil. At the same time, the Third World cannot ignore the fact that the quadrupling of the oil price has been a major cause both of inflation and the general economic malaise in Western Europe and elsewhere, and that this phenomenon adversely affects its own economic fortunes. Cartels to regulate prices of other raw materials found mostly in the Third World will not help the economic situation; rather, they will add to the forces fueling inflation. Indeed, in view of the well-publicized interdependence of the world, the developing countries might be well advised to put pressure on all oil producers in order to restrain them from further increasing prices or reducing the flow of oil.

The German-French rejection of the key features of America's nonproliferation policy, which was largely based on strategic, political and, not to a small degree, on moral considerations, initially gave rise to major transatlantic tensions. The rejection had strong

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, September 19, 1977.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, April 28, 1977, and *Wall Street Journal*, September 12, 1977. See also Pierre Desprairies, "Le problème de l'énergie trois ans après la crise pétrolière," *Politique Etrangère*, vol. 42, no. 1, 1977, pp. 21-34, and Guy deCarmoy, *Energy for Europe* (Washington: AEI, 1977), pp. 75-79.

popular support in Germany, as my experiences as a visiting professor in West Berlin and my observations throughout Germany confirmed again and again. Despite widespread protest against all nuclear activities, it seems that much of the French populace also supported their government. Joint studies on uranium enrichment and reprocessing, studies approved at the London summit of May 1977, have not been completed; but the EC Council of Ministers' likely adoption of the commission's plans and concepts relating both to these matters and to the need for fast-breeder reactors may well set the stage for a feud between the United States and the EC member governments. Indeed, already existing commercial competition over sales of nuclear facilities to third countries,⁶⁶ and Western Europe's very legitimate desire to ensure adequate energy sources, can only contribute to transatlantic discord. That national egoism on both sides of the Atlantic, rather than the rational imperative of alliance cooperation, may carry the day is a danger that cannot be denied. Much will depend on top-level foreign-policymakers and their perceptions of the political cost of divergent policies compared with the cost of closely coordinated policies. The greater the cost of policy divergence, the more attractive will be close policy coordination. The IEA, an example of such coordination, has clearly proved its usefulness by reducing the threat of another oil embargo and thereby reducing the potential for panic in Western Europe.

With respect to European unification, the hope that the oil crisis might act as a catalyst for community solidarity and provide an impetus toward political integration proved to be a short-lived illusion. Indeed, each member state chose to deal individually with its own problems, often at the expense of its neighbors. But, as we know, this attitude was not confined to Western Europe. On the other hand, the coordination procedures and institutional mechanisms developed on an intergovernmental basis to cope with the effects of the oil crisis have sharpened diplomatic and bureaucratic skills for cross-national policy cooperation. They may also have favorable long-range implications for European unity.

⁶⁶ France has succeeded recently in selling Iran two nuclear power plants worth \$3 billion and has offered to reprocess nuclear fuel for Japan on a long-term basis. (*Wall Street Journal*, September 6, 10, 1977.)

ISRAEL IN NATO: BASIS FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT?*

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

By his historic visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977, and his prompt opening of direct negotiations with Israel, in Cairo on December 14, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat has transformed the Arab-Israeli cockpit. For the first time in thirty years, after four costly and dangerous wars, a peace settlement of sorts — whether partial or comprehensive — is being discussed for the twentieth century's most protracted conflict.

For the moment, everything seems possible, yet nothing is certain. As the principal protagonists grapple with the concrete issues, the bedrock of realities will have to be faced. There are no precedents, no guidelines, no sense (as yet) of where the constraints will draw the line to an accord. It is far too early to know whether a partial settlement will emerge, ending the conflict between Egypt and Israel only, thus obviating the likelihood of another major Arab-Israeli war; or whether Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian leaders will enter the negotiations and help fashion a comprehensive settlement; or whether the talks started at Cairo will bog down, falter and fail to produce a significant agreement. With failure, war again becomes a feasible option by the early 1980s.

A fifth Arab-Israeli war, if matters come to such a head, would be a disaster for the West. Given the growing arms build-up and the congealed bitterness and hostility that would result from collapse of the Sadat initiative, a fifth war would not only be costly and destructive to Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, but would also threaten the continued viability of the Western security community. Unlike the massive and sustained Soviet military build-up in Europe, which serves to promote alliance cohesion, another Arab-Israeli war would searingly expose the unresolved U.S.-West

* This article is the product of a study on the strategic and political implications for NATO of soviet policy in the Mediterranean-Middle East area, work on which was begun during the summer of 1977 with a NATO Research Fellowship. The views are the author's own and are not to be construed as in any way representing official NATO policy. The author, however, expresses his appreciation to NATO for its assistance.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. A frequent writer on problems in the Middle East, he is the author of *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the Six-Day War* (Princeton University Press, 1977).

European disagreements over the Middle East and grievously hurt Western economies still not fully recovered from the effects of the 1973 October War. The unity of the Atlantic Alliance would be undermined, and the internal political stability of those NATO members highly vulnerable to the Arab oil weapon would be jeopardized. The events of 1973 made amply clear the umbilical connection between an Arab-Israeli war and destabilizing propensities in the West. It showed, too, that the fighting would be as much with oil as with weapons. Another war would also pave the way for a far-reaching re-entry by the Soviet Union into the mainstream of the Arab world. Only Moscow and anti-Western radical movements and personalities stand to benefit from a fifth Arab-Israeli war.

For the moment, the initiative lies with Sadat and Begin. They will define the limits and set the pace. One might hope that their efforts will be crowned with success, but success may well depend on credible guarantees from credible and congenial friends. Ideally, an overall settlement would be preferable. "Step-by-step" diplomacy has run out of variations, and lobbying for a reconvoction of the stillborn Geneva conference is more a desperate move to sustain the illusion of momentum than a prescription for breaking the impasse. What is required is a conceptual design that matches in tangible fashion the psychological breakthrough made by President Sadat. A comprehensive settlement should provide concrete advantages for all the confrontation states and for the nations of the Western world which have a crucial stake in the future of the area.

The feat of fashioning an overall settlement is beyond the capability of the United States alone. What is essential now is a Western, not just an American, initiative. To be successful, it must devise and guarantee a settlement that safeguards the basic interests of both sides, without trying or expecting to be completely satisfying to either side. This Western initiative must be realistic, far-reaching, specific in its conditions and guarantees, and formulated to strengthen the case of those constituencies on both sides who genuinely seek to end the spiraling cycle of death, destruction and onerous arms races. It must commit the Western countries collectively; preserve the basic security interests of each of the Middle Eastern parties; bar the Soviet Union, whose long-term aims are antithetical to those of the West; and exclude the United Nations, which has shown itself incapable of preventing or ending wars involving competing superpower interests.

The involvement of the Western community is vital. Without it, another war in the Middle East may well undermine the

NATO security community. Another war could seriously impair the ability of alliance members to meet their military responsibilities in Europe, their economic and political systems dangerously shaken by another rupture of the oil flow and all that follows from such an eventuality.

Any Western-sponsored settlement that is to have a chance of success must provide for the following:

1. A formalized, institutionalized and credible arrangement that guarantees the national security and territorial integrity of Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon—the countries directly involved—against attack by protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict;
2. Formal recognition by each of these parties of the existence and territorial integrity of all the others;
3. Outside pressure sufficient to help the political leadership of each country to obtain needed domestic support for the settlement;
4. Security guarantees that are explicit, automatically invoked and effective; and
5. A solution for the Palestinian problem.

II

All the necessary and sufficient conditions for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict could, I believe, be met if Israel were admitted to NATO — it always being understood that membership be linked to Israeli and Arab acceptance of a formal peace settlement, the main provisions of which will be outlined below.

The crucial, initial step is for NATO to admit Israel into the alliance. Let us look at the advantages inherent in this proposal, for they go beyond those of the many proposals that have been raised in recent years.

First, with membership in NATO, Israel would have a formal treaty guaranteeing its independence, security and territorial integrity within adjusted and recognized borders — not just from the United States but from the entire Atlantic Alliance. Of course, Israel's key ally would be the United States (as it is at present for all of the NATO countries), but diplomatically and politically Israel would have powerful friends. Israel, then, would no longer be a beleaguered state; and, militarily, it would have regular access to the most advanced weaponry as a matter of normal alliance procedure and not as a perennial act of favoritism or largess. Israel would be an ally, not a ward.

Equally important, Israeli membership in NATO should forestall any possible future attacker: the knowledge that an attack

on Israel would automatically involve NATO should, in and of itself, be enough to end the recurring cycle of Arab-Israeli war. It would be enough if it restrained only Egypt, without whose participation no Arab coalition to destroy Israel is plausible. Finally, with strong allies, with firm treaty guarantees from a credible alliance, Israel might have less of a fixation on "defensible" borders. The "territorial imperative" would not loom so prominently in Israeli thinking, and Israel might be willing, under such circumstances, to return to an approximation of the June 4, 1967, borders. The trade-off of optimally defensible borders for merely adequate ones would be more than compensated for by the acquisition of powerful allies, formal guarantees against attack, international recognition of adjusted borders, regularized patterns of arms acquisition and intelligence exchange, and Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for the settlement to be negotiated between them.

Second, Israeli agreement to a NATO-engineered settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict would buttress the position of the West in the Arab world and the outlook of those Arab leaderships already favorably disposed to the West. The United States and Western Europe would be assured of good relations with Saudi Arabia and other key Western-oriented Arab oil producers, and they will have eliminated the one impediment to an uninterrupted flow of oil, encouraged the expansion of Western-Arab economic relationships, and set the stage for diminution of Middle East arms races. With the defusing of dangerous political disagreements, the links between Western technology and expertise, on the one hand, and Arab oil and capital, on the other, would be soundly forged. And only an interdependency resting on solid political, as well as economic, foundations can have a meaningful impact on regional and international stability.

The U.S. commitment to the existence and defense of Israel, already deeply rooted in American politics and conviction, would be formalized in felicitous ways that would strengthen NATO's cohesiveness and Israel's security. The United States stands in unique relationship to Israel. Having demonstrated its readiness to defend Israel from Soviet-backed attack, Washington would welcome Israel's admission to NATO. It would welcome an arrangement that committed the NATO allies to defend Israel within adjusted and internationally recognized borders. If Israel were a member of NATO and were attacked, it would be assisted, like any other NATO member, without question. There would be no repeat of October 1973, when the United States found itself hampered and

at odds with several of its allies over the issue of using NATO facilities to aid a non-NATO member. A serious source of past alliance tension, then, would be eliminated.

Third, another advantage accruing to NATO would be the setback dealt to Soviet ambitions in the area. There is no question that an overall settlement (as distinct from a partial settlement) is antithetical to Soviet aims. Moscow feeds on regional rivalries and tensions. Since 1967, its major advances in the Arab world have occurred in periods of heightened tension, of "no war, no peace." Understandably, the Soviets have never shown any real interest in pressing their Arab clients to compromise with Israel, except on terms that Israel would clearly not accept. To deprive the Soviet Union of the most dangerous and pervasive rivalry in the Middle East would be to diminish sharply its capacity for mischief, the basic purposes of which are to weaken the position of the United States and disrupt relations between the West and the Arab world.

Nothing could be more ill-conceived, less perceptive of basic Soviet policy or aims, or strategically myopic than to involve the USSR in a Middle East settlement; or, even worse, to base a settlement on joint U.S.-Soviet guarantees. (What would happen if Soviet policy shifted and embarked on a course of subverting the condominium?) An overall settlement that depended on continued Soviet-American cooperation would provide Moscow with unacceptable leverage over the United States. Nothing would better suit Moscow. Nothing would be less suited to establishing and preserving peace between Israel and its neighbors.

Fourth, the advantages to Western Europe would be immediately realized and long-lasting. In facilitating a settlement, the Europeans would be (a) eliminating the reason for another, even more disruptive, oil embargo or sudden boost in oil prices and (b) taking timely action to prevent another devastating recession, in this way cushioning their systems against the destabilizing political consequences of energy-induced unemployment, inflation and industrial retrenchment. They could look forward to an end of the economic uncertainty that has frustrated their recovery efforts, and to a renewed impetus for economic and technological cooperation between Western Europe and the Arab East. Western Europe's economic stability and development stands only to be strengthened by an Arab-Israeli settlement.

Politically, the way would at long last be open for Western Europe and the United States to formulate a common policy on the

Middle East. The way would be open to supplant the persisting suspicion, rivalry and friction that has marred relations since 1945, eating into alliance cohesion, with a constructive, mutually beneficial and coherent strategy for dealing with the core conflict in the Middle East. And the way would be open to ensure that the Arab-Israeli conflict does not become the screw unhinging NATO. The October 1973 war was a warning. A crisis in the Middle East that can sharply divide Western Europe from the United States bears within it the seeds for a dangerous erosion of alliance relationships, from which only the Soviet Union can benefit.

The helplessness that Western Europe has felt as it viewed developments in the Middle East can, through participation in the shaping and implementation of a settlement, be quickly ended. Western Europe has an opportunity to play a vital role in securing its economic and political well-being. It can sharply reduce the likelihood of a war that would adversely affect its stability and prosperity. The notion that individual countries making separate deals with Arab oil producers can insulate themselves from the consequences of another war has little to commend it, either in logic or past experience. Willy-nilly, the countries of Western Europe are deeply affected by what happens in the Middle East, and by their reluctance to help pioneer a way out of the Arab-Israeli conflict, they may well find themselves victims of the superpower clash they seek to prevent.

Fifth, a reassured Israel might also be willing to sign a nonproliferation treaty, thereby advancing the Carter administration's goal of containing the nuclear arms race and encouraging economic development as a political alternative to war.

Finally, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon — the Arab states most involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and with the most to gain — would find that their own national interests would be furthered by an Israeli membership in NATO that is linked to an overall settlement. Though the principal focus of this essay is to discuss the possibilities for peace inherent in Israel's admission to NATO, still, some brief statement is required concerning the kind of settlement Israel and the Arab states would be asked to accept in return for the security package and other advantages offered them. These proposals are offered tentatively, with the caveat that the final, precise arrangements on some of these matters should be negotiated directly by the Arab states and Israel at a peace conference: (1) Sinai would be returned to Egypt, with an arrangement for the long-term demilitarization of Sharm el Sheik; (2) the Golan

Heights would be returned to Syria and would be partially demilitarized; (3) Jerusalem would remain united and Israeli, with provisions for Jordanian control over Muslim holy places; and (4) the West Bank and Gaza would be granted autonomy, in some kind of confederation with Jordan (they would be permanently demilitarized — no tanks, no artillery and no military aircraft would be permitted in either area, the stipulation being made that violation would automatically set in motion and legitimize Israeli occupation).

These proposals are made in the belief that though they may well undergo modification once the parties to the conflict get down to serious negotiations, their essentials are politically attractive and acceptable to the principals involved. For a genuine peace with ironclad guarantees, Israel will have to relinquish territory, and the Arab protagonists will have to recognize Israel within adjusted borders and end their belligerency.

III

For the sake of argument, let us assume that the above basic proposals, when coupled with Israel's membership in NATO (without which none of the concessions called for above is likely to see the print of a treaty), would bring about an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and then let us examine the reasons that will nevertheless be marshaled against admitting Israel to NATO.

The first and perhaps the most compelling argument against admitting Israel to NATO is that NATO was not intended to operate outside the European security community. It is a military alliance established for the defense of Europe against the threat of Soviet attack. It will be argued that expanding the alliance to include Israel, a non-European state, would involve NATO in extraregional quarrels that have nothing to do with the Soviet Union and that would seriously weaken NATO's *raison d'être*. History has shown that the efficacy of any alliance system depends on keeping the threat that initially brought it into being as specific, clearly focused and commonly accepted as possible.

This conception of NATO is narrowly military. It argues a minimalist case for alliance cooperation against what is deemed to be a receding possibility of Soviet attack (owing to the vulnerability of each side to nuclear retaliation). It is defensive-minded and accepts the need for measured ripostes, but only when confronted with a direct military challenge by the Soviet Union. Intrinsicly status-quo-oriented, it would have alliance members

maintain strong national military establishments, on the assumption that these serve as adequate deterrence; only in times of crisis need contingency plans for collective defense be implemented. Moreover, it regards the central front (i.e., West Germany) as the most probable locus of a Soviet offensive thrust.

This view of NATO has prevailed for more than a generation. During that time, alliance cohesion has frequently suffered because of disagreements (extraneous to the Soviet threat) between the United States and West European members over a number of issues, the most prominent of which now are the Middle East, international economic and energy policies, and Washington's penchant for trying to establish a special detente relationship with Moscow. Though the alliance has withstood past strains and has continued to function, at stake now is its viability in a milieu of incipient economic collapse: Would not the economic dislocation in Western Europe, and the resultant domestic forces that might be unleashed in the event of a major Arab-Israeli war, seriously undermine NATO's political unity?

The NATO security community has been steadily weakened as a consequence of a flawed conception of what is crucial for the continued cohesiveness of the alliance. The flaws inhere in the failure (a) to accord proper importance to the integral link between Moscow's policies in Europe and in the Middle East, the function of which is to weaken NATO by aggravating the Arab-Israeli conflict and exploiting U.S.-West European policy differences; (b) to act forcefully to promote the interdependence between a strong NATO and an economically stable Western Europe, which requires sound and expanding ties with the oil-producing states of the Middle East; (c) to assign sufficient weight to the geostrategic importance of the Mediterranean basin; and (d) to eschew passivity and adopt an activist, though indirect, strategy to counter Soviet designs and adventurism in the Middle East, thereby keeping Moscow prudent in Europe.

Despite more than two decades of evidence, NATO minimalists refuse to accept the proposition that Soviet policy in the Arab world is formulated primarily with the Western world in mind. At the heart of Moscow's post-1953 "forward policy" in the Third World, in which the Middle East has been accorded pride of place, is the conviction, ideologically derived and generated, but strategically sound (more so now than when Lenin propounded it in 1916), that the West can be brought to its knees by disrupting

its connections with the markets and raw materials of the former colonial world.

Nowhere has Moscow persisted more with this policy than in the Middle East. It has opened its arsenal to promising clients and has committed military power on behalf of clients whose policies have been detrimental to the West. The Arab-Israeli conflict was a boon to Moscow, and the Soviets know that so long as the conflict goes on — nothing has occurred to persuade them that it will end in the foreseeable future — and so long as the United States upholds Israel's right to exist, the Arab countries will not be able to wage a major war without some assurance of Soviet assistance. The greater the intensity of the conflict, the greater is Arab reliance on the arms and shield that Moscow proffers. Notwithstanding repeated setbacks and rebuffs, Moscow is prepared to provision another go-around because of the potential for capital gains at the West's expense, gains to be realized largely in Europe, in the aggravation of intercapitalist "contradictions" (viz., economic dislocation and NATO disunity).

Moscow is patient. It watches U.S. efforts to generate progress toward a settlement, confident that they will fail and that the key Arab parties will eventually have to call in the Soviet Union from the wings and ask its support. Whether the prospect is another decade of "no war, no peace" or another war, Moscow can view the ongoing imbroglio with equanimity: none of its vital interests is affected, while those of its main adversaries can only be harmed. At rather little cost, it can require the United States to expend a great deal, in resources and in goodwill.

Given Western Europe's dependence on Arab oil (and investment) and the known economic and political harm that a fifth Arab-Israeli war could do, the Soviet provision of arms to the Middle East should be seen for what it is — a protracted proxy war, cleverly subsidized, against the NATO security community. Hence, the USSR's attention to the Mediterranean basin, which Moscow sees as a strategic hub reinforcing and cross-connecting the economic, political and military sinews of the Western geopolitical network. An erosion of Western connections in the Mediterranean-Middle East region will have magnified effects elsewhere.

NATO's test is not in Europe, where the Soviet threat is clear, constant and containable, but in the Middle East where the danger is more subtle and less overtly military. A hobbled Western Europe will embolden Moscow there and elsewhere. What a NATO-

engineered overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict can do is to frustrate Moscow's one strong card in the Middle East power game and occasion a Soviet rethinking of relations with the West. A fruitful NATO initiative would transform the international environment in which Moscow has expected to weaken the West: instead of a hotbed of war, the Middle East would become a hot-house of development. That is to say, by arranging an Arab-Israeli settlement, NATO would deprive the Soviet Union of a prime setting for weakening the West, in the process perhaps leading Moscow to re-evaluate the validity of the ideologically reinforcing assumptions on which it has predicated its imperial rivalry with the West. The result could be a change in Moscow's policy toward the West and the Middle East. There is no reason why NATO should limit itself to passive defense or remain wedded to a "Maginot Line" strategy in its dealings with the Soviet Union. Much can be gained by adoption of an indirect strategy for countering Soviet probes and influencing Soviet attitudes. But the main point to be kept in mind is this: if NATO membership for Israel can, in fact, help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Atlantic Alliance will have done more to ensure the stability and unity of the community it is designed to protect than has been accomplished by any other single act since the birth of NATO. What better reason for action?

A second argument against Israeli membership is that it would exacerbate polarization in the region and enable Moscow to exploit Arab fears of "imperialism." This might be true of a U.S.-Israeli treaty, but not of a NATO-Israeli treaty specifically tied to an overall settlement. If the key Arab states — Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia (without whose express approval none of the others would proceed) — negotiated a settlement along the general lines outlined above, no significant polarization would result. Did not Sadat state before his April 1977 visit to the United States that Israel could have any guarantees it wanted in return for a settlement? Of course, Moscow might pander to the die-hard Arab states (Libya, Iraq and Algeria), which have no immediate stake in the Arab-Israeli conflict, other than enhancement of their own ambitions in the Arab world, and which are not in a position to wage war against Israel on their own. Could Moscow really afford to label all the parties to a settlement as "Zionists" and "agents of imperialism"? Would it not then show itself to be the *provocateur* it is and destroy any future role for itself in the rest of the Arab world?

Once having accepted the terms of a NATO-guaranteed settlement, the Arab signatories, who would be provided with guar-

antees as concrete as those given to Israel, would have a political stake in its success and would strenuously resist Soviet propaganda. Moscow would try to undo what NATO had wrought, but in the absence of the all-pervasive Arab-Israeli conflict of the past decade or so, it would find itself bereft of influence to effect regional developments or the outlook of the leading Arab actors.

A corollary of this argument contends that Israel would be considered by the Arab states as a "Western policeman" in the Middle East and would never be accepted as an independent country with a legitimate claim to participation in regional political and economic developments. The result would be a new wall between Israel and its Arab neighbors. While there is merit in this contention, it is nonetheless difficult to imagine how the present situation could be worse. Does a pariah receive better treatment than a policeman? A new political reality such as would be created by an overall settlement at least offers hope for some improvement over the current relationship.

Finally, there is the argument that if Israel were admitted to NATO, the Atlantic Alliance would become embroiled in perennial quarrels between Israel and the Arab states, quite apart from any threat exacerbated by Soviet encouragement. But, in fact, this should not be the case; for an overall settlement, by definition, would have removed the vital issues of survival and security from contention, and each party would have enough of a national investment to preserve without having to threaten war periodically. Such tensions as might naturally develop would be local and limited, not systemic. A NATO guarantee is a formula for legitimizing the territorial status quo among the signatories, and for eliminating the current, very real danger of a war that could enmesh the superpowers in a confrontation. A NATO guarantee, then, is not a panacea for all that ails the region.

On the Palestine issue, what is foreclosed in my proposal is an independent Palestinian state — an alternative Israel refuses to consider. If a settlement can be reached, on the basis, *inter alia*, of a demilitarized West Bank and Gaza that enjoy autonomy within the framework of Jordanian sovereignty, then the question of the Palestinians becomes a purely internal Arab affair. What they choose to call themselves, whether Jordanian or Palestinian, is their affair. The military and territorial limits of the West Bank and Gaza would be fixed and enforced by treaty; the political character of the autonomy granted the Palestinians would be determined by the Jordanians and Palestinians, in consultation with other interested

Arab parties. If the Arab states refuse to accept anything but an independent Palestinian state, then, of course, we are back at square one, an uncertain and bleak future for all except the Soviets.

IV

Western leaders are well aware of the dangers that another Middle East war poses for their countries, and they are trying to find some basis for a settlement or, to be more accurate, for avoiding another war. For a combination of reasons, varying from capital to capital, the West Europeans seem resigned to rely on Washington to effect a breakthrough. Aside from periodic communiques, which cite UN resolutions and general goals that should be implemented in talks that have yet to take place, Western Europe has kept to the sidelines. But with the American initiatives failing to gell, it may be that the seriousness of the problem and its long-term implications for the stability of the West require a searching new evaluation by the entire Western leadership, working as a group. No instrument of Western policy is better suited for this purpose than NATO. The composition, activities, concerns and objectives of NATO make it an ideal forum for exploring all the implications of a problem and a proposal that entail new responsibilities and new risks in the interest of safeguarding the community as a whole.

SOVIET NAVAL POLICY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE

by Aurel Braun

The initial optimism that greeted detente — that much used and abused term which ostensibly describes East-West relations in the 1970s — is quickly deteriorating into realpolitik cynicism. Attempts to lessen tension such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have had only a limited effect on the upward spiral of the arms competition. East-West naval competition has continued unabated, and in the Mediterranean region it has intensified. Seemingly, since the mid-1970s, disparate developments have been unfolding in the region as well. Political instability has affected several states in the area. The Yugoslav-Soviet conflict continues to fester without apparent solution. There has been a putative enunciation of a new American doctrine of acquiescence to Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe — the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine — while President Carter declared during the 1976 presidential campaign that the United States would not intervene in Yugoslavia even in the event of Soviet military intervention.

All of these factors are interwoven in East-West relations in that most sensitive and significant geopolitical area, the Mediterranean. The purpose of this article is to ascertain how they are interconnected and what impact they exert on the trends in Soviet and American relations in the region. A key strand in the web is to be discerned in Soviet naval policy, which has been prosecuted with a view toward creating a vast blue-water navy. This policy in the Mediterranean is irretrievably intertwined with three factors. The first concerns the worldwide power balance and the consequent deployment in the Mediterranean of Western naval forces. Second, the influence of Western policies must be noted, not merely in terms of naval policy and strength but also in terms of political attitudes

Aurel Braun is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario and a Research Associate with the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University. His *Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Limits of Autonomy* is forthcoming from Praeger.

and support for the various countries in the area. Third, any Yugoslavian reversion into the Soviet sphere of influence would furnish opportunities for the Soviet Union to effect major changes in the local balance of power. The magnitude of this opportunity and any subsequent changes depends on the first two factors. Since, in practice, all function together and often simultaneously, the three-fold division in this study is artificial and is made solely for analytical purposes.

Soviet Global Naval Policy

Just as military policy is a function of a state's foreign policy, so naval policy is a function of military policy, and therefore the Soviet Union's Mediterranean naval policy constitutes a part of her global military aims. While Moscow may have conveyed the impression in the early 1970s that it was prepared to accede to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's ideas on "compartmentalization" of conflicting world interests, it never submerged its global concerns. As NATO's former Commander-in-Chief, South, Admiral Means Johnston, has said, "the Soviets linked their military capacity very closely with their diplomacy."¹ And as Soviet economic prospects have worsened in the present decade, Moscow has shown an increasing propensity to compensate for its economic inferiority vis-a-vis the West with military power.

While it may be true, as some observers have noted, that the navy is not a major arm of Soviet foreign policy in the sense that the army is,² the emphasis placed on it by the political leadership in Moscow suggests that it is, nevertheless, a very important policy tool. In the past ten years the Soviet navy has become a true blue-water navy and has enjoyed a tremendous quantitative and qualitative growth. Since this global naval power imposes certain of the parameters for Soviet naval policies and activities in the Mediterranean, it is important to analyze the extent of its growth. This is to be, however, an analysis of conventional power, with nuclear weapons treated only according to their influence on the conventional balance. The nuclear war scenario is excluded.

Power is not readily quantifiable. It incorporates a large number of variables that are at times undefinable. As Admiral Stansfield Turner, the new director of the Central Intelligence Agency

¹ Adm. Means Johnston, USN Cincsouth, "Problems of the Southern Region in the Post-Yom Kippur Period," lecture to RUSI, London, February 12, 1975.

² G. E. Hudson, "Soviet Naval Doctrine 1953-1975," *World Politics*, October 1976, p. 112.

has warned, comparing naval power or assessing its weight cannot consist solely of a numbers game.³ Not that numbers should not be examined; this indeed can be the first step in the analysis. But raw statistical data, undiscerned as to probative value or improperly weighed, has been at the heart of the problem in East-West military comparisons. And Soviet global naval strength cannot be scrutinized in isolation but only in the context of East-West competition.

Whereas in the 1950s the U.S. navy was virtually unchallenged on the oceans, by the 1960s, and particularly during the 1970s, the Soviet navy was challenging the American fleet in many of the world's seas. Furthermore, during the 1970s the American navy shrank both in manpower and equipment (from 694,000 in 1970 to 524,000 by 1976, and from a surface combat fleet of 259 ships to 176);⁴ a process so rapid that it led in many circles to a view of Soviet ascendancy as against American decline. If this was indeed the case, the Soviet Union could develop surplus naval capacity more easily and would have more flexibility to increase her naval power in the Mediterranean in pursuit of political goals.

Did the American numerical decline, though, result from a lack of will or ability? Part of the decline can be accounted for by U.S. disengagement from the Vietnam war. But the decline of the American fleet has been greater than the number of vessels required for support missions in Vietnam. Therefore, there must be some other explanation. The reduction in the American fleet, in fact, was the result of a deliberate policy whose source is to be found in Project 60. Admiral Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, who was in charge of the project during the early 1970s, described it as follows:

I could see that for the navy to free funds for developing up-to-date ships and weapons systems that could cope with the new Soviet armaments it was necessary to retire immediately large numbers of old ships and aircraft. That meant that the price the nation would have to pay for sufficient and appropriate naval capacity in the 1980's would be seriously reduced naval capacity during the early 1970's while the new systems were being designed, built and deployed.⁵

The interpretation of the numerical balance also needs clarification. While not wishing to engage in the sort of numerical

³ Adm. Stansfield Turner, "The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977, p. 341.

⁴ *The Military Balance, 1970-1971* (yearly volumes are henceforth referred to as *The Balance*) (London: IISS), p. 4, and *The Balance, 1976-1977*, pp. 6 and 9.

⁵ E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., "High-Low," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, April 1976, p. 47.

evaluation that has distorted analyses of East-West balances, we should still clear up a certain anomaly. It is difficult to compare ships or naval systems, and all attempts to categorize are somewhat arbitrary; nevertheless, a logical methodology has been advanced by Michael McGwire for the comparison of surface ships according to a division by primary functions and by size within those functions.⁶ In his analysis of Soviet and Western naval construction for the period 1965-1976, he lists in the small aircraft carriers' category (15,000 to 30,000 tons), two Soviet and sixteen U.S. ships,⁷ and in the medium carrier category (30,000 to 60,000 tons), one Soviet ship and five U.S. ships.⁸ *The Military Balance 1976-1977*, from which the Soviet-American comparison (214/176) is drawn, lists all of the Soviet vessels in the total,⁹ but none of the 22 U.S. ships. The latter are listed separately in a category of 65 "amphibious-warfare ships."¹⁰

Furthermore, while all of the 176 U.S. ships are over 3,000 tons and have true transoceanic capacity, the Soviet total of 214 includes 97 ships averaging 1,100 tons with limited oceangoing capability.¹¹ Moreover, one-third of these 97 ships are of the obsolete 1950s-built Riga class,¹² so it is difficult to justify their inclusion in the Soviet total, especially in view of the exclusion of the 65 amphibious-warfare ships of the United States that do have full transoceanic capacity. If both categories are excluded, and there is a good basis for doing this, as both have ambiguous roles compared with the remaining surface ships, the ratio becomes 176 ships for the United States to only 117 for the Soviet Union. This still does not make allowances for the 13 attack aircraft carriers of the U.S. fleet, for which there is no Soviet counterpart, or for the United States' onboard naval aircraft, which comprise the world's third most powerful air force.

As Project 60 has shown, however, the new U.S. concentration has been on quality rather than quantity. Admiral Hyman Rickover also has stated that the United States should concentrate on superior ships.¹³ Thus, new construction may be as relevant a

⁶ M. McGwire, "Western and Soviet Naval Building Programmes 1965-1976," *Survival*, September-October 1976, p. 204.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

⁹ *The Balance, 1976-1977*, pp. 6 and 9.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹¹ *The Balance, 1975-1976*, p. 82.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Rickover claimed that "The U.S. has given up any possibility of matching the Soviet navy in numbers of ships; therefore, our only hope is to be able to carry out

factor in assessing the balance of power as the numbers of ships. If *The Military Balance* categories are used for the period 1965 to 1976, the United States outbuilt the Soviet Union in combat ships of over 3,000 tons (new and with major modernization) by 95 units to 65,¹⁴ representing 53.9% and 30.3% respectively of the total American and Soviet major surface combat ships in service. During this period as well, the United States built 65.3% of her non-ballistic-missile submarine fleet while the Soviet Union built only 35.9% of her fleet. *Thus, the conventional U.S. oceangoing fleet is much newer than the Soviet.* Moreover, if a comparison is made of construction between the West and the Soviet bloc,¹⁵ the former has taken delivery of two to three times as many surface ships as the latter, while in across-the-board surface ship deliveries, the United States took 20% more than the Soviet Union during 1965-1976.¹⁶

Furthermore, while the Soviet Union has no allies in the Warsaw Pact with significant naval power, in the Western camp both Britain and France possess several ballistic-missile nuclear submarines that carry missiles with the ability to strike at important Soviet targets in Europe while they remain stationed in protected home waters.¹⁷ This further complicates Soviet problems of interdiction. In projected new construction, the United States is in the process of acquiring four nuclear-propelled frigates of 10,000 tons each, 30 Spruance-class destroyers of 7,800 tons, and 50 patrol frigates of 3,500 tons.¹⁸ So it appears that even if one accepts *The Military Balance's* categorization of major surface combat ships, the numerical discrepancy between the American and Soviet fleets will be rather short-lived, even if there is some slowdown in U.S. construction.

Thus, while the proportional growth of the Soviet navy quantitatively, and in some aspects qualitatively, may have been more rapid than that of the United States and her Western allies, the decline-ascendancy relationship advanced by some scholars is not fully tenable. The key effect of this on the Mediterranean area rests in the proposition that the Soviet Union has not been able to achieve a significant surplus capacity in worldwide naval deploy-

missions in areas of highest threat through the use of superior ships." *New York Times*, May 6, 1976.

¹⁴ *The Balance*, 1975-1976, p. 88, and MccGwire, pp. 206-209.

¹⁵ The West includes in this context the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and Australia.

¹⁶ MccGwire, p. 205.

¹⁷ *The Balance*, 1976-1977, pp. 18 and 21, and *The Balance*, 1975-1976, p. 74.

¹⁸ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1975*, Table 10.7, p. 300.

ment. She has increased her ability to compete with Western navies and she has complicated tremendously these Western navies' roles of sea control and power projection. Nevertheless, her navy is still inferior to the Western navies and to the U.S. navy worldwide, and this, combined with her own role demands, limits considerably the type of power she can deploy in the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean

The purpose of the above analysis has not been to denigrate the tremendous increase in Soviet naval strength during the 1960s and 1970s, but rather to set this development in the proper perspective of Soviet policy aims, capacity, and opportunities offered in the international arena as a result of Western actions. Overreaction, on occasion, by Western statesmen and news media to Soviet naval growth has merely reinforced Moscow's psychological warfare in its claim to superiority. Some lonely voices, such as Admiral Turner's, when he was commander of NATO forces for Southern Europe, warned other "brass hats" against exaggerating Soviet military might,¹⁹ but Turner was in a minority. The balance in assessment needs to be redressed, but it would be a grave mistake if the pendulum were allowed to swing too far in the other direction and thereby underestimate the Soviet threat. If anything, the analysis of worldwide Soviet naval policy and capabilities demonstrates that although there are severe inherent limits in the global aspect, Moscow is still capable of deploying great force in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. This capacity and Soviet policy in the area must be reexamined within the regional context.

Traditional Russian interest in the Mediterranean became fused with particular Soviet interest in the region in the 1960s and 1970s. Moscow perceived NATO's southern flank to be its weakest part, which could be most readily influenced or "disintegrated" if the Soviet Union gained preponderant authority in the area. In the Soviet view, this could be accomplished in part through forcing the American Sixth Fleet out of the Mediterranean, or failing that, by neutralizing it and then bringing the Arab states into a Soviet military alliance. Against the most unstable NATO flank, great military stress could be applied in conjunction with ideological pressure. Therefore, Soviet naval policy is irretrievably intertwined with political policy whose dialectical complexities are only partly synthesized. The consequent advantages and disadvantages for the Soviet Union,

¹⁹ *Newsweek*, February 21, 1977, p. 17.

as well as the means Moscow has used and has at its disposal in order to utilize or counter them, constitutes the remaining focus of this paper.

The Best Case Scenario

Soviet movement of ships to the Mediterranean began in 1953 with official visits to a number of states, but it was only in 1958 that any substantial naval capacity was deployed. In August of that year four submarines were stationed at Valona, Albania,²⁰ partly as a response to the December 1957 decision by NATO governments to allow the stationing of American ballistic missiles on their territories. Additional submarines were sent to Valona in subsequent years and in 1960 a squadron from the Black Sea spent four weeks in the Mediterranean.²¹ In March 1963, however, the Americans announced that a Polaris submarine was on station in the Mediterranean, and in April they communicated the presence of a second submarine and the intention to bring in a third.²² The Soviet Union had already decided on a forward deployment of the fleet for a variety of reasons, both political and strategic, but the increment of U.S. nuclear striking power represented by the presence of Polaris, in addition to the attack aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet, placed new urgency on Soviet actions. The Soviet naval exercises in the Aegean Sea during September 1960, using submarines based in Albania, had already demonstrated the value of such bases in the event of an East-West confrontation. A build-up of Soviet strength in the Mediterranean would entail both increased numbers of ships and the acquisition of supply bases.

Following preliminary survey work by Black Sea hydrographic units and pilot deployment during 1962-1963, the Soviets began the first sustained deployment of surface warships in the Mediterranean during 1964.²³ Moscow had also sought further Mediterranean bases when the Soviet navy was forced out of Valona in May 1961, and it is noteworthy that Admiral Gorshkov paid his first visit to Egypt in December of that year. The Soviet build-up was gradual but reached a high crest immediately following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when it consisted of 40 combat and auxiliary ships, including two troop-landing vessels.²⁴ That year was, in fact, a turning point for the Soviets in the Mediterranean.

²⁰ M. McGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 345.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *New York Times*, April 13, 1963.

²³ McGwire, *Soviet Naval Developments*, p. 345.

²⁴ T. W. Wolfe, "Soviet Naval Interaction with the U.S.," in *ibid.*, p. 260.

Despite the worldwide limitations on Soviet naval power, Moscow signaled a more assertive Mediterranean naval policy when, in April 1967, Leonid Brezhnev called for the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the area.²⁵ Soviet ships began to shadow and harass the Sixth Fleet more intensely, a familiar tactic for them in the Black and Baltic seas. The sinking of the Israeli destroyer, *Eilat*, in October 1967 by a Soviet-made surface-to-surface cruise missile fired from a Komar-class patrol boat of the Egyptian navy, lent sudden and overwhelming credibility to Soviet naval power. The anti-ship missile armaments of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet both impressed and sensitized Western opinion and caused alarm in certain Western policymaking circles.²⁶ Thus while the global fighting capacity of the Soviet fleet may still have been questioned, the Soviet navy clearly achieved a psychological breakthrough.

Fleet size in the Mediterranean fluctuated after 1967, averaging 16 combatants between 1967 and 1972,²⁷ for instance, but the fleet enjoyed overall growth, and by early 1972 it contained 10 to 14 surface combatants and 8 to 12 submarines,²⁸ while in July of that year it had 12 surface combatants and 12 submarines in service.²⁹ During the October War in 1973 the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet increased from 50 to 90 ships,³⁰ though this number was subsequently reduced. By 1976 the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, from which the Mediterranean fleet is drawn, stood at 59 major surface combat ships.³¹ During May and June 1976, the Mediterranean fleet totaled a high of 70 ships of all types but declined to 55 in the fall.³² Of the 55 ships, however, only 10 were combatants.³³

The 1973 increase to 90 ships (only partly combat ships) was an aberration in Soviet deployment, for it would have been difficult for Moscow to maintain that strength in the Mediterranean over a long period without dangerously weakening its naval defenses elsewhere. But there was past evidence that the Soviet Union could rapidly increase her Mediterranean fleet when necessary. During

²⁵ *Izvestia*, April 26, 1967.

²⁶ A. M. Kuzmock, "Where Does the Navy Go From Here?," *Military Review*, February 1972, p. 46.

²⁷ Wolfe, p. 260.

²⁸ Adm. Zumwalt, in letter to Senator Proxmire, June 8, 1972.

²⁹ Robert P. Berman, "Soviet Naval Strength and Deployment," in McGwire, *Soviet Naval Developments*, pp. 131-134.

³⁰ *The Times* (London), November 9, 1973.

³¹ *The Balance*, 1976-1977, p. 9.

³² Capt. W. H. J. Manthorpe, "The Soviet Navy in 1976," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1977, p. 206.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

1970 she had brought 70 ships into the Mediterranean,³⁴ while at the height of the crisis in Jordan that same year she deployed 20 surface combatants and 13 to 15 submarines, and had 26 other combatants within one day's steaming time or less.³⁵ Though Moscow halved its naval force in the Mediterranean in early 1973,³⁶ (as it usually did for the winter months), in March it increased its combat fleet to 57 ships, including 6 cruisers.³⁷

In conjunction with the numerical growth of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet from 1964 onward, there has been a correlative improvement in quality and in the length and scope of its operational activity every year. Whereas in 1964 the fleet consisted of largely obsolescent escort ships and destroyers, the next few years saw a gradual but steady qualitative improvement. In October 1968 the Kynda and Krupny surface-to-surface missile-armed (SSM) ships the Soviet Union had on station were joined by an SSM-armed submarine for the anti-carrier role.³⁸ During the same year the new Moskva-class helicopter carrier was dispatched to the Mediterranean for a six-week period. This ship carried 20 specially designed ASW helicopters as well as sophisticated electronics, thereby greatly enhancing Soviet anti-submarine capabilities. As new ship designs, both surface and submarine, such as the Kresta II, Krivak and Kara became operational, they were deployed in the Mediterranean. For instance, the *Nikolaiev*, first of the 10,000-ton Kara-class guided missile cruisers, which commenced fleet service in 1972, was deployed in the Mediterranean by 1973.³⁹

In 1975 the Soviet Union began sea trials of its first aircraft carrier, the 39,000-ton *Kiev* S/VTOL.⁴⁰ This ship, which carries 25 Ka-25 ASW helicopters and some Yak-36 vertical take-off aircraft,⁴¹ represented an entirely new capacity for the Soviet navy to use fixed-winged aircraft at sea. It is noteworthy that on July 18, 1976 the *Kiev* steamed into the Mediterranean.⁴²

In anti-shipping missile technology, as well, the Soviet Union has made great strides forward, for in addition to deploying large numbers of SS-N-3 Shaddock (800 km range) and SS-N-2 Styx

³⁴ *The Times* (London), March 15, 1973.

³⁵ Adm. I. C. Kidd, "View from the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1972, pp. 25-27.

³⁶ *The Guardian* (London), January 27, 1973.

³⁷ *The Times* (London), March 15, 1973.

³⁸ Western European Union, Document no. 462, February 1969.

³⁹ *The Times* (London), March 15, 1973.

⁴⁰ *The Balance*, 1975-1976, p. 4.

⁴¹ *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Jane's Yearbooks, 1975), p. 596.

⁴² Barry Buzan, "The Status and Future of the Montreaux Convention," *Survival*, November-December 1976, p. 242.

(30-40 km range) cruise missiles, she is reported to be developing the SS-N-13, a submarine-launched ballistic missile of 1,200 km range with mid-course guidance against which there is no present shipboard defense.⁴³ By 1977, the Soviet inventory in the Mediterranean contained 20 to 30 types of surface-to-surface missiles.⁴⁴ Thus, it appears that the Soviets have steadily maintained a qualitative as well as a quantitative improvement in their Mediterranean fleet since 1964.

Moscow was keenly aware of the need for base facilities to complement this quantitative and qualitative naval anabasis, especially during 1967-1968 when the navy began taking delivery of new classes of ships and aircraft. In the quest for facilities Gorshkov, as well as Kosygin and Brezhnev, made visits to Egypt⁴⁵ and Yugoslavia.⁴⁶ While Moscow was unsuccessful in the case of Yugoslavia, Soviet ships did gain access to Egyptian ports in July 1967. A five-year agreement for access to "facilities on the Mediterranean" was signed with Egypt in March 1968,⁴⁷ and the Soviet Union's warships gained use of Port Said, Alexandria, Sollum and Mersah Matruh. Simultaneously, the Soviet navy assigned a central role to naval aviation and air cover from Egyptian shore-based facilities. With increased security of access to Egyptian airfields, Soviet aircraft including MiG-25 and TU-16 reconnaissance planes as well as air-to-surface missile equipped TU-16s, IL-38 maritime patrol and AN-12 electronic surveillance aircraft, flew from these fields to work in conjunction with the helicopter cruisers in ASW exercises and to monitor the Sixth Fleet.

The Soviet navy also made frequent use of Syrian ports but never set up the type of infrastructure it had established in Egypt. In July 1972, when Egypt expelled the Soviet advisers and air units, Soviet ships continued to be allowed limited use of Egyptian naval facilities.⁴⁸ In this "best case scenario" analysis of the Soviet position in the Mediterranean, the evidence indicates a great increase in Soviet naval power and influence despite the limitations of the Soviet navy's worldwide strength.

⁴³ *Strategic Survey 1975* (London: IISS, 1975), p. 22.

⁴⁴ Adm. S. Turner, and Cdr. G. Thibault, "Countering the Soviet Threat in the Mediterranean," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1977, p. 28.

⁴⁵ *Pravda*, May 9, 1966.

⁴⁶ *Strategic Survey 1971*, p. 34.

⁴⁷ President Sadat's speech, Radio Cairo Domestic Service, April 3, 1974, in G. S. Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 1967"; in M. McCwire, K. Booth and J. McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 269.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

Political Instabilities and Western Influence

Within this period political developments in the Mediterranean region also could have enhanced Soviet area power. NATO suffered severe strains in the early 1970s that weakened the strength both the alliance and the United States held in the area. On July 15, 1974 the pro-union (*enosis*) coup in Nicosia against President Makarios was followed within weeks by a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The subsequent confrontation between the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, bordered on war. In Greece, the Nicosia coup was followed by one in Athens where the military dictatorship was replaced by the democratic government of Constantine Karamanlis, but as a protest against the lack of American support in the Cyprus crisis, Greek forces were withdrawn from the integrated command at Ismir, Turkey. In April 1975 the United States and Greece issued a joint statement giving notice of an agreement to end home-porting of American warships at Elefsis (the home port of Destroyer Squadron 12 of the Sixth Fleet), the closing of the USAF base at Hellenikon, and the projected diminution of some lesser U.S. facilities in Greece.⁴⁹

The American Congress took retaliatory action against Turkey in February 1975 by placing an embargo on arms shipments, thus endangering renegotiations for the American bases in Turkey. Following the embargo, ships from the U.S. Sixth Fleet were denied anchorage at Istanbul or Ismir, and 25 American intelligence-gathering bases were closed. During this period of alliance friction, the Soviet Union enjoyed cordial relations with both Greece and Turkey.

Elsewhere on NATO's southern flank political problems abounded, jeopardizing the members' commitment to the alliance. The Italian Communists made great gains in local elections while the Christian Democrats' hold on power was loosened during 1975.⁵⁰ In Portugal the Caetano dictatorship was overthrown, but in the first free elections on April 25, 1975 the Communists were held to 12.5% of the vote. Nevertheless, the Communist influence was strong with the heavily pro-Arab Armed Forces Movement (AFM), which restricted American and NATO use of bases in the Azores for any aid mission to Israel. Consequently, Western military

⁴⁹ *The Times* (London), April 29, 1975.

⁵⁰ David Rees, "Southern Europe: NATO's Crumbling Flank," *Conflict Studies*, August 1975, p. 11. The Communist vote moved from 27.9% to 33.5%. The Socialist-Communist majority governed six regions following the election, as opposed to three before, and gained the city hall of 24 out of the 47 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. See Giafranco Pasquino, "Before and After the Italian National Elections of 1976," *Government and Opposition*, Winter 1977, p. 62.

power in the Mediterranean, correlated as it is with political power, was negatively affected by the leftist gains and instability. Yet, in this "best case/worst case" analysis of East-West relations, the Soviet Union's apparent sharp ascendancy in the Mediterranean represents only part of the picture. There are severe local weaknesses in the Soviet position which are only partially reflected by a global naval inferiority.

The Worst Case Scenario

Geographically, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles restrain Soviet access to the Mediterranean. Movement through these straits is limited not only in wartime. There are specific peacetime restrictions embodied in the Montreaux Convention of July 1936 to which the Soviet Union is a party. While Articles 10, 14, and 18 to 21 contain restrictions on the rights of non-Black Sea states to send warships, other than light surface vessels, into the Black Sea during peacetime as well as placing limitations on tonnage,⁵¹ there are constraints on the Soviet Union as well. Aircraft carriers are prohibited passage (Articles 10 and 11) and the submarines of the Black Sea states can transit only under two conditions: (a) to allow vessels purchased or constructed outside the Black Sea to move to a Black Sea base, and (b) to allow such craft based in the Black Sea to leave and return for the purpose of repairs in non-Black Sea dockyards (Article 12).⁵² The submarines must transit the straits on the surface and in daylight, and as with all other types of vessels, the Turkish government must be notified through diplomatic channels at least eight days in advance (Article 13).

Soviet compliance with the terms of the Convention was questioned with the *Kiev's* transit in 1976 into the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. In the Western view, it clearly constituted transit by an aircraft carrier. Moscow, however, classified the ship as an "anti-submarine cruiser" and pointed to similar Western craft not classified as carriers.⁵³ Furthermore, the *Kiev* incident appears to be an anomaly, for Moscow has otherwise observed the Convention rather strictly. It has made little use of Black Sea submarines in the Mediterranean fleet. In July 1972, for example, of the 12 submarines deployed in the Mediterranean only one was from the Black Sea,⁵⁴ and in the period from 1973 to 1975, only one submarine passed

⁵¹ The Montreaux Convention, *Survival*, November-December 1976, pp. 267-269.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Buzan, p. 243.

⁵⁴ Berman, p. 129.

through the straits.⁵⁵ Thus, the submarines on station in the Mediterranean must operate from bases 4,000 miles away in the Baltic and the Arctic. Their deployment is rendered both costly and somewhat ineffective because of the length of time it takes to reach their station. These factors combine to weaken gravely Soviet submarine strength, and therefore overall naval strength in the Mediterranean.

Soviet technological advances were thought to have compensated for some of the Mediterranean fleet's limitations. Particularly, Soviet use of surface-to-surface cruise missiles (which are in a way unmanned aircraft) on their surface ships and submarines at a time when the Western navies employed only gun-equipped surface ships, gave the impression that the Soviet navy greatly out-ranged the Sixth Fleet⁵⁶ and could seriously threaten U.S. attack carriers. This missile/gun argument bears some evaluation, for the long-range (up to 800 km) Soviet missiles appear awe-inspiring when compared with the 5- and 8-inch guns, of horizon range or less, of the Western ships, and as a result a whole mythology has been built around them.

The Soviet cruise anti-shipping missiles' effectiveness is severely circumscribed by a number of limitations.

First, the long-range missiles require mid-term guidance commands from external sources such as aircraft. Helicopters on the *Moskva* and other ships in the Mediterranean have largely an ASW role, so they are of only limited use. Besides, helicopters are highly vulnerable to enemy attack because of their low speed and short operational radius. Therefore, the Soviets need fixed-winged aircraft for direction, and these must come from land bases or from aircraft carriers. They were, however, deprived of land bases with their expulsion from Egypt in 1972, and only began to have a limited number of carrier-based aircraft available when they sailed the *Kiev* into the Mediterranean in 1976. Without external guidance, the manner in which these missiles had to operate — namely, hitting a moving target at over-the-horizon range — was virtually impossible. Thus, their effectiveness was restricted to horizon range, which was not radically different from shipboard guns.

New Soviet longer-range cruise missiles may have terminal guidance that could obviate the need for external guidance, but these remain to be deployed in force. Furthermore, the new Soviet cruise missiles such as the SS-N-10, the SS-N-11 and the SS-N-14

⁵⁵ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 20, 1975.

⁵⁶ Vice-Adm. H. G. Rickover, *Washington Post*, May 31, 1971.

have effective ranges of only 25 to 30 miles.⁵⁷ In 1976 fully two-thirds of the cruise missiles deployed on Soviet ships were of the short-range type.⁵⁸ This may well reflect Soviet recognition of the limited operational effectiveness of longer-range missiles that require guidance from an additional platform. One new Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, the SS-N-13, with a range of 1,200 km could severely complicate shipboard defenses for the West, but this anti-shipping missile also requires mid-course guidance.⁵⁹

Second, these Soviet missiles are heavy and bulky. For instance, the SS-N-1 is 7 meters long and weighs 6,500 kg, while the SS-N-3 is 12 meters long and weighs 12,000 kg.⁶⁰ This greatly restricts the number of missiles a ship can carry, and it further complicates the process of reloading. As a result, Soviet ships carry only a limited number of these missiles, and most of their missile ships have no reloading capacity, with the consequence that the navy is a "one punch fleet."

Third, the Soviet anti-ship cruise missiles have no "sea-skimming" capacity, that is, the ability to avoid radar detection by approaching the target at extremely low altitude. Hence, these subsonic missiles can be picked up on radar and intercepted by fire from high-speed guns such as the unmanned radar-directed system of the Italian Oto and by a variety of shipboard missiles such as the British Sea Wolf. Subsonic, or even low supersonic speeds render large missiles (upon radar detection) extremely vulnerable to countermeasures, particularly electronic. It therefore appears that the use of anti-ship cruise missiles by the Soviet Union cannot in itself counterbalance the deficiencies of the fleet vis-a-vis the attack aircraft of the Sixth Fleet. If anything, Soviet cruise missile technology makes the fleet more dependent on land-based aircraft along the Mediterranean coast in order to gain over-the-horizon capability.

By the 1970s, however, the Soviet Union was experiencing considerable difficulty in acquiring or retaining base facilities in the Mediterranean region. In 1971 two additional naval airfields in Egypt came under Soviet control,⁶¹ for shore-based air cover for the fleet was considered essential, at least until Soviet aircraft carriers could

⁵⁷ *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, January 24, 1977, p. 42.

⁵⁸ Turner, p. 350.

⁵⁹ *Strategic Survey* 1975, p. 22.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁶¹ *Strategic Survey* 1971, p. 32.

be deployed.⁶² But the July 1972 expulsion of Soviet advisers ended Soviet use of air facilities in Egypt. While Moscow could still use Egyptian naval facilities, the loss of air facilities was irreplaceable. Syria was not a stable political alternative, nor did it have the extensive facilities the Soviets had constructed in Egypt.⁶³ In April 1974, Egyptian President Sadat indicated that the 1968 Soviet-Egyptian agreement for facilities, which had been renewed in 1973, was under review and that Egypt might grant similar privileges to other fleets, including the U.S. Sixth Fleet.⁶⁴ On March 14, 1976 Egypt abrogated the treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and gave the Soviets one month's notice to close down their submarine support facilities and remove their personnel from Alexandria.⁶⁵ Relations between the two states deteriorated to the point where Sadat openly blamed the January 1977 food riots in Egypt on Soviet instigation.⁶⁶

Syrian-Egyptian reconciliation in 1976, exemplified by the creation of a unified political command in December, further endangered any future Soviet use of naval facilities at Syrian ports. In January 1977 Syria asked the Soviet Union to remove her submarines and support craft from the port of Tartus, thereby leaving the Soviets, at least temporarily, with no naval bases in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁶⁷ Soviet use of Libya's limited port facilities depended entirely on the whims of the mercurial Colonel Qaddafi. The Arab states of the eastern basin of the Mediterranean thus proved to be rather unreliable "allies" on whose naval facilities the Soviet Union could place but scant reliance in an East-West confrontation. Problems of deployment in the Mediterranean without the use of secure bases were illustrated by Soviet stress in various publications in 1976 on refueling and resupplying the Mediterranean squadron at sea.⁶⁸

While Yugoslavia (as will be seen later) could provide the facilities, that state remains independent despite innumerable Soviet attempts to win back its allegiance. During the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973 Yugoslavia granted Soviet planes transit rights,

⁶² Uri Ra'anani, "Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle East, 1969-1973," in M. McCgwire et al., *Soviet Naval Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 193.

⁶³ See Robert Weinland, "Aegypten und die sowjetische Mittelmeer-eskadra," *Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, September 1977, p. 5-77.

⁶⁴ Sulzberger interview in *New York Times*, April 22, 1974.

⁶⁵ *Washington Post*, March 15, 1976.

⁶⁶ *New York Times*, January 29, 1977.

⁶⁷ *Newsweek*, January 17, 1977, p. 12.

⁶⁸ Manthorpe, p. 210.

but this only resulted from Tito's total commitment to the Arab cause. There are rumors that Soviet submarines use the Bay of Martinsica,⁶⁹ and it appears true that the Yugoslavs have granted some limited porting facilities to Soviet surface ships,⁷⁰ but these concessions are mainly symbolic. Talks between Brezhnev and Tito in Belgrade during November 1976 did not succeed in settling the mistrust between the two states⁷¹ and it seems unlikely that Belgrade will grant bases to the Soviet Union while Tito remains in power.

The Problem of Bases

American difficulties with bases, on the other hand, were somewhat alleviated in 1976. Moving from west to east, there were positive developments. In 1976 pro-Communist Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves of Portugal lost power and a moderate president and moderate prime minister were elected. An extreme leftist coup attempt was foiled and the Communist and extreme left vote remained well under 20% during the 1976 elections. In Italy, in the June 20, 1976 national elections, the Communists made substantial electoral gains but still remained in second place behind the Christian Democrats who retained power by receiving the same percentage of votes as they had in the 1972 national elections.⁷² Whether a Communist victory would have caused more problems for the Soviet Union than the United States, as some observers have contended, is a matter of conjecture. The test would simply be too risky for the West, and the Christian Democratic victory (though as a minority government) ensured retention of the Italian bases by NATO and the United States. In 1978, despite crises and formal agreements with the Communists, the Christian Democrats managed to keep all of the cabinet posts. For the time being, the position of NATO in Italy appears secure.

In the case of Greece, while there was to be a gradual elimination of U.S. bases, American aircraft contributing "to Greek defense needs" were allowed to continue operations.⁷³ In addition, the new premier, Karamanlis, recognized the need for reconciliation and visited West European capitals, where he expressed

⁶⁹ S. Clissold, "Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union," *Conflict Studies*, April 1975, p. 12.

⁷⁰ *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), December 19, 1974.

⁷¹ *New York Times*, December 14, 1976. Tito rejected Soviet requests for increased servicing of warships.

⁷² Pasquino, p. 75, Table 4.

⁷³ *The Times* (London), April 29, 1975.

Greece's wish to join the European Common Market (EEC).⁷⁴ However, he was to realize that support for membership would not be forthcoming from such members as Germany unless Greece was prepared to return to the NATO structure.⁷⁵ It is rather interesting in this connection that in October 1976 Karamanlis strongly defended the existence of American bases in Athens.⁷⁶ Furthermore, the Greek elections showed that the country was on the road to political stability with the Communists receiving less than 10% of the vote.

In the November 20, 1977 elections, Papandreou's rabidly anti-West and anti-NATO Socialist (Pasok) Party gained 24.6% of the vote, but Karamanlis' party maintained its — albeit reduced — parliamentary majority.⁷⁷ The Communists gained only about 9% of the vote. While relations with the United States continued to be fragile, the two governments did initial an agreement in July 1977 which would grant Greece \$700 million in military aid over four years, in exchange for American use of four air and naval bases which have been unavailable for the past three years. Moreover, Carter signed the authorization for a \$33 million military aid bid in August, and the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Greece increased by 300 during the year (to 3,600).⁷⁸ Since Greece is inextricably linked to the West both economically and culturally, it is really only a question of time and the settling of the Cyprus dispute with Turkey before it returns to the NATO fold.

Turkey's dispute with the United States derives from the U.S. congressional arms embargo, although its partial lifting was approved by Congress in October 1975. While Soviet-Turkish relations have improved, the rationale for U.S.-Turkish rapprochement is strong on grounds of mutual interest. Despite the closing of the intelligence bases, Turkey allowed 7,000 American servicemen and their families to remain. In March 1976 the U.S. and Turkish foreign ministers signed a \$1 billion military aid package for Turkey that failed to be approved by Congress in its 1976 session.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, on September 28, 1976, Congress did pass the foreign aid bill which included \$150 million in military arms credits to Turkey.⁸⁰ Relations with the United States remained strained in 1977 because of the

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, May 12, 1975.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *New York Times*, October 21, 1976.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, November 22, 1977.

⁷⁸ *U.S. News & World Report*, January 2, 1978.

⁷⁹ *New York Times*, March 30, 1976 and October 3, 1976.

⁸⁰ *Keesings Contemporary Archives 1976*.

partial arms embargo. In April, however, President Carter endorsed Kissinger's 1976 plan for \$1 billion in military aid (over four years) and asked Congress for an increase of \$50 million in military sales over those of 1976.⁸¹ The number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Turkey in 1977 increased by 300 over the previous year.⁸² The United States, in the end, is the only state that can provide Ankara with a counterweight to the Soviet threat.

Moreover, as a Cyprus settlement inches closer, the better are the chances for settling the U.S.-Turkish and U.S.-Greek disputes. What Turkey has succeeded in accomplishing through the use of her invading forces has been a de facto partition of the island. Ankara forced virtually all of the Greek residents from the northern part of Cyprus, with the result that the north has become a homogeneous Turkish area. Thus, either a formal partition or a loose federation is likely. A purported meeting in January 1977 between President Makarios of Cyprus and Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, gave an indication that a settlement may well be possible along one of these lines,⁸³ and the two men agreed to future meetings to discuss a peace settlement.⁸⁴ It is hoped that the recent death of Makarios will not destroy these prospects. With Cyprus stable, NATO's position in both Greece and Turkey would improve and the impediment to the use of bases would be only temporary.

Even without the Greek and Turkish bases, though, NATO and its member states enjoy the use of a strong string of bases stretching from the Atlantic to the eastern end of the Mediterranean and remain in a strong position in general base and facility use.

U.S. Allies and Western Advances

While the two main competing naval powers in the Mediterranean since the mid-1960s have been the United States and the Soviet Union, their allies' military support in the area must also be taken into account. In the case of the Soviet Union, she has had to rely on her own navy, for no Soviet-bloc states border on that sea. The closest Moscow came to receiving naval support from her allies was through the "show the flag" maneuvers held in the Mediterranean by some obsolete Bulgarian destroyer escorts in the 1960s. On the other hand, the European NATO members have deployed

⁸¹ *New York Times*, April 20, 1977.

⁸² *U.S. News & World Report*, January 2, 1978.

⁸³ *Toronto Daily Star*, January 21, 1977.

⁸⁴ CBS News, February 12, 1977, 11:00 p.m. EDT.

large forces in the Mediterranean. Britain, with 76 major surface combat ships in 1976,⁸⁵ had several units deployed there as well as ASW aircraft and marines. France, which has withdrawn from the NATO military structure, nevertheless has had aircraft participating in the Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean command⁸⁶ and has been providing data on submarine detection to the Sixth Fleet.⁸⁷ Moreover, France has decided to move her fleet headquarters from Brest on the Atlantic to Toulon on the Mediterranean, and with a fleet of 52 major surface combat vessels, including two aircraft carriers,⁸⁸ she should have a strong presence in the area during the 1970s. Italy had 21 major surface combat vessels in the Mediterranean in 1976, while Greece and Turkey had 11 and 14 such ships, respectively.⁸⁹

It is true that the United States may be able to count on these allied forces only in a general East-West confrontation, when even the Greeks and the Turks would have to participate out of self-interest, whereas in lesser disputes (such as the Arab-Israeli conflict) the Sixth Fleet may have to act alone. Nevertheless, since the Soviet Union must be prepared for all types of conflict, its contingency planning must take into account the combined allied fleet. In the mid-1970s, with an average of 20 to 30 major surface combat ships on station in the Mediterranean,⁹⁰ and only a small number of submarines, the Soviet fleet is vastly outnumbered by the Western fleets. The United States has maintained great strength in the Mediterranean and the Sixth Fleet in 1976 contained two attack aircraft carriers with 150 combat aircraft on board, 16 major surface combat ships, and one Marine Amphibious Unit (5 to 7 amphibious ships with a marine battalion aboard).⁹¹ Therefore, despite some gains in her deployment capacity the Soviet Union faces an apparently unbridgeable numerical gap in relation to the West.

Quality provides another measure of comparison of Mediterranean fleets, and Western advances should also be looked at in line with the previous analysis of Soviet naval qualitative changes. The greatest deficiency of the Western surface ships during the 1960s was their lack of surface-to-surface missiles of the type the Soviet Union was already deploying. In the 1970s, however, this

⁸⁵ *The Balance, 1976-1977*, p. 19.

⁸⁶ Rees, p. 10.

⁸⁷ *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, January 24, 1977, p. 44.

⁸⁸ *The Balance, 1976-1977*, p. 22.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 23 and 26, respectively.

⁹⁰ B. M. Blechman, *The Control of Naval Armaments* (Washington: Brookings, 1975), p. 95.

⁹¹ *The Balance, 1976-1977*, pp. 6-7.

situation was remedied when the Western states began to introduce cruise missiles vastly superior to the Soviets' Styx and Shaddock or to their submarine-launched missiles. France built the Exocet, Italy the Otomat, and the United States the Harpoon.⁹²

These new missile systems have terminal guidance sensors and are reported to be highly accurate at "over-the-horizon" ranges. Secondly, they are able to avoid radar detection by closing in on the target at extremely low altitude. Thirdly, unlike the Soviet missiles, they have ready adaptability to a variety of launch platforms because of their small size and light weight. For instance, they (especially the American Harpoon) can be adapted to be fired from standard-sized submarine tubes and from aircraft.⁹³ By 1975, not only the United States but Britain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey all deployed advanced surface-to-surface missiles on some of their ships.⁹⁴ Moreover, since the best counter to the Soviet cruise missile is destruction of the launching platform, these new missiles greatly enhanced Western capacity to accomplish this task at longer ranges and in a shorter period of time.

Improved Defenses

Furthermore, during the 1970s the Western navies increased their anti-cruise missile defenses with improved radar, electronic countermeasures, missiles, and automatic radar-controlled high-speed guns that made the Soviet missiles vulnerable. Digital computer technology has allowed a revolutionary reduction in reaction time (the time elapsed between detection and engagement of a target) — the true measure of effectiveness of anti-missile weapons. It also facilitated the development of integrated combat systems that can cope simultaneously with several types of threat. Introduction of the Aegis system for defense against combinations of enemy air threat on the American fleets in the 1980s should vastly improve their survivability.⁹⁵ In essence, cruise missiles can be more readily intercepted than bombs or projectiles for they are much slower, and in the case of the Soviet missiles, less accurate. For instance, of the 52 Soviet-made cruise missiles fired at Israeli targets by Egyptian and Syrian naval forces during the October War,

⁹² *Strategic Survey* 1975, p. 22.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹⁵ Adm. W. E. Meyer, "The Combat Systems of Surface Warships," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1977, pp. 120-122.

not one scored a hit on an Israeli ship.⁹⁶ While the Russians would undoubtedly do better, it is clear that these missiles are far from unbeatable.

The Sixth Fleet also acquired the F-14 Tomcat aircraft, which not only increased the attack carrier's offensive capacity, but greatly enhanced the carrier's chances of survival because of its Phoenix missile system and its capacity to track 24 and hit 6 separate targets simultaneously⁹⁷ (such as Soviet cruise missiles).

The American aircraft carriers are not nearly as vulnerable as Soviet propaganda would have us believe. While no ships are invulnerable to attack, the United States now employs only very large carriers on which the compartmentalization is many times that of World War II battleships, thereby greatly minimizing the possibility of fatal damage. U.S. Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf has stated that the *Nimitz* (which is presently in the Mediterranean) can sustain 10 torpedo hits without slowing down, and that 10 hits from the heaviest Soviet cruise missiles would render it inoperative for only a few hours.⁹⁸ With their limited or no reloading capacity for missiles, it is questionable how well Soviet ships could do against the American carrier forces. In light of these developments it appears that the Soviet Union has been no better able to close the technological gap than the quantitative one.

Lastly, the Soviet combat fleet in the Mediterranean, both surface and undersea, is highly susceptible to the mining of the Turkish straits and Gibraltar in wartime. A successful mining of these waterways would make the Soviet naval threat finite. Soviet naval aircraft coming from Crimea would have to fight their way over NATO air space. Offensive mine warfare readiness and development in the United States have been increasing.⁹⁹ Thus, if the U.S. fleet survived a Soviet preemptive strike it would have numerous means to reduce and eliminate the Soviet threat.

In peacetime, as well, the Sixth Fleet has demonstrated that while its tasks have been complicated by the Soviet deployment, it has been far from neutralized. During the 1970 Jordanian crisis the Sixth Fleet moved close to the coast of Israel in preparation for helping King Hussein against Syria, despite the presence of the Soviet fleet. In October 1973 the United States was able to resupply

⁹⁶ Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975), p. 269.

⁹⁷ *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, January 24, 1977, p. 36.

⁹⁸ *Aerospace Daily*, March 1, 1976.

⁹⁹ R. F. Hoffmann, "Offensive Mine Warfare: A Forgotten Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1977, pp. 154-155.

Israel massively by sea and air while the Soviets stood by, and it countered the increase in the Soviet fleet with an increase of its own. Moreover, the commander of the Sixth Fleet declared publicly that the Americans retained their edge in firepower.¹⁰⁰

The West's Edge and the Soviet Need for Bases

What this analysis shows is that the Soviet Union has not been able to eliminate the gap in naval power in the Mediterranean and that her political gains have often been offset by political losses. Soviet naval power has increased, but so have role demands, both worldwide and in the Mediterranean. At the same time the West has been able to maintain a substantive numerical and qualitative edge. The problem for the West has not been one of capacity but of will. Soviet policy in the Mediterranean has consisted of both a numerical and a psychological offensive and the latter has been aided greatly by some Western alarmists, overreacting to the Soviet threat. It is precisely this type of overreaction, or exaggeration, that can undermine morale.

The Soviet Union's Mediterranean policy has been determined both by a desire to extend her influence and as a reaction to Western, particularly U.S., naval policy. She was hurt by losses in the Arab world after the expulsion of her advisers from Egypt and was unable to force the Sixth Fleet out of the Mediterranean, or even to neutralize it. A "breakthrough" from which she might have achieved dominance has proved unachievable, and this was the case even when we used the "best case scenario/worst case scenario" hypothesis. Soviet naval inferiority in the Mediterranean is likely to continue, and in view of the massive U.S. and French¹⁰¹ shipbuilding programs, the gap with the West may well widen.

The only possibility whereby Moscow could radically improve its position would be if it were able to acquire naval and air bases on the Mediterranean to which it had a secure land route. If it could bring Yugoslavia back into the Soviet orbit, it might be able to achieve this end. The Soviet Union has troops stationed in Hungary, a country with which it has a common boundary, and if it could move additional forces to Yugoslavia the routes to and the

¹⁰⁰ *The Times* (London), November 9, 1973.

¹⁰¹ According to the SIPRI yearbook, in 1974 France had under construction or firmly planned 23 C70 destroyers of 3,800 tons and 3 F67 destroyers of 4,580 tons, as well as 12 small frigates. Since France has moved naval headquarters to Toulon and is trying to reassert French influence in the Middle East, it would be reasonable to infer that much of this new strength will be deployed in the Mediterranean. See *SIPRI Yearbook 1975*, Table 10.6, p. 300.

bases on the Mediterranean coast would be protected. With secure bases, the Soviets could reverse their submarine weakness in the Mediterranean by shifting large numbers from the Baltic and Northern fleets. Furthermore, Soviet naval aircraft flying from Yugoslavia could cover all the eastern half of the Mediterranean, provide mid-term guidance instructions to Soviet cruise missiles which would make them truly effective at over-the-horizon ranges, and directly threaten both surface and undersea shipping through their own armaments.

This is not to say that the Soviet Union would necessarily achieve superiority, for the worldwide East-West naval (and general military) competition places limits on Soviet power in any particular area. Moreover, this fact might constrain Soviet risk-taking vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, because of the nature of the "breakthrough." Yet the gap with the West would be drastically narrowed, with all that implies politically. It is therefore of crucial interest to the West to see Yugoslav independence preserved.

The Yugoslav Equation

Soviet-Yugoslav relations since the 1948 break have fluctuated between outright hostility and close cordiality, but Yugoslavia has remained independent throughout and, as we have noted, has refused to grant Moscow base rights. A new law passed in April 1974 specified strict conditions under which foreign warships could use Yugoslav ports for repairs. Article 7 stated that there could be no more than two foreign ships in port at a time, and they could be of no larger displacement than 4,000 tons for combat and 10,000 tons for support ships.¹⁰² The November 1976 talks between Brezhnev and Tito garnered Moscow no concessions, for the available evidence indicates that the Yugoslavs have continued to resist adamantly Soviet requests for bases.¹⁰³ In August 1977 Tito was given a friendly reception in Moscow by Brezhnev, but the Yugoslav leader indicated that Moscow was but the first stop on his travel to Peking and the Far East, where he was given a tumultuous welcome. Thus, the long process that Moscow began in 1948 to bring Yugoslavia to heel, both for ideological and strategic reasons, continues. What makes these Soviet attempts more imminently exploitative despite previous failures is that current conditions within Yugoslavia may enhance their chances of success.

¹⁰² *Sluzbeni list* (Belgrade), April 30, 1974, and *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, December 19, 1974.

¹⁰³ *Globe & Mail* (Toronto), November 17, 1976.

Yugoslavia survived pressure from Stalin because of a strong leadership, national support for the leadership, a willingness to fight for national independence, and American support. She still has a strong leader in Tito, but he is 85 years old and cannot stay on much longer. Provision has been made for succession through a collective presidency, but none of the personalities involved has Tito's prestige. Since Yugoslavia is still beset by internal problems such as Croatian separatism, the period of succession following Tito's death or incapacitation could be a volatile one, easily susceptible to foreign exploitation. The will of the country to maintain its independence from Moscow appears strong, and an external threat may well act as a unifying factor. Moreover, specific steps have been taken to improve national defense, such as the February 1969 Defense Law which provided for "total national defense," that is, the arming of the local population to fight in conjunction with the regular armed forces.¹⁰⁴ The Yugoslavs increased their defense spending by over 30% between 1974 and 1975 and again by a substantial amount in 1976.¹⁰⁵ Yugoslavia also established strong military links with Romania, a dissident Warsaw Pact member, and the two states have embarked on some important joint armaments programs such as building the Orao fighter plane.¹⁰⁶

But Yugoslav willingness and ability to deter or successfully resist Soviet intervention or pressure has always depended to a considerable degree on American support. In 1948 this was crucial in deterring drastic military action by Stalin and in providing the economic, military and psychological aid needed to resist covert Soviet pressures. In the 1970s, particularly if Tito leaves the scene, American military and economic aid will be essential, while the psychological impact of American support — the feeling of having superpower backing instead of being alone — cannot be overstated. American policy toward Yugoslavia in the mid-1970s, however, has been ambiguous and generally interconnected with a policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole. The so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine and later interpretative statements by President Carter may give a good indication of what has been and is the U.S. policy.

The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine

In March 1976 newspapers broke the story of a confidential address made by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Secretary of State Henry

¹⁰⁴ Clissold, p. 13.

¹⁰⁵ *The Balance, 1976-1977*, p. 78.

¹⁰⁶ *Interavia* (Interavia S.A., Geneva), no. 8, 1976, p. 739.

Kissinger's senior aide and closest adviser on communist affairs, at the NATO ministerial session in December 1975.¹⁰⁷ In the speech, which the popular press labeled the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," Sonnenfeldt declared that the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was not a genuine partnership but rather that it consisted of an organization held together by Soviet military power. Sooner or later, he felt, the bloc members would try to break the strait jacket, and this would result in a great danger of East-West conflict. In order to avoid this, Sonnenfeldt advocated a more "organic" relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European states. Since he made the speech in the presence of the U.S. Secretary of State, it was assumed that it represented official policy. Unfortunately, it lent itself to two broad interpretations — one pessimistic, the other optimistic.

Among the pessimists, the contention was that the "doctrine" represented a general decline of U.S. power and a change in policy. According to this theory the United States felt the need to humor the Soviet Union, which was in ascendance. Some went further and added that the United States hoped for Soviet concessions elsewhere in exchange for a hands-off policy on Eastern Europe. The latter contention, however, is hardly tenable, for if there was a decline/ascendancy relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the latter would not feel it incumbent to make concessions. But Romania and Yugoslavia, the two East European states most dependent on Western support, both denounced the "doctrine" as a means of creating zones of influence.¹⁰⁸ Romania, particularly, praised President Ford's disassociation from any "doctrine" and his declaration in favor of observance of national independence.¹⁰⁹

The Romanian and Yugoslav denunciations of a purported doctrine do not mean that they necessarily adhered to the pessimistic view but could well indicate that they were attempting to preempt the development of such a view of U.S. policy. It is important to note that appearances and not just facts are important in Eastern Europe. Ford's disavowal, in turn, referred to the pessimistic interpretation rather than the whole speech.

The optimistic view contended that the United States had not abandoned Eastern Europe but instead favored a "Finlandization" of these countries, which within the local context would have

¹⁰⁷ *The Guardian* (London), March 31, 1976.

¹⁰⁸ *Scinteia* (Bucharest), April 13, 1976.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

been a great improvement. While this may represent an overly rosy picture, the speech has to be put into proper context. The United States and the West had given up on any policy of detaching Eastern Europe from the USSR when the "rollback of communism" policies under Dulles proved to be so much myth. In his February 1970 message to Congress, President Nixon asserted that

it is not the intention of the United States to undermine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. The time has certainly passed with the development of modern technology, when any power would seek to exploit Eastern Europe to obtain strategic advantage against the Soviet Union. . . . Our pursuit of negotiations and detente is meant to reduce existing tensions, not to stir up new ones.¹¹⁰

This seems remarkably similar to Sonnenfeldt's statements, yet there were no cries of a sell-out of Eastern Europe. In fact, since the mid-1960s the West, led by the United States, has been pursuing a policy of "bridge building" and "peaceful engagement" toward Eastern Europe aimed at stimulating further diversity in the Soviet bloc and a greater measure of political independence from Soviet domination (possibly leading to neutrality) — but without the restoration of a Western economic system, which clearly Moscow would not tolerate. One of the chief intellectual mentors of this policy, significantly enough, was the present U.S. National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.¹¹¹

Sonnenfeldt, then, could reasonably have been referring to the inefficiency of Soviet hegemony rather than to the abandonment of Eastern Europe to total Soviet control. An acceptance of a "strong Soviet geopolitical influence" ¹¹² in the area did not inexorably exclude an autonomous existence for these states but rather presupposed it. The word "organic" can also be employed here in its Hegelian sense of a more natural, broader-based, multi-lateral relationship. In that sense, Sonnenfeldt was saying that the Soviet Union was not making good use of the WTO in her effort to build a safe but harmonious relationship with the member states, that Moscow needed to be more innovative with that organization and synthesize autonomy with geopolitical influence. Moreover, in the case of Yugoslavia, Sonnenfeldt placed great emphasis on the preservation of its independence:

Finally, on Yugoslavia, we and the Western Europeans, indeed, the Eastern

¹¹⁰ Cited by Kovrig Bennett, *The Myth of Liberation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 293.

¹¹¹ Z. K. Brzezinski, and W. E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1961, pp. 642-654.

¹¹² H. Sonnenfeldt, *The Guardian* (London), March 31, 1976.

Europeans as well, have an interest which borders on the vital for us in continuing the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet domination. Of course, Yugoslav behaviour will continue to be, as it has been in the past, influenced and constrained by Soviet power. But, any shift back by Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit would represent a major strategic setback for the West. So we are concerned about what will happen when Tito disappears, and it is worrying us a good deal.¹¹³

Kissinger indicated in June 1976 that the United States was not giving up its role in Eastern Europe. In The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, he stated that

we are determined to deal with Eastern Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of each of its countries. We recognize no spheres of influence and no pretensions to hegemony. Two American presidents and several Cabinet officials have visited Romania and Poland, as well as non-aligned Yugoslavia, to demonstrate our stake in the flourishing independence of those nations.¹¹⁴

While Kissinger's derision of spheres of influence and hegemony was largely political rhetoric, his speech made it clear that U.S. policy was still geared toward "bridge-building" and "peaceful engagement" in Eastern Europe. Former President Ford, despite his faux pas on Eastern Europe during the second televised presidential debate in October 1976¹¹⁵ indicated that there was to be no change of policy under his leadership. In fact, in March 1976 the Ford administration issued a statement on the Security Assistance Program which referred to Yugoslavia's strategically important position in the Balkans and declared that U.S. policy was as responsive as possible to Belgrade's arms requests.¹¹⁶ It was also disclosed in April 1976 that the United States had agreed to sell TOW anti-tank missiles to Yugoslavia,¹¹⁷ but then in May it was reported that Yugoslavia had postponed the deal indefinitely because of undesirable publicity.¹¹⁸

Yugoslavia's rejection of an arms deal illustrates the problem in accepting Western help without proper preparation. Belgrade has to be careful in its external relations because of the Soviet threat and its nonaligned status. In this instance, it felt that the risk of provoking the Soviet Union outweighed the security benefits these armaments might have given. But since Yugoslavia is a nonaligned state, since a million of her workers are in the West

¹¹³ *New York Times*, April 6, 1976.

¹¹⁴ *Survival*, September-October 1976, p. 199.

¹¹⁵ CBS, October 6, 1976, and *New York Times*, October 7, 1976.

¹¹⁶ *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), April 15, 1976.

¹¹⁷ Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *International Herald Tribune*, May 16, 1976.

sending home valuable hard currency remittances, and since most of her trade is with the West, unlike the WTO states, she can develop strong American ties in order to balance the Soviet Union if this is done gradually.

Both Yugoslavia and the United States should have aimed to develop a relationship whereby the revelation of an arms agreement would strengthen Yugoslav independence instead of provoking Moscow. The solution must surely lie in gradualness, leading to open announcements of certain U.S. arms sales. The importance of such proposed sales to Yugoslavia is largely symbolic, for they would signal a strong American commitment to the independence of that Balkan state. The type of commitment need not be specified, so as to give the United States a great deal of flexibility. It could warn the Soviet Union but, because of the selectivity of the weapons systems, need not provoke her — if the preparation is adequate. Through the proposed TOW sale the United States was giving the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine an optimistic interpretation.

What interpretation the Carter administration gives to the doctrine remains to be seen. In the third presidential debate Presidential-candidate Carter stated that he would oppose the introduction of U.S. troops into Yugoslavia even if that country were invaded by Soviet forces, for this would not threaten U.S. security.¹¹⁹ A few days later in an interview, Carter reiterated his opposition to committing American troops to Yugoslavia.¹²⁰ George Ball, one of his key advisers at this stage, tried to soft-pedal this statement in an interview he gave on national television during which he claimed that Carter meant that the United States would only intervene in conjunction with the West European powers. This helped somewhat, but it does not clarify the situation sufficiently or refute the pessimistic interpretation of U.S. policy given by such scholars as Brian Crozier.¹²¹

Since assuming the presidency Carter has made public statements supporting human rights in the Soviet bloc. This, however, is an ideological and not a military commitment. Its translation into empirical terms is ambiguous. The United States is not expected to make an open-ended military commitment to Yugoslavia, but to rule out military help *ab initio* gives the impression of a sharp change of policy. Furthermore, Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia

¹¹⁹ Reported in the *New York Times*, October 23, 1976.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, October 27, 1976.

¹²¹ Brian Crozier, "Security and the Myth of Peace," *Conflict Studies*, October 1976.

after Tito would most likely take the form of intense domestic subversion, with direct military intervention as a weapon of last resort. Carter's choices for national security adviser and for secretary of state tend to indicate that there is no change in U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia or Eastern Europe, but the very appearance of commitment is important.

As we have seen, an independent Yugoslavia is essential to stability in the area, for its restoration to the Soviet orbit would involve a serious change in superpower equilibrium. This could be one of the variables that might lead the Soviet Union away from a policy of cautious pressures to one of sharp confrontation. The United States, therefore, should indicate a strong commitment without necessarily defining its forms, and certainly not its extent. It could accomplish this through the open sale to Yugoslavia (following diplomatic preparation) of such "defensive" weapons as the TOW anti-tank missiles discussed by the Ford administration, and Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, as well as through economic aid. Since there are precedents for such U.S. aid, these moves by the Carter administration would indicate to Moscow the gravity with which the United States viewed interference in Yugoslavia, without disclosing American contingency plans, and at the same time they would give Yugoslav morale a tremendous boost.

The Yugoslavs, in turn, must strive for better relations with the United States. They must stop making petty and absurd accusations that Washington is aiding Croatian separatists and generally behave in what Sonnenfeldt himself suggested would be a "less obnoxious manner."¹²² Yugoslav support of international resolutions designed to weaken America's global position demonstrates a reckless disregard for power balances that in the long run clearly benefit Belgrade.

As former U.S. Ambassador Laurence Silberman has observed, the United States has interests in Yugoslavia other than maintaining the latter's independence from the Soviet Union and should insist on protecting these interests.¹²³ Nevertheless, their protection should not be allowed to work to the serious detriment of Yugoslavian sovereignty. American-Yugoslav disputes and problems must not leave the impression with the Soviet Union that these factors would weaken the American resolve to safeguard Yugoslav independence. Such problems should be handled at State Depart-

¹²² *New York Times*, April 6, 1976.

¹²³ Laurence Silberman, "Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism: Europe's Fiddler on the Roof," *Foreign Policy*, April 1977, pp. 3-27.

ment level, through the normal function of a government department and not through presidential statements which may be interpreted as changes in certain pivots of American foreign policy.

Tito's visit to the United States in March 1978 presented an opportunity for the Carter administration to repair some of the damage done in the 1976 presidential campaign. The Yugoslavs wanted assurances that Washington did not consider Yugoslavia of such peripheral interest that it might be willing to make some secret arrangement with the Soviet Union. Relations between Belgrade and Washington have been improving somewhat, with the United States resuming very modest arms sales. In February 1978, Carter submitted legislation to Congress which sought to increase these sales to a maximum of \$15 million.¹²⁴

In the joint communique issued at the end of the visit, Carter expressed the "continuing support of the United States for the independence, territorial integrity and the unity of Yugoslavia."¹²⁵ The use of the word "unity" was significant, for it made the statement one of the strongest issued in the past thirty years and was directed at any foreign power that might seek the disintegration of Yugoslavia through manipulation of national rivalries within the federation. Carter's March 1978 statement, then, went a long way toward repairing the damage done by his campaign utterances; but this will be of little value as a safeguard for Belgrade if it is perceived as just another crest in an erratic foreign policy line. A policy of support for Yugoslav independence and integrity has to be nurtured through gradual growth, and the Carter administration must continually demonstrate that it is the optimistic interpretation of the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine that constitutes U.S. policy.

Military Power, Political Will and Intelligent Leadership

Any analysis of recent military policy is limited by the information available. This study is no exception to this rule, but some trends can nevertheless be perceived. There has been considerable growth in Soviet naval power, both worldwide and in the Mediterranean, but there has been no corresponding Western decline. Power is, of course, correlated to role, and while the Western and particularly the U.S. role of naval control and projection (essential for economic trade survival and support of allies), has been

¹²⁴ *New York Times*, March 7, 1978.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, March 10, 1978.

vastly complicated by adverse political developments in some of the NATO states and by the growth of the Soviet navy, the latter's role has also been made vastly more difficult. Its functions of interdiction and spreading Soviet political influence abroad have placed increasingly heavy demands on it because of Western naval strength and worldwide Soviet political commitments.

The introduction by the United States of the longer-range Polaris A-3 and Poseidon missiles on its Polaris submarines means that it is able to hit virtually all important strategic targets in the Soviet Union from any point in the Mediterranean. The anti-Polaris task of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, which now must cover the expanse of a large sea noted for extremely difficult anti-submarine warfare conditions, has therefore been rendered nightmarish. Added to this, the increasingly more sophisticated and longer-range carrier-borne aircraft that the United States has been deploying in the Mediterranean and the introduction by the U.S. and Western navies of advanced shipboard cruise missiles with over-the-horizon capacity, have made the Soviet fleet's interdiction tasks onerous indeed.

In the political sphere Soviet involvement in the Caribbean, Africa and the Indian subcontinent necessitates deploying naval units to those areas, thereby limiting the number of ships available for the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the rapid growth of the Soviet merchant fleet and maritime-borne trade has added the task of protecting ocean shipping to that of interdiction. In order to respond to all of these requirements, the Soviets have improved their fleet both quantitatively and qualitatively, and this has caused alarm in certain Western circles.

But an analysis of ship construction and technological developments shows that the West has been able to outmatch the Soviet Union since the mid-1960s through a vast construction program of its own. The sharp numerical decline in the U.S. fleet has been temporary and partly a trade-off for qualitative improvements. The large American shipbuilding program will reverse this decline in numbers according to plan. Granted, the tasks of the Western navies require more ships than the Soviet Union's, but the significant factor here is that the USSR has been unable to eliminate the wide quantitative gap with respect to the West despite all her shipbuilding, nor is it likely that she will be able to close it in the future if the West maintains the present pace of its construction programs.

Unfortunately, Westerners have often felt that necessary funds for countering the Soviet threat could be received only by

“appropriation through alarm.” This is a dangerous attitude, for Soviet policy against the West involves not only military but psychological pressures as well. Exaggeration of the Soviet threat and consequent overreaction can destroy Western morale, a situation much desired by the Soviet Union, particularly where NATO’s southern flank is concerned. The Soviet naval threat is real enough to necessitate the maintenance of a strong Western naval counterforce through rational programs proceeding without alarmist exaggeration.

In the Mediterranean, Soviet naval power has been helped by American difficulties, but the latter must be put into proper perspective. The United States continues to deploy the Sixth Fleet and has modernized it. Despite the loss of some facilities and political instability in some allied states, the Sixth Fleet in 1976 still retained a long string of important Mediterranean bases. Moreover, the political situation along NATO’s southern flank has been stabilizing and the fleets of these nations, even if acting in self-interest, present a strong counter to the Soviet fleet. While the Soviet Union has increased the power of her Mediterranean fleet, it has been working under severe constraints. The worldwide inferiority of the Soviet navy compared with those of the West, difficulties in countering the increased submarine strategic threat, and global political commitments all limit Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean, as has been noted. Also, Moscow has suffered severe political reverses in the Arab world.

The Soviet Union has increased her interdiction capacity toward the Sixth Fleet with new ships but has been unable to force it out of the Mediterranean or, as the Jordanian crisis and the October War proved, even to neutralize it. The quantitative and qualitative gap of the late 1960s vis-a-vis the West has remained wide, and the only way the Soviet Union appears capable of closing it and giving full impetus to a political offensive is through the acquisition of secure naval and air bases on the Mediterranean.

If Yugoslavia is forced back into the Soviet orbit, Moscow will be able to achieve this quantum increase in naval strength. It is therefore in the West’s interest to do everything in its power to safeguard Yugoslav independence—but Western policy is dependent on U.S. policy, and the latter has been ambiguous. The most comprehensive recent statement on U.S. policy regarding Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe, made by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, has been subject to contrary, pessimistic/optimistic interpretation. Only the optimistic interpretation can aid Yugoslavia and maintain the

Western balance in the Mediterranean, and therefore the Carter administration should continue to demonstrate its interest unequivocally. This would involve certain actions and statements showing a strong U.S. commitment to Yugoslav independence, without specifying the precise form of the commitment, and certainly without eliminating any contingency actions.

Soviet power and policies in the Mediterranean can be countered by the West, but doing so involves a question of political will and political intelligence no less than one of military capacity.

AFTER PANAMA: LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

During President Carter's sojourn to Venezuela and Brazil in March 1978, there was a distinct inclination to ignore the pending issue of the Panama Canal treaties. Among members of the traveling party, observers and Latin American officials, many felt that the treaties had received enough attention — that the "real business" of inter-American relations had been ignored long enough. Whether for or against the treaties, people took the view that issues of greater substance and wider relevance needed to come to the fore.

The list of items for consideration in inter-American consultations has been substantially transformed during the past ten years. Cuba's revolutionary legions have moved to a different continent and a more congenial political environment; no longer are North American military goods at the top of Latin American shopping lists; and, politically, the Latin American leaders have found that they can defy U.S. "suggestions" at international forums, and get away with it.

One finds, instead, a series of issues that are a blend of confrontation and cooperation — issues on which Latin American nations are themselves split and which sometimes provoke inconsistent North American responses. These issue-areas are generally

identifiable as (1) human rights, (2) proliferation, (3) energy and (4) the new international economic order. If inter-American harmony is to be achieved, much needs to be done in each of these areas to define U.S. interests and to understand the perspectives of the various Latin American participants. Much has been written on the new international economic order; therefore, we do not deal with that subject in this issue of ORBIS. We do attempt, however, to introduce our readers to a few considerations in each of the other areas.

Howard Wiarda, of the University of Massachusetts, offers an explanation for a basic misunderstanding between Washington and Latin American capitals. Professor Wiarda challenges the widely held assumption that there is a set of universally accepted human rights. The questions he raises are crucial to the future of the human rights campaign.

Dr. John Redick describes the development of the "nuclear problem" in Latin America. Of particular interest are the national considerations that cannot be forgotten when the United States attempts to draft its regional policy for Latin America. Indeed, Dr. Redick's article may be the last opportunity to read about Latin American nuclear proliferation in such short space—for the proliferation chain may quickly extend to the point that an entire volume will be required.

Professor Edward Williams, of the University of Arizona, tackles the most proximate energy problem for the United States: the availability of oil and gas from the recent finds in southern Mexico. There are many more energy issues to consider in the future, such as Venezuelan oil politics, Argentine and Brazilian uranium development, or U.S.-Canadian cooperation. We hope that ORBIS can shed light on them as well.

The above agenda is being drafted, as were those in the past, both by North and South Americans. We hope that our presentation of some of the issues will help clarify the interests at stake, and that confrontation can be transformed into cooperation.

—The Editors

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION*

by Howard J. Wiarda

The number of books and articles on Latin America's "struggle for democracy" runs into the legions. In much current foreign policy discussion, moreover, the issues of human rights and U.S. relations with authoritarian regimes have received a great deal of attention.¹ This paper deals with those issues (with special reference to the Iberic-Latin American context) and raises some troubling questions: Are democracy and human rights everywhere the same and universal? Are they relevant in the same sense to all societies and in all time frames? and Do grounds exist for the hope of exporting democracy and human rights to other lands and culture-areas?

The difficulty is that terms such as "democracy," "human rights," "representative rule," "pluralism," "freedom," "participation" and "social justice" mean different things, convey different connotations or enjoy differential legitimacy from society to society. Moreover, even in a single society (obviously including the United

* This article is based on a paper presented at the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, on January 25, 1977. An earlier version was presented at Lafayette College. The author thanks those at Lafayette and the Department of State who offered comments and raised questions, and acknowledges the suggestions of Keith Rosenn and Iêda Siqueira Wiarda which led to improvements in the written draft. The views expressed, however, are entirely those of the author and do not in any sense represent an official position.

¹ Amnesty International has issued numerous reports on human rights violations in Latin America; the *New York Times* has published many accounts; the U.S. Department of State has submitted to the House International Relations Committee detailed reports on human rights conditions abroad; congressional hearings have been held; the report of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations (the "Linowitz Commission") urged a stronger emphasis on human rights; and, of course, President Carter and his key advisers have referred repeatedly to human rights protection as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. But see, also, Marshall D. Shulman, "On Learning to Live with Authoritarian Regimes," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977, pp. 325-338, and William P. Bundy, "Dictatorships and American Foreign Policy," *ibid.*, October 1975, pp. 51-60.

Howard J. Wiarda is Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Program in Latin American Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. His books include *Nation in Transition: The Brazilian Catholic Labor Movement*; *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience*; *Latin American Politics and Development*; and *Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration: Politics and Social Change in the Dominican Republic*.

States), these concepts may change over time, relating generally to broad cultural, socioeconomic and political transformations. We have long been aware of such differences of meaning with regard to the "peoples' democracies," but it is here suggested that even within the "West" the above concepts and terms of reference may carry, among different societies, quite distinct meanings and understandings. Neither adequate grounds for moral judgment, nor the basis for an enlightened and rational foreign policy can be established until these differences are clearly understood. Although the focus here is on Iberia and Latin America, on what democracy and human rights mean in that culture-area, the following discussion also has relevance to Africa, Asia and perhaps elsewhere.

In offering such a broad view, one must sometimes gloss over the nuances, national variations and ambiguities that exist, elements which must be taken into consideration in any final and definitive analysis of the subject. Obviously, the situation of democracy and human rights in present-day Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela is different from that in Argentina, Chile and Paraguay. Although we must certainly be cognizant of these variations, differentiate carefully among the diverse nations of the area, and note how they change over time, the emphasis here will be on the common and continuous features. My purpose is to offer a way of thinking about the meaning and practice of democracy and human rights in Iberia and Latin America, as distinguished from the North American conception, and to present an ideal-typical construct which stresses the similarities in the Iberic-Latin American political culture as compared with that of the United States. Sound policy, of course, demands that each country be examined on an individual basis, but before that can be done, an understanding must be achieved of the common context in which such individual variations take place. The present article is conceived, therefore, not as a set of concrete prescriptions to be applied in individual cases but, perhaps more fundamentally, as an essential prelude before any such policy measures can be intelligently thought about.

Democracy and Human Rights: Applying a North American Perspective

In 1945, the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace, meeting at Chapultepec, Mexico, adopted a resolution calling for the international protection of human rights. At the Bogotá Conference in 1948, the Latin American nations adopted

the Charter of the Organization of American States and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the latter document based largely on the UN Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Latin American states are also signatories. In their own constitutions, too, the Latin American nations have consistently embraced the principles of republican government, separation of powers and human rights.² Because of such documents, we often assume that Latin America uses such terms in the same way as the United States.

A useful starting point for the discussion of just how "democratic" Latin America is, and how its interpretation of "human rights" may differ from that of North America, is the influential, periodic survey of "democracy" and its "progress" in Latin America by Russell H. Fitzgibbon and his collaborators.³ The following criteria, among others, are included in their definition and measures:

1. the degree to which freedom of the press, speech and assembly exist;
2. whether there are free elections and honestly counted votes;
3. whether freedom exists for political party organization, for party opposition in the congress, for opposition groups generally;
4. whether there is an independent, coequal judiciary and congress;
5. the degree of accountability for the collection and expenditure of public funds;
6. whether there is civilian supremacy over the military;
7. whether political life is free from ecclesiastical controls;
8. the strength of independent local government; and
9. whether there is representative, participatory and pluralist democratic government.

² See Kenneth L. Karst and Keith S. Rosenn, *Law and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

³ Fitzgibbon, "Measurement of Latin American Political Phenomena: A Statistical Experiment," *American Political Science Review*, June 1951, pp. 517-523; Fitzgibbon, "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin American Democracy," *Western Political Quarterly*, September 1956, pp. 607-619; Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, September 1961, pp. 515-526; Fitzgibbon, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," *Journal of Politics*, February 1967, pp. 129-166; Johnson, "Measuring the Scholarly Image of Latin American Democracy, 1945-70," in *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1976); Johnson, "Scholarly Images of Latin American Political Democracy in 1975," *Latin American Research Review*, Summer 1976, pp. 127-138; and Johnson, "Research Perspectives on the Revised Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index of the Image of Political Democracy in Latin America, 1945-75," in James W. Wilkie and Kenneth Ruddle, eds., *Quantitative Latin American Studies* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1977), pp. 87-91.

In the more recent formulations, Professor Johnson distinguishes usefully between Latin American democracy per se and the various nations' reputations for democracy as perceived by the U.S. scholars surveyed. He has also introduced a number of other qualifications in order to remove some of the ethnocentrism from the original index.

Few of us would disagree with these values and institutions. But it may be argued that this is so because the concepts and criteria used correspond closely to the liberal, Lockean, Anglo-American tradition and polity. The Fitzgibbon definition, to which most of us in the United States subscribe, has in it a powerful Montesquieuian, Jeffersonian, Madisonian bias. It is based on contract theory and the civil law tradition. It stems directly from the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Its model is the independent yeoman and individualist of the New England ideal, grassroots democracy and popular (electoral) participation, separation of powers and of the military and ecclesiastical realms from the political, and a pluralistic and egalitarian polity with a hallowed tradition of respect for individual human rights. The question is whether these fundamental characteristics apply equally and in the same sense to Iberia and Latin America, or whether they represent instead a peculiarly North American set of expectations and practices inapplicable in culture-areas other than our own.

A second difficulty with the Fitzgibbon formulation, besides its ethnocentrism, is that it ignores those features in the Latin American constitutions, features at least as prominent as the liberal-democratic ones, that enshrine authoritarian rule, corporate privilege and constitutional and legal restrictions on human rights. Reserving further discussion for later, let us for now emphasize that authoritarian rule in Latin America does not necessarily mean a usurpation of the laws and constitution but often represents a new emphasis on those features that the Fitzgibbon criteria ignore.⁴

Third, there is no sense in the Fitzgibbon studies that "freedom of the press," "elections," "opposition," etc. may mean something different in Luso-Hispanic civilization and law than they do in the Anglo-American, or that they may exist at different levels of popular acceptance and legitimacy. Keeping in mind the vicissitudes within nations as well as the variations among them, let us examine the Fitzgibbon criteria one at a time, as a way of examining both what Iberia and Latin America generally understand by these terms and how these understandings are distinct from those of North America.

⁴ See the comment of Dale Furnish ("Military governments . . . are an accepted part of the legal system"; they also govern "through laws and acts constrained by custom and constitutional privileges") in "The Hierarchy of Peruvian Laws: Context for Law and Development," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, Winter 1971, pp. 91-120.

(1) Freedom of the Press, Speech, Assembly

The freedoms of press, speech and assembly are a part of the Latin American legal and constitutional tradition, and some countries, to a greater or lesser degree, have striven to uphold them. But, even allowing for the formal presence of such freedoms in Iberia and Latin America and for their implementation in some countries in ways that parallel U.S. practice, it is clear that the meaning of these terms in the Iberic-Latin American culture-area reflects different understandings and expectations than in the North American area. These liberties do not enjoy the hallowed place they do in the U.S. Bill of Rights, nor are they enshrined as inviolable principles. To a far greater degree than in the United States, freedom in Iberia and Latin America also implies obligations and duties, including the obligation to obey those in authority. Liberty carries with it the obligation for self-censorship and the exercise of prior restraint.

The lists of human and social rights contained in the Latin American constitutions, or in their injunctions to democracy and representative rule, constitute ideals, aspirations and future goals for society to achieve. They are not presumed to correspond to actual operating reality, nor is any regime expected to live up to them completely. Frequently, human rights (*derechos*) must be subordinated to (a) even more fundamental corporate group rights (*fueros*), (b) the notion of the "common good" (generally, as defined by the state), and (c) the even higher-order requirements of natural, eternal or, if one wishes, divine law (although even in Catholic Latin America the latter is seldom explicitly invoked). There is, in short, a hierarchy of laws which command varying obedience: what in the United States is considered a fundamental right often occupies a third- or fourth-order priority in Latin America. Human rights are respected and honored, but they may be subordinated to such perceived higher-order priorities as the unity and integrity of the state. When the two conflict, it is most frequently individual human rights that must give way.⁵

Moreover, there are provisions contained in the Iberian and Latin American constitutions (e.g., "emergency" clauses and those providing for the declaration of a "state of siege") that make

⁵ The best brief discussion is John Henry Merryman, *The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969). Also see the special issue of the *American Journal of Comparative Law* (Winter 1971) dealing with "Law and Development in Latin America."

it possible to suspend human rights altogether, sometimes indefinitely. Freedom of the press or of assembly may legitimately be curbed if the peace and order of the nation are threatened. Of course, there are abuses of these clauses, but the point is that historically the rights contained in the U.S. Constitution have in Latin America seldom been considered inalienable. Rather, it is the state itself that is the arbiter and dispenser of rights and justice, and what the state gives, it can also revoke. Even in those habeas corpus, writ of personal security, and *amparo* cases where an individual or group challenges the suspension of human rights, it is the state, acting in the name of some higher-order common good, that must ultimately decide.⁶

(2) Elections

Electoral politics and elections have also become both important and imbedded in Latin American law and constitution. In Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela, and in some other countries at other times, competitive elections have become a regular part of the political process. But in most Latin American countries, even in some of those mentioned, elections do not necessarily convey definitive legitimacy to a regime or an individual for a prescribed term. Alternative routes to power, such as the skillfully executed coup d'état or the heroic guerrilla struggle, remain open and also carry potential for gaining legitimacy.⁷ Furthermore, even when electoral results are accepted in principle, numerous legal and constitutional means exist to nullify their impact. The Brazilian election in 1960 of João Goulart, who was allowed to assume the presidency — temporarily, as it turned out — only after agreeing to transfer most of his authority to the congress, provides a dramatic case in point.

Additionally, when elections do occur and do count, seldom is there a genuine choice; rather, the Bonapartist or Gaullist model tends to be followed. Elections often take a plebiscitary form, being used more to ratify a government-in-power than to provide real choice. Moreover, party pacts and accords are employed to provide for continuity (and monopoly) and to exclude other challengers. Of course, genuinely competitive elections do occur, but even in those countries often thought of as democratic (Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, perhaps Mexico and the Dominican Re-

⁶ Karst and Rosenn, pt. 2, esp. p. 232ff.

⁷ Charles W. Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1967), chap. 4.

public), one is struck by the tendency toward oligopoly and accord within and among the major parties and, hence, the shutting off of possible alternatives. Thus, two potentially conflicting functions can be served at once: the opposition and the ruling groups can have the "democratic" electoral campaign both can agree is necessary, and the government "party" can generally "have" its election.⁸

(3) Party Freedom and Loyal Opposition

Freedom for opposition groups and parties is generally allowed in principle in Latin America, but this freedom, too, is often constrained and subject to higher priorities. The constraints derive both from the legal-constitutional framework and the overall political culture.

The law and constitution provide the executive with ample power to limit opposition party activity or to suspend opposition functions altogether. The more liberal and democratic regimes of Latin America have seldom been inclined to use the full gamut of the powers at their disposal, but the power is there nonetheless. Also, there is often rather little "party politics" in the Anglo-American sense. One can easily overdraw the differences, but they remain important. In the U.S. system, parties are usually viewed as at the center of politics, carrying out many important functions and providing just about the only legitimate route to power. Throughout Latin America, in contrast, and again with several notable exceptions, parties operate at the margin of the public law, frequently enjoying neither respect nor much legitimacy. The hurly-burly and chaos of party competition is frequently viewed as intolerable: divisive party politics is seen as detracting from the unity and coherence of the state. Hence, a "technocratic" regime devoid of "politics" and parties is usually much preferred.

Under the organicist, monistic conceptions that so pervade Iberia and Latin America, moreover, opposition is almost by definition subversive, traitorous and something to be dealt with harshly. A "loyal opposition," then, is almost a contradiction in terms. Finally, even where parties are organized, the party label is often avoided. One forms a "movement" or a "civic-action association," but seldom a party. Political parties tend to become official appendages of the regime, bureaucratic state machines, national patronage agencies, or personalist vehicles. Rarely do they maintain

⁸ For one such case, see Steven Ussach, "The Portuguese Presidential Election of 1958" (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Political Science, 1974).

an independent existence. Terms like "party freedom" or "opposition freedom" must be understood in this light.⁹

(4) Independent, Coequal Congress and Judiciary

Checks and balances à la Montesquieu exist in the formal laws and constitutions of Latin America. But in those same laws and constitutions, as well as in hallowed tradition, centralized and unitary control is also enshrined. The extensive power of the executive, in the "Caesarist" or "imperial" traditions, and the weakness and lack of independence of the courts and legislatures, are familiar features of Latin America's political culture. Though lip service is often paid to "separation of powers," and though in some countries the legislature has gained prominence, the prevailing pattern has been presidential dominance.¹⁰

The strong executive is neither a quirk, aberration nor a sign of Latin American "underdevelopment." It is a logical outgrowth of the assumptions on which the polity is based. For under the prevailing organicist conception, government is "natural" and "good" — not "unnatural" or "bad," and therefore to be distrusted, as in the historical U.S. conception. If government is natural and good, there is little need to limit or check-and-balance it. One should not, therefore, look for a coequal congress or judiciary in a system where such has not been the tradition, in law, constitution or history.¹¹

(5) Public Funds and Accountability

Quite a sharp distinction is made in the United States between the public and the private weals. Abuses occur, but the fact that we are incensed when a congressman or vice-president enriches himself in public office illustrates the strict separation we seek to maintain. Our model of the good public servant is that of the Burkean savant idealized in our public-school civics courses: someone who is fair, responsible, serves the public interest, and strictly segregates private and public affairs.

⁹ Douglas Chalmers, "Parties and Society in Latin America," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Summer 1972, pp. 102-130; Robert Dix, "Latin America: Opposition and Development," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973).

¹⁰ Glen Dealy, "The Tradition of Monistic Democracy in Latin America," in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), pp. 71-104; James Busey, "Observations on Latin American Constitutionalism," *The Americas*, July 1967, pp. 46-66.

¹¹ Guenter Lewy, *Constitutionalism and Statcraft During the Golden Age of Spain* (Geneva: Droz, 1960).

In the Iberic-Latin American patrimonialist tradition, no such sharp division exists: the line between public and private is blurred. Historically, both private and public wealth were considered part of the ruler's domain. Land, water, mines and trading contracts could be granted in trust to individuals for development, but the crown always expected to receive a share of the profits and reserved the right to reclaim the grants it had made. Moreover, land grants and charters, virtually any service, involved mutual obligations and generally the payment of a fee. For any official document to be expedited required a favor, often monetary, in return. This is not to imply that North Americans are by nature honest and Latin Americans not. It is to say that "honesty" may mean different things in different contexts, that in the patrimonialist conception prevalent in Latin America, no strict separation between private and public wealth is possible. Anyone who purports to measure accountability for the collection and expenditure of public funds must take these differences into account.¹²

(6) Civilian Supremacy over the Military

Civilian supremacy is a major premise of the Anglo-American polities, but in Latin America, it is often circumscribed or nonexistent. One must not, of course, overstate the differences, for military influence in the United States has probably long been stronger than we usually presume, and in Latin America there are usually constitutional injunctions against the military exercising political functions. Yet in Latin America, no strict separation exists between the military and civilian spheres. When North Americans refer to "civil-military relations," a separation is implied that in Latin America does not always exist. The military is often the strongest "party," a fact recognized both by civilians and military men; and the result is that most political conflicts take the form not of a civilian-versus-military struggle, but of competing factions that overlap and crosscut the civilian and military spheres.

In addition, the military in Latin America is no mere interest group, in the U.S. sense, but an integral part of the bureaucratic system and inseparable from it. Stemming perhaps from the role of the military orders in the formation of the Spanish nation, the

¹² Patrimonialism is discussed in Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 334-360. Also see Sidney M. Greenfield, *The Patrimonial State and Patron-Client Relations in Iberia and Latin America* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, Program in Latin American Studies, Occasional Paper no. 1, 1976).

army is one of the fundamental props of the state system, with special responsibilities, prerogatives and functions. Even in the more democratic Latin American countries, the military has consistently acted at or close to the surface of power. The military, moreover, by law and constitution, has certain "higher-level" priorities to preserve order and tranquility, maintain domestic peace, and exercise a "moderating" role in national affairs. The military serves almost literally as a fourth branch of government, having a duty to step into politics under certain circumstances. That the military stepped into power in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay should not be very surprising. What is shocking and repugnant, especially in Chile, is what the military did after it came to power.¹³

(7) Freedom from Ecclesiastic Controls

Much of what has been said of the military also applies to the Church. The Church is intimately a part of Iberian and Latin American culture, in terms of (a) the philosophic base of the political order and (b) the frequent fusion and mutual reinforcement of Catholicism and the legal, educational and social systems. As is the army, the Church is often a part of the state system and inseparable from it, having special obligations in the administration of schools, orphanages, hospitals and the defense of public morality and order. The Church is not a mere interest group but bears certain primary responsibilities in the political realm. Despite the sometimes formal separation of church and state in the Latin American constitutions, the reality is more ambiguous. The principle of "freedom of political life from ecclesiastic controls" is either meaningless or in need of further refinement.¹⁴

(8) Strong, Independent Local Government

The principle of strong, independent local government also derives from the Anglo-American tradition, particularly the oft-romanticized New England town meeting. It is not an appropriate measure of Latin American democracy for several reasons.

¹³ On the military's place and role, see Lawrence Graham, *Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971); Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); and Robert A. Potash, *The Impact of Professionalism on the Twentieth Century Argentine Military* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, Program in Latin American Studies, Occasional, Paper no. 3, 1977).

¹⁴ Fredrick B. Pike, *The Conflict Between Church and State in Latin America* (New York: Knopf, 1964); Henry A. Landsberger, ed., *The Church and Social Change in Latin America* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970).

Despite difficulties of implementation, the Latin American pattern has been one of centralized, administrative rule from the top, rather than grassroots participatory democracy. As in most nations whose administration is based on the Napoleonic Code, little power has ever devolved upon the local units; instead, most local officials are appointed, and power is concentrated in the central state. There is little expectation at either the local or the national level that local government can or should be effective. The national regime usually must respect local charters, where they exist, and has some obligation to listen to local demands; but virtually all decisions are made in the capital city, and programs are implemented by the national government through its local agents. Local governments themselves have no power to tax or to devise educational or any other important local programs. Nor is there much expectation that they should.¹⁵

(9) Representative, Participatory and Pluralist Government

Again, few of us would argue with the principle of representative, participatory and pluralist government. The difficulty is that what Iberic-Latin American civilization means by these terms frequently varies from the Anglo-American view.

"Representation" in Iberia and Latin America means not just geographic representation and "one man, one vote" but often implies representation of society's major functional or corporate groups. Although lip service (and sometimes more than that) is paid to the principles of equal representation, special groups and corporate elites frequently receive preferential treatment. The mere fact of birth does not carry with it the right to representation; rather, representation is earned through a "civilizing" process which usually includes incorporation of the individual into one of society's recognized component groups. Hence the frequent importance of (a) functionally representative legislatures and councils of state, (b) special access for those groups with "juridical personality," and (c) the mixture of corporate and individualistic modes of representation.¹⁶

"Participation" also takes place, generally through offi-

¹⁵ Lawrence Graham, "Latin America: Illusion or Reality?," in Wiarda, ed.

¹⁶ Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977). More generally, see Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics*, January 1973, pp. 206-235, and Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism: Social and Political Structures in the Iberian World* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974).

cially recognized and sanctioned agencies, and not necessarily on the basis of free associability. Hence the frequent importance of official parties, trade unions and the like, and the sanctions often used against unofficial and unrecognized groups.¹⁷

"Puralism" may also exist in Latin America, but it is usually a system of limited pluralism not the freewheeling laissez-faire pluralism of Tocqueville and the United States. Plural groups are often structured and controlled: an infinite multitude of uncontrolled groups "out there" would not do. To be accepted as one of the groups permitted to bargain in the political process, more than an informal, *ad hoc* association is required. Often, acceptance requires official licensing by the state and, hence, limitations on the group's activities.¹⁸

What "democracy" means in the Iberic-Latin American context is treated more fully in the next section. Suffice it here to suggest that while democracy is honored in Latin America, and while it has been established in some countries in some time periods, it, too, represents more an ideal to strive for than an operating reality. Further, "democratic government" is not necessarily incompatible with elitist rule and a hierarchical, pyramidal, non-egalitarian structure of society and polity.¹⁹

It is clear from the foregoing that the measures of democracy and human rights commonly applied to Latin America are strongly culture-bound. They derive largely from the Anglo-American constitutional model, which is often far-removed from Latin American culture and reality. Indeed, what such indices purport to measure — democracy — is not being measured at all. Instead, what is actually measured is the presence or absence of North American institutional molds in Latin America. By such criteria, Latin America naturally shows glaring deficiencies. To my mind, not only are the measures faulty, but the questions raised are the wrong ones. A set

¹⁷ Howard J. Wiarda, "The Corporative Origins of the Iberian and Latin American Labor Relations Systems," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Spring, 1978.

¹⁸ Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964), pp. 291-341. In an otherwise provocative article, Philippe Schmitter has confused the issue by presenting corporatism and pluralism as polar opposites, when in fact pluralism may exist in corporatist or liberal polities. ("Still the Century of Corporatism?," in Pike and Stritch, eds.)

¹⁹ As derived from Roman law and Thomas Aquinas, as well as from modern secular theorists (Gumprowicz, Mosca, Pareto, Michels). See the discussion in Howard J. Wiarda, "Corporatist Theory and Ideology: A Latin American Development Paradigm," *Journal of Church and State*, Winter 1978.

of measures which seeks to assess Latin American democracy on its own terms, rather than by North American criteria, and which (it is hoped) does begin to pose the right questions, is offered in the following section.

Before condemning the earlier indices to the ash can of anachronism and ethnocentrism, however, it should be said that the old measures do have some relevance for Latin America. For probably all the Latin American nations in fact represent a blend of both the corporatist-organicist-patrimonialist features highlighted here and the liberal, republican, representative features of the Anglo-American model. There are, then, two sets of institutional pillars on which the Iberic and Latin American state systems rest. Sometimes fused, sometimes parallel (but usually untouched), these two institutional foundations continue to coexist.²⁰ Any attempt to describe or measure Latin American democracy, therefore, must take both traditions into consideration; and the criteria one uses must reflect the composite, sometimes hodgepodge mix of historical organicist concepts and the newer liberal-democratic ones.

Toward New Definitions

Given the differences outlined above, let us proceed to new definitions of democracy and human rights in Latin America, taking into account (a) the distinctive features of the Iberic-Latin American political tradition and (b) the newer fusions. The following model has been fashioned in the form of a set of measureable indicators substitutable for the Fitzgibbon indices and based more on indigenous Latin American than on North American criteria. These new indices provide a means of measuring Latin American democracy on its own terms and also constitute a handy check list to determine when a government oversteps its democratic legitimacy and is therefore likely to be challenged or overthrown. It must be recalled that the model presented is an ideal-typical construct, and that a fuller exposition would be required to account for the considerable variations among countries and within countries over time.

²⁰ John J. Bailey, "Pluralist and Corporatist Dimensions of Interest Representation in Colombia," in James Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); J. A. Morris and S. C. Ropp, "Corporatism and Dependent Development: A Honduran Case Study," *Latin American Research Review*, no. 12, 1977, pp. 27-68; Linn A. Hammergren, "Corporatism in Latin American Politics: A Reexamination of the Unique Tradition," *Comparative Politics*, July 1977, pp. 443-461; as well as Howard J. Wiarda "Corporatism in Iberian and Latin American Political Analysis: Criticisms, Qualifications and the Context and 'Whys'," *Comparative Politics*, January 1978, pp. 307-312.

(1) Strong, personalist, executive leadership, caudillo or Bonapartist rule, is not only permissible but expected. The president may rule in an authoritarian fashion but not a totalitarian one. He should be strong and paternalistic but not a tyrant. The president is only partially limited by a separate congress, judiciary or constitution; equally important in checking unbridled authority are the corporate group rights, or *fueros*, and the restraints imposed by moral law. By "moral law" is meant not the vague pragmatism of "situational ethics" but a higher eternal and natural law as articulated in Christian doctrine or in somewhat more secularized standards of "right" behavior, beyond which strong leaders may not go. The index one uses to measure the limits on presidential power, then, must take into account the widespread acceptability of authoritarian, paternalistic rule, as well as the fine line that often distinguishes authoritarianism from the unacceptable forms of tyranny and totalitarianism.²¹

(2) Although the principle of separate, coequal branches of government has not been so firmly established or desired in Latin America as in the United States, it does exist. The congress is not coequal, but it does have important advisory, consultative and representative roles, corresponding to the historical functions of the traditional *Córtes*. The executive may be dominant, but the congress can still make life difficult for him; and if he rules entirely without a parliament, he runs the risk of alienating public opinion.²²

The same applies to a government that rides roughshod over its national court system. Any government that comes to power, especially if it does so by extraconstitutional means, must immediately resolve its legitimacy problem. No court can entirely frustrate a government determined to pursue a particular action and willing to use force to accomplish it. Much less would any court interpose itself to prevent an armed insurrection aimed at overthrowing an existing government. However, judicial review and a functioning court system, although circumscribed, do often serve as checks on unbridled executive rule. Furthermore, the courts have a certain power in their ability to confer legitimacy on *de facto* regimes. A court may issue accords legitimating a regime in return for promises to observe human rights, to preserve or restore the constitution, or even to maintain the independence of the judiciary itself. Govern-

²¹ Linz (see fn. 18, above) has most clearly drawn the authoritarian-totalitarian distinction.

²² W. Agor, *Latin American Legislatures* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

ments of doubtful legitimacy can thus be nudged toward a greater commitment to respect constitutional rights, although, of course, broad political support for such moves is also necessary.²³ Hence, while the principle of separate and coequal power among the three branches is not always an established or accepted principle of Latin American government, the courts and congress do have some autonomy and power. An index that measures these relations in terms of the Latin American conception of the role and functions of the courts and congress, rather than in terms of the North American view, would be both useful and feasible.

(3) Free speech, free press and free assembly are also principles of Latin American constitutionalism, but they can similarly be limited for the "common good." Freedom is not an absolute but implies, to a far greater degree than in the United States, predetermined bounds. Nor should one mistake the formal constitutional enactment of such rights, designed as goals and aspirations rather than operating realities, for their implementation. In addition, the laws and constitutions of Latin America give the executive broad discretionary power to declare a state of siege in times of emergency and suspend the usual guarantees. These emergency powers, however, are not intended to extend to violations of the human person. Nonetheless, the terrible centrifugal forces that have torn, and continue to tear, these societies apart are such that in Latin American constitutional law, political rights that might otherwise seem inviolable must legitimately give way before the need to preserve the state itself.

At the same time, the Latin American nations are signatories to a number of international documents for the protection of human rights. These documents include the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the Organization of American States, and others. They encompass political and human rights (fair trial, habeas corpus, freedom of speech, etc.) and socioeconomic rights (work, food, health care, etc.). Further, although liberalism and republicanism — and the basic liberties usually associated with them — are still probably a minority strain in Latin America, the force of this tradition is nonetheless important and cannot be ignored. Finally, if it is inappropriate to judge the human rights credentials of various Latin American governments by U.S. criteria, one may employ their own criteria. A case in point is

²³ Keith Rosenn, "Judicial Review in Latin America," *Ohio State Law Journal*, vol. 35, no. 4, 1974, pp. 785-819.

Paraguay, where a state of emergency has been in effect almost continuously since 1947. Clearly, in this case, the emergency laws are being abused to maintain in power an unpopular authoritarian regime, to take measures that are disproportionate to the actual emergency, and to systematically violate the human rights of the opposition. Here, it would seem particularly appropriate for the United States to join the Paraguayan Bar Association in its formal condemnation of the continued abuse of the emergency laws.²⁴ For here it is clear that both by North American and Paraguayan criteria, human rights have been grossly violated.

(4) Although the Latin American tradition provides for strong, centralized rule with little power given over to local government, a history of respect for the rights of local, state or regional entities also exists. Frequently such local rights are enshrined in long-standing charters, sometimes in the constitution itself, providing for varying degrees of autonomy from the central government. There are numerous center/periphery issues revolving around the autonomy question, perhaps most dramatically expressed in present-day Spain in the conflict over Basque and Catalan aspirations for independence from national policy emanating from Madrid. In Brazil, the centralization of power at the expense of state prerogatives involves a related issue; so do the Peruvian government's efforts to extend its control over the more isolated interior.²⁵ This conflict between center and periphery constitutes one of the major arenas of Latin American politics, although posed in this way, the issue is somewhat different from that posed by those North American scholars who have elevated the strength of representative government at the grassroots level to an index of democracy. To the extent a Latin American government respects local or regional *fueros*, it is considered "democratic"; when it rides roughshod over local rights and fails to care for those living in the periphery, it risks losing its democratic legitimacy.

(5) Closely related to the issue of local and regional rights is the matter of corporate group rights. While few Latin American executives are strongly restrained by congressional or judicial limits on their power, they are "checked" by the major "power con-

²⁴ The Paraguayan document is reprinted in Karst and Rosenn, p. 235ff. See, also, Héctor Fix Zamudio, "Latin American Procedures for the Protection of the Individual," *Journal of the International Commission of Jurists*, December 1968, pp. 60-95.

²⁵ Karst and Rosenn, introduction. Also see Hammergren.

tenders" that are a part of their respective systems. These groups, the *fuerzas vivas* or *intereses creados*, include the army, the Church, economic elites, organized labor, the government bureaucracy, university students, and some others. These are not merely interest groups, in the U.S. sense, but fundamental vertebrae or corporate pillars on which the entire governmental superstructure rests. The concept is more a feudal, semifederal or traditional Luso-Hispanic conception than it is a reflection of North American interest group pluralism.²⁶

Any president who comes to power in Latin America must respect the autonomy, as expressed in his nation's charters and organic laws, of the several corporate pillars on which the government — any government — rests. This implies a certain respect (a) for the Church and the concordat (if any exists) between the state and the Vatican; (b) for the national university and its charter of autonomy; (c) for landed, commercial and industrial interests; and, perhaps above all, (d) for the armed forces and their privileged position as ultimate arbiters of national affairs, their special courts and immunities, and their direct access to policy through the *casa militar*. Any civilian president must be wary if he intervenes in the internal affairs of the military, for that is to invite the reverse process. Recently, corporate group rights have been extended to urban workers, peasants and women.

Obviously, the power of the various groups is unequal, helping to explain their differential treatment by the state. But generally, a government is considered democratic to the degree it respects the corporate group *fueros* of society's component units; to the extent it does not respect them, it not only violates basic rights but runs the risk of its own overthrow.²⁷

(6) A government is viewed as democratic to the degree that it is pluralistic and that all elements enjoy (a) autonomy from arbitrary authority and (b) considerable freedom of action and movement. By "pluralism" we mean not the laissez-faire hurly-burly of the largely unrestricted U.S. interest-group struggle, but a limited pluralism in which the various groups, while controlled and restricted by the state, often elaborately so, nonetheless enjoy a certain

²⁶ Ronald C. Newton, "On 'Functional Groups,' 'Fragmentation,' and 'Pluralism' in Spanish American Political Society," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, February 1970, pp. 1-29.

²⁷ Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, *Latin American Politics and Development* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, forthcoming 1979), introduction.

contractually defined independence from it.²⁸ A system is pluralistic in Latin America insofar as it allows or safeguards centers of power other than itself: the family; the local entity; the hacienda; various religious, cultural, educational, philanthropic and professional agencies; to say nothing of the municipal, regional and corporate groups already referred to, which promote the rights and interests of their members and protect them against unwarranted encroachments by the state or other groups. Some of these groups, such as the family, local community or the Church, are considered to be prior to the state, theoretically at least, both in history and in natural law. Except in emergencies (and even then there are some safeguards), these are sacrosanct institutions against which no government may move unless it is willing to sacrifice the loyalty and support of the group affected. A government that antagonizes several groups by violating their rights can be, and likely will be, overthrown.

(7) Latin American governments are also obligated to protect the basic human rights of individual citizens. These individual rights are not necessarily conceived of in the same way or afforded the same elevated position as in the U.S. Constitution, although through such devices as the writ of *amparo*, *segurança*, habeas corpus and cassation, some protection is received. Even more fundamental, because it stems from natural law, is the obligation of government to leave people alone, to respect their individuality, to protect the inviolability of the human person. While authoritarian rule of a paternalistic sort may be permissible or even desired, a regime or police agency that terrorizes its own people is not. Torture and killings as instruments of state policy; turning loose the police or army on hapless trade unions, students or opposition elements; summary trials and executions; beating women, priests and children — all are clearly outside the bounds of acceptable behavior. The cumulative effect of such violations may undermine the legitimacy of a regime. Batista, Trujillo, Pérez Jiménez, Somoza and the present Chilean regime are cases in point; Brazil seems to be skirting the edge.²⁹

²⁸ See Linz; also, David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, "Who Does What, to Whom, and How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism," in Malloy, ed.

²⁹ See especially "Proceedings of the 67th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, November 1973, pp. 198-226.

(8) Government must be both “representative” and “participatory,” but in the Latin American sense of those terms. It must be representative of society, meaning those groups (the Church, army, labor, elites, etc.) that have been duly recognized by the state and given official sanction as legitimate power contenders in the system. These groups are usually represented in the cabinet, congress or council of state, and in the ministries and state agencies, and they have special access to the centers of decisionmaking. The state must also provide for participation, generally through an officially sanctioned network of associations for workers, farmers, women and so forth. To the extent a government allows such representation and participation, it may be considered democratic; but to the extent it closes off or stifles such legitimate group life, it may lose its democratic standing. Note, however, that not all elements are represented in this scheme (unorganized peasants, Indians and urban “marginals” are excluded), nor is the principle of “one man, one vote” necessarily applicable.³⁰

(9) While government must be “democratic” in the sense I have been describing, that is not always incompatible with “top-down” or elitist rule. Pervasive notions of hierarchy and authority often imply that deference is given to those with a perceived “natural” right to rule. The elites, however, are obligated not to abuse their privileged position. They must provide charity and benefices to the poor and, while retaining social distance, respect the rights and individuality of those beneath them on the social scale. They may be patronizing and paternalistic, but they may not ignore or excessively disdain their workers, peasants or servants. Transferred to the national level, this means an obligation, also, to accommodate and absorb the rising social forces, not to close them out as in Nicaragua and Paraguay. In classic patron-client fashion — now extended from the hacienda to the state agency — the *patrón* enjoys a preponderance of rights, but the situation cannot be entirely one-way. The clients also have their rights, and a *patrón* or government that ignores or abuses those rights may lose the loyalty usually given in return for various favors. The cumulative loss of his clients’ services and loyalty spells trouble for any *patrón*, including the great national *patrón*, the government itself.³¹

³⁰ Wiarda, *Corporatism and Development* . . . , chaps. 2-4, 11.

³¹ Emilio Willems, *Latin American Culture: An Anthropological Synthesis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), chaps. 5, 14, 17.

(10) A new criterion for democratic legitimacy in Latin America includes the requirement that government provide for economic development and social justice. Development and social justice have become part of the ideology of the region and are closely linked to its concept of democracy. The older conception — that people must be poor, live in wretched housing and see their children diseased and with bloated bellies “because poverty is good for the soul,” or because the Church obligated them to accept their station in life — is dead or dying. The “revolution of rising expectations” has come to Latin America, and any government must “deliver” in the way of housing, health services, food, jobs, etc. — or else! Democracy in Latin America has thus been redefined to encompass social and economic criteria as well as political ones — though the precise nature of the regime that brings social justice and economic growth is left open, and the models used (including varying forms of populism and syndicalism) may, again, be quite distinct from those of the United States or Western Europe.³²

(11) A Latin American government that oversteps the bounds of permissible behavior outlined above, rides roughshod over natural law and rights, concentrates all power in its own hands, violates the contracts and *fueros* governing corporate associational life, becomes brutal and oppressive — in short, a tyranny — deserves to fall. The right of rebellion is as much a part of the Latin American political tradition as is the obligation to obedience. Against an unjust tyrant the citizen has the right and duty to resist, to go outside the system, to seek to replace it. But even here, certain ground rules apply. Faced with widespread popular opposition, the tyrant has an obligation to resign (e.g., Perón, Batista) instead of seeking to stay in office and provoking further bloodshed. Such barbarism as napalming rural villages and unleashing campaigns of terror against the opposition has consistently been considered illegitimate and self-defeating. The opposition, however, is also obliged to play by the rules: the right of asylum for officials of the outgoing government must be respected; those who wish to go into exile should be allowed to do so; reprisals should be avoided. In short, the final measure of democracy in Latin America is the right to rebel against the system if that system becomes tyrannous, abusive and ineffective.³³

³² Charles W. Anderson et al., *Issues of Political Development*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pt. 3.

³³ The literature on this theme is vast, ranging from Saint Thomas to Fidel Castro's “History Will Absolve Me.” See also Manuel Giménez Fernández, *Las doctrinas popu-*

Nowhere in the above list of characteristics and criteria for measuring democracy in Latin America is the notion of a formalized, constitutional separation of powers or checks and balances given central focus; nor do elections, political parties and the like constitute the chief criteria. Of course, in some countries today and in others in the past, elections make a critical difference, but it must be re-emphasized that elections are not the only legitimate route to power and certainly do not, by themselves, constitute an adequate measure of democracy. The criteria developed here seek to go beyond the older, largely U.S.-based, procedural gauges of democracy and, rather than impose outside criteria, to develop criteria deriving from the context and tradition of the Latin American culture-area.

Yet, while the concepts and criteria developed here derive from what is even now probably the dominant tradition in Latin America, it is no longer the *only* one. For alongside the historical tradition — here briefly characterized as organicist, patrimonialist and corporatist (in the broad, political-cultural sense) — there has grown a genuinely liberal-democratic one. These two models (which give rise to the “two Spains” concept, for instance) may coexist within a given country, sometimes wholly separate and sometimes overlapping, considerably complicating any measurement of democracy in Latin America. The situation is complicated further (in Peru, Portugal, Cuba) by the superimposition of a third, socialist overlay. Any assessment of democracy’s presence or absence in Latin America must keep in mind the distinctive historical-cultural meaning of democracy in the area as well as the newer conceptions that have recently emerged.

Needed: Care, Caution and Sensitivity

This discussion began with the question of whether democracy and human rights are everywhere the same and universal. The answer as applied to Iberia and Latin America is both yes and no. Neither the nations of Latin America nor Spain and Portugal have much trouble agreeing with the human rights principles set forth in various international charters; and there was probably no hypocrisy in King Juan Carlos’s message to the U.S. Congress that his goal was to “perfect” Spanish democracy, or in Ernesto Geisel’s labeling Brazil a “relative democracy.” At the same

listas en la independencia de Hispanoamérica (Seville: 1947) and Lawrence E. Rothstein, “Aquinas and Revolution,” a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2-5, 1976.

time, one must be cognizant of the impact of what Lucian Pye once termed the "world culture,"³⁴ largely Western, which forces dependent countries like those in Latin America to redefine themselves in our terms instead of their own historical ones, to be judged by our criteria of democracy and human rights whether or not they wish to be and whether or not the Western notion is even functional in their own distinct political culture.

It is clear from this discussion that in Iberia and Latin America, key terms like "representation," "participation," "pluralism," "democracy" and "rights" frequently have quite different meanings, carry different connotations, or imply different expectations from those predominant in the Anglo-American context. One must bear in mind the hierarchy and differential importance of distinct bodies of law in Latin America, that human rights (*derechos*) may occupy a different level of importance than in U.S. law, that individual human rights are often subordinated to corporate group rights (*fueros*), and that human and group rights may both be subordinated to the common good or the necessity of maintaining the unity and integrity of the state.

The sweep of the analysis given here is broad, and the model presented is an ideal-typical one. It is a heuristic device and is not meant to correspond to reality in every instance. That however, should not blind us to the numerous qualifiers and variations that must be recognized. At one level, a "macro" model such as this is useful as a means of alerting us to the general parameters of a major issue-area, but for specific policy recommendations, we must also take into account variations within nations, between nations and across time. A dynamic component must be incorporated so that the model is less deterministic than it sometimes appears.³⁵ We must be alerted to the human rights-versus-intervention dilemma, and we must weigh carefully the mechanisms that produce successes in our efforts to promote human rights and those that produce backfires. We must further distinguish among types of human rights: (a) those involving freedom from government violation of the person, (b) social and economic rights and (c) democratic political freedoms. On the first of these types, there exists considerable international consensus; hence, it may be hypothesized, there

³⁴ In Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), introduction.

³⁵ These more dynamic features of change and modernization are treated in some of my writings: "Toward a Framework . . ." *Politics and Social Change . . .*, and *Transcending Corporatism? The Portuguese Corporative System and the Revolution of 1974* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, Institute of International Studies, 1976).

is some possibility of policy success in the human rights area. On the second, which lies at the heart of the acrimonious "North-South" dispute, and which involves the issues of who has primary responsibility for resolving socioeconomic ills and how best to achieve that goal, there is less consensus; hence, there is probably less chance of success. On the third category (the main topic of discussion here), there is even less agreement and probably an even slimmer chance of success.

I conclude with a series of caveats. We must, I think, be skeptical of U.S. journalists and government officials who insist on interpreting Latin American democracy entirely through their own cultural and political concepts. The "liberalizing" and "democratizing" currents and "struggles" of which they so frequently write or speak are often valid up to a point, but they tend to be based on superficial readings derived from North American, rather than Latin American, criteria. The fact that political parties exist in Spain, for example, and that elections are held is insufficient evidence on which to describe Spain as democratic. But the reverse also holds. Because the Latin American systems do not always correspond to U.S. notions of democracy, we have frequently been quick to brand them as "failures." The fact is that in many cases they are simply practicing a type of "democracy" that is reflective more of their own historical and cultural understanding of that term than of the Anglo-American conception.

So, too, with human rights. What is a violation of human rights in one cultural context may not be in another, or may be seen in a different light, or may have another meaning altogether. Furthermore, over time, these conceptions may change along with broader developmental changes, thus giving human rights a different meaning in one epoch or in one group of countries than in another. The *fuero*, for instance, will mean something different as the particular group grows in strength or as the balance between competing groups is altered. Hence, in the case of "democracy" and "human rights," a conception is needed that derives from Latin American understandings and not from our own culture-biased views. The concepts discussed here represent a first step in that direction. We must distinguish between (a) what the United States conceives of as human rights violations (which often become issues reflective primarily of U.S. domestic politics) and (b) those violations that reflect actual Latin American disenchantment with their own governments' actions. Care, caution and sensitivity to the cultural and political differences involved are required. These qualities can lead

us to a greater understanding of how the Latin American political systems actually function, and can keep us from despair when Latin American politics evolve in directions that do not correspond to our own conception of democracy.

We can and should be in favor of democracy and human rights in Latin America (and at home) while also differentiating among the several categories of human rights, understanding how they apply in various countries at different stages of development, and remaining sensitive to differences of meaning and interpretation in societies other than our own. We cannot impose our conceptions on nations where human rights and democracy are conceived of differently without considerable damage being done to them and to us. We must come to grips with the fact that distinct culture-areas have different understandings of democratic concepts and their relative importance.³⁶ The criteria of democracy and human rights offered here give us a handle to grasp, a means to support human rights while also being sensitive to cultural differences. Hence, for the policymaker as well as the scholar the same caveats apply: prudence, discretion, empathy and a sophisticated understanding of quite different social and political traditions.³⁷ For if we are to cease acting as "policeman to the world," we probably cannot, unless with great modesty, circumspection and sensitivity, presume to be its political and moral superior either.

³⁶ Fortunately, there are signs that those responsible for policy have begun to grasp these differences. See, for example, the speeches of Cyrus R. Vance ("Human Rights Policy") and Warren Christopher ("Human Rights: Principle and Realism"), both available from the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Service.

³⁷ Sound policy and informed moral judgment must be based on a clear understanding of the broad cultural differences extant. A thorough, factual dossier on democracy and human rights in specific countries is also required. This article helps provide a theoretical understanding of the issues involved and thus serves as a necessary prelude to policy; Department of State reports and reports growing out of congressional hearings on human rights in specific countries provide the essential data base.

For policymakers who may have already grasped the distinct conceptions involved and who have the factual materials at hand, however, the dilemma is no longer a lack of understanding but what to do about governments that violate democratic norms and human rights even on their own indigenous terms. What levers can be manipulated? What mechanisms are appropriate? How can human rights and democracy be encouraged without unwarranted interference in another nation's internal affairs? — these issues must constitute the subject matter of a separate paper.

REGIONAL RESTRAINT: U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY AND LATIN AMERICA

by John R. Redick

In 1977 the Carter administration undertook major new initiatives regarding the global proliferation of nuclear armaments. Implicit in the effort was recognition of the interrelationship between decisions affecting this nation's domestic nuclear program and U.S. non-proliferation strategy. Coinciding with the presidential initiatives, increased bipartisan congressional concern produced growing likelihood of a more coherent and well-defined U.S. nonproliferation policy. Far from resolved, however, is the degree of acceptance of the U.S. policy by other nuclear supplier nations and certain developing nations with growing nuclear programs. The deceptively simple but significant question remains: Will the policy achieve its intended effect of limiting or preventing further nuclear proliferation in various regions of the world?

This question is particularly timely for Latin America. Leaders of the two regional nations possessing the greatest technological capability to develop a nuclear explosive — Argentina and Brazil — have serious reservations about certain aspects of the new U.S. initiatives in the nuclear area. As they perceive the situation, the United States is seeking to convince or pressure other nuclear supplier nations into policy arrangements that will serve to make Latin American nations more dependent on foreign technology and/or frustrate their ability to develop their indigenous technology fully.

Anticipating the central conclusion of this paper is the view that, while a range of policy strategies can be espoused for avoiding nuclear proliferation in Latin America, regional mechanisms may provide one of the best options. Consequently, it is argued, U.S. policy should be particularly sensitive to and supportive of indigenous regional or subregional Latin American mechanisms.

John R. Redick is Research Director of the Stanley Foundation and Editor of its Occasional Paper series. He is the author of several articles dealing with nuclear proliferation and Latin America. The views expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Stanley Foundation.

Carter's Nuclear Policy

The general contours of the Carter administration's nuclear policy¹ can be briefly summarized in the following areas.

(1) *The U.S. Nuclear Program*: An indefinite deferring of the reprocessing of spent fuel from, and recycling of plutonium in, the existing generation of light water power reactors was announced in the early part of 1977. In addition, a deferral of the commercial development of breeder reactors (Clinch River) was advocated, although a full-scale testing process would be continued. Specifically, funding requests for liquid metal fast breeder reactor development were reduced and increases sought for alternative breeder types including those using the uranium/thorium fuel cycle. It was also determined that the United States would considerably upgrade its enrichment capacity—through development of gas centrifuge technology and continued expansion of existing gaseous diffusion facilities—so as to be in a position to guarantee other nations an assured supply of enriched uranium. Signifying a clear emphasis on the front end of the fuel cycle, the United States reopened its order books for foreign enrichment services with the intended goal of discouraging foreign purchasing or developing of reprocessing facilities. Supportive of this policy are increased efforts to locate and develop new U.S. uranium reserves and an offer to accept, on a limited basis, spent reactor fuel from foreign sources.

Increasing attention is also being given to alternative fuel cycle technologies, through the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP), with the goal of developing a more "proliferation resistant" nuclear technology. The overriding thrust of the Carter administration's nuclear policy is to reduce the likelihood, at home and abroad, of widespread use of plutonium.

(2) *Criteria for Nuclear Exports and Agreements*: Strong new criteria for U.S. nuclear export licensing and international agreements are being implemented in addition to the evolving development of new international restraints. Both the Carter admin-

¹ Some of the relevant documentation outlining Carter's nuclear policies are: "Statement by the President on Nuclear Power Policy," Office of the White House Press Secretary, April 7, 1977; "Control of Nuclear Proliferation," Message from the President of the United States (to Congress), April 28, 1977; *The National Energy Plan*, Executive Office of the President, April 29, 1977; and the administration's request to Congress for the Department of Energy budget for fiscal year 1979 as summarized in *Nucleonics Week*, January 26, 1978. In March 1978 President Carter was forced by Congress to compromise on a key portion of his nuclear policy and sign authorization for funds for continued development of an industrial-scale breeder (Clinch River), but efforts to find a compromise on this issue continue. See, also, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (PL 95-242).

istration and Congress desire improvement, although the former would give greater emphasis to the chief executive and a multi-national approach and the latter to unilateral U.S. actions and more rigid criteria.

Despite differences, there is general consensus between the administration and Congress on certain basic principles for future U.S. policy on nuclear exports and international agreements: (a) acceptance of comprehensive safeguards by importing nations on all nuclear activities; (b) application of adequate physical security measures by recipient countries to materials or facilities received from the United States; (c) assurance that no U.S.-supplied material or equipment will be used for a nuclear explosive; and (d) U.S. right of approval for any retransfer of U.S.-supplied material or equipment to other countries.

Also during 1977, in relatively little noticed actions, the administration undertook certain unilateral initiatives to tighten U.S. criteria. These included a decision to resist approving any new export licenses for shipment abroad of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel during the two-year International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), and a requirement of presidential approval for export of highly enriched uranium (heU). These actions were generally supportive of the intent of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, passed by Congress early in 1978.

(3) *International Measures*: A considerable effort has been undertaken by the Carter administration to convince other supplier nations, among them close allies, to adhere to U.S. views that certain sensitive technology should not be exported, including reprocessing and enrichment facilities. Some success has been achieved with the agreement of France and the Federal Republic of Germany not to export reprocessing equipment in the future (while excluding enrichment facilities). Existing commercial arrangements have been tightened (Germany-Brazil) or revised (France-Pakistan) in part due to U.S. pressure. However, European nations and Japan have made clear their intent to proceed with reprocessing and plutonium recycling and aggressive development of breeder technology, despite the apparent shift in the U.S. program.

The administration has also attempted to exert considerable influence on countries with accelerating nuclear programs but still dependent on external sources for equipment and/or fuel. Such nations as Brazil, South Korea, Argentina, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Taiwan and others have been subject to varying degrees of public and private pressure.

While bilateral efforts continue, there is a growing commitment by the Carter administration to the view that nuclear proliferation can be solved only on a multilateral basis. The fifteen-nation London Nuclear Supplier talks reached agreement on a broad set of guidelines in September 1977 (announced in January 1978) as to the transfer and sale of nuclear equipment and materials. The core portion of the supplier guidelines is agreement that, prior to exporting certain sensitive or "trigger" materials, importing nations must agree to provide assurances that imported material will not be used for nuclear explosives and will receive effective physical protection and be placed under IAEA safeguards. Also, transfer of sensitive material will occur only with approval of the original supplier. Finally, a permanent consultative arrangement is established whereby, in the event of suspected violation of a supplier/recipient agreement, no supplier nation would "act in a manner that could prejudice any measure that may be adopted by other suppliers" pending outcome of consultations.² Due to the opposition of France and the Federal Republic, however, the suppliers failed to agree that recipient nations should be required to accept full-scope safeguards over their entire nuclear program as a prerequisite for co-operation or commerce.

The multilateral approach received continued emphasis with the establishment of INFCE, a U.S.-inspired two-year scientific evaluation of various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Participating in INFCE are forty nations including all nuclear-weapon states except China, nuclear supplier nations, and all major near-nuclear nations with the exception of Taiwan and South Africa.³ While INFCE is labeled as a "technical and analytical study and not a negotiation" (to be carried out in eight working groups), the U.S. government hopes to use the opportunity to convince participating nations of feasible alternatives to widespread use of plutonium. In this regard President Carter also used the organizing session to propose that "an international fuel bank should be established so that there might be a reservoir of fuel to be supplied under those circumstances."⁴

In summary it may be observed that other nuclear supplier nations have been responsive to U.S. efforts to develop more

² *Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers*, September 21, 1977 (made public January 11, 1978).

³ *Final Communiqué of the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation*, October 21, 1977.

⁴ "Nuclear Fuel and Non-proliferation" President Carter's address to the organizing meetings of INFCE, U.S. Department of State News Release, October 19, 1977.

careful control and export restrictions, but opposed to abandonment of current and planned reactor systems (due to concern for adequate energy supply when faced with interruptible and/or high-cost foreign energy supply). Near-nuclear nations such as Argentina and Brazil have similar concerns for energy security — and similar reluctance to alter or abandon current nuclear programs for uncertain alternatives. Their acute vulnerability to policy decisions of nuclear supplier nations makes them understandably suspicious of efforts to tighten cooperative arrangements and common export criteria and reluctant to cooperate fully with new international measures. Within a regional context, however, genuine opportunities exist.

Latin America's Accelerating Nuclear Programs

In several Latin American nations the dramatic rise in world crude oil prices has caused heightened concern for energy security and a concomitant acceleration of investment in nuclear power. By the early 1980s three Latin American countries will have one or more power reactors in operation, producing a militarily significant amount of plutonium. Research or test reactors of varying size exist or are under construction. Also, as in other regions, there is a growing trend toward full mastery of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle through purchase of foreign equipment and the development of internal expertise. The embryonic development of intra-regional export activity is another emerging trend.

In some nations, notably Argentina and Brazil, India's example is providing an attractive model: that is, development and testing of a so-called peaceful nuclear explosive device (PNE). Military application is another incentive affecting some Latin American nations' growing interest in nuclear energy. It is probably not yet the predominant factor in nuclear policy, but it is of definite importance to certain sectors within specific nations — again primarily Argentina and Brazil.

Argentina

Argentina has Latin America's most advanced nuclear power program, having opted nearly a decade ago for natural uranium/heavy water technology purchased from West Germany and Canada. The momentum of the national nuclear effort is indisputably toward total fuel cycle independence. Guided — and somewhat insulated from internal political turmoil — by the Argentine navy, the Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA) is

making rapid progress toward this goal. The national energy program for 1977-1985 envisages a doubling of electrical generating capacity, increasing nuclear energy's share from 10 per cent to 12 per cent; a reduction of thermal energy from its current 70 per cent to 46 per cent, and an increase in hydroelectricity from 5 per cent to 46 per cent (by 1985).

The nation's first nuclear power reactor, purchased from West Germany in 1968, commenced operation in 1974. Initially rated 320 MWe (now being upgraded to 365 MWe), the plant has had a successful track record despite having been briefly held while under construction by internal dissidents in 1973, and subsequently struck and partly damaged by lightning late in 1976. Argentine uranium is utilized, and heavy water was supplied initially by the former U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. A second 600 MWe natural uranium Candu power unit, Embalse Río Tercero, is being constructed near Córdoba under a commercial arrangement with a Canadian-Italian consortium. Scheduled now for operation in 1980, its early completion was significantly affected by a number of factors including extensive unforeseen inflation, Canadian desire to stiffen bilateral safeguard arrangements, and bribery scandals.⁵

A third 600 MWe unit, Atucha II, to be built by Canada and West Germany in proximity to the first Argentine unit is scheduled for completion in 1985, but funding problems will delay its completion by a year.⁶ A fourth 600 MWe or larger facility (to be constructed in Mendoza province in western Argentina at the foot of the Andes) will also commence operation in the mid-1980s.⁷ Other plants are planned for Bahía Blanca and on the Atlantic coast. CNEA officials have stated that the nation plans to have fifteen reactors in operation by the year 2000, producing 9,000 MWe.⁸

Argentina is moving rapidly toward complete self-sufficiency in the front end of the fuel cycle. The country is richly endowed with uranium, possessing more than 23,000 tons of high quality uranium concentrate, with at least 31,000 tons available at higher cost. This is sufficient to meet the needs of six plants of 600 MWe for thirty years and more than ample for the nation's projected

⁵ *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), October 25, 1977.

⁶ Interview with CNEA Director Castro Madero in *La Nación*, February 17, 1977; *Nucleonics Week*, January 19, 1978.

⁷ Details on specific projects for the Argentine nuclear energy program are outlined in Proyecto de Ley, *Programa Nuclear Argentino, 1975-1985*, Cámara de la Nación (prepared by the CNEA for the Argentine Congress). See also Carlos Castro Madero, "Argentina. Política nuclear," and Juan E. Guglielmelli, "Argentina. Plan nuclear y presiones externas," both in *Estrategia* (Buenos Aires), September-October 1976.

⁸ *Nuclear Engineering International*, December 1977.

needs throughout the 1980s and beyond. CNEA President Castro Madero, alluding to the fact that Argentina is already the eighth largest producer of processed uranium in the world, recently foresaw that it could become an exporter.⁹ Currently over 150 tons of yellowcake are being produced per year, an amount expected to increase dramatically in the future.¹⁰ Argentina is developing a growing ability in fuel fabrication, already producing fuel elements, some of which are being used in Atucha I. It plans to be fully meeting its fuel fabrication needs within several years.

Domestic production of heavy water, an essential element of the natural uranium type reactor, is a central goal of Argentine nuclear officials. The CNEA has carried out research on heavy water for a number of years and will shortly install a one-ton experimental facility of its own design that will produce heavy water for use in Atucha I. In late 1977 Castro Madero announced that Argentina would seek bids for a pilot heavy water plant to be built in Arroyitos, in southern Neuquén province, which would produce 250 tons per year. He "hoped that countries having advanced technology in the area — the U.S. and Canada — will be interested in taking part in the competition."¹¹ Thus far the United States and Canada have privately rebuffed Argentine efforts to purchase principal equipment for the unit.

On the back end of the fuel cycle the nation is well advanced in research and development of technology for dealing with radioactive waste. By 1980, it is anticipated, a plant to store liquid waste will be completed, and by 1985 the first stage of a plant for solidification of liquid waste will be complete. Argentina's interest in this area was reflected in its decision to co-chair a working group on "Spent Fuel Management" in INFCE. The country also possesses the only publicly known plutonium reprocessing plant in Latin America, its stated objective being to reprocess spent fuel from some of the nation's research reactors. The lab-scale facility has been shut down, but a modified and enlarged pilot facility was reportedly reactivated for operation in 1977. It can be reasonably assumed that the new pilot unit will be capable of separating a militarily significant amount of plutonium, although there is no firm evidence to this effect. Currently it is one of the few nuclear units in a non-nuclear-weapon state not subject to IAEA safeguards.

⁹ *Jornal do Brazil* (Rio de Janeiro), November 17, 1977. As a point of fact Argentina has exported uranium in the past, notably to Israel.

¹⁰ *Nucleonics Week*, April 21, 1977. See also Madero interview in *La Nación*, cited above.

¹¹ *O Globo* (Rio de Janeiro), November 16, 1977. (Author's translation.)

While Argentina has apparently not reprocessed spent fuel as yet, U.S. officials have previously admitted that it possesses the technical means to do so. Recent statements by Castro Madero have tended to downplay the importance of reprocessing due to the Argentine reactors' "greater efficiency" relative to other types, and Carter administration officials profess to have little concern over the Argentine unit.

Argentina is not a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but has recently indicated its intention to seek conditional ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America). All research reactors and its one operating power reactor are under IAEA safeguards as a result of bilateral agreements instituted as a part of arrangements with foreign suppliers (i.e., the United States for enriched uranium for research reactors and West Germany for the Atucha facility). Negotiations have been completed between Argentina and West Germany on a new safeguards accord to replace the current agreement which terminated in the fall of 1977. Canada is also requiring strict safeguards for the nation's second and third power reactors.

In addition, when the United States supplied heavy water for the Atucha facility it did so on the condition that the reactor should be subject to IAEA safeguards, thus erecting yet another legal impediment. This assumes that Argentina will not acquire heavy water from another source or from its own facilities to free itself from legal obligation. As part of a November 1977 U.S.-Argentine agreement the United States will extend its current agreement for cooperation to cover (and thereby permit) Argentine purchase of heavy water from Canada under strict safeguards.

Brazil

International attention has been sharply focused on the Brazilian nuclear energy program as a result of a much publicized commercial arrangement with West Germany signed in June 1975. Since the agreement has received wide coverage in the international press and been the subject of several recent essays, it will be given only limited attention here.¹²

¹² For example, Edward Wonder, "Nuclear Commerce and Nuclear Proliferation: Germany and Brazil, 1975," *ORBIS*, Summer 1977; William W. Lawrence, "Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West Germany, 1975," *International Security*, Fall 1976; Juan E. Guglielmelli, "Y si Brazil fabrica la bomba atomica," *Estrategia*, May-June, July-August 1975; H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Nuclear Aspirations," in Marwah and Schultz, eds., *Nuclear Proliferation and the Near Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1975); and Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Danger for All," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1976.

Under the German contract Brazil will receive at least two and as many as eight 1,300 MWe light water reactors and, in addition, enrichment and reprocessing technology, a fact interpreted by some as presenting Brazil with a nuclear weapons option. Construction is already underway on the first two units (Angra 2 and 3) scheduled to go into operation in 1982-1983 in close proximity to Brazil's first 600 MWe reactor (Angra 1), obtained from the United States and scheduled to go into operation in October 1978. At present the Brazilians are definitely committed to only four units, although it is anticipated that the full order of eight will eventually be purchased. Assuming that the full purchase proceeds, the remaining units will be installed in pairs, one set near Rio de Janeiro, another near São Paulo, and the third in the northeast portion of the country.¹³

Enriched uranium for Angra 1 will be supplied by the United States as announced by the State Department in November 1977. Export permits for transfer of plans for the small reprocessing and pilot enrichment facility have been approved by Germany. Brazilian officials have announced that work will begin on the enrichment facility in 1979 and that once having met the country's own requirements an export market for enriched uranium will be sought. All facilities are to be placed under rather extensive IAEA safeguards, with additional stipulations prohibiting Brazilian replication or transfer to other nations.¹⁴ Enriched uranium for the first two German-supplied reactors will be obtained under a ten-year agreement from URENCO, the European gas centrifuge organization. This agreement was completed early in 1978 with Brazil's acceptance of IAEA safeguards over plutonium produced in the German-supplied reprocessing unit, an agreement that in turn partly allayed Dutch opposition. Under the arrangement Brazil will apparently cooperate with URENCO countries in establishing a future plutonium storage regime under IAEA controls.¹⁵

¹³ IAEA *Bulletin*, vol. 8, nos. 3-4, 1976; Furnas Centrais Elétricas SA, *Annual Report 1976* (February 1977). According to Brazilian press reports in late 1977 (denied by the government), an internal study of the Ministry of Mines and Energy recommended reducing from eight to six the number of nuclear power reactors to be on line by 1990. (*Jornal do Brasil*, December 6, 1977.)

¹⁴ The Brazilian interpretation of the agreement with Germany is outlined in a "white paper" distributed by the Federative Republic of Brazil: *The Brazilian Nuclear Program*, March 1977.

¹⁵ Under the contract URENCO will supply Brazil with 200 tons of enriched uranium per year beginning in 1981 or, roughly, when the German-supplied enrichment and reprocessing units should be completed. All spent fuel or plutonium will be stored in an international enclave in Brazil and no plutonium will be permitted to leave the enclave until the IAEA assures that it will be used in a safeguarded facility. *Nucleonics Week*, January 26, February 2, 1978. However, the Dutch Parliament continued to express

An urgent need for additional energy is the driving force behind the extensive Brazilian commitment to nuclear power. The current leadership views with understandable concern not only the cost of imported oil, but also the extent of its reliance on oil in meeting national energy needs — presently about 47 per cent. Estimates are for virtually all of the nation's vast hydroelectric potential in high use areas to be developed by 1990. Further, there is concern that excessive dependence on hydroelectric facilities servicing the nation's prime industrial areas is unwise, due to the danger of both natural and man-made disasters. Nuclear energy is therefore viewed as both an important additional source of needed energy and a welcome step toward diversification of energy sources. The 1977 National Energy Plan published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy envisages uranium providing 4 per cent of the total energy production by 1986; an installed nuclear capacity of 10,000 MWe is projected by 1990.¹⁶

Brazilian uranium reserves, the subject of considerable international speculation, are currently estimated at 66,800 tons. According to the head of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Shigeaki Ueki, this amount is sufficient "to construct 10 facilities of 1,300 MWe with an operating life of 30 years instead of 8 [units] as are now planned."¹⁷ Under the German-Brazilian commercial arrangement additional quantities (up to 20 per cent of newly discovered reserves) may be exported to West Germany after Brazilian needs are satisfied. Brazil also possesses one of the world's largest deposits of the fertile material thorium, and considerable cooperation has been underway with France for many years to develop thorium technology. Brazil has a contractual agreement with Gulf General Atomic Corporation for cooperation in research and development of a gas-cooled fast breeder reactor which would use thorium as fuel.¹⁸

The nation also possesses a small fuel fabrication facility, and a commercial-scale plant will be constructed with Germany's assistance. In addition, according to NUCLEBRAS President Paulo Nogueira Batista, Brazil is rapidly moving toward development of a domestic nuclear reactor manufacturing plant capability. The Brazilian official recently stated that by the mid-1980s the nation

reservations and, after discussions between the Brazilian and Dutch foreign ministers in March 1978, Brazil announced it would not accept Holland's new demands in regard to additional safeguards for plutonium storage and reprocessing.

¹⁶ *The Brazilian Nuclear Program*. For a recent description of the Brazilian energy situation, see *Nuclear Engineering International*, May 1977.

¹⁷ *O Globo*, December 29, 1977.

¹⁸ *Nuclear Engineering International*, March 1974.

would have a modern nuclear manufacturing plant capable of producing reactor cores and major components of nuclear steam generating systems.¹⁹

As is true of Argentina, Brazil has refused to ratify the NPT. However, unlike Argentina, it has ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Brazil also ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1968 but has not permitted the agreement to come into force for its national territory, a status that Argentina has now indicated it will assume. At the present time all known nuclear facilities are under international safeguards and it is an indisputable fact that the Brazilian-West German-IAEA agreement for the application of nuclear safeguards is one of the most comprehensive currently in existence. As was noted above, this will be supplemented with extensive additional safeguard arrangements as part of the URENCO contract. However, the Brazilian leadership is adamant about its intent to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle. The choice it has presented the world is full fuel cycle development: with foreign assistance and safeguards, or indigenously with no safeguards. That the nation possesses the human and physical resources to pursue either course successfully should not be doubted.

Chile

Chile's nuclear energy program trails only those of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and possibly Cuba in the Latin American region. The current military government is seeking to accelerate nuclear energy development, building initially on a program of so-called test (research) reactors and continuing with construction of the nation's first nuclear power reactor by the late 1980s. A 5 MW reactor purchased from Great Britain, for which the United States supplies enriched uranium, is located at an army-run nuclear energy center in Santiago. A second test reactor located on the outskirts of Santiago and designed and constructed in part by Chilean engineers commenced operation in October 1977. It is the largest facility of its type in Latin America. France is supplying the highly enriched uranium for the 20 MW reactor; engineers from the Spanish nuclear energy commission and private Spanish firms participated in its design and construction.²⁰ For a variety of reasons, including the issue of human rights, the United States has very little involvement or co-operation with the Chilean nuclear program.

¹⁹ *O Estado do São Paulo*, May 26, 1977.

²⁰ *Hispano* (Mexico City), April 19, 1976; *Nucleonics Week*, March 17, 1977.

In 1976 the president of the Chilean nuclear energy commission announced an intent to seek international financing for a 600 MWe power reactor. The type and site are as yet undetermined, but it is estimated that the facility would supply over 4 per cent of the nation's annual energy needs.²¹ If located in the north it could be utilized to supply energy for a water desalinization plant, a project that has intrigued Chilean leaders for over a decade. Bids for site studies were sought in December 1977 and bids for plant design and equipment supply will be sought in June 1978, with a completion goal of 1988.

Stimulated by a UN study that predicted that certain sections of Chile may have extensive uranium reserves, intense government-sponsored prospecting efforts are underway. With financing from the UN Development Program (UNDP), the IAEA has been undertaking a coordinated multidisciplinary program of assistance to Chile relative to the establishment of a research reactor center. The program is considered to be a model that may be followed in other nations. At present a UNDP-IAEA effort using Chilean engineers is focusing upon nuclear power development in Chile.

Chile was one of the strongest supporters of the Tlatelolco Treaty during the negotiating phase (1964-1967). Mexican and Chilean negotiators had all but completed consultation leading to Chile permitting the treaty to come into full force for its national territory when this likelihood was aborted with the advent of the military coup and a concordant worsening of Chilean-Mexican relations. Chile is not a party to the NPT.

Colombia

Although there is abundant hydroelectric potential in proximity to Colombia's three largest cities, as well as relatively plentiful deposits of coal and petroleum, recent (and projected future) energy shortages experienced by the country have raised interest in nuclear power. Growing indications of possible Venezuelan investment in nuclear power are also being watched with interest. Colombian uranium reserves may be considerable, although it is not yet known whether recovery costs will prove manageable. Recently, contracts have been signed with both France and Spain for their exploration and development, and under the agreement with Spain a joint company for uranium exploration will be established. In addition, an arrangement has been negotiated with a

²¹ *Hispano*, April 4, 1977.

Japanese company for a geological survey of possible uranium deposits in the eastern Andes. Long-term national plans call for purchase of a nuclear power facility to come into operation prior to 1990.²² The Tlatelolco Treaty is in force for Colombia. However, that nation has signed but not ratified the NPT.

Cuba

In 1975 Cuban leaders announced an ambitious plan for nuclear power development including the construction of up to nine power reactors designed to double the nation's electrical generating capacity by the end of the next decade. But Soviet support for the Cuban program, an obvious prerequisite, has been limited to a 1976 announcement of assistance in construction of a 440 MWe reactor beginning in the late 1970s. Financing is being provided by the Soviet-supported economic association, COMECON. The ultimate capacity of the nuclear power installation is expected to be 1,700 MWe, equal to approximately half of Cuba's existing electrical capacity. Initial construction activities are now underway.²³

Cuba has neither signed nor ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty or the NPT. Cuban opposition to the Tlatelolco Treaty is undoubtedly a factor affecting the Soviet Union's failure to fully support that agreement. Soviet authorities have indicated that the power reactor and all future reactors to be supplied to Cuba will be under effective safeguards, but they are noncommittal as to whether safeguards will be bilateral or multilateral (IAEA). As the USSR is a party to the NPT, Soviet nuclear equipment being provided to Cuba should be placed under IAEA safeguard procedures. It is notable that a developing cadre of Cubans trained at Soviet nuclear power stations will be assisting in the construction of units in Cuba.²⁴ Cuban officials have stated that the facility will be subjected to IAEA safeguards but they had not concluded such an agreement by early 1978.

Mexico

Mexico's nuclear energy program, in contrast to that of most other leading Latin American nations, is directed by civilians

²² *Nuclear News*, March 1977, September 1977.

²³ *New York Times*, January 7, 1977; *Nucleonics Week*, April 21, 1977.

²⁴ Some influential U.S. congressmen have expressed growing concern over the significance of the Soviet-supported nuclear program in Cuba. See Dante Fascell, *Congressional Record*, February 3, 1977, p. H879.

and lacks formal bilateral cooperative agreements with the United States or any other country. Technical assistance has been drawn in part from the IAEA, and in addition many nuclear scientists receive training in the United States and European countries — and certain *ad hoc* cooperative arrangements do exist between Mexico and U.S. nuclear energy centers. The Mexican Instituto Nacional de Energía Nuclear (INEN) has experienced some organizational difficulties, and in 1976 its director resigned and it was subjected to major reorganization. With the inauguration in 1977 of President López Portillo, a former director general of the national electric utility (CFE), it is anticipated that strong presidential support for the nation's nuclear program will be forthcoming.

Mexico has under construction twin 654 MWe light water power reactors supplied by the United States, which will also supply the enriched uranium in an arrangement with the IAEA. Unfortunately the terms by which the United States will supply power reactors and enriched uranium to Mexico will need renegotiation in order to comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. The legislation requires the insertion of U.S. veto rights over reprocessing and retransfer of nuclear fuels and equipment to be supplied through the trilateral U.S.-Mexico-IAEA arrangement.²⁵

By 1984 it is estimated that Mexico will have 1,308 MWe of installed nuclear power comprising 8 per cent of the nation's total energy production. Eventually a third nuclear power unit of similar size is scheduled to be built in the same location, bringing the total capacity of the Laguna Verde, Ver facility to 1,931 MWe.

In 1975 former President Echeverría outlined to the Mexican Congress a program for installing seven nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 15,000 MWe to be constructed over the next fifteen years. Most officials from the Mexican nuclear establishment concur with these projections, although the target date has now been extended to 1995.²⁶

There is serious interest in developing a reprocessing facility in order to reduce dependence on foreign sources, especially the United States. Considerable study is underway concerning the economics, as well as other factors, of an industrial-scale reprocessing facility. It is emphasized by Mexican officials that all facilities would be submitted to IAEA safeguard inspections.²⁷ Cur-

²⁵ *Nucleonics Week*, November 24, 1977.

²⁶ *Hispano*, June 6, 1977, October 17, 1977. In early 1978 Mexico initiated siting studies for ten units similar in size to those now under construction.

²⁷ Ferdy Kaufmann et al. (INEN-Mexico), "Conceptual Study for a Fuel Reprocessing Pilot Plant in Mexico," paper prepared for the Conference on Nuclear Power

rently, according to U.S. government officials, Mexico has under construction a small pilot reprocessing plant with IAEA assistance.

A small fuel fabrication facility exists, with plans calling for construction of a larger facility in the next several years. Intensified exploration for uranium is underway and current reserves are estimated at between 15 and 30 thousand tons, which Mexican sources believe will be sufficient to support the nation's nuclear program. Actual amounts may be much higher.

Mexico spearheaded the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement to which it is a full party as well as to the NPT. Significantly, in 1974 the Mexican Congress, on Echeverría's urging, passed an amendment to the federal constitution limiting "the use of nuclear energy to only peaceful purposes in accordance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco."²⁸

Peru

Prompted in part by the growing involvement of its traditional rival, Chile, in nuclear energy, the Peruvian military government is developing increased interest in this field. Peru has a program of nuclear cooperation with Brazil, and, as will be noted later, has recently signed an agreement with Argentina covering a broad range of nuclear matters. The Instituto Peruano de Energía Nuclear (IPEN) has announced plans for a large uranium mining installation in the Andes, and more long-range plans to build one or more medium-sized power reactors.²⁹ Peru has also taken good advantage of assistance from the IAEA in cooperation with the UNDP Country Program for Peru for 1977-1982 relative to the development of its nuclear program. Recently the IAEA allocated \$1.9 million to the IPEN to develop its nuclear plan, including assistance in setting up a nuclear research center near Lima which will house a reactor to be received from Argentina.³⁰ Peru is party both to the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty.

Venezuela

With vast petroleum reserves and hydroelectric potential, Venezuela has not, until recently, demonstrated interest in a nuclear program. However, at present Venezuelan policymakers, realizing

Applications in Latin America, sponsored by the American Nuclear Society, Mexico City, 1975.

²⁸ *Hispano*, December 30, 1974.

²⁹ *Nuclear Engineering International*, July 1976.

³⁰ *BOLSA Review*, May 1977.

the need for a diversified energy base, are considering the desirability of a major investment in nuclear power. Negotiations have begun between Venezuela and several potential foreign suppliers concerning a possible multiple unit nuclear power installation. In February 1976 Venezuela signed an agreement with the Italian state electrical agency to promote nuclear power development in the nation.³¹ Some government projections are now calling for construction of over a dozen power reactors prior to the year 2000, although the type, size, timing and supplier are unresolved. Significant uranium and thorium deposits exist, particularly in a disputed area between Venezuela and Guyana, but their full potential is not precisely known. Venezuela is a full party to and strong supporter of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and in 1976 ratified the NPT. In recent years it has emerged as a vocal advocate of regional and multilateral nuclear disarmament initiatives, and it supports the creation of a new regional agency to control nuclear activities in Latin America.³²

Other Latin American Nations

Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Panama and the Central American nations have relatively undeveloped nuclear programs. All have ratified both the Tlatelolco Treaty and, with the exception of Panama, the NPT. Guyana, with no nuclear potential, but possible uranium reserves, has ratified neither agreement, in part because of a boundary dispute with Venezuela.

Uruguay has one small research reactor and enjoys the benefit of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear experts working in the country under the support of UNDP. A U.S.-South Korean joint commercial venture will prospect for what may be considerable reserves in Paraguay for export purposes. Bolivia will purchase a small research reactor from Great Britain to be installed by 1980. The Bolivian nuclear energy commission (COBOEN) is directing prospecting efforts for what may be significant deposits of uranium, with the assistance of Italian concerns. Jamaica has long-range plans to develop nuclear power, and reportedly is seeking to purchase a small power reactor in the range of 100-200 MWe (not currently available on the world market).

³¹ *Ibid.*, April 1976.

³² See, for example, the address by Venezuelan Foreign Minister Consalvi to the 32nd UN General Assembly session in September 1977 (reproduced in *Venezuela Now*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Caracas, September 30, 1977).

Intraregional and Extraregional Nuclear Cooperation

Due to a variety of factors, some Latin American nations are moving away from traditional reliance on the United States for advanced nuclear technology in favor of European suppliers and Canada. The United States is no longer the principal supplier to Argentina, Brazil or Chile, and the prospect of future sales by U.S. vendors in the region is becoming less promising.

Coinciding with the above are growing Latin American interactions in nuclear development. Argentina, building on its leadership in nuclear power development, is pursuing an active effort to promote its chosen heavy water/natural uranium technology in cooperation with other Latin American nations. The most important of these arrangements is an agreement signed with Peru in March 1977, by which Argentina agreed to supply a 10 MW zero-power research reactor for the stated use of producing radioisotopes for medical and industrial purposes. At the end of an eighteen-month trial period Peru will have the option to purchase the unit, and possibly a second unit will be supplied. A close working relationship is being established between the nuclear energy commissions of the two nations, and Peruvian personnel are being trained by Argentina.³³ According to a joint Argentine-U.S. communique following Secretary of State Vance's trip to Argentina in November 1977, Argentine transfer of reactors and fuel to Peru will be subjected to IAEA safeguards as part of the U.S.-Argentine agreement for nuclear cooperation.³⁴

Other agreements between Argentina and Latin American nations include a 1967 arrangement with Paraguay (as amended in 1975) for nuclear cooperation in a range of areas, and similar relationships with Colombia and Uruguay. An agreement exists with Chile by which Argentine nuclear officials have worked in an advisory capacity in Chile, and Chilean experts with the Argentine CNEA (including six Chileans in residence at Atucha). In addition, Argentina has signed a recent agreement with Ecuador for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as part of a five-year cooperative effort for economic development. Argentina's emphasis on bilateral nuclear cooperation can best be understood in the context of its ambitions to encourage such nations as Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Peru to adopt natural uranium/heavy water

³³ *La Nación*, April 18, 1977.

³⁴ Joint Communique of the Argentine Republic and the United States, November 21, 1977, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

technology.³⁵ In this manner a Latin American "natural uranium club" could be established whereby those nations adopting the technology would be dependent on Argentina for nuclear equipment, uranium and heavy water. This possibility was alluded to in the November 1977 U.S.-Argentine communique by "recognizing Argentina's potential as a significant nuclear supplier on the same basis as other suppliers." Competition for regional export markets between Argentina and Brazil is a distinct possibility.

Thus far Brazil has focused to a far lesser degree than Argentina on bilateral relationships, emphasizing its own national nuclear efforts and the need to fully develop the nuclear fuel cycle. However, Brazil has an agreement to supply a subcritical nuclear unit and other equipment to Paraguay, a program of nuclear cooperation with Uruguay, and ultimately hopes to become a regional supplier of enriched uranium, utilizing equipment it will receive from West Germany.

Officials from other Latin American nations — notably Mexico and Venezuela — have carried out preliminary discussions regarding the desirability of shared installations such as enrichment facilities, although no specific plans have been formulated.

In addition to bilateral relationships with neighbors, certain bilateral cooperative efforts exist between some Latin American states and nonaligned nations with growing nuclear programs (Argentina-India, Argentina-Libya, Brazil-India). However, there is as yet little evidence of a high degree of Latin American interest in cooperating with the embryonic effort led by Yugoslavia to create a cooperative arrangement in nuclear technology which could ultimately extend to shared nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Although the Peruvian government helped to promote initial discussions on this topic at a ministerial meeting of the nonaligned nations in Lima in 1975, and Argentina is still a titular member of the nonaligned group, government shifts in both countries are affecting the extent of their cooperation with the nonaligned effort. Discussions on nuclear cooperation continued at the Fifth Summit of Nonaligned Countries in Colombo in August 1976, at a subsequent meeting in New Delhi in April 1977, and at a nuclear energy conference in Iran in April 1977, in which an informal group, "The

³⁵ This issue is discussed in Martin F. Yriart, "La política exterior Argentina en materia de energía nuclear," *Estrategia*, September-October 1976, and José Enrique Greno Velasco, "Tecnología nuclear y cooperación regional en el Cono Sur," *Revista de Política Internacional* (Madrid), January-February 1977.

Persepolis Club," was created.³⁶ That the nonaligned nations' effort to forge cooperative nuclear endeavors may have definite appeal to some Latin American countries in the future was evidenced in the strong support for "Persepolis Club" cooperation as a counterweight to the "London Suppliers Club" expressed by CNEA President Castro Madero at the IAEA Conference in May 1977.³⁷

Finally, reference should be made to a most interesting but as yet unsuccessful effort to create a Latin American coordinating group in the nuclear energy area. Spearheaded by the Argentine CNEA president, the Reunion de Autoridades Nucleares de América Latina (RANDAL) met in September 1976 in Rio de Janeiro prior to the 20th General Conference of the IAEA. Composed of the sixteen members of the IAEA's Latin American group, RANDAL's goals were general in scope: to promote cooperation among Latin American nations in the use of nuclear energy, and to take maximum advantage of available international support for nuclear energy development, such as offered through the UNDP and IAEA.

In the unrecorded session Argentina argued strongly for a number of regional cooperative efforts, including a wide-ranging and systematic exchange of experts among nuclear energy commissions. However, proposals for greater cooperation were not supported for a variety of motives. Brazil resisted, initially implying that more time was needed to build up its own national effort, but late in the conference it reportedly indicated some receptivity to a bilateral relationship with Argentina rather than a new regional effort. Mexico, Cuba and Paraguay were generally unsympathetic, arguing that an institutionalization of RANDAL would simply create a new bureaucracy. Mexico's opposition was largely based on the view that the Tlatelolco Treaty regime and OPANAL (the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America), rather than an IAEA related effort, offered the best framework for regional cooperation.³⁸

Regional Restraint: The Treaty of Tlatelolco

As the foregoing material illustrated, nuclear technology has attained considerable momentum in Latin America, and at

³⁶ For a discussion of nuclear cooperation among the nonaligned nations see J. Brezaric, "Nuclear Problems," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), May 5, 1977.

³⁷ *Nucleonics Week*, May 9, 1977.

³⁸ This interpretation is drawn in part from Yriart, Greno Velasco and personal interviews with Latin American diplomats.

least two nations are building toward complete self-sufficiency in the nuclear fuel cycle. The effort by the Carter administration to have reprocessing and enrichment facilities stripped from the West German-Brazilian commercial arrangement has been unsuccessful while producing significant strains in U.S. relations with both nations.

The possibility of future nonproductive confrontations with Brazil and Argentina (and ultimately other Latin American countries) over nuclear issues suggests the need to consider alternative approaches to preventing nuclear proliferation in the region. Currently there is a multiplicity of regional organizations in Latin America, some well developed and others in the formative stage. Some have direct tie-ins to nuclear and/or conventional energy development, while for others these aspects are at present quite peripheral to their central goals. This situation presents varying opportunities for the United States to complement and encourage indigenous regional efforts. Such an approach may well produce far more desirable results than U.S. bilateral pressure on other supplier or consumer nations or a multilateral effort via the London Club of nuclear suppliers (which conveys negative connotations of a nuclear cartel) or the INFCE effort.

The Treaty of Tlateloco is the most significant effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Latin American region. Signed in 1967 and currently in force for twenty-one Latin American states, the agreement established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area.³⁹ Four militarily significant Latin American nations — Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba — are not full parties to the treaty. Four of the five generally recognized nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Great Britain, France, China) have signed and ratified Additional Protocol 2, by which they pledge neither to use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty. The Soviet Union remains the lone holdout.⁴⁰ Additional Protocol 1, designed for nations with territorial interests in the Americas, has been or is in the process of

³⁹ Cuba and Guyana have not signed the Tlatelolco Treaty, whereas Argentina has signed and recently indicated its intent to ratify. Brazil and Chile have signed and ratified. However, the agreement will not technically come into force for Argentina, Brazil and Chile until all Latin American nations have adhered without reservations and all nuclear-weapon states and nations having territorial interests in the Americas have signed and ratified the appropriate protocols. Recent Latin American adherents are Surinam, in February 1976, and the Bahamas in July 1976.

⁴⁰ India rejected a request by the OPANAL secretary general to ratify Protocol 2, stating that its detonation of a PNE did not qualify it to be termed a nuclear-weapon state and thus it did not fall under the purview of Protocol 2. OPANAL (Document) CG/126, April 2, 1975.

being ratified by all appropriate nations (Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States) with the exception of France.⁴¹ The treaty's machinery is a permanent organ, OPANAL, located in Mexico City and administered by a secretary general and a small secretariat. Overall policy guidance is provided by the General Conference, composed of all the full parties to the treaty meeting periodically in Mexico City (and occasionally in other Latin American capitals). A smaller body, the Council, has certain specially defined responsibilities which could have growing significance in the future.

Three important events occurred in 1977 relative to the Tlatelolco Treaty: President Carter announced his intent to ask for Senate ratification of Additional Protocol 1; Brazil issued an important paper, *The Brazilian Nuclear Program*, expressing strong support for the treaty; and Argentina announced conditional ratification of the agreement.

U.S. Ratification of Protocol 1

The decision for U.S. ratification of Protocol 1 occurred in the context of a comprehensive administration re-evaluation of U.S. nuclear strategy (under the leadership of Deputy to the Under Secretary of State Joseph Nye) and during a prolonged dispute between the United States and Brazil over the latter's plans to purchase enrichment and reprocessing facilities. The decision followed by nine years the U.S. signature of Protocol 2 of the Tlatelolco Treaty (1968), which had been accompanied by an "interpretative statement" affirming, among other things, transit privileges within the zone and the U.S. view that peaceful nuclear explosives are prohibited under the terms of the agreement. Of great significance, however, was the United States' explicit non-use pledge relative to parties to the treaty — this nation's first self-limiting agreement of this nature.

Following the U.S. ratification of Protocol 2, Latin American supporters of the agreement continued to press for full adherence to both protocols by all other necessary states. Achievement of full external support for the agreement, it was believed, would enhance the likelihood that the main Latin American hold-

⁴¹ For more details on the various positions of Latin American and non-Latin American nations regarding the Tlatelolco Treaty, see John R. Redick, "Regional Nuclear Arms Control in Latin America," *International Organization*, Spring 1975. Two perceptive Latin American discussions of the treaty are Héctor Gros Espiell, *El Tratado de Tlatelolco: Algunas consideraciones sobre aspectos específicos*, OPANAL, 1976; and Antonio González de León, *La renuncia al uso de la fuerza: La proscripción de las armas nucleares por zonas y el Tratado de Tlatelolco*, OPANAL, 1976.

outs (particularly Argentina and Brazil) would adhere. Significant breakthroughs were achieved in 1973 with ratification of Protocol 2 by both France and China. The United States, however, continued to resist all Latin American efforts to gain its ratification of Protocol 1 as expressed in bilateral discussions and annual UN General Assembly resolutions.

U.S. spokesmen were generally instructed to take the position that U.S. territories within the zone (such as the Virgin Islands) are integral parts of the United States as far as foreign relations are concerned, and that the United States does not exercise sovereignty over such areas as Guantanamo Naval Base and the Panama Canal Zone. In face of this argument the OPANAL secretariat proposed that the United States consider partial acceptance of Protocol 1 by including only those areas deemed to fall under U.S. responsibility. The U.S. State Department's somewhat evasive reply was to resubmit a proposal made earlier of willingness to include Guantanamo, assuming Cuba adhered to the agreement, and to defer questions dealing with the Canal Zone pending ongoing negotiations with Panama. There the matter rested essentially unchanged for the duration of the Nixon/Ford administrations.

With the election of President Carter expressing a strong commitment to nonproliferation, OPANAL supporters believed it would be opportune to make another attempt to gain U.S. adherence to the agreement. In January 1977 the secretary general of OPANAL, Héctor Gros Espiell, transmitted to the U.S. ambassador to Mexico a well-reasoned paper entitled "Los Estados Unidos y el Tratado de Tlatelolco," which was subsequently sent to the Mexican desk of the U.S. State Department. In the paper Gros Espiell urged the United States to follow recommendations of the influential "Linowitz Report"⁴² (widely interpreted as an early outline of the Carter administration's Latin American policy) to review its position and ratify Protocol 1. The Gros Espiell paper and the efforts of supporters of the Tlatelolco Treaty in ACDA and outside of government were successful in bringing the issue before the special State Department group led by Joseph Nye.

On April 14, 1977, in a speech before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS), President Carter announced that "the United States will sign, and I will ask the Senate to ratify, Protocol 1 of the Treaty prohibiting the place-

⁴² Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, *The United States and Latin America: Next Steps*, December 20, 1976.

ment of nuclear weapons in Latin America.”⁴³ Shortly over a month later the president formally signed the protocol in a White House ceremony attended by long-time Tlatelolco Treaty supporter Hubert Humphrey, the foreign minister of Mexico, and other dignitaries. It is of note that the U.S. pledge is without qualifications — “we will not deploy nuclear weapons in the Caribbean or in the Central or South American Continent”;⁴⁴ thus, all U.S. territories in the area are included. Final U.S. action on Protocol 1 awaits resolution of the Panama Canal treaties by the U.S. Senate.

The U.S. signing of Protocol 1 has brought renewed pressure on France (primarily by the United States and Mexico acting separately) as the only remaining holdout, and its adherence seems likely. Coincidentally, U.S. willingness to include all its Latin American territories within the treaty zone of application may help to dampen Soviet perception of the treaty as granting the United States special privileges. A growing U.S.-Cuba rapprochement will also no doubt affect the likelihood of Soviet adherence to Protocol 2, although in late 1977 Soviet spokesmen in the discussions before the 32nd UN General Assembly were still expressing rigid opposition. In private discussions the Carter administration has continued to seek an understanding with the Soviet Union which could lead to the latter’s ratification of Protocol 2.

Brazil and Tlatelolco

While the U.S. signature of Additional Protocol 1 was a commendable expression of support for the Latin American initiative, it also called attention to the U.S.-Brazilian nuclear dispute. Having been unsuccessful in gaining Brazilian adherence to the NPT or in denying that nation access to full fuel cycle capability, U.S. policymakers viewed the Tlatelolco Treaty as an alternative method of restraining Brazilian nuclear weapon development. Brazil’s interest in the Tlatelolco Treaty has definite historical roots, the Brazilian delegate to the UN having offered the first draft resolution for a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone in October 1962 (prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, which in turn mobilized considerable Latin American support for the concept). Although

⁴³ U.S. Department of State News Release, April 14, 1977.

⁴⁴ An “Interpretive Statement” similar to that accompanying U.S. ratification of Protocol 2 will accompany the president’s formal ratification request to the Senate. In addition, President Carter is using U.S. ratification of Protocol 1 to pressure for Soviet support of the agreement: “We have encouraged the Soviets to join us in signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco which would ban the introduction of nuclear weapons into the southern part of the Western hemisphere.” *New York Times*, July 22, 1977.

with the advent of the 1964 military coup it shifted from its early enthusiasm for the agreement, the Brazilian government nonetheless signed and ratified the treaty. However, Brazil did not waive the requirements of Article 28, paragraph 1 of the treaty as have all twenty-one current parties and thus, strictly speaking, the treaty is not in force for it until certain specified preconditions are satisfied.

That Brazilian ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty has a practical significance was made explicit in the formal government statement on nuclear policy, *The Brazilian Nuclear Program*, issued in 1977 in part as Brazil's response to U.S. pressure on nuclear issues. While expressing the reasons for opposing the NPT, the paper stressed that "Brazil on the other hand is a party to a Treaty which not only prohibits the manufacture or possession of nuclear weapons but also keeps any signatory from accepting the storage or emplacement in its territory of weapons belonging to nuclear weapon countries." The statement went on to note the importance of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 pledges, and concluded with: "The full enforcement of the Treaty of Tlatelolco depends at the moment on the acceptance of this commitment by those powers. Having signed the Treaty, Brazil has committed itself, according to the canons of international law, not to perform any act which defeats the objectives of the Treaty, to which there corresponds the guarantee that the other signatories will do likewise."

It is significant that Brazil linked full enforcement of the treaty to protocol adherence by appropriate nonregional nations rather than insisting that all Latin American nations must adhere.⁴⁵ This taken together with the last point (i.e., by signing and technically ratifying the agreement, the nation was committing itself not to take action contrary to the treaty's objectives) conveys strong Brazilian support for this regional approach. In effect, Brazil seems to be stating that: (1) at least for the time being it will not develop nuclear weapons as prohibited by the treaty, assuming that other Latin American signatories share this position; and (2) more complete Brazilian support for the treaty would be dependent on full protocol adherence by appropriate non-Latin American nations — in this case, France and the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ Left unsaid was a crit-

⁴⁵ This position was confirmed by Brazilian support for two resolutions of the 32nd UN General Assembly calling for French ratification of Protocol 1 and Soviet ratification of Protocol 2. UN Documents A/32/368, December 1, 1977; A/32/372, December 5, 1977.

⁴⁶ A minor but interesting diplomatic flap in December 1977 gave renewed indication of Brazil's support for the Tlatelolco Treaty. A comment by U.S. Ambassador to Argentina Raúl Castro made following Argentina's decision to ratify the treaty suggested that Brazil had not ratified the agreement. Ambassador Castro's confusion produced a

ical issue: Brazil continues to hold the view, opposed by most parties to the treaty and the United States, that detonation of PNEs is permitted. However, recent indications of U.S.-Soviet progress toward a comprehensive test ban treaty, which would include PNEs, may defuse this issue.

The United States has sought to capitalize on and encourage Brazilian adherence to the treaty. President Carter undoubtedly had this in mind when, in his remarks during the Protocol 1 signing ceremony, he singled out Brazil as having taken early leadership in the regional effort. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman was even more explicit in a May 1977 visit to Brazil. Calling attention to U.S. ratification of Additional Protocol 1, he stated that "other countries that have not signed or that have signed and not ratified or ratified and not signed the existing clause" should take action to put the treaty into force.⁴⁷ The president also used the opportunity presented by his March 1978 visit to Brazil to express strong public support for the treaty.

Argentina and Tlatelolco

As noted earlier, Argentina signed but refused to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty. Significantly, its signature in September 1967 included an affirmation that in its view PNEs are permitted. In the decade following the formal signing Argentina remained the only major holdout among Latin American nations which had taken part in the actual negotiations of the treaty.⁴⁸

Despite two personal initiatives by the OPANAL secretary general with successive Argentine foreign ministers, that nation's noncooperative posture remained unaltered until a September 1977 meeting between Presidents Carter and Videla. Meeting Videla in Washington for the Panama Canal Treaty signing ceremony, Carter reportedly stressed the importance of, and was successful in obtaining agreement for, Argentine ratification. In late September the Argentine ambassador to Mexico formally announced Argentina's intent to ratify the agreement, including an exceptionally strong endorsement of the treaty goals, as contrasted

strong reaction by the Brazilian foreign ministry and a restatement of Brazil's support for the treaty. The Brazilian ambassador to the United States demanded and received an apology from Under Secretary of State Christopher. *O Globo*, December 14, 1977.

⁴⁷ *O Globo*, May 14, 1977.

⁴⁸ The Argentine objections to the Tlatelolco Treaty are outlined in an article authored by a military member of the negotiating team: Roberto M. Ornstein, "La desnuclearización de América Latina," *Estrategia*, January-February 1971.

to the NPT. The Argentine statement also made particular mention of the importance of Tlatelolco Treaty parties pursuing the peaceful development of nuclear energy.⁴⁹

Argentina's decision to ratify the treaty was made in the context of a broader arrangement with the United States following lengthy discussions between special Ambassador Gerard Smith and Argentine officials, and announced at the close of Secretary of State Vance's visit to Buenos Aires in November 1977. Under the arrangement Argentina agreed to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty and agreed that its nuclear cooperative arrangement with Peru should fall under the U.S.-Argentine nuclear agreement for cooperation, and the United States agreed to permit Argentina's purchase of heavy water for its current and forthcoming power reactors. Argentina, however, apparently resisted waiving the requirements of Article 28, paragraph 1 of the treaty, citing, for one thing, its concern that Brazil should be equally bound. However, in the several months since the Argentine announcement no action has been taken to proceed toward ratification, due in part to continued disagreements with the United States over human rights issues and also to a serious diplomatic rift with Mexico regarding alleged actions of Argentine security forces against exiles in Mexico.

Brazilian and Argentine ratification of, and strong expression of support for, the Tlatelolco Treaty are significant steps in the effort to avoid nuclear weapons development in Latin America. Their ratification (and that of Chile) is conditional in the sense that they have failed to waive Article 28, paragraph 1 requirements, which state that the treaty will not come into full force until all appropriate Latin American states have ratified and all nonregional and nuclear-weapon states have ratified the relevant protocols. In practical terms this means that Cuba must be convinced to abandon its adamant opposition, and a resolution must be found to the long-standing Venezuela-Guyana dispute, thus permitting the latter to sign and ratify. Also, France must be persuaded to ratify Protocol 1 and the Soviet Union Protocol 2. While circumstances vary in each case, all are feasible goals that can be achieved through determined diplomatic efforts.

Assuming they are achieved, under the terms of the treaty Argentina, Brazil and Chile would then become "contracting parties" — i.e., "those for whom the Treaty is in force" (Article 2).

⁴⁹ The full text of the Argentine announcement of ratification is reproduced in Héctor Gros Espiell, "Argentina y el Tratado de Tlatelolco," *Revista Internacional y Diplomática* (Mexico City), December 10, 1977.

As a contracting party each would be bound (Article 13) to initiate negotiations on IAEA safeguard agreements over all their nuclear activities within 180 days, with the agreements to come into force no later than eighteen months following deposit of ratification (or in this case after all the preconditions for the treaty's entry into force are achieved). Further, upon becoming contracting parties, said nations would fall under the purview of other treaty provisions (Article 16), which allow for "challenging inspections" by the Council of OPANAL at the request of other parties to the treaty.

The important point is that the Tlatelolco Treaty represents a valid alternative avenue for achieving full fuel cycle safeguards over the nuclear programs of those Latin American nations that refuse to accept the NPT. It also represents an important means to avoid confrontation: in supporting it the United States is supporting a timely Latin American regional initiative rather than seeking to impose a global agreement orchestrated by the superpowers (the NPT). Therefore, as an important part of its nonproliferation strategy, the United States should give accelerated emphasis to achieving the political arrangements needed to permit the Tlatelolco Treaty to come into complete operation.

Linkages with Other Regional Organizations

Several Latin American regional organizations exist with potential for linkage, at some future point, to the Tlatelolco Treaty regime, and in particular OPANAL. Such linkages could greatly enhance both the attractiveness and effectiveness of OPANAL. For this to occur it is vital that OPANAL continue to evolve from a control mechanism to one with the goal of regional coordination of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. After several years of initial consolidation, a consensus now appears to be growing among OPANAL's membership that evolution of this nature is necessary to the future vitality of the organization. This view was clearly expressed by OPANAL's General Conference meeting in February 1977, in a final declaration which stated:

Its resolve to give impulse to the use of nuclear energy in Latin America and, to that effect, to coordinate efforts made in this field by member states and to assume planning of peaceful uses of this energy at a regional level. . . . Its desire that the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America be the instrument for this action, thus adding to its competence on disarmament matters the required powers to become the international regional agency for the coordination, organization, planning and

systematizing of the Latin American efforts for the full and effective peaceful uses of this kind of energy.⁵⁰

Latin America's two established regional organizations, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the more active Andean Pact have not, thus far, concerned themselves with cooperative energy projects. Nor do current trends support this as a likelihood in the short-term future. However, a relatively new organization, Sistema Económico Latino-Americano (SELA), may hold some prospects for evolution in this area. SELA was organized in 1975 and by early 1977 eighteen Latin American nations had ratified its constitution. With permanent headquarters and a director established in Caracas and a budget allocated among member states, SELA seeks to promote consultation, coordination and co-operation among Latin American nations including Cuba. It is supportive of processes of integration in the region and includes as one of its more important objectives the creation of Latin American multinational enterprises.

It is far too early to evaluate SELA's success, but its advocacy of Latin American multinational entities in a variety of areas could have potential significance. Officials of the Mexican national electric commission have suggested, for example, the creation of "multi-national nuclear energy companies for peaceful purposes within the framework of the Latin American Economic System (SELA)." Among the possibilities believed worthy of consideration are the manufacturing of nuclear power plants, the establishment of multinational arrangements for the enrichment of uranium, and the treatment of irradiated fuel. Studies have been suggested to evaluate the "attractive possibility" of a joint venture establishing an enrichment plant in Venezuela, which could give Mexico the enriched uranium it requires to meet its projected needs for nuclear power reactors, as well as laying the foundations for a reactor industry in Venezuela. Other Mexican spokesmen, noting projections for Mexico's nuclear power output, have stressed that the nation should "join with other interested parties to form a regional company in which the large countries in Latin America would seem likely partners."⁵¹

While such proposals are only tentative, multinational Latin American ventures in the nuclear fuel cycle under the aus-

⁵⁰ OPANAL (Document) CG/E/RES.5(II), February 14, 1977.

⁵¹ Juan Eibenschutz, "The Role of Nuclear Energy in Meeting Future Power Needs of Mexico," and Elias Seřchovich, "Nuclear Power and National Participation in Mexico" — both papers prepared for the Conference on Nuclear Power Applications in Latin America (see fn. 27, above). Also, *Nuclear News*, November 1975.

pices of a regional mechanism such as SELA are a future possibility. SELA's momentum has come primarily from Mexico and Venezuela, nations whose economic foundations are based in varying degrees on oil revenues, and which are fully cognizant of the need for future energy security. These two nations could very well spearhead the development of a regional nuclear energy center situated in and serving the needs of countries in the northern portion of South America. It is notable that those most actively supporting SELA (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru) are full parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty and OPANAL, whereas the southern nations (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) have not yet embraced SELA and are not full parties to the treaty.

The United States should continue to observe the progress of SELA and other Latin American regional organizations working in the economic sphere, and should be prepared to lend support to multinational nuclear efforts if they will advance nonproliferation objectives.

Of far greater relevance to the nuclear question is the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (CIEN) of the Organization of American States. The relationship between OPANAL and CIEN has, to this point, been nearly nonexistent. The historical roots for the seemingly illogical separation derive from the negotiating process of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the strong opposition by some Latin American states (notably Mexico) to any linkage with the OAS. CIEN has carried out useful work in technical and nonpolitical areas since its creation in 1959. The final report of its tenth meeting in July 1977 called for nuclear cooperation among Latin American nations in a variety of areas, including use of radioisotopes for industry and agriculture, assistance in training personnel for nuclear power programs, the sharing of regional experts, and a greater exchange of information as well as cooperative projects.⁵² OAS Secretary General Orfila has recently recommended vigorous strengthening and reinforcement of CIEN's work in the nuclear energy area.⁵³ Final reports of OPANAL's general conference meetings have advanced remarkably similar proposals for nuclear cooperation efforts on a regional basis.⁵⁴

The prevailing situation therefore is that of two regional organizations whose goals are increasingly overlapping. OPANAL,

⁵² OAS Document, OAE/SER. L/IV.2.10, November 17, 1977.

⁵³ Alejandro Orfila, "Energy," *Américas*, October 1977.

⁵⁴ See, for example, the set of recommendations included in OPANAL 22, September 1970.

while clearly political in its stated objective of nonproliferation, is seeking to expand into more technical areas of peaceful uses. CIEN, primarily a technical organization, is nonetheless seeking to promote a regional coordinating role for itself—an effort that will inevitably involve it in highly political areas, for as recent events have amply demonstrated, the development of nuclear energy in Latin America is not separable from political issues. Further, it is very doubtful that divisive nuclear issues can be adequately dealt with in the context of the Inter-American system as presently constituted.

An outright merger of OPANAL and CIEN would appear to be a logical step toward achieving both nonproliferation goals and regional cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. CIEN's experience and scientific contacts could be of considerable utility to OPANAL as it seeks both to evolve into a more effective control mechanism (as parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty develop their nuclear programs) and toward better coordination of nuclear energy development in Latin America. It could have the added benefit of making OPANAL more attractive to such nations as Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

A merger is likely to be strongly resisted by both organizations, particularly if the impetus should come overtly from the United States. One possible alternative approach that has been discussed is the creation of a new regional organization in which both OPANAL and CIEN would be institutional members, each with responsibilities in its particular sphere. It is notable that Brazilian President Geisel has stated his opposition to the creation of any new nuclear agency for the hemisphere (as proposed by Venezuelan President Pérez) but continues to express strong support for the Tlatelolco Treaty. The concept nonetheless deserves continued consideration.

Finally, particular mention should be made of a relatively new Latin American organization whose importance is growing: the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE). Created in 1973 with headquarters in Quito, Ecuador, OLADE's purposes are to serve as "an instrument for cooperation, coordination, and consultation" and to work for "integration, protection, conservation, rational utilization, marketing and defense of the energy resources of the region."⁵⁵ It has been undertaking a useful series of studies on regional energy requirements and resources, including a special

⁵⁵ Lima Agreement establishing OLADE, November 1973 (Article 2).

study on nuclear energy.⁵⁶ An important emphasis of its work is "to encourage the formulation and development of common energy policies as a factor of regional integration."⁵⁷ Achievement of high-level coordination among OPANAL, CIEN and OLADE would seem a desirable initial step, perhaps leading to a far closer interrelationship later on.

Policy makers within the Carter administration view the Tlatelolco Treaty far more favorably than their predecessors as a useful adjunct to global nonproliferation strategy. Unfortunately this favorable inclination has not as yet led to U.S. actions to support the strengthening of existing organizations (particularly OPANAL) to their full potential. Nor has the United States sought to promote better coordination among existing regional organizations. While it is quite likely that heavy-handed U.S. pressure would be counterproductive, this should not become a justification for inactivity. Rather, a wide range of policy alternatives exist for enhanced U.S. support of OPANAL and/or other regional organizations.⁵⁸ These issues deserve a higher priority than they have received to this point. At the very least they should be explored in high-level contacts between U.S. officials and the appropriate Latin American organizations.

Argentina, Brazil and Regional Nuclear Cooperation

Argentina, Brazil, and on a far lower scale, Chile and Cuba, are the critical nations in any consideration of nuclear proliferation in the Latin American region. None is a party to the NPT or full party to the Tlatelolco Treaty, although Chile and Brazil have technically ratified the latter agreement. With the exception of the Argentine reprocessing facility, all existing installations are apparently under IAEA safeguards instituted as a part of arrangements with supplier nations. However, both Argentina and Brazil are working on their own respective approaches to full mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and thereby ultimate independence of action.

Until quite recently the United States experienced close nuclear cooperation with Argentina and Brazil, initially through the

⁵⁶ For a description of OLADE's views on the potential for nuclear energy in the hemisphere, see the address by its executive secretary, Carlos Miranda Pacheco, to the most recent CIEN meetings. OAS Document, OEA/SER. L/IV. 2.10, July 13, 1977.

⁵⁷ *Lima Agreement*, Article 3m.

⁵⁸ Some proposals relative to OPANAL can be found in John R. Redick, "Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America," in Fontaine and Theberge, eds., *Latin America's New Internationalism* (New York: Praeger, 1976).

Atoms for Peace Program and subsequently via the sale of research reactors and other equipment. But, the United States is no longer a principal supplier to either nation, and thus its ability to influence their nuclear programs, while still significant, is much reduced from its earlier high level. It will most likely be further reduced in the future because of the resulting loss of contact in a range of different levels.

Current Disputes

The continuing U.S.-Brazilian dispute has become an important flash-point for the Carter administration's nuclear policy. Building upon campaign statements calling for cancellation of the sale of West German reprocessing and enrichment facilities to Brazil, President Carter dispatched Vice President Mondale for discussions with Chancellor Schmidt in January 1977. Brazilian leaders, particularly Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, were incensed, and subsequent visits to Brazil by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher, Mrs. Carter and Secretary of State Vance have not fully resolved the issue.

Brazil was not receptive to various U.S. trial-balloon proposals advanced in early 1977: i.e., that Brazil should cancel its purchase of the sensitive equipment (and its arrangement for enriched uranium from URENCO) in exchange for an assured U.S. supply of enriched uranium; or the possibility of Brazilian investment in multinational facilities in a third country, in exchange for cancellation of the controversial portions of the German contract.

Nor has the Carter administration's decision late in 1977 to approve the long delayed delivery of enriched uranium for the Angra 1 reactor led to the hoped for understanding on nuclear issues. State Department approval of the initial core shipment was made "only on its merits," as meeting the immediate requirements of recent legislation passed by Congress. In mid-March, 1978, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) gave reluctant approval to the export fuel license for enriched uranium destined for the Angra 1 reactor. However, two commissioners indicated they would approve no further export licenses to Brazil unless there were improvements in U.S. controls over the fuel.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ *Nucleonics Week*, November 24, 1977; January 12, March 23, 1978. A close reading of the original 1972 U.S.-Brazilian nuclear agreement under which Brazil will receive enriched uranium does raise some questions. The agreement suggests that Brazil could retain plutonium produced from the fuel and reprocess it "in Brazilian facilities upon a joint determination of the parties. . . ." Also, PNEs are not explicitly prohibited as part of the agreement.

Vance's discussions with President Geisel in late November 1977, following the U.S. decision to approve shipment of enriched uranium, were at best inconclusive. According to Brazilian sources, Vance and his colleagues emphasized again that Brazil should consider temporarily deferring reprocessing until completion of the INFCE effort, which might identify some less dangerous alternatives. The possibility that the Brazilian reprocessing plant might be organized to serve as a regional facility was suggested, and the danger of nuclear competition with Argentina was raised. However, the Brazilian president and foreign minister were adamant in their intent to pursue the program as planned.⁶⁰ The position was underscored by President Geisel in discussions with President Carter in Brazil in March 1978.

Similar to a number of foreign policy initiatives in other areas, it may be observed that the Carter administration initially assumed a hard position relative to the Brazilian nuclear program and, throughout 1977 and early 1978, has progressively softened it. While U.S. opposition to the sensitive aspects (essentially reprocessing and not enrichment facilities) of the German-Brazilian arrangement continues, the obvious hope of the administration is that in time Brazilian leaders may be receptive to incorporating their nuclear program into an international framework.⁶¹ In this context the United States has successfully urged Brazilian (and Argentine) participation in the two-year INFCE effort. At the same time it has not been averse to considerable bilateral pressure, such as Vance's reported warning that if Brazil persists in its reprocessing plans this will invariably affect future U.S. decisions as to the transfer of nuclear fuel and technology. Carter re-emphasized this view to Geisel in their recent discussions and urged that greater Brazilian attention be given to thorium as a more proliferation-resistant technology. However, Carter also publicly acknowledged Brazil's right to proceed with its arrangement with Germany.

Cooperation in the Southern Cone

Many observers of Latin American politics have long held the view that a U.S. policy which attempts to inhibit the momentum of nuclear technology (or gives the impression of doing so) in Argentina and Brazil will inevitably breed counterproductive con-

⁶⁰ *O Globo*, December 9, 1977.

⁶¹ See, for example, the address by Joseph Nye to the Houston Rotary, Houston, Texas, June 30, 1977.

frontation and should be avoided.⁶² Concurrently, it is maintained here that U.S. efforts to involve the two nations in multilateral dialogues such as INFCE — or even a broadened nuclear supplier-consumer dialogue — while important and necessary, will not of themselves be sufficient to deter the current trend in either nation's nuclear policy. Both countries are clearly committed to total nuclear independence and energy security, and a U.S. nonproliferation policy predicated on this point is a prerequisite. However, it should also be a basic U.S. foreign policy goal to seek to facilitate a more stable political pattern in the southern portion of South America, i.e., the southern cone plus Brazil.

The essence of such an approach is the relationship between Argentina and Brazil and a compelling need for the two states to reach mutually satisfactory arrangements in a range of areas including the nuclear field. Competition in nuclear matters between Argentina and Brazil is incontestable. Decisions regarding nuclear programs are closely followed in, and the subject of intense speculation by, the media of each country. The military leadership of each nation is particularly sensitive to the national security implications of decisions taken by the other regarding the nuclear fuel cycle. However, it is also apparent that both nations share a reciprocal and mutual self-interest not to proceed unilaterally toward development of a nuclear explosive device. The leadership of each country is no doubt aware that detonation of a nuclear device would create an unstable and potentially dangerous relationship with the other from that point on. They may also appreciate that they have more leverage on the United States and other nuclear-weapon states as near-nuclear nations than would be true if they detonate a nuclear device. Thus, the current situation may have elements of stability, albeit short-term and precarious.

But while Argentine-Brazilian competition in the nuclear field has extremely serious ramifications, it has been overshadowed by a more basic bilateral conflict relative to the energy development of the vast River Plate Basin. This rich area, equivalent to one-sixth of Latin America and approximately equal to one-third of Europe, includes portions of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. It has immense hydroelectric potential currently being developed by a series of dams, including Brazil's giant Itaipu,

⁶² This was the strong consensus of a group of U.S. nuclear and Latin American experts in a conference convened at the outset of the Carter administration: see *U.S. Nuclear Policy and Latin America*, Vantage Conference Report, The Stanley Foundation, December 1976.

which when completed in 1983 will be the largest in the world.⁶³ The dispute has centered upon Itaipu's possible impact on a somewhat smaller Argentine facility (Corpus), which will be constructed 200 miles to the south on the Parana River. Argentina has argued that Itaipu will alter the navigability of the Argentine portion of Parana and adversely affect the generating capacity of Corpus. As both Corpus and Itaipu are being built partly in, and in cooperation with, Paraguay, traditional "buffer country" rivalries have affected the conflict.

This lengthy and often bitter dispute, however, seemed to be nearing a partial solution in early 1978 when Brazil agreed to reduce Itaipu's water drop height in an amount that would permit Corpus to be appropriately raised. Progress was also made on another troublesome issue in late 1977 with Brazil's proposal to install half of Itaipu's generators at the Paraguayan (and Argentine) standard of fifty cycles and the other half at the Brazilian sixty-cycle standard.⁶⁴ However, Paraguay has refused the proposal, and this and other issues are being discussed in tripartite negotiations.

Argentine-Brazilian rivalry in the River Plate Basin has deep historical roots overlapped by current geopolitical rivalries in the southern cone. However, even a partial muting of this bilateral friction can have important ramifications, including the further development of a now tenuous foundation for regional cooperation. The cooperation is embodied in a regional organization, the Plata Basin Group, established by treaty in 1969 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia. The objective of the Plata Basin Group is to promote, on a cooperative basis, the vast hydro potential of the area, with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank and other international organizations. It has made considerable progress both in coordinating ongoing national programs and stimulating new efforts. Of particular significance was the establishment by the eighth meeting of the Plata Basin foreign ministers of a special Fondo Financiero to finance feasibility studies for integration projects. With an initial capital of \$20 million apportioned among the membership, the fund will soon be expanded to \$100 million and will be able to borrow from other organizations.

⁶³ For an interesting discussion of the politics of the Plata River Basin, see Rubén J. de Hoyos, "South American Geopolitics and La Plata River Basin Hydroelectric Developments," prepared for delivery at the 1976 Round Table of the International Political Science Association. See also "The River Plate Basin — An Alternative Integration Strategy," *BOLSA Review*, December 1977.

⁶⁴ *O Globo*, December 18, 1977.

Progress toward resolution of the persistent river disputes is a prerequisite to possible Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in other areas, including nuclear matters. Concurrently the gradual strengthening of regional machinery for development of the River Plata Basin is slowly creating a web of economic interrelationships between the two nations. There have been isolated instances in the past, during years of compatible military leadership, which suggest that cooperation in nuclear matters is feasible. During the administration of former Argentine President Onganía close Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in nuclear policy, particularly in shared positions regarding nuclear arms control measures, suggested an emerging Argentine-Brazilian condominium.⁶⁵

Interest continues among policymakers in both nations (more so in the navies and nuclear energy commissions than the rest of government), although it cannot be maintained that it is taking a definite trend at the present time. In Argentina articles in the respected periodical *Estrategia* have frequently called for substantive nuclear cooperation in tandem to resolution of other outstanding bilateral problems.⁶⁶ These views, known to reflect those of some in the Argentine foreign ministry and the CNEA, have been closely followed by Brazilian policymakers.

Ironically, U.S. pressure on Brazil regarding the West German agreement appeared to stimulate renewed interest in Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation. In mid-January 1977 a communique following a meeting between former Argentine Foreign Minister Augusto Guzzetti and Brazilian Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira stressed the importance of joint cooperation in nuclear matters. According to the CNEA, technological exchanges were to commence between the nuclear energy commissions of both states.⁶⁷ Argentine newspapers editorialized on the need for Argentina's support of Brazil in its dispute with the United States and called for cooperation between the two nations. In February 1977 the Argentine foreign ministry released a statement suggesting the desirability of future nuclear cooperation, followed by a strong expression of support for Brazil by CNEA President Castro Madero.⁶⁸

Brazilian leaders' interest in collaboration is cautiously

⁶⁵ David C. Jordan, "Argentina's Bureaucratic Oligarchies," *Current History*, February 1972.

⁶⁶ Guglielmelli, "Argentina. Plan nuclear y presiones externas," and "Y si Brazil fabrica la bomba atómica."

⁶⁷ Embaixada do Brazil, *Boletín Especial*, January 17, 1977.

⁶⁸ *Clarín* (Buenos Aires), February 10, 1977.

expressed, reflecting both a sincere desire to concentrate first on their own domestic nuclear program and acute sensitivity and suspicion regarding the motivation for such proposals. Evidence of this was revealed in their critical reaction to a proposal U.S. Representative Paul Findley made following a fall 1977 visit to Brazil and Argentina. The proposal for continual and mutual on-site monitoring of nuclear facilities by exchanges of safeguards inspectors, although politely received, was viewed by Brazilian officials as a bilateral issue that should not be a concern of the United States.⁶⁹ A similar view was expressed by Brazilian officials following Vance's visit in November, during which he expressed concern about an Argentine-Brazilian nuclear arms race.

In summary, it can be observed that while Brazilians are sensitive to suggestions from external sources, they are not unaware of the possible advantages of some form of nuclear cooperation. This view was best expressed in the close of a thoughtful editorial in a Brazilian newspaper generally reflecting government views, late in 1977, dealing with the hydroelectric disputes in the River Plate Basin: "A conciliatory solution on the Parana River [issue] will open doors for a profound program of cooperation between Argentina and Brazil . . . including in the question of atomic energy."⁷⁰

New Initiatives

A reduction in bilateral nuclear tension and competition, and a concurrent development of a degree of nuclear cooperation between the two Latin American nations is a desirable U.S. nonproliferation objective. The United States can encourage preliminary tendencies in this direction by economic, political and technical measures. However, an important prerequisite for success is that U.S. nonproliferation policy should be undertaken in a quiet, noncontroversial manner more sensitive to the political realities of the region. Parenthetically, but of direct relevance here, the Carter administration's human rights emphasis is clearly complicating our nonproliferation objectives in Latin America. Reaching mutual understandings on nuclear issues is a complex and difficult process made nearly impossible when explicitly and publicly intertwined with human rights issues.

In the economic sphere the United States should support

⁶⁹ *O Globo*, September 9, 1977.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, September 11, 1977. (Author's translation.)

energy cooperation in the River Plate Basin by facilitating the availability of adequate funds from regional and international lending institutions. Private enterprise should also be encouraged to invest in the subregion. Although relevance to the resolution of nuclear issues is indirect, its long-term implications for harmonious relations between Argentina and Brazil — and thereby the peace and security of the region — may be profound.

In the political area maximum emphasis should be given to encouraging Argentine and Brazilian adherence to the Tlatelolco Treaty without reservations, and these nations' full involvement in the operation of OPANAL. This will necessitate persistent U.S. efforts to gain Soviet, French and Cuban support for the agreement and would result in full-scope safeguards and inspection by challenge. Full implementation of the existing provisions of the treaty and a significant evolution in the responsibilities of OPANAL may prove more acceptable to Argentina and Brazil than suggestions for creation of an entirely new hemispheric organization dealing with nuclear energy. U.S. policymakers should keep in mind an important fact: in supporting the Tlatelolco Treaty and OPANAL the United States is giving encouragement to an indigenous Latin American initiative whose goals all major Latin American nations (with the exception of Cuba) have endorsed.

This being said, it may well prove productive for the United States to give quiet encouragement to political arrangements between Argentina and Brazil in nuclear matters. Among the possibilities: (1) more frequent exchanges of scientists, engineers and other officials from the nuclear energy commissions; (2) a bilateral system of inspection of nuclear facilities (although the Tlatelolco Treaty regime supplemented by IAEA safeguards is the more desirable route); (3) a bilateral agreement prohibiting the detonation of any nuclear explosive devices, after the United States and the Soviet Union have achieved a CTB agreement.⁷¹

Finally, of a more technical nature but with direct political ramifications, the United States should give sympathetic attention to the establishment of a regional nuclear energy center in the southern cone area as a desirable nonproliferation strategy.

⁷¹ The United States may also wish to consider giving quiet encouragement to security cooperation between Argentina and Brazil in the southern Atlantic area. This vital area is of profound concern to both nations and can be a source of either competition or, preferably, cooperation with each other and the United States. See Kenneth E. Roberts, *U.S. Defense and the South Atlantic*, Military Issues Research Memorandum ACN 76027, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 1976; and David C. Jordan, *U.S. Foreign Policy and a Military Regime in Argentina*, Military Issues Research Memorandum ACN 77034, October 15, 1977.

Currently, the Carter administration's interest in the regional approach appears limited to the future possibility of "developing international spent fuel arrangements including regional centers."⁷² However, pending the results of the two-year INFCE effort, U.S. officials are unwilling to support regional centers, particularly those including sensitive portions of the nuclear fuel cycle. Given the administration's heavy policy investment in preventing widespread reprocessing and plutonium recycling, this view is understandable, but in the case of Argentina and Brazil it may prove inappropriate and too little too late. Both are fully committed and neither is likely to be deterred by suggestions of delay pending the uncertain development of more "proliferation resistant" alternative technologies. The net result of waiting two years or more for INFCE results will no doubt be that Argentina and Brazil are more fully committed to exclusively national programs, and a bilateral or regional arrangement will be less likely.

The United States should take the initiative and commence discussions with the two Latin nations regarding the establishment of a regional center. A regional facility with major Argentine and Brazilian investment and control, and under appropriate IAEA safeguards, would facilitate a partial interlinking of the two countries' nuclear programs. It could help to facilitate a bridge of trust and confidence, a lessening of suspicions and a greater certainty of mutual intentions.

As both nations have chosen to invest in different processes for nuclear power production, the most likely options for inclusion in a regional center are in the back end of the fuel cycle: reprocessing and temporary or long-term storage of spent fuel or separated plutonium.⁷³ Such a facility could, perhaps, be situated in a relatively neutral country such as Paraguay, although complex logistical problems would have to be carefully weighed, including the expense and difficulty of transportation of spent fuel from Argentine and Brazilian reactors to a distant location. The obvious point of departure for such an initiative is a spent fuel storage facility that would service important mutual needs — immediate in the case of Argentina and forthcoming for that of Brazil. An early U.S. initiative to offer technical assistance in facilitating financing for such a facility, under IAEA safeguards, would seem highly desirable. It would be a tangible and positive affirmation of U.S. support

⁷² Nye's Houston address.

⁷³ For a discussion of the various approaches to regional facilities see "Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers," *IAEA Bulletin*, vol. 18, no. 1, February 1976.

for the nuclear programs of both nations, in contrast to our current policy, which is perceived as obstructionist. It might also create a better atmosphere for the needed dialogue on the uses and control of plutonium, including its possible management through new regional mechanisms.

Latin American Participation: An Essential Ingredient

There appears to be growing appreciation among U.S. policymakers for the desirability of directly involving nations with accelerating nuclear programs, such as Argentina and Brazil, in the search for an overall solution to the nuclear proliferation problem. Slowly the view has emerged that these nations should become an important part of a more broadly based international forum. The organizing of INFCE with broad participation by most near-nuclear states is an important effort. Expansion of the supplier discussions to include some key consumer nations would be an even more beneficial step. Realistically, the effort to achieve a comprehensive and broadly acceptable nonproliferation regime will be difficult and of considerable duration. As this global effort proceeds, the particular circumstances of the Latin American region present the real possibility of more rapid progress — an opportunity that should not be ignored.

OIL IN MEXICAN-U.S. RELATIONS: ANALYSIS AND BARGAINING SCENARIO*

by Edward J. Williams

Although Mexico is not yet oil-rich and the United States not quite energy-poor, both nations have evolved real and imagined pretensions and projections in that direction, and still another element has wormed its way into bilateral relations between the two neighbors. At the most basic level, the United States needs oil and gas, and Mexico has extra supplies to sell or trade.

Sadly enough, that picture is much too simple. Relations between the two nations are informed by a complex set of preferences and prejudices wrought in the annals of historical intercourse and hammered into form by a contemporary set of circumstances highlighted by marked disparities in wealth, power and interests. The basic picture is also too naive because it forms only one portrait in a literally monumental gallery of contemporary social, economic and political relations. That gallery implies a plethora of problems, of course, but it also conjures up a scenario full of potential for creative bargaining that could lead to mutually advantageous resolution of outstanding differences.

In this paper, I will analyze the significance of oil in that larger context. In the first instance, I describe and analyze the sociopolitical attitudes and economic realities obtaining in Mexico which condition that nation's propensities and possibilities in the exploitation of oil and gas and in its exportation to the United States. In a rather different way, I also catalogue and discuss the several other issues and controversies in contemporary bilateral relations and posit a bargaining scenario featuring the role of oil and gas in the more broadly conceived picture.

In Mexico, the context that informs petroleum trade with

* The research reflected in this paper was made possible by a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship in Conflict in International Relations.

Edward J. Williams is Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona. He is the author of *Latin American Christian Democratic Parties* (1967), *The Political Themes of Inter-American Relations* (1971) and, with Freeman J. Wright, *Latin American Politics: A Developmental Approach* (1975). The material in this article will be included in a forthcoming book on the rebirth of the Mexican petroleum industry.

the United States manifests a certain ambiguity. On the one hand, the ideology of Mexican nationalism includes a solid dose of anti-gringoism, and relations between the two nations are always shot through with a paradoxical combination of belligerence and fear. Conversely, a subcurrent of "realism" also influences attitudes toward the United States, counseling a "special relationship" between the two nations characterized by accommodation and compromise. Beyond such general reactions to the United States, more practical influences also condition Mexico's capacity to export large quantities of oil and gas to the United States. These include Mexico's domestic necessities, stemming from a rapidly expanding industrialized economy, and limitations on wholesale exploitation deriving from scarce financial and technological resources.

The Mexican Context: A Gloomy Scenario

All that pertains to Mexican-U.S. relations is bothered by Mexican nationalistic sensitivities.¹ Mexican revolutionary ideology carries an omnipresent strain of anti-Yankeeism that pervades Mexican responses to its powerful neighbor to the north. Although relations between the two nations are basically rather good, a certain fragility is ever-present, implying a threat of serious discord and introducing a sense of unpredictability.

Several early policy statements on oil reflected that posture. At the very outset, President Luis Echeverría was quick to declare that the United States could expect no special treatment in oil deals. Indeed, he argued against increased sales of any degree because they would only strengthen Mexican dependence on the United States. At about the same time, in a calculated display of "somewhat exaggerated nationalism," the minister for natural resources announced that Cuba was to be offered the first opportunity to purchase Mexican oil.²

It is crucial to emphasize, furthermore, that petroleum is involved in perhaps the most hallowed historical act in Mexican nationalist mythology. President Lázaro Cárdenas's nationalization of the foreign-owned petroleum industry on March 18, 1938, is still celebrated as a national holiday. It struck a valiant blow for national independence against the Yankee and evokes pride from all sectors of the Mexican nation. In that sense, Mexican oil nationalism is Mexican nationalism in spades. The vision of Mexican petroleum

¹ The definitive work on Mexican nationalism is Frederick C. Turner's *The Dynamics of Mexican Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968).

² "Kissinger en la junta LE-Ford," *Excelsior* (Mexico City), October 17, 1974.

going off to the United States evokes a special poignancy and touches a particular sensitivity in the nationalist soul. Hence, a U.S. purchase of Mexican oil and gas is no trifling matter. It hits the very root of the self-definition of Mexican revolutionary and nationalist ideology. It is inextricably tied to deeply felt and carefully nurtured feelings of national independence and patriotic pride.

To carry the argument one step farther, it should also be stressed that Mexican nationalist sensitivities and fears of the United States are perfectly understandable. A historical account of Mexican-U.S. relations is beyond the ken of this paper,³ but the record demonstrates a dreary series of confrontations in which Mexico was inevitably the loser. Nearly one-half the original Mexican domain is now a part of the United States. On more than one occasion, U.S. military forces have occupied parts of Mexico, and on dozens of occasions U.S. diplomats have forced the Mexican government to bend to the will of its overwhelming neighbor. With more specific reference to oil, the story of relations between 1917 and 1938 featured an ongoing struggle centering on the protection of North American petroleum interests in Mexico. That struggle revolved around the U.S. oil industry's opposition to the implications of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, which declared national ownership of all subsoil wealth. When nationalization came in 1938, the threat of physical intervention hung heavy and a boycott of Mexican oil was imposed, to be lifted only with the onset of World War II.

Given that history and petroleum's key role within it, there should be little wonder that apprehension continues to figure in Mexican attitudes about their oil and U.S. ambitions. Although they may not quite be representative of the more general reaction, a couple of Mexican commentators have captured the essence of the Mexican position. One reacted to "irresponsible" estimates of Mexican oil finds emanating from the United States:

It is not unreasonable to suppose that the United States' government is exaggerating the news deliberately so that the Middle East will know of other important sources of oil.

Thus North America might obtain better results from the negotiations now in progress with the Arabs. This view finds support not only in the timing of the reports on Mexican finds, but also in the announcements that great reserves of petroleum exist in Elk Hills, California, Alaska, and the North Sea. One might further suppose that reports of Mexican discoveries are also intended to calm United States' public opinion by implying that

³ See Karl M. Schmitt, *Mexico and the United States, 1821-1973* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974).

it may be easier to negotiate with Mexico and thus diminish the present North American dependency on the Middle East.⁴

Going beyond even that rather plausible scenario, a columnist writing in *Excelsior* hinted at the specter of actual invasion.⁵ He began by positing that "our history shows that the discovery of natural riches in our territory is followed immediately by some national disaster." He then declared that California gold was really discovered before 1848 and linked that revision of history to the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848. Finally, creating a fantastic image, he described how the wonders of American technology were at work to rob Mexico of its petroleum:

Now although they are shut out of Mexico, American oil companies, López Lara said, might bring their "powerful machines of suction and extraction" to neighboring Guatemala, which may contain part of the same oil field that has been discovered in southeastern Mexico. López Lara implied that the Americans, with their machinery, would suck out the Mexican oil.⁶

Real and imagined hurts and threats have helped complicate analysis of the role of petroleum in Mexican-U.S. relations. Although the López Portillo government has evolved a more open posture, the first several years of Mexican oil policy (1972-1976) was characterized by a defensive, secretive stance designed to obscure and confuse facts and figures on reserves and production. The Mexican government was fearful of the "envy and rapacity" of the United States and played down the potential richness of the finds.

Even more meaningful to the United States, and possibly more harmful to Mexican-U.S. relations, oil policy has emerged as a political football to be kicked about by competing interests. In early 1976, for example, a strike within PEMEX illustrated the ongoing inflammatory and divisive possibilities when the two sides began to hurl charges and countercharges revolving about Mexican collusion with the manipulating Yankees. A headline in *El Universal*, quoting the strikers' declaration that "Subdirectors with Political Interests and Ties with Multinationals Cause Conflict in PEMEX," captured the tone of the insinuations. As controversy warmed, the image of Yankee imperialism assumed a featured role in the conflict. There were accusations that "within PEMEX there are North Ameri-

⁴ Romeo Flores Caballero, "Mexico in the International System and Its Relations with the United States," *PCCLAS Proceedings*, 1974 (San Diego: San Diego State University Press, 1975) vol. 4, p. 28.

⁵ Stanley Meisler, "Fear of U.S. Exploitation Major Theme in Reaction from South of the Border," *Los Angeles Times*, December 1, 1974.

⁶ *Ibid.*

can consultants who receive confidential information which represents a danger to the [petroleum] industry." Some were denounced for contracting for U.S. machinery and technology when comparable equipment and skills existed in Mexico. Inevitably, allegations of CIA involvement also surfaced.⁷

All of that is par for the course of Mexican domestic politics, but it does highlight an important element in the equation of Mexican petroleum policy vis-a-vis the United States. Beyond the overarching and omnipresent sensitivities of Mexican nationalist pride, that is, the issue is wont to take on more concrete form. Oil exports to the United States are destined to continue to enter domestic political discourse, partisan conflicts and power struggles. Although a host of other factors may tend to balance out the most dangerous implications of that fact, it does add its part to a series of components tending to contribute to potential problems for the U.S. ambition to purchase large quantities of Mexican gas and oil.

At another level, more tangible realities, flowing from the demands and limitations of the Mexican economy, may also influence the future of Mexican-U.S. commerce in petroleum. Despite occasional setbacks, the Mexican economy continues to expand, and Mexico's energy needs grow even more rapidly. With the demand for oil energy moving ahead at about 8 per cent per year, a solid chunk of Mexico's new output must be set aside for domestic use. Recent projections predict an internal demand level of well over 1 million barrels per day by 1982 — double the consumption rate of the early 1970s. It is true that the same projections look to an impressive growth in overall production, but a number of uncertainties may prove that prediction to be overly optimistic.⁸

The limitations of the Mexican economy may portend some restrictions on capitalizing the petroleum industry's expansion program. PEMEX pronouncements on projected production have always been qualified with reservations recognizing the frequent scarcity of developmental money, and new dimensions to that ongoing problem have emerged with the 1976 devaluation of the peso and the 1977 decision to exploit and export the ever-growing gas resources of the southern fields. Although the Mexican government has given top priority to PEMEX, realization of the industry's expansion is mightily conditioned by the general health of the Mexican

⁷ See "Colonialismo técnico en PEMEX" (editorial), *El Universal* (Mexico City), February 20, 1976; Nidia Marín, "Nuestro petróleo sigue en manos de extranjeros apoyados en el pretexto de vendernos tecnología," *ibid.*, February 24, 1976; and Reyes Fuentes, "Subir y avanzar en PEMEX," *ibid.*, February 21, 1976.

⁸ See "Mexican Oil Outlook," *Oil & Gas Journal*, February 14, 1977.

economy. Most economists are optimistic, but the slowdown of the mid-1970s offers adequate testimony to the fact that unforeseen problems may arise.

The consequences are twofold. First, a faltering Mexican economy means a smaller financial pie to be apportioned among the several petitioners, even assuming the strength of PEMEX's claims. Furthermore, economic slowdown, combined with the unsettled condition of the peso after the devaluation and subsequent float, has already elicited troubled murmurs from public and private international financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund, for example, limited Mexico to a \$3-billion increase in its foreign debt for 1977, and even less for 1978 and 1979. As Mexico's economy has faltered and PEMEX's financial necessities have increased, moreover, the state petroleum industry is borrowing ever larger amounts of investment capital from abroad. In the spring of 1977, a *Journal of Commerce* report quoted the PEMEX director-general as estimating that fully half the industry's investment capital for the present *sexenio* (1976-1982) will come from foreign sources. By mid-1977, the Mexican government's decision to push ahead with construction of a gas line to the north compounded the financial dilemma by adding another \$1 billion to the total.⁹

The potential problem is obvious enough. Any significant cutback in outside funding could seriously jeopardize Mexico's ambitions as a major oil and gas producer and exporter. In the more specific sense of this discussion, furthermore, it could also limit increases in sales to the United States.

All of these negative factors must be weighed in any analysis of the future of Mexican oil and gas exports to the United States, but they form only part of the context. A more positive unfolding of events is probably more likely. For one thing, it is quite unlikely that all those pessimistic developments will evolve, and even less unlikely that they will converge. Mexican nationalism is, of course, anti-Yankee, but it is not irrationally xenophobic. Yankee-baiting, assuredly, is a key part of Mexican domestic political intercourse, but it seldom gets beyond the control of the conservatively inclined elites. The Mexican economy has experienced some problems, but it is still basically healthy. Some segments of the international banking community have become suspicious, but more

⁹ See A. Koffmann O'Reilly, "PEMEX Plans to Borrow \$1.25 Billion," *Journal of Commerce*, April 14, 1977 (in Information Services on Latin America [ISLA] 1929); "Mexico Eyes Gas-Starved U.S. as Outlet for Surplus," *Oil & Gas Journal*, June 22, 1977, pp. 63-65; and Richard R. Fagen, "The Realities of U.S.-Mexican Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1977, p. 696.

have expressed confidence in Mexico's economic viability and the promise of oil wealth.

The "Special Relationship": An Optimistic Scenario

In looking to the specific focus of Mexican-U.S. relations and the possible commerce in oil and gas, a strong current of Mexican opinion and an influential principle guiding the nation's foreign policy are informed by the perception of a "special relationship" between Mexico and the United States.¹⁰ The relationship supposedly emanates from the social and economic ties of the border region and from a basic situation of "neighborliness" that geography has imposed upon the two nations. By definition, goes the argument, neighbor nations enjoy a particularly intimate relationship exemplified by a plethora of favorable interactions, including voluminous trade, mutual investment, reciprocal tourism and cooperative efforts to resolve occasional problems.

President José López Portillo gave testimony to the principle early in his term when he offered to serve as a "bridge builder" in inter-American relations.¹¹ President López Portillo's characterization of his role as a "vehicle for harmony" is extrapolated from the special relationship image. The image features a Mexican president (and a Mexican people) possessed of a more acute appreciation of the United States than that of most others. They are therefore able to talk to U.S. policymakers more effectively than others can, and they are able to bridge gaps of understanding that sabotage discussions when the parties are not so intimately connected.

In the area of economic relations, the doctrine imposes particular obligations on the United States, but it also defines a scenario that can be influential in bringing about increased petroleum exports to the north. A former secretary of industry and commerce in Mexico articulates his nation's view of the U.S. obligations that flow from the special relationship:

Our Government considers that the sharing of a border and the consequences of this on the economic elements should be taken into account in the United States Government's decision on trade and credit policy, international air traffic control, restrictions on its citizens who visit Mexico,

¹⁰ See Olga Pellicer de Brody, "Mexico in the 1970s and Its Relations with the United States," in Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen, eds., *Latin America and the United States: Changing Political Realities* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 317-320.

¹¹ See "Lopez Portillo Sees Role as Bridge Builder," *Arizona Daily Star* (Tucson), January 26, 1977.

and other related matters. In short, Mexico hopes that the United States will recognize our nation's right, in various economic areas to be given the treatment of a border nation.¹²

In the Mexican view, however, the relationship implies a degree of reciprocity that can be generally advantageous to the United States and markedly important in defining Mexico's policy on oil and gas exportation. In criticizing "strong interest, both within and without the public sphere," a Mexican political leader set out the point:

for Latin America, and particularly for Mexico, the market of the United States is a natural market besides being the principal market of the world, both for buying and for selling, and . . . the physical proximity of our two countries offers to us a condition of lower transportation and selling costs for our products, so it is neither necessary nor convenient to change the structure of our international trade.¹³

Indeed, as the indicators of petroleum trade have evolved, it seems that the special relationship is proving valid in some degree. As early as March 1975, it became clear that no discrimination was to be exercised against the United States in oil trade. By the end of that year, the pattern of Mexican sales began to take on rather clear form, the United States getting about 75 per cent of all exports. In a gesture of friendship during the hard winter of 1976-1977, the Mexican government made a special point of offering oil and gas to the hard-pressed United States. By mid-1977, the United States was receiving nearly 155,000 barrels a day from Mexico — about 90 per cent of that nation's overseas sales. At about the same time, moreover, the Mexican government firmed up plans to construct a gas line connecting to the U.S. distribution system, promising delivery 1 billion cubic feet per day by late 1979 and double that by 1981. Formal ratification of an accord to sell gas to the United States has been postponed, but an eventual rapprochement is anticipated by policymakers both in Mexico and the United States.¹⁴

Neither the special relationship doctrine nor the early events surrounding commerce in oil and gas prove that the United States will be assured good treatment in the future, of course, but both are encouraging signs. Indeed, in the context of the generally amicable relations of the past dozen years, during which several outstanding problems have been resolved, they appear to take on added positive significance. Even more to the point of this analysis,

¹² Quoted in Pellicer de Brody, p. 318.

¹³ Jorge Cruickshank García, "Nuestro comercio exterior y la lucha por la independencia nacional," *El Universal*, January 13, 1976.

¹⁴ See "Mexico Eyes Gas-Starved U.S. . . ." and Bill Sansing, "Mexico's Oil, Gas Plans Good for U.S.," *Tulsa Tribune*, June 17, 1977.

the trade in oil and gas couples with the more broadly conceived elements of the bilateral equation to form a fascinating scenario of give and take destined to play a major role in relations in the immediate future. As that bargaining scenario continues to unfold, in fact, diplomatic and political interaction promises to become more frequent and more intimate, suggesting that Mexico and the United States are on the threshold of a new relationship brimming with potential to heal the wounds of old with the salve of reciprocity and trust.

A Bargaining Scenario

In the last analysis, the future of Mexican oil and gas exports to the United States forms part of the larger intercourse between the two nations. That context is characterized by continuous relations encompassing a host of factors and exemplifying practically every nuance of association. In some areas, relations are quite good; in others, the issues are controversial. Many facets of exchange seem to offer a decided advantage to the United States, but in several areas the Mexicans exercise significant influence. Several problems are just about resolved, but others defy solution for the time being.

Of the several factors that impact on Mexican oil exports to the United States, general trade relations are the most important, and Mexico's unfavorable trade balance with its northern neighbor is the most significant part of the bilateral trade equation. By the mid-1970s, Mexico's trade deficit had assumed crisis proportions. In 1965, the deficit stood at about \$400 million; by 1970, it had more than tripled to about \$1.25 billion; and by 1976, it had tripled once again to more than \$3.75 billion. (The 1977 negative balance should be about \$2 billion.)¹⁵

The Mexican trade situation becomes even more precarious when it is analyzed in light of the nation's foreign debt and its relationship to export earnings. In the 1970s, the long-term foreign debt of the public sector has skyrocketed from \$3.6 billion in 1971 to more than \$25 billion in 1977. International lending organizations frequently determine a country's credit rating by relating the servicing costs of the foreign debt to export earnings. When more than 20 per cent of a nation's export earnings is going to debt service, a danger point is reached, and anything beyond 25 per cent is nearly intolerable. Since 1965, Mexico has consistently

¹⁵ See National Bank of Mexico, *Mexico Statistical Data*, 1975, pp. 22-24.

exceeded the 20 per cent figure and has twice gone beyond 25 per cent. For 1977, Mexico's debt service exceeded \$4 billion, and the International Monetary Fund imposed a net borrowing limit of \$3 billion. All of this demonstrates, of course, that Mexico's financial situation is serious. Indeed, were it not for the promise of increased oil exports, international lending agencies might well be taking a much tougher stance with Mexico.¹⁶

Obviously enough, the debt issue is related to the trade problem and pertains quite directly to the United States. About two-thirds of Mexico's trade is with the United States, and perhaps as much as 90 per cent of Mexico's foreign debt is with U.S. private banks or with international lending agencies in which the United States exercises significant influence (e.g., the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund). In that sense, the diminution of the trade deficit growing from oil exports to the United States implies several advantages. It earns much-needed dollars; it brings about a better credit rating as it improves the ratio of export earnings to foreign debt; and it creates goodwill among U.S. decisionmakers who are, for better or worse, influential in ensuring credit for Mexico in private and public lending institutions.

Although the trade/debt problem is certainly the most pressing for Mexico, and although it relates most directly to possibilities of oil exports, several other significant issues form a part of the larger context of Mexican-U.S. relations. Those issues present a rather different picture of bilateral relations in that they offer Mexico slightly more leverage. They are also noteworthy because they suggest that the two nations have been, and are, involved in good-faith bargaining and in activity designed to resolve the problems. As these problems are met and resolved, a repository of trust and negotiating experience should evolve and have ramifications for the issue of oil and gas. Equally important, their resolution may signal a departure in Mexican-U.S. intercourse implying better and closer overall relations.

Several of the controversies that have bothered Mexican-

¹⁶ See "El ahorro externo apoya la balanza de pagos," *El Universal*, January 1, 1976; Calvin P. Blair, "Mexico: Some Recent Developments and the Interdependency Relationship with the United States," statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, January 24, 1977 (mimeo.), p. 12; "'Black Gold' for Mexico," *Arizona Daily Star*, April 11, 1977; and Kenneth Ruddle and Donald Obermann, eds., *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1971* (Los Angeles: University of California, Latin American Center, 1972), p. 383.

U.S. relations in recent times are well on their way to amiable resolution. These include a number of minor irritants but also some rather contentious issues. In the mid-1960s, the long-festering Chamizal controversy was resolved to Mexico's satisfaction. In the early seventies, bilateral relations again took a step forward when the United States assumed responsibility for de-salting Colorado River irrigation waters that had been damaging Mexican farmland and when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed a treaty designed to squelch the theft of and trafficking in Mexican antiquities. In still another instance, the U.S. government has responded to Mexican entreaties to prevent the flow of smuggled arms into Mexico. Indeed, as the seventies evolve, some progress is emerging on the problem of illegal Mexican migrants, some of the measures pursued having earned positive commentary in Mexico.

In other cases, the United States has been rather more favored, but, to the point, both nations have demonstrated a high level of goodwill and reciprocal trust in attacking serious problems. The 1976 bilateral treaty on the exchange of prisoners is well known. To a large extent, it set to rest a serious irritant in Mexican-U.S. relations. Less publicized, but probably more significant, has been the Mexican government's stepping up of investigative and military activities to counter the drug traffic originating in or passing through Mexico.

None of these examples of bilateral cooperation is directly involved in the oil-trade scenario, of course, but all of them offer rather strong evidence that the two nations have been hard at their problems over the past decade or so. They reflect a spirit of give and take that can have a real impact on cooperative efforts in the exploitation and exportation of petroleum to the United States.

While it is certainly true that the United States brings much power and many resources to negotiations between the two nations, the evolving oil power of Mexico is supported by several other significant resources that make the bargaining situation rather more equal than it might seem at first blush. In the area of trade, 1975 data show that Mexico was the fourth most important customer of the United States and its sixth largest supplier of goods. (Both those calculations, by the way, exclude border transactions of considerable magnitude.) As for tourism to the United States, Mexico ranks only behind Canada. In 1975, Mexican visitors spent more than twice the amount expended by all European tourists in the United States. In that same year, investment income, fees and

royalties coming from Mexico into the United States totaled nigh onto \$700 million.¹⁷

Underlying all those nice economic figures, moreover, the basic fact of continued Mexican stability is crucial to the United States. Trouble in Mexico spells trouble for the United States. If that nation of more than 60 million people, armed with its rather impressive industrial machine and sharing a 2,000-mile border, were ever to collapse or dramatically reverse its posture, the United States would suffer. An analysis of President López Portillo's visit to the United States makes the point:

López Portillo's final card, which he played with great care and tact, might be called the "Doomsday Machine." He told Congress that the extreme positions adopted by many Latin American Governments arose from their grave economic difficulties. But if Mexican efforts to develop without abandoning "liberty and social justice" were to succeed, more support and better understanding from the United States were essential. In other words, unless you treat us more fairly, we may well end up in chaos and instability, or with a ferocious right-wing dictatorship of the type that pervades the *cono sur*. [Or with a Moscow-line regime similar to Fidel Castro's?] And this is something which no government in Washington, least of all the Carter administration, could wish for a neighbor with a common frontier 2000 miles long.¹⁸

If socioeconomic and political collapse seems to be Mexico's final card in the game of bilateral relations, petroleum trade is certainly an important trump to be played rather earlier. As the foreign policy of the López Portillo regime evolves, moreover, indications evidence exactly that strategy. Given Mexico's nationalist sensitivities, arrangements may never crystallize into specifically defined and explicit treaty agreements, but an implicit understanding appears perfectly possible. Likewise, the details of any understanding might remain only generally defined and fluid, but several likely key elements are fairly clear.

In the first instance, the entire tone of López Portillo's foreign policy indicates a concerted effort at rapprochement with the United States. The Mexican president has dismantled much of the anti-gringo structure of his predecessor's foreign policy and has reaffirmed belief in a special relationship between Mexico and the United States. He has pronounced, for example, that "never, never has Mexico wanted to be a leader" of the Third World. Other Mexican sources have talked about "an intense interdependence between the two countries" and have explained the Mexican decision

¹⁷ See Blair, pp. 6, 13.

¹⁸ *Latin American Political Report* (London), February 25, 1977, p. 57.

to send emergency shipments of gas and oil to the United States as emanating from the fact that Mexico "[knows] full well that friends must help friends."¹⁹

The arrangements first appeared in concrete form during López Portillo's official visit to Washington early in 1977. Mexican oil experts accompanied López Portillo to Washington, and discussions were conducted on petroleum trade and financing. Among other matters, talks were initiated on financing with the U.S. Export-Import Bank. Indeed, a wide-ranging bargaining scenario began to unfold during that visit when the Mexican president suggested that the two countries discuss problems ranging from advanced technology to illegal immigration.²⁰

From the Mexican side, the elements of the bargaining scenario are fairly clear. The Mexicans need increased trade, steady financing and some technological assistance. The trade part of the equation includes increased earnings from petroleum sales, of course, but also much more than that. Mexico wants to go beyond the usual trade relations and even beyond the preferences granted under the 1974 Trade Act. Although Mexican nationalist pride would recoil from the words, Mexico is, in truth, seeking assurances that the United States will offer very special treatment to Mexican exports. In addition to the provisions of the 1974 trade legislation, in other words, the Mexican government seeks (a) some sort of pledge that Washington will expend all efforts to encourage sales of Mexican goods in the United States and (b) an acknowledgment that Washington will use none of its myriad trade weapons (i.e., quotas, special penalties or temporary tariffs). The message is clear: in the words of a North American commentator, "Mexican sources here in Mexico City put it bluntly: 'We need help.'"²¹

Besides increased earnings through trade, the Mexican government needs financing on an ongoing basis. In that context, the United States can respond in several ways. At one level, governmental encouragement of private lending to Mexico seems an established fact. Private banks in the United States now carry more than half of Mexico's \$25 billion in foreign loans, having lent Mexico \$2.5 billion in 1976 alone. Ongoing governmental activity in public

¹⁹ James Nelson Goodsell, "U.S., Not Third World, Key Tie for Mexico," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 17, 1977 (ISLA 686); John B. Oakes, "Mexican Leader, Outlining Plans, Sees a Challenge in National Crisis," *New York Times*, February 1, 1977 (ISLA 667).

²⁰ See Goodsell; also, Richard Lawrence, "Mexico Chief Wants More U.S. Business," *Journal of Commerce*, February 16, 1977 (ISLA 685).

²¹ Goodsell.

financing is also important, and that, too, seems assured. As the Mexican financial crises unfolded in 1976, for example, the U.S. Federal Reserve dispatched a short-term loan of \$360 million. Other support came later from the U.S. Treasury and, again, from the Federal Reserve. At a third level, some hint has surfaced of a possible rescheduling of part of Mexico's foreign debt. Finally, some elected officials in the United States have encouraged the initiation of a formal aid program to Mexico; although, in truth, that prospect seems unlikely, given Mexico's proud history of eschewing such programs.²²

In another context with social and economic implications, the reintroduction of a new bracero program may evolve as a key part of an overall arrangement. The bracero program, involving legalized entry of Mexican workers into the United States, was for many years an important goal of the Mexican government. In a rather confused exchange in 1974, President Echeverría repudiated that plank in what appeared to be another manifestation of his anti-gringo stance. (In reality, it probably reflected his perception of President Gerald Ford's opposition to a bracero treaty.) Whatever the meaning and motives of the 1974 episode, the López Portillo government is in favor of the program. Moreover, despite opposition from the AFL-CIO, a generally sympathetic environment is evolving in the United States, and sufficient political support for the legalization of Mexican temporary workers may be forthcoming. Indeed, the need for a bracero treaty seems to become increasingly visible as the Carter administration frames its response to the problem of *indocumentados* (workers without proper documents). An element of that package is designed to make illegal immigration more difficult.

In the area of technological aid, little problem exists. The Mexican petroleum industry, it should be emphasized, is perfectly capable of handling all but the most sophisticated demands, and private companies in the United States are clearly willing to cooperate in furnishing the rest. Both during the Echeverría regime and in the present one, as a matter of fact, a number of initiatives have been launched with U.S. firms in order to assist the Mexicans in several specialized areas of the industry. Significantly, no opposition appears to have mounted from the U.S. oil giants who suffered nationalization four decades ago.

From the North American side of the bargaining table,

²² See Fagen pp. 686, 695, and "U.S. Aid to Mexico Being Considered," *Arizona Daily Star*, February 10, 1977.

assurance of increased oil supplies is the key factor, but drugs and *indocumentados* continue to be significant concerns. The Mexican government has made a start toward lessening the impact of Mexico's contribution to the U.S. drug problem, but much more needs doing and Washington will press for increased action. The issue of illegal migrants is even more difficult, but Washington needs Mexico's cooperation, and U.S. officials are sure to see that problem as part of the overall bargaining scenario.

As for the sale of oil, Washington is seeking a special arrangement ensuring it the lion's share of Mexico's exports. It also wants a commitment from the Mexicans spelling out their readiness to concentrate on rapid development of the fields for export, rather than conserving them for future domestic use, holding up development until Mexico's refineries come "on stream." Adequately sensitive to the realities of Mexico's nationalist foreign policy and the tone of domestic policies in Mexico, none of those initiatives needs formalization by treaty, but the United States certainly looks to an informal agreement.

Beyond Oil and Gas

In sum, Mexico's increasing petroleum-export capacity and the United States' decreasing self-sufficiency in energy have come to a crucial juncture in the two nations' bilateral relations. The United States wants more Mexican oil and gas; and Mexican domestic politics, the bilateral context, and early events offer encouragement that significant commerce in oil and gas will come about within several years. In Mexico, nationalist sensitivities in tandem with partisan political maneuvering certainly imply some problems—but probably not insuperable impediments to an informal arrangement. Taking advantage of and highlighting the traditional doctrine of the special relationship between Mexico and the United States, the moderate leadership of the López Portillo regime has combined with Mexico's present economic problems and developmental ambitions to offer an encouraging situation.

Indeed, beyond oil and gas the present nexus holds the potential for resolution of a series of outstanding problems, ranging from the theft of Mexican antiquities to the employment of Mexican braceros. The very intimacy of Mexican-U.S. relations and the multiplicity of differences, then, offers a context for imaginative diplomatic negotiation featuring a number of compromises and trade-offs that, in truth, may well evoke a series of

mutually satisfactory accords. The encouraging backdrop to that scene, furthermore, is composed of several significant agreements that have emerged over the past dozen years and have contributed to a more trusting attitude conducive to fruitful negotiation.

It is not too optimistic to propose that Mexico and the United States may be on the threshold of achieving a new quality in their relationship. Although the promise of more oil and gas for the United States is only one part of the larger package, it will play a featured role as Mexican-U.S. bilateral relations unfold.

THE TECHNOLOGY OF MODERN WEAPONS FOR LIMITED MILITARY USE*

by John W. Cane

Flexibility in the use of military force is a U.S. objective pre-dating the concept of massive response. John Foster Dulles, who is generally credited with inventing the term "massive retaliation," went on record in 1954 in favor of flexibility; i.e., of meeting force with like force.¹ After many years of one-sided U.S. strategic advantage, which underwrote nuclear deterrence under the doctrine of assured destruction, the Nixon administration began in 1971 to call for more limited forms of nuclear response as part of a flexible-response strategy. White House and Pentagon reports to the Congress² are evidence of the new desire for discrete attacks, tailored to fit the seriousness of the aggressive act, minimizing collateral damage and avoiding unnecessary violence. Early indications are that the Carter administration intends to continue with the development of limited nuclear-response options.³

In discussions of the use of military force in response to limited aggression, the so-called dual criterion has come into use as a means of stating the requirements. What this means is that along with confidence in destroying the intended target, one must also possess assurance that one will not destroy unintended targets, or "nontargets." Implicit in these requirements is the need for weapons (nuclear and conventional) of limited destructive power, delivered with very high accuracy.

As a result of the evolution of nuclear-use policy in the

* The author gratefully acknowledges many helpful comments and revisions contributed by Robert W. Vining.

¹ John F. Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1954.

² Richard M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's*, reports to the Congress: *Building for Peace* (1971), *The Emerging Structure of Peace* (1972), *Shaping a Durable Peace* (1973); James R. Schlesinger's reports to the Congress on the FY 1975 and FY 1976 defense budgets; Donald R. Rumsfeld's report to the Congress on the FY 1977 defense budget.

³ Charles Mohr, "Carter Orders Steps to Increase Ability to Meet War Threats," *New York Times*, August 26, 1977.

John W. Cane is Manager of the Washington Research Center of Systems, Science and Software, a California-based scientific research and consulting firm. A retired Commander in the U.S. Navy, he has participated in numerous research projects concerned with the design and effects of nuclear warheads.

mid-1970s, the phrase "limited nuclear options"⁴ came into use to describe the range of options perceived necessary to provide enhanced deterrence against various levels of aggression. The purpose of these options is to make available to the national leadership planned, limited responses to possible enemy aggressions of a limited nature. These options are designed to bring an early end to hostilities at the lowest possible level of violence.⁵

In defending the need for more accurate weapons, James Schlesinger and his congressional audience concentrated on an extreme form of counterforce: the disarming, selective countersilo strike.⁶ Many weapons whose destructive capability need not be of the silo-threatening variety were not discussed in the hearings and debates of 1975. Such weapons can go far toward providing the capability to respond to limited aggression in a limited way.

In this paper, the salient features of modern warheads are described in order to facilitate better-informed public discussion of the relevant issues. To orient the reader, a numerical description of the targeting problem will be presented, followed by a description of conventional and nuclear warhead concepts. Finally, some examples of application are given.

Lethality, Accuracy and Escalation Control

The "probability of destroying a target" (P_d) is a measure of one's confidence that one can successfully carry out a military strike. P_d is affected by target characteristics ("hardness"), the explosive energy ("yield") of the weapon, and the accuracy (or "miss distance") of the means of delivery. A given weapon system's "lethality" against a certain target may be described by the weapon's "lethal radius" (LR). A common measure of delivery accuracy is the "circular error probable" (CEP).

In the ideal limited nuclear option, one would wish to maintain a rather high P_d (about 90 per cent) and at the same time limit violence. To control escalation and minimize unnecessary collateral damage, the target should be destroyed with the first weapon detonation. This requires a weapon with an LR of just less than twice the CEP. More precisely, the ratio of LR/CEP should be at

⁴ L. Davis, *Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 121, 1976).

⁵ As in the early part of this decade, the late seventies are again witnessing a White House-level review of national strategic priorities and doctrines. As of this writing, these have not progressed sufficiently to furnish a clear idea of their direction.

⁶ See, for example, *Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1975).

least 1.8 to have a 90 per cent probability of mission success. Table I shows the number of weapon detonations (N_{90}) required for 90 per cent assurance of target destruction according to various probabilities that a single shot will destroy the target. The LR/CEP ratio is also shown.

Table I illustrates that a large increase in N is required to achieve high-confidence target destruction when P_d is less than about 50 per cent. Many of our older weapon systems have an undesirably low P_d value against certain targets and, consequently, would require large numbers of weapons to destroy those targets with high confidence. This creates a situation where needless violence might occur, simply because of a low LR/CEP value. There are two options for increasing that ratio: (1) the lethal radius can be increased, or (2) the CEP can be decreased. Option 1 still results in large amounts of unnecessary damage between the target and the impact point when inaccurate weapons are employed. Option 2, made possible by recent advances in the technology of guidance and terminal homing, is preferable because of the reduced collateral damage level that results.

As an example, consider a target against which a hypothetical weapon might have a low P_d , say 20 per cent, because of poor delivery accuracy. From Table I, the corresponding LR/CEP ratio is 0.6. To achieve a damage probability of 90 per cent with one weapon requires tripling the ratio LR/CEP to 1.8, corresponding to a P_d of 90 per cent. In order to appreciate the implications of this statement, recall that most military targets are *blast-sensitive*. Blast pressure varies directly, as weapon yield, and inversely as the cube of the distance from the detonation to the target. This means that, for a 2-kiloton weapon with a P_d of 20 per cent (LR/CEP=0.6), a

TABLE I
INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG DAMAGE PROBABILITY (P_d),
NUMBER OF ROUNDS FOR 90 PER CENT DAMAGE
(N_{90}), LETHAL RADIUS (LR) AND ACCURACY (CEP)

P_d	N_{90}	LR/CEP
90%	1	1.8
70%	2	1.3
50%	4	1.0
30%	7	0.7
20%	11	0.6

twenty-seven-fold [$(1.8/0.6)^3 = 3^3$] increase to 54 kilotons is needed to raise the P_d against this target from 20 per cent to 90 per cent. (Alternatively, from Table I, eleven 2-kiloton weapons could have been programmed for 90 per cent kill probability.) High yields or multiple burst must be employed, accompanied by high collateral damage. Today, we have the alternative of tripling accuracy instead of lethal radius in order to triple LR/CEP. The resulting increase in the destructive capacity of lower-yield weapons, while effectively limiting the degree of violence, responds directly to the requirements of the dual criterion referred to earlier and offers the promise of controlling escalation by tailoring the reply to meet the aggression. Indeed, because of the marked increase in effectiveness of nonnuclear munitions owing to improved accuracy,⁷ many opportunities exist for substituting conventional warheads for nuclear weapons.

Matching Weapons to Targets

The foregoing discussion demonstrated how the improvement of accuracy will result in a considerable reduction in the explosive power required to inflict a given amount of target damage, thereby reducing the amount of collateral damage and the number of civilian fatalities. There are other weapon characteristics which can be exploited to respond to the dual criterion. As will be seen, nonnuclear as well as nuclear weapon concepts have matured to provide greatly enhanced military capabilities.⁸

The dual criterion has its strongest applicability in central Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces face each other amid thousands of rural communities. The widespread use of currently deployed nuclear weapons in NATO territory would result in extensive collateral damage. Grave doubts about the credibility of those weapons as war-fighting tools thus arise. This fact has prompted the remark that NATO would "save Europe by destroying her." Several nuclear-design options, some of which have existed for many years, are now being considered for inclusion in NATO's

⁷ As James Digby has observed, modern conventional precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have progressed to the point where a target, once acquired, may be considered hit and, once hit, destroyed. See his *Precision-Guided Weapons* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 118, 1975.) In this connection, see also Geoffrey Kemp et al., eds., *The Other Arms Race: New Technologies for Non-Nuclear Conflict* (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1975).

⁸ For a comprehensive treatment of issues pertaining to modern nuclear and conventional weapons technology, see Cecil I. Hudson and Peter H. Haas, "New Technologies: The Prospects," in Johan J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich, eds., *Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Aims, New Arms* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977).

nuclear forces. If implemented, these design options can effect a positive reduction of collateral damage while maintaining lethality against intended targets.

Nuclear Weapons

One of these options is the "enhanced-radiation" (ER) weapon,⁹ a thermonuclear weapon whose nuclear radiation effects far exceed the radiation levels of other nuclear weapons. Against selected targets, the ER weapon has extremely high effectiveness and causes substantially lower blast damage to unintended targets.¹⁰ A hypothetical ER weapon can be just as effective against personnel as a fission weapon having ten to fifteen times greater yield. This is important when considering nuclear weapons in the role of battle-field support. Initial nuclear radiation is the dominant weapon-effect against troops in the open, in foxholes or in armored vehicles. Protection against the initial pulse of neutrons and gamma rays from a nuclear airburst is very difficult to provide for personnel on foot or in military vehicles (viz., self-propelled artillery, tanks, troop carriers), although the vehicles and foxholes are quite resistant to blast effects. Thus, radiation becomes the preferred kill mechanism.

A second nuclear option is the "clean weapon." This alternative offers a means of dealing with another form of collateral damage: fatalities or casualties caused by fallout radiation. Such radiation has two causes, fission and activation, which are present in all nuclear explosives. Fission products are radioactive materials left over after the fission of weapon materials. Activation results when the fissionable or environmental materials capture neutrons, thus becoming radioactive. In the "clean" device, advanced design techniques are used to (a) reduce to a minimum the amount of fissionable material required for a reliable weapon and (b) contain within the device the neutrons generated, thus minimizing the amount of activation. Clean nuclear warheads have their utility against targets requiring surface or subsurface bursts, which provide a destructive combination of airblast and ground shock. Underground command posts, nuclear storage sites, buried petroleum-

⁹ Recent congressional debate and media coverage have used the term "neutron bomb" to describe ER weapons. As early as 1971, it was observed by Robert M. Lawrence that advanced nuclear-weapon technology programs, which included "clean" and ER warhead concepts, have existed since 1963. ("On Tactical Nuclear War," *General Military Review*, February 1971.)

¹⁰ While collateral damage from the radiation effects of the ER weapon extends to greater radii than that caused by fission weapons, residential basements or similar shelters should provide significant shielding from this effect.

product storage and some bridges are examples of targets which might be attacked with surface or subsurface explosions.

A third design option, a reliable nuclear weapon of low yield, is of interest because advances in delivery technology now make it more effective. Refer again to Table I. Weapons having P_d of 20 per cent are of little utility because of low yield and poor accuracy. With improved accuracy, the same low-yield weapon can have a damage probability of 90 per cent against the same target. As noted above, such accuracies are achievable today. Considerable progress has been made in our capability to build low-yield warheads, and yields of 1 kiloton or less are now readily available.

Conventional Weapons

A vast array of new high-explosive weapons has been demonstrated both in field experiments and in combat during this decade. In some cases, the effectiveness of improved conventional munitions is so high that they can replace nuclear weapons for some target assignments. As with nuclear warheads, increases in delivery accuracy have paced the overall development of improved capabilities.

An important development with strong application against "soft" targets uses "submissiling" technology, wherein a given payload is divided by placing the explosive contents into many small units and dispersing them in a wide pattern. This allows the lethal effects to be spread over a much greater area than would be possible if the payload were one piece of explosive. The large number of small, submissile explosions creates a more uniform lethal environment over a broader area and avoids the single explosion's significant "overkill" at closer ranges. This permits more efficient use of limited payload against area targets, such as troop formations or exposed logistic sites.

A similar development is known as "controlled fragmentation," in which the explosive casing is designed to break up into optimally sized and shaped fragments for effectiveness against certain targets.

A third nonnuclear explosive is the "shaped charge" (or hollow charge), which has the ability to focus the energy of the explosion in one direction, thus permitting penetration of several inches of armor or a few feet of concrete. While this is not a new concept, its refinement as an antiarmor weapon and its application

to earth-penetrating weapons is contributing to the enhanced effectiveness of both nuclear and conventional weaponry.

Finally, the fuel-air explosive (FAE) offers an airblast weapon which has an effectiveness, per pound, up to twenty times that of ordinary high explosives. It achieves this in two ways. First, unlike the ordinary high explosive, it mixes with ambient air at the target and does not require oxygen in its payload. Second, by wider dispersal of the fuel, its lethal effects extend to longer ranges, reducing the amount of overkill within close-in regions. Weapons using the FAE principle were effectively employed over Vietnam in several important applications, and further development should result in a significant improvement to the United States' conventional capability.

Targeting with Modern Munitions: Some Examples

The application of modern weaponry can be illustrated through several examples of nuclear and conventional weapon-targeting. Let us examine a hypothetical target consisting of a random collection of twenty buildings in a logistic area 300 meters in radius. The requirement: to severely damage the buildings. To achieve the desired level of damage, delivery of 200 unguided, 2,000-pound bombs with a 300-meter CEP would be required. Modest improvements in accuracy could reduce the weapon requirement as shown in Table II. For really significant reductions in numbers of weapons, one could rely on precision-guidance technology and attack individual buildings. Rather than depending on large numbers of weapons indiscriminately targeted against the entire 280,000-square-meter area, PGMs allow one to discretely

TABLE II

BOMBS (MK-84), PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM), AND FUEL-AIR EXPLOSIVES (FAE) REQUIRED TO DAMAGE TWENTY BUILDINGS IN AN AREA WITH A 300-METER RADIUS

Weapon Type	CEP (meters)	Number	Payload (tons)
MK-84 *	300	200	200
MK-84	100	80	80
PGM	30	20	20
FAE	30	20	.5

* Two thousand pounds.

target each building with a single weapon, which, given a direct hit on its target, will be lethal. (Of course, allowance has to be made for weapon reliability and for attrition from enemy defenses.) Reductions in collateral damage (from gross misses), in logistic loads, and in payload delivered are seen to be significant.

Further reductions in payload may be possible by using advanced munitions such as fuel-air explosives. The more efficient blast production per pound of payload could conceivably result in equivalent damage if twenty PGMs with FAE munitions (20- to 50-pound warheads) were employed.

Considerations relative to nuclear targeting are somewhat more complicated because of the different ways in which the effects of nuclear weapons manifest themselves. Nuclear radiation and airblast will damage different targets at different radii, depending on target characteristics, weapon design features, yield, and weapon employment mode.

Nuclear weapons of low yield are more damaging to personnel than to structures because the lethal effects from emitted neutrons extend farther than do airblast effects. In the case of weapons with higher yields, the airblast will severely damage structures and will cause casualties to personnel located inside at greater ranges than will the prompt neutrons and gamma rays.

The locus of a nuclear detonation in relation to the ground surface gives rise to another set of trade-offs among effects. An airburst creates little or no fallout with no appreciable loss in blast effectiveness. The surface or underground burst is more effective for ground-motion-sensitive targets or for the creation of barriers (craters). As described above, cleaner weapon designs would reduce the amount of delayed radiation or fallout associated with a surface or subsurface nuclear explosion.

As an example of nuclear targeting, consider a hypothetical attack using airburst weapons against a military airfield located near a populated area. The same level of damage to the aircraft located at the field can be achieved with the weapon and yield combinations shown in Table III. Significant reductions in collateral fatalities would result at weapon yields below 10 kilotons. The small difference in fatalities between the 100-kiloton and 10-kiloton cases results from the population-at-risk being located near the collateral-effects radius of a 10-kiloton airburst.

Technical means now exist, or can be developed, to confine collateral damage to the physical boundaries of the target area. The estimate of 5,000 fatalities from nine 1-kiloton weapons

TABLE III
COLLATERAL DAMAGE FROM AIRFIELD ATTACK

Yield (kilotons)	Number of Warheads	Number of Fatalities
100	2	28,000
10	4	26,000
1	9	5,000

(Table III) is a conservatively high limit to the collateral damage which would occur if weapons incorporating available modern technology were used.

An attack on an armored unit departing its garrison near a village is another example of nuclear targeting. To incapacitate personnel in tanks by nuclear radiation would require a fission weapon of several kilotons yield, detonated directly overhead. The airblast effects from such a weapon would extend more than 2 kilometers in all directions from Ground Zero, destroying most residential and light commercial structures within that area. Much of this unwanted, or collateral, damage could be reduced through the use of an enhanced-radiation weapon, as described earlier. The blast-damage radius would be reduced to less than 1 kilometer.

A third use for nuclear targeting is in the creation of barriers. NATO has long had a stockpile of atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), which are designed to be buried and detonated in order to impede progress or deny access over a given route. ADMs have always labored under some disadvantages. For one thing, there are political constraints associated with the digging of emplacement holes ("prechambering") at advantageous locations during peacetime. In wartime, given an urgent need for an ADM barrier, the field commander is still faced with the need to deploy troops with the ADM device, emplace it and withdraw to safety — all in sufficient time to detonate the ADM and achieve the desired result: i.e., timely delay or diversion of the enemy force. Also, fallout radiation may hamper one's own operations after an ADM detonation. Granted that many attractive barrier sites (mountainous defiles, passes, choke-points in terrain) are remote from concentrations of civilians, one's forces will still require access to the terrain in order to provide the active defense without which a barrier's full effectiveness cannot be realized.

New developments in munitions design and delivery

technology hold promise to overcome these disadvantages. That promise is represented by earth penetrators and clean warheads. The earth penetrator affords a great reduction in the elapsed time between receipt of authorization to use an ADM and the detonation itself. Problems of pre-emplacement, prechambering or human transport of devices to barrier sites can be eliminated with PGM delivery of the penetrating round. Marriage of the technologies — PGMs, earth penetrators and clean weapons — would allow significant strides to be made toward reduction of the extent and intensity of fallout radiation.¹¹

From Concept to Reality

This paper represents an attempt to show how weapons-use policies could be better implemented through new weapon systems that make use of modern technology to carry out discrete attacks. Moreover, if weapons *and the means for their delivery* are carefully matched to their targets, the extent of collateral damage can often be limited to the physical boundary of the target under attack. Most of the hardware concepts described here have been demonstrated — many in combat, the rest in conclusive laboratory or field tests. Thus, the process of converting these concepts to reality is more a problem of decisionmaking, budgeting and hardware procurement than one of long-term research or development projects.

¹¹ There are practical difficulties with the penetrability of clean-warhead devices, owing to their larger diameters; but these are differences in degree, not principle. Shallow-penetrating weapons are believed to possess other advantages, such as significant airblast effects without excessive nuclear radiation, while still creating sufficiently large craters.

AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT IN THE SEVENTIES*

by Raymond W. Copson

African international politics in the 1970s have been marked by periodic international conflict, as they have been since the early days of independence. There was a lull in continental conflict at the end of the 1960s,¹ but now some of the disputes of the immediate postindependence period have been revived — the renewal of the dispute between Algeria and Morocco is an example — while new conflicts, such as the one between Kenya and Uganda, have broken out. Conflict has persisted despite the pledge of the African states at the first OAU meeting in 1963 to work for African unity, and despite repeated assertions by leaders around the continent of their support for African brotherhood.

Most of the international conflict in Africa in the 1960s consisted of nothing more than angry verbal exchanges. These exchanges took place over a variety of issues, including the location of boundaries, larger territorial claims, the course of the liberation struggle in southern Africa, ideological rivalries, and the mistreatment of alien workers from other African countries. More serious conflict, endangering the safety of lives and property or the stability of regimes, did occur, as in the Somali crisis of 1963-1964 or in the attempts to overthrow the Tshombe regime in the Congo (Leopoldville), but this sort of conflict was unusual. In the 1970s, angry verbal exchanges between African states have continued and more serious conflict has become commoner. East Africa has seen the use of economic weapons in the 1970s, as well as some fighting between Tanzanian and Ugandan troops. It is rather clear that President Qaddafi has attempted to overthrow the governments of Morocco,

* The author thanks Jack P. Finnegan, of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and Charles O. Lerche, Jr., of the University of Port Harcourt, for their comments on an early draft of this paper.

¹ See my "Foreign Policy Conflict Among African States, 1964-1969," in P. McGowan, ed., *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, 1973 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), pp. 197-199.

Raymond W. Copson, a political scientist, has taught at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and the University of Nairobi, Kenya. His current research interests include U.S.-Nigerian relations.

Tunisia, Sudan and Egypt. Fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia has broken out again, and the long-standing dispute between Egypt and Libya has finally resulted in violence.

The persistence of conflict on the African continent is deeply rooted in the underdevelopment² of African states and of the African system of states. The purpose of this essay is to examine political and economic underdevelopment as a cause of international conflict in Africa and to determine whether conflict is likely to continue to be a major factor in African international politics.

This paper will make use of the systems level of analysis,³ examining the characteristics of the African subsystem of the global international system and the general characteristics of the states which make up the subsystem. The reader should be forewarned that at this level the unique causes of particular conflicts will be overlooked. The personalities of leaders, for example, will not be emphasized, even though personalities — Amin, Qaddafi or Ian Smith, for example — have been significant factors in some disputes. Nor will the peculiar characteristics of individual states receive special attention, even though these characteristics have often been important. The unique history of South Africa, for example, is of extreme importance in explaining the conflict in that region. But the systems level promises an overview of the problems of African international conflict, its causes and its likely future — a promise worth pursuing.

The African States

The first set of general factors which helps to explain the persistence of African international conflict has to do with the political and economic underdevelopment of the African states themselves. Economic underdevelopment, of course, also helps to explain the predominantly verbal form of most conflict to date because it implies that the military capabilities of African states are typically few. Countries with armies of a few hundred or a few thousand men simply cannot contemplate an aggressive war.

Even states that appear rather strong in some of the tangible components of power may be weak in the intangibles.

² I am aware that the term "underdevelopment" is not a popular one among many students of the Third World nations. However, I still find it a useful word to describe the economic situation of the African states and the weakness of African political institutions.

³ On levels of analysis, see J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92.

Uganda has a great advantage over Kenya in air power, for example, but there is much doubt about the ability of Uganda's pilots to handle the MiG aircraft which give it this advantage. The failure of Uganda's air force to disperse its MiGs prior to the Israeli raid at Entebbe indicates that military planning is not well developed in Uganda.⁴ Such lapses must raise doubts about the capabilities of other fairly large African military establishments.

In this paper, "political underdevelopment" will refer to Huntington's model: that is, there is underdevelopment when institutionalization and organization do not keep pace with rates of mobilization and participation.⁵ Institutionalization and organization have been limited both within African states and in the African state system. The most obvious implication of such political underdevelopment within African states is that governments are unstable, or at least insecure, in a large number of countries. The legitimacy of regimes is often denied by elements of the elite and sometimes by larger segments of the population. Since the capabilities of regimes are limited, governments usually cannot completely control the dissident elements by force. The result is that governments in many states have been overthrown more than once and that governments in most states are under the more or less constant threat of a coup. Moreover, a few states — Ethiopia, Burundi, Chad and Sudan — have faced large-scale civil upheavals in the 1970s.

The internal insecurity of African regimes is responsible for the few known instances of subversion in the 1970s and for the much more frequent unsubstantiated charges of subversion. The insecurity of one regime encourages governments of other states which oppose that regime to believe that they might be able to overthrow it by aiding the internal opposition and exiles. Thus, the insecurity of North African regimes actually assisted President Qaddafi in providing him with opportunities to advance the "Arab social revolution" through subversion. The insecurity of the Amin regime in the postcoup period evidently encouraged President Nyerere to believe that he might restore his friend and ideological ally Milton Obote to power, by helping expeditions of Obote's supporters to arm themselves and cross into Uganda.⁶

⁴ Uganda probably had only one other base to which the MiGs could have been sent, but if this is so, it only proves the point that planning was not well developed.

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, April 1965, pp. 386-430.

⁶ The evidence is clear that in September 1972 a force of Ugandan exiles, possibly supported by Tanzanian troops, crossed into Uganda in a drive toward the capital.

A certain amount of hypersensitivity to external threats is the inevitable result of the insecurity of African regimes, and this has often led to charges of subversion even where the actual threat was minimal or nonexistent. President Touré probably went too far in accusing Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny of trying to overthrow his government in 1973 — calling them “traitors,” “puppets” and allies of “Portuguese fascism.”⁷ But, his sensitivity to the presence of Guinean exiles in Senegal and Ivory Coast, many of whom were former members of the governing elite, is understandable. Rwanda had little power to intervene in the 1972-1973 tribal upheaval in Burundi, but the Burundi government, sensitive to Rwanda’s ethnic sympathy for the Hutu victims of the slaughter and to the presence of Hutu refugees in Rwanda, accused that country of subversion and of supporting an invasion by Hutu rebels.⁸

Angry exchanges also result when civil upheavals spill over into neighboring countries. Tanzania’s relations with Burundi deteriorated when Burundi troops repeatedly pursued fleeing refugees into Tanzania.⁹ Sudan’s friendly relations with Ethiopia throughout the early 1970s were disturbed in early 1976 by Ethiopian intrusion of Sudan airspace in pursuit of Eritrean guerrillas.¹⁰ Exacerbated by the ease with which dissident elements could cross their mutual border, the conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan assumed a tone of increasing ideological bitterness, culminating in Numeiry’s charges of Ethiopian complicity in the July 1976 coup attempt.

An insecure government is often fearful of the example a neighboring government may set for segments of its own population. During the seventies, the governments of Tanzania and Kenya have not accused each other of subversion, but the deterioration in their relations has been so serious that their economic ties in the East African Community have collapsed and their border has been closed.¹¹ A major cause of this deterioration is each government’s

(*Africa Research Bulletin*, September 1972, pp. 2597-2601.) On the morning of September 15, an East African Airways DC-9, which had disappeared from Dar es Salaam, was found abandoned at Kilimanjaro airport, Tanzania. Subsequent speculation suggested that the plane had been diverted in an abortive attempt to land an armed group of exiles at Entebbe airport. (*East African Standard*, November 28, 1972.)

⁷ *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 1973, pp. 2982-2983.

⁸ *Ibid.*, May 1973, pp. 2845, 2859-2860.

⁹ Tanzania was angered by Burundi bombings in the Kigoma area in March 1973. (*Ibid.*, March 1973, pp. 2783-2784.) In July, Tanzanian dockworkers refused to handle Burundi exports because of alleged killings of Tanzanians along the border. (*Africa Research Bulletin* [Economic, Financial and Technical Series], 1973, p. 2774.) In the same month, Tanzanian troops pursued a Burundi force that had crossed the border near Kigoma. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, July 1973, p. 2915.)

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, February 1976, p. 3954.

¹¹ Relations had taken a sharp downward turn in December 1974 when Tanzania,

fear that the other country's development strategy will be more attractive to its people than its own development strategy. The Kenyan government is tolerant both of private investment, including Western corporate investment, and of private wealth. It fears the attraction of Tanzania's "socialist self-reliance" to members of its own intellectual elite and for its secondary and university-level students. On the other hand, the Tanzanian government fears the attraction of Kenya's prosperity for its skilled workers and urban middle classes. Therefore, each government is wary of the other, and cooperation is extremely difficult to maintain. In relations between other African nations, similar fears are a factor. The North African governments must be wary of Qaddafi because his romantic leftism appeals to the youth of their countries. Touré may fear Ivory Coast as much for its prosperity as for its alleged attempts to overthrow him.

Insecurity has no doubt tempted some African regimes to initiate and to exaggerate conflicts with others, so that they might build up popular support and divert attention from domestic failings. Amin may have begun his dispute with Kenya to provide himself with a convenient external enemy on whom to blame Uganda's economic collapse. On the other hand, there is much suspicion that the Kenyan government exaggerated the seriousness of the dispute in order to restore the legitimacy lost in the aftermath of the March 1975 assassination of J. M. Kariuki, an outspokenly critical member of parliament. Touré may be another leader who distracts attention from domestic problems by using foreign scapegoats.

A related method used by African regimes to enhance their domestic popularity is the expulsion of laborers who come from other African countries. This, of course, almost invariably draws hostile comment — and, sometimes, retaliation in kind — from the aliens' countries of origin. Repeated expulsions among the East African states have hastened the decline of the East African Community. Relations between Ghana and Nigeria were poisoned early in the decade by Ghana's expulsion of Nigerian workers,¹² as were the relations between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea in 1976 over

pleading the need for repairs, closed its northern roads to heavy Kenyan trucks traveling between Mombasa and Zambia. During 1976, there was a press war between the two countries, which saw Kenya denounced in Tanzania for pervasive capitalism while the Kenya papers reviewed the alleged failures of Tanzania's socialism. In the same year, the East African Railways and the East African Harbors corporations broke up, while 1977 saw the collapse of East African Airways.

¹² *Ibid.*, July 1970, pp. 1803-1804.

the mistreatment and expulsion of Nigerian workers in the latter country.¹³

The insecurity of African regimes also corresponds with a low level of institutionalization in leadership selection throughout the continent. This has obviously been the case in those countries which have had military coups, but even in countries which have had only a single regime since independence — e.g., Kenya, Tanzania and Tunisia — it is by no means clear just how the successor regimes will be chosen. In these countries, chance is likely to play a far greater role than it does in more politically developed states.

Where selection processes are not well established, leaders can and do come to power who have done little or nothing to prove their merit, but who just happen to have the strongest force in the right place at the right time. The problem this creates in international politics is not that regimes which come to power by irregular processes *necessarily* behave capriciously in foreign affairs. (Indeed, most African military regimes, perhaps recognizing their inexperience, have behaved with considerable caution.) Rather, the problem is that the high degree of chance in leadership selection allows unpredictable, even emotionally disturbed, leaders to come to power with greater frequency than in international subsystems composed of politically developed states.

Even one or two such leaders in a subsystem can cause considerable disruption, as Presidents Amin and Qaddafi have amply shown. These two leaders by themselves have been responsible for a very large proportion of the continent's conflict in the 1970s. Each has repeatedly undertaken extreme and divisive actions with little apparent regard for the consequences. Amin's erratic and often violent actions within Uganda, together with various bizarre foreign policy acts — including his grandiose territorial claims against Kenya, his apparent complicity in the Entebbe hijacking and his threat to destroy Kigali, Rwanda "in less than a minute" ¹⁴ — suggest irrationality rooted in mental illness or, at least, an unreasoning and dangerous overestimation of Uganda's capabilities. Qaddafi's repeated challenges to Egypt, so many times more powerful than Libya, suggest a similar overestimation, and the mercurial character of his relations with both Sadat and Bourguiba must raise questions.

¹³ *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic, Financial and Technical Series), 1976, p. 3776.

¹⁴ Amin accused Rwanda of spying for "the imperialists," particularly Israel. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, August 1972, p. 2562.) Again, in 1973, Amin threatened to bomb Rwanda, charging it with supporting the Hutu uprising in Burundi, in collusion with Israel. (*Ibid.*, May 1973, p. 2860.)

In West Africa, Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea is a leader whose domestic and foreign policies indicate derangement. Fortunately, he has very little military power at his disposal. Perhaps it is fortunate, too, that "Emperor" Bokassa of the newly created Central African Empire does not command powerful armed forces. These men may, of course, disappear from the scene as suddenly as they arrived. But the strong element of chance in African leadership selection augurs for the emergence of other unstable leaders.

The African Subsystem

The second set of factors which helps to explain the persistence of international conflict in Africa today lies in the low level of organization and the very limited institutionalization of the African subsystem. The subsystem is underdeveloped in three ways:

First, it is not yet fully a system of states. Instead, several colonial remnants remain within the system, including territories still under colonial rule and territories left in a chaotic condition by the departing colonial powers.

Second, several international boundaries remain in dispute, despite the 1964 OAU resolution calling upon all member states to accept the borders existing at independence.¹⁵

Third, the subsystem lacks certain structural features which are generally conducive to orderly relations between states. Integrative international organizations have declined in recent years, limiting the potential for growing interdependence. Alternatively, the arrangement of African states in regional balances of power or in regional hierarchies would end much of the bickering and attempted subversion which takes place today; but such structural arrangements are very poorly developed. (Under such arrangements, however, if conflict were to occur, it would more likely take a military form.)

The colonial remnants in Africa in the 1970s included the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea; the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (Djibouti); and Spanish Sahara. Colonial rule over these territories has now been terminated, although unsettled situations in Angola, Djibouti and the former Spanish Sahara continue to disturb African international politics. Rhodesia and South Africa may also be considered colonial remnants, not viable over the long term in their present form.

Some such remnants, because they are small or weak, have not been clearly destined for independent statehood. During the decolonization process, these remnants have caused conflict

¹⁵ Resolution 16(1), First Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Cairo, July 1964.

over the division of the spoils. The current conflict between Algeria and Morocco may be seen as a contest over the disposition of a particularly valuable piece of territory — the Spanish Sahara. Similarly, the announcement by France of its intention to grant independence to the Territory of the Afars and Issas led to heightened tension between Somalia and Ethiopia. In the past the port of Djibouti has provided Ethiopia with its principal access to the sea. Somalia has an ethnic claim to Djibouti and would find control over the territory useful in its struggle with Ethiopia over that vast area of Ethiopian territory inhabited by Somali tribesmen.¹⁶

Where the annexation of a colonial remnant has not been at issue — because the size of the territory and its potential power have clearly destined it for independence — African states have still come into conflict, both over the likely ideological character of the new independent government and over their zeal to contribute to the cause of liberation. The two factors are related because governments which find compatible liberation movements in the vanguard are likely to support them and to criticize those who are slow to do so. On the other hand, governments which find that an ideologically hostile regime is likely to come to power will suspect the motives of the liberation zealots, particularly if the territory is nearby and a potential threat. Thus, the fairly moderate regimes in Zaire and Zambia were reluctant to support the MPLA in Angola and drew much hostile African criticism for their reluctance.

In regard to South Africa, where liberation does not appear to be an immediate prospect, African conflict at present centers on the zeal with which the economic and political isolation of South Africa is pursued. The few supporters of “dialogue” with South Africa¹⁷ maintain that African states can persuade South Africa to accept a policy of internal reform. They also seem to be anticipating the economic benefits which can flow from cooperation with that industrial country. These states, too, have come under much criticism from the more militant supporters of liberation.

¹⁶ The Territory became independent on June 27, 1977. When French withdrawal was first announced, it was thought that the base at Djibouti would be retained. (*East African Standard*, January 2, 1976.) The future of France's military role in Djibouti, however, now seems uncertain.

¹⁷ The 1971 OAU summit rejected dialogue by a vote of 28-6. Those in favor of dialogue were Ivory Coast, Gabon, Lesotho, Malagasy, Malawi and Mauritius. Upper Volta, Dahomey and Togo abstained. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 1971, pp. 2026-2027.) Malagasy withdrew its support for dialogue in 1972. (*Ibid.*, June 1972, p. 2501.) Direct South African contacts with Liberia, Central African Empire, Ivory Coast and Senegal have been reported; but Senegal and Liberia have abandoned dialogue, at least formally, for the present. (*Ibid.*, October 1975, p. 3783, and January 1976, p. 3888.)

Of course, apart from the few "front-line" states, none of the more militant countries is sacrificing very much or risking very much in the liberation struggle. But it is the fashion today to advocate confrontation in southern Africa — and to follow this fashion can help a regime build its popularity at home.

The African state system is also disorganized because several international boundaries remain unsettled. In more developed states, and in more developed state systems, the limits of national authority are usually precisely defined and accepted by long practice; but in Africa, this is often not the case. Some boundary problems are in part an inheritance from the colonial powers, which left Africa with many undefined borders and conflicting boundary agreements. Two countries — Morocco and the Somali Republic — reject all colonial boundaries and are pursuing irredentist claims on precolonial grounds.

Those boundary disputes which have been most troublesome in the 1970s are those involving territories that are economically important because of mineral wealth or other assets. On a continent of less developed countries anxious to secure their economic future, this is only to be expected. Libya has annexed a part of northern Chad, using a colonial treaty as its justification,¹⁸ but its action is probably best explained by the presence of uranium ore and other unexploited minerals in the region. Nigeria and Cameroon have repeatedly disagreed over the ill-defined border in the Cross River estuary and seaward because of fisheries and, more important, oil deposits in the area.¹⁹ In early 1977, tensions arose between Tunisia and Libya as Libya pressed ahead with oil exploration on the continental shelf.²⁰ The police of Nigeria and Chad have recently clashed over fishing rights in Lake Chad,²¹ while Mali and Upper Volta have been involved in a dispute over territory which may be rich in minerals and which has known value as well-watered grazing land.²²

¹⁸ Libyan forces have apparently moved about 200 kilometers into Chad and established a base at Aouzou. According to reports, President Tombalbaye gave up efforts to control this region in exchange for Libya's withdrawal of support for the FROLINAT revolutionary movement. (*Ibid.*, April 1975, p. 3595). The new Chad military government has complained of the Libyan occupation but, so far as is known, to no avail. (*Ibid.*, September 1975, p. 3759.) Libya claims the border drawn in the 1935 Mussolini-Laval Treaty, although that treaty was never ratified or applied. Chad accepts the 1899 Franco-British line, which was in force at the end of the colonial period. (*Ibid.*, September 1975, p. 3759; and October 1975, p. 3784.)

¹⁹ *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic, Financial and Technical Series), 1975, p. 3221.

²⁰ *Africa Research Bulletin*, March 1977, p. 4351.

²¹ *Ibid.*, May 1976, p. 4018.

²² *Ibid.*, December 1974, pp. 3452-3454. There is some doubt, however, about the

Irredentist claims seem to have their economic aspect, as well. The annexation of most of Spanish Sahara restores the king of Morocco to his traditional authority in the area, it is true, but it also brings his country valuable phosphate deposits. The renewal of Somalia's drive against Ethiopian territory may be, partly, the result of persistent rumors of oil deposits in the border region.

If several states have tried to use boundary disputes to make their economic futures more secure, there have been few such disputes on other grounds. Tribal and ethnic unification sentiments, once thought to be a potential source of much international conflict, have been a serious problem only in the Horn, where they remain the fundamental cause of Somali irredentism. There has been some recent agitation among the Ewe (of Ghana) for unification with Togo,²³ but this has not led to a revival of the rather bitter Ghana-Togo dispute of the 1960s. President Amin lent an ethnic note to his claims against Kenya and Sudan, arguing that the people of the disputed areas were rightfully "Ugandans,"²⁴ but his claim struck no responsive chord among the people concerned. Since most African countries are ethnically fragmented, there has been no real basis for international ethnic irredentism. The state itself, rather than the state system, has been the arena of ethnic group conflict.

During the 1970s, claims to extended borders on security grounds have also been rare in Africa. Since so few African states face the threat of conventional ground attack, there has been little need for them to seek defensible frontiers. Amin has threatened to extend Uganda's border with Tanzania some distance south to the Kagera River because the river could be more easily defended against a Tanzanian invasion. South Africa's military build-up along the northern frontier of Namibia may also be seen as an attempt to establish a new de facto border on security grounds, but this case provides the only other example of such an effort.

Integrative institutions in Africa, as already noted, have declined in the seventies. Instead of limiting conflict, they have been the victims of conflict. The East African Community, once thought of as the integrative model other states should follow, has been the most outstanding of these victims. The African organization of francophone states (OCAM) has suffered defections in the 1970s which have weakened it considerably and have reduced its numbers

actual mineral wealth of the area. This doubt may have been a factor in the reconciliation between these two countries. (*Ibid.*, June 1975, p. 3650.)

²³ *Ibid.*, February 1975, p. 3525.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, February 1976, p. 3920.

from fifteen to ten. The Organization of Senegal River States (OERS) broke up in 1971 as a result of the Guinea-Senegal dispute, to be replaced by a less ambitious organization without Guinean participation. The bright spot in this picture may be the formation of the Economic Community of West African States in 1975, but ECOWAS is in its infancy and cannot yet be evaluated.

Even in the absence of integrative institutions, other structural arrangements could still prevent much of the conflict that currently takes place. Regional balances and international hierarchies provide order by holding out the threat of disciplinary action against aggressive and disruptive states. An African collective-security system could have the same effect. Working well, such structural features would have allowed the African states to restrain the activities of Amin and Qaddafi; they would have provided many governments with an increased sense of security; and they would have rendered pointless any territorial claim that could not be settled by minor territorial adjustments.

The African subsystem, however, is no more underdeveloped than other subsystems, or than the global system, with respect to effective collective security. Nowhere have states consistently been able to unite against aggressor nations, and the states which founded the OAU were only being realistic when they chose not to include a collective-security system in their charter. The OAU Secretariat has been active in mediating several disputes in the 1970s, including the Tanzania-Uganda, Kenya-Uganda and Mali-Upper Volta conflicts. On occasion, it has been successful, but only because the conflict participants, quickly exhausted by their limited capabilities, have found mediation convenient. Agreements reached under such conditions may not outlast the recovery of the participants.

A balance of power, or approximate equilibrium, among the states in a region can reduce the level of conflict if governments are persuaded that overt aggression or subversion is likely to meet with unacceptably severe retaliation. Governments must be convinced that their potential opponents are strong and that they have the will to retaliate. Even if a "balance" of power fails to dissuade an aggressor, it can still limit conflict by enabling the victims of aggression to put up an effective defense on their own territory and to launch a counterattack, opening the way to a negotiated settlement. A single threatened state can attempt to maintain an approximate balance with its potential enemies on its own or, at less expense, by aggregating its power with that of its allies.

Regional balances of power are possible in Africa — certainly far more possible than an African collective-security system. One government alone can try to achieve an equilibrium with another, and only two governments are needed for an alliance. However, the decision on the part of one or more governments to establish an equilibrium need not lead to immediate stability in a troubled region. An emerging balance is likely to be challenged by those states whose initial provocations caused others to bring about the balance. An established balance may also be challenged: perceived weakness in one of the parties, or even the passage of time, can raise doubts about the continued validity of the equilibrium. Since, ultimately, a balance must depend on military power, such challenges can lead to armed conflict.

In Africa, regional balances have successfully limited conflict on two occasions. The approximate military equality of Algeria and Morocco led to a stalemate in the fighting along their border in 1963-1964 and persuaded them to enter into a period of cooperation. Ethiopian military power, applied in several armed reprisals against the Somali Republic, enabled Ethiopia to defeat the Somali guerrillas in the mid-1960s and to protect Kenya, which had entered into an alliance with Ethiopia against the same threat.

But in the 1970s, we are witnessing the breakdown of existing regional balances and the emergence of serious new imbalances. With the political instability in Addis Ababa and the worsening of the Eritrean civil war, the balance in the Horn has been thrown into doubt — doubt which helps to explain the renewal of fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia. Kenya must be concerned for its own security, for it can no longer rely on the unstable, radical socialist regime in Ethiopia to assist it in the event of attack. In the Maghreb, King Hassan has been able, at least for the time being, to circumvent Algeria's military strength by discovering the means — a peaceful civilian march in apparent collusion with Spain — of presenting Algeria with a *fait accompli*.

In the 1970s, East Africa saw the emergence of an imbalance between Uganda and Kenya. Kenya, already at a considerable disadvantage with respect to Somalia, failed to ally with Tanzania against Amin, thus allowing Uganda to achieve superiority in men, aircraft and mechanized equipment — a fact which no doubt encouraged Amin in his excesses. Amin, however, probably did not have the capability to occupy a large part of Kenya because, as we have seen, his forces were not very reliable. Moreover, Kenya was protected in some measure by a defense agreement with Great

Britain²⁵ and because it could block Uganda's access to the sea. If Uganda could not have obtained petroleum products through Mombasa, it would have been hard put to sustain an invasion. Nonetheless, the capabilities of its MiG aircraft, together with reports of Ugandan helicopter landings in western Kenya during early 1976, created an atmosphere of insecurity throughout Kenya. In a country so dependent on tourism this was a serious matter.

In southern Africa, there is an imbalance which could prove especially disruptive. Black African states in the region have committed themselves to the liberation of South Africa, by violence if necessary, and they are apparently willing to support the guerrillas who will fight in this cause. But they remain utterly unprepared to confront the military might of South Africa should that country decide to retaliate in the face of an intensifying guerrilla campaign. South Africa might well be tempted by the apparent ease of retaliation.

There are several reasons for the weakness of regional balances in Africa. First of all, prevailing international morality places great value on the doctrines of African solidarity, sovereignty and nonintervention. Although these doctrines are violated by the disruptive states themselves, any government taking action against a disruptor runs the risk of widespread African criticism. This African international morality contributes to the difficulties of Algeria — long a champion of African ideals — in finding a way to deal with Morocco's sudden and alarming territorial growth, and it restrains Kenya from a full-scale blockade of Uganda in order to precipitate the downfall of Amin.

Another factor limiting the growth of regional balances in Africa is the sheer expense that can be involved. For Kenya to arm itself sufficiently to fend off both Uganda and Somalia would require heavy expenditures over several years. Expenses faced by states trying to arm themselves against South Africa would be even greater. Moreover, rivalries among African states make it difficult for them to defray these expenses through alliances. Kenya and Tanzania, for example, probably have not allied against Amin because of their ideological rivalry. Kenya must be particularly wary since joint action could be of tremendous benefit to Tanzania if it led to the restoration of Obote.

The failure to achieve regional balances of power within Africa produces a tendency to rely on external powers to perform

²⁵ *The Military Balance, 1975-1976* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 41.

the balancing function. Kenya seems to be relying increasingly on the United States, which on several recent occasions has sent ships and planes to Kenya in order to display support against Amin. It is likely, too, that Kenyan officials were not greatly saddened when Israel destroyed the Ugandan MiGs during the Entebbe raid, whatever the exact nature of Kenya's involvement in the rescue. In southern Africa, there may be some expectation that Cuba, the Soviet Union and, in Zambia's case, Britain, could be relied upon to deter South Africa in a crisis.

While external allies may indeed provide useful short-term protection in an emergency, they do not offer a long-term solution to the problem of African imbalances. The interests of external powers in some African countries are strong,²⁶ but not so strong as to make them wholly dependable allies. There will always be some doubt as to how much an external power will risk for the defense of a local ally. Somalia learned this lesson recently when the Soviet Union shifted its support to Ethiopia. Britain is surely a weak reed for any African state to rely on today, and it is doubtful that the internal politics of the United States in the post-Vietnam era will permit more than symbolic support for any African government under threat of attack. External alliances are also undesirable because they themselves can be a source of conflict. Even to be suspected of an alliance with some external powers can increase tensions with African states fearful or distrustful of those powers. Kenya, for example, will get along better with its neighbors if it acquires the ability to defend itself, blunting the criticisms of those who see it, however unjustifiably, as the agent of the United States, Britain or Israel.

Another structural change that can establish order in a subsystem is the formation of regional international hierarchies, each centered around a local great power. Established great powers tend to prefer order to disorder: in an environment of order, their political position is not being challenged; nor is their economic position being threatened by disruptions of regional markets and sources of supply. Thus, a regional great power can be expected to use its power to restrain challenges to its own authority and to limit conflict among other states within its region. As is the case with an emerging balance, the period during which a regional great power

²⁶ Countries rich in minerals, such as Zambia, Zaire and Nigeria, have some bargaining power with respect to the great powers. So do those along the littoral of the Indian Ocean, through which flows most of Western Europe's petroleum. But, no African state seems to be in a position to extract a wholly reliable security guarantee from any great power at this time.

is establishing its authority may be one of conflict, since other states in the region are likely to resist the new order. Once established, a regional hierarchy may still be challenged on occasion, particularly when domestic or international changes call into question the continued superiority of the dominant power.

Because they are so much stronger than their neighbors, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa seem to be candidates for the role of order-maintaining regional great powers. Yet, only Egypt, in its recent military action against Libya, has begun to show signs of assuming such a role. Before taking that action, Egypt was oddly restrained toward Qaddafi, perhaps because of the pressures of the prevailing international morality or because of the distractions of the Arab-Israeli confrontation or internal economic and political problems.

Nigeria has, in the recent past, signed agreements to supply oil to several West African states,²⁷ and it was largely responsible for the founding of ECOWAS — an organization that will be of great benefit to Nigeria should that country bring its full productive potential to fruition. Nigeria has also proposed that the ECOWAS states enter into a nonaggression pact.²⁸ These are signs, at least, that Nigerian regional interests are growing. But, for now, ECOWAS is far more vision than reality, and there is no sign that Nigeria is prepared to play a significant role in any regional crisis, such as might occur between Guinea and Ivory Coast or between Togo and the People's Republic of Benin. Nigeria's primary energies will be directed inward, to solve its great development problems, which include continuing ethnic and regional tensions, corruption and the dislocations caused by the rapid increase in oil revenues.

The South African government is clearly aware of the benefits of regional order, as shown by the pressure it has placed on Rhodesia to come to terms with demands for majority rule. But South Africa cannot begin to play the role of a responsible regional great power until there is major political change from within. If South Africa fails at domestic political change, regional opposition will simply be too great to allow it to organize regional international politics.

The Future of African International Conflict

Since the causes of international conflict in Africa are so deeply rooted in the underdevelopment of the continent, the

²⁷ *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic, Financial and Technical Series), 1975, pp. 3609-3610; *ibid.*, 1976, pp. 3769-3770.

²⁸ *Sunday Times* (Nigeria), November 7, 1976.

outlook for the future of African international politics is gloomy. There is every reason to believe that angry verbal exchanges will persist — indeed, that they will increase in number. In some regions, outbreaks of military violence must be anticipated.

The capabilities of most African states can be expected to remain quite limited in view of the economic constraints under which their governments must operate. However, some African states, including Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Ethiopia and the Somali Republic, already possess substantial military establishments, and other African states can build up their armed forces quickly with the aid of allies outside the African continent. Somalia did so with Soviet help in the 1960s, as did Uganda in the 1970s. Once established, large armed forces are not likely to grow smaller. Since coups are an ever-present possibility, it is extremely dangerous for any government to attempt to weaken the military. Thus, a gradual increase in the number of rather large military establishments can be expected. As a result, when domestic instability, boundary disputes or other factors lead to conflict, there will be a greater probability that this conflict will take a military form.

The insecurity of African regimes, and the resulting hypersensitivity to outside threats, shows no sign of abating. True, the “staying power”²⁹ of some African governments — such as those headed by Numeiry, Kenyatta, Kaunda, Nyerere and Touré — has been impressive, but endurance is not a sign of security. The means of holding onto power in Africa have always included a strong measure of vigilance, and vigilance will be reflected internationally in continuing suspicion.

Over the longer term, insecurity will probably be reinforced by increasing popular disaffection and restiveness. The population of Africa is doubling every twenty-five years,³⁰ and in some countries the growth rate is even greater. The detrimental effect of such a tremendous increase in population on Africa’s cities, health care and employment will be extreme, and popular unrest in many countries must be expected. Administrative weakness and inefficiency, endemic in so many African governments, will only aggravate the situation. Few indeed are those that have shown the capacity to plan for orderly economic development, to establish basic industries, to control imports, or to create self-sufficient agri-

²⁹ Victor T. LeVine, “Problems of Political Succession in Independent Africa,” in Ali A. Mazrui and Hasu H. Patel, eds., *Africa in World Affairs: The Next Thirty Years* (New York: Third Press, 1973), p. 90.

³⁰ Based on an annual rate of increase of 2.8 per cent for the period 1970-1973. (*Demographic Yearbook*, 1973 [New York: United Nations, 1974], p. 81.)

cultural systems capable of meeting the needs of an expanding population. We can expect the continuing tribal rivalries within African countries to intensify the struggle for access to scarce resources in the years ahead.

The problem of colonial remnants will eventually fade from African politics, but even this is still some distance into the future. The reverberations of the Spanish withdrawal in the Maghreb are far from over, and the full impact of Djibouti's independence has probably not been felt. In Rhodesia, the rivalries that have arisen during the liberation struggle mean that any government in an independent Zimbabwe is likely to be insecure from the start. Thus, events in Zimbabwe will continue to disturb regional politics for a very long time, as will events in Angola. In any case, the solution to the South African problem is years in the future. If the violence in South Africa continues, the African controversy over "dialogue" will dissipate as advocacy of compromise becomes impossible. An increasingly violent situation in South Africa will only enhance international concern over the nature of the successor regime, raising the danger of South African retaliation against African supporters of the guerrillas.

It is also possible that other political entities left by the colonial powers will become a source of conflict. Gambia, a tiny country, holds a river with great potential for the development of Senegal. Even the president of Gambia acknowledges that the eventual union of his country with Senegal is "inevitable and necessary,"³¹ but if Gambia delays too long, it may find Senegal resorting to force. Equatorial Guinea is another microstate of dubious viability. It might one day be absorbed by Nigeria, particularly if large oil deposits are found in its vicinity.

Since the scarcity of resources in Africa will continue, boundary conflicts will persist. Wherever valuable resources lie along international boundaries, the potential for conflict will be there. Any of the resource-related conflicts noted above may suddenly intensify, and new conflicts may emerge. Zambia, for example, may not accept indefinitely what has been called the "curious southward extension" of Zaire into its territory — an extension which includes some of the most valuable mineral deposits in all Africa.

Africa's two irredentist struggles, moreover, are by no means resolved. Morocco's initial success in Spanish Sahara may

³¹ *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 1973, p. 2852.

encourage its government to revive the country's claim to Mauritania. This claim was only renounced in 1970, when the two countries reached a reconciliation through the mediation of President Boumediène. Across the continent, Somalia's claims in Kenya and Ethiopia remain active despite its defeat in the Ogaden.

Imbalances of power will be a source of conflict in the future, and where attempts are made to create or restore balances, the conflict characteristic of an emerging balance may be expected. At times, this conflict will be violent. Algeria cannot afford to remain indifferent to the danger that an expanding Morocco poses, so Algerian action to redress the local balance must be anticipated. Indeed, it has already begun in the form of Algerian assistance to the Sahourien independence movement. Support for the POLISARIO guerrillas can easily escalate into armed confrontation. Alternatively, Algeria might decide, after a period of frustration with guerrilla efforts, to launch an armed attack despite the international criticism that would result.

New imbalances may be created in Africa as individual leaders, in the manner of Amin, decide to embark on arms-acquisition programs. States which find themselves the victims of imbalances might try to limit conflict by concentrating on the purchase of defensive arms, such as antitank and antiaircraft weapons. If Kenya were to follow such a policy, for example, it could acquire the capacity to deal with an armored attack from Somalia or Uganda without acquiring an offensive capacity to attack these countries. Regional tensions would at least not be worsened by this kind of arms-acquisition program.³² Kenya and the United States have shown some sensitivity to this problem by emphasizing that the dozen F-5 jets recently ordered by Kenya are short-range tactical aircraft, useful primarily as firing platforms against attacking forces. But that arms purchasers and suppliers would generally show such wisdom is more than can be expected.

In most of Africa, regional hierarchies will not be a significant factor for some time to come. Only in North Africa, where Egypt now seems to have established its authority over Libya, is there a dominant power apparently willing and able to impose order in its area. The rest of Africa will avoid the conflict that surrounds an emergence of great powers, but it will suffer the disorder that issues from the lack of such an established hierarchy.

African international conflict will persist in the foresee-

³² On this point, see my "East Africa and the Indian Ocean — A Zone of Peace?," *African Affairs*, July 1977.

able future, whether in the form of verbal exchanges or as armed struggles. Conflict will hinder regional cooperation, distract the attention of elites from essential development tasks, and waste resources. It will mean that African unity must remain an elusive goal. Conflict is the unavoidable consequence of the underdevelopment of the African states and of the African state system.

ORBIS, A Journal of World Affairs

Published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
in association with
The International Relations Graduate Group
University of Pennsylvania

Editor:	William R. Kintner
Managing Editor:	Richard E. Bissell
Assistant Managing Editor:	Charles B. Purrenhage
Assistant Editors:	Margaret M. Capotrio, Alan H. Luxenberg
Circulation Manager:	Alan H. Luxenberg
Advertising Manager:	Charles B. Purrenhage

Editor Emeritus:	Robert Strausz-Hupé
-------------------------	---------------------

EDITORIAL BOARD:	Adda B. Bozeman, Inis L. Claude, Jr., Alvin J. Cottrell, James E. Dornan, Jr., Frederick W. Frey, William E. Griffith, Don D. Humphrey, J. C. Hurewitz, David C. Jordan, Morton A. Kaplan, Roy U. T. Kim, Lawrence B. Krause, Thomas Naff, Covey T. Oliver, Norman D. Palmer, Stefan T. Possony, Uri Ra'anan, Franklin R. Root, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Robert A. Scalapino, Paul Seabury, W. Scott Thompson, Frank N. Trager, William R. Van Cleave, Richard L. Walker, Arthur P. Whitaker, J. K. Zawodny.
------------------	--

EDITORIAL INTERNS:	Margaret Cain, Adam M. Garfinkle, Joanne S. Gowa, Richard Harris, Nimrod Novik, Kevin O'Keefe, William Perry, Karen Pesavento, Scott M. Pinkus, L. Joseph Woods, Stephan B. Yost.
--------------------	---

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the University of Pennsylvania, or the Editors of ORBIS.

Copyright © 1978 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Delaware nonprofit corporation. Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden.

ORBIS is published four times a year by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. **Editorial and business offices:** 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. **Subscription rates**, per year: \$12.00 for individuals, \$20.00 for institutions. (Plus \$2.00 per year, overseas.) Single copy, \$5.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editor. Address correspondence relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP).

ISSN 0030-4387

reader feedback

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Number Mysticism: Correction

TO THE EDITOR:

Regretfully, I must call to your attention an error which I made in footnote 7 of my article "Number Mysticism, Rationality and the Strategic Balance" (Fall 1977 ORBIS). The sentence "Thus, a 10-kiloton weapon (.01 megatons) would have .1 equivalent megatons, and a 4-megaton weapon would have 2 equivalent megatons" should be changed to read as follows: "Thus, a 1-kiloton weapon (.001 megatons) would have .01 equivalent megatons, and a 4-megaton weapon would have 2 equivalent megatons."

My thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Horning, USAF, for bringing this error to my attention.

THOMAS A. BROWN
Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE SCHOLAR-DIPLOMAT SEMINARS

The Scholar-Diplomat Seminar Program will begin its ninth year this fall. University faculty members spend a week in the State Department observing the foreign policy process at first-hand and discussing current policy issues. The Seminars bring together scholars, particularly younger Ph.D's and Government officers involved in making and executing foreign policy. More than 1400 scholars have participated in the program since its inception in 1969. One indication of the program's effectiveness is the fact that most new applications are received from scholars who have heard about the program from previous attendees.

To facilitate informal give-and-take discussion, the seminars are kept small (20 is the usual maximum). A key element of the program is the assigning of each scholar to a host officer whose interest most nearly matches that of the scholar. During the week the scholar views the host officer's work, discusses policy papers and contributes knowledge and ideas. Participating scholars receive a security clearance prior to the Seminar and are therefore able to read classified materials and discuss fully their host's work.

As part of the Seminar several workshops are scheduled "for scholars only" during which candid, unbiased observations are drawn together by participants for a paper that is usually presented to the host bureau's Assistant Secretary and/or country directors. In some cases the paper is also forwarded to the Secretary of State.

In-depth sessions are arranged with the major organizational units of the Department, both geographic and functional. Similar sessions are also arranged with other Government agencies involved in the foreign policy process.

Requests for application forms or for further information concerning the program should be addressed to: Scholar-Diplomat Seminars, National Capital Division, Office of Public Programs, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 5831, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520 (telephone 202-632-3340).

A tentative schedule for academic year 1978-1979 will be available after May 1, 1978.



reviews

SShA: politika, voina, ideologiya [USA: Policy, War, Ideology]. By G. A. Trofimenko. Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Mysl," 1976. 359 pp. R 1.40.

GEORGE GINSBURGS
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY-CAMDEN

Soviet scholarship has made impressive strides during the past two decades in shedding the straitjacket of Stalinism in favor of a less cliché-ridden approach to world affairs. Nowhere is this shift more evident than in the Soviet literature on American foreign policy. In the past, that literature had consisted of little more than suitable quotations from the official canon carefully strung together; today, it enjoys an incomparably improved academic image. Dr. Trofimenko's study rates as an especially noteworthy performance, both for the caliber of his research and the quality of his analysis.

The author, who heads a department in the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences — a prestigious "think tank" in the Soviet government's advisory apparatus—has set out to chart the evolution of American doctrine on military-political strategy from the inception of the Republic to the present. He starts off by examining the Founding Fathers' views and their impact on the emergence of America's vision of (a) the international system, (b) the national role in global affairs, (c) a diplomatic agenda in pursuit of certain vested interests, and (d) the role of armed force in the achievement of these ends. The resulting American "philosophy" — a practical mix of bourgeois economic desiderata and geopolitical prescriptions — is then studied in its subsequent reincarnations: enlightened selfishness, Manifest Destiny and balance-of-power diplomacy. The bulk of the book is addressed to questions of nuclear strategy and the successive theories developed in the post-war situation in order to promote America's "quest for global hegemony": viz., containment, massive retaliation and flexible response.

The nub of Dr. Trofimenko's thesis is that a central strand runs through the entire fabric of U.S. strategic planning, which is woven

from America's economic and geopolitical experience. The historical record, according to the author, demonstrates an undeviating commitment to political and economic expansionism, a belief in the inherent superiority of the United States and, hence, a sense of messianic fervor in dealing with other peoples and an excessive reliance on military power in the conduct of foreign relations. However, the author is quick to add, Washington's traditional willingness to use armed force in furthering its ambitions abroad has always been tempered by a keen awareness of the expense involved: its choices were consistently motivated by sober calculations of whether the advantages to be gained through war warranted the price tag attached.

In short, the ruling elite's approach to war was coldly business-like and so retained an aura of rationality: power was not sought for its own sake, but for what its proper application could profitably purchase. The only time this went haywire, in Dr. Trofimenko's view, was after World War II when the Washington establishment fell victim to illusions of global dominion and, intoxicated with the vision of a universal Pax Americana, abandoned *ad hoc* cost-accounting and plunged instead into a gamble for the ultimate prize. These delusions of grandeur, we are told, suffered rebuff in a series of confrontations with the "forces of peace" (spearheaded by the USSR), and now American governing circles are slowly beating a retreat, envisaging a game played for limited stakes.

No great purpose would be served in undertaking a substantive critique of this portrayal of the U.S. diplomatic record. Too much depends on one's premises, and few observers of the American scene would concur either in the author's assumption of a "clockwork mechanism" regulating the American political system or in his conclusions about how the U.S. leadership has perceived the world and managed its international life. Suffice it to say that Trofimenko's analysis follows the precepts of Marxism-Leninism without indulging in sectarian stridency and even as it faults the American experiment, it does so in a tone of moderation and restraint appropriate to constructive intellectual debate. By technical standards, the work ranks high: the author has labored diligently. Whereas in the past it was fair to say of Soviet writers on American topics that they swallowed everything and understood nothing, in this case the formula ought to be amended to read that the author has consulted all the relevant materials and understood selectively.

Indeed, if pressed to identify a structural weakness in Trofi-

menko's construct, I would point to his excessive concentration on American goals and aspirations, to the detriment of an adequate appreciation of the international milieu in which U.S. statesmen have been called upon to operate. Instead of a dialectical relationship between the actor and the setting in which he must perform, we end up with a picture of the world as a passive target of American intentions, an arena in which the United States exercises its various options with nearly complete freedom. Apart from being unidimensional, and therefore visually flawed, this tableau runs counter to the far more common interpretation of U.S. foreign policy as being reflexive, rather than innovative, and largely content to handle situations as they arise instead of anticipating contingencies and instituting measures to prevent their occurrence. In this respect, Trofimenko seems to overrate the enemy, and with good reason. Since the United States is seen as the USSR's chief adversary, it must star in that role or the USSR's own stature will be proportionately diminished and the match will have lost all its sense of drama. Moreover, if someone claims to have unraveled a phenomenon, the best way to advertise the value of the inquiry and elevate the rank of the unraveler is to inflate the significance of the object of investigation or the virulence of the specimen under study.

The specific format and contents of Trofimenko's monograph are not the main issue, however. Far more important (for "Soviet-watchers") are the conceptual implications of the author's methodology. In recent U.S. treatment of Soviet behavior, both among scholars and practitioners, a marked tendency has been to focus attention on the short- and medium-range prospects in relation to desired ends and available means. In the immediate postwar period, the opposite attitude prevailed, and the routine features of Soviet diplomatic activity were overlooked because of our fascination with the grand ideological design. Now, the reverse appears to be true, and the official script, in turn, is brushed aside as irrelevant to the daily conduct of diplomatic business. Precisely what occasioned the switch is hard to tell, but several possible explanations recommend themselves.

First, we have here a definite element of "cultural attribution," i.e., bestowing on others one's own presumed virtues, which in this instance amounts to a bid to "Americanize" the Soviets. Americans view themselves as hard-nosed, pragmatic, problem-oriented people, good at diagnosing existing situations, but without much talent for engaging in abstract contemplation, cosmic generalizations or planning for the distant future. The accent is on present

reality and the next stage of its incremental progression. Comfortable with this piecemeal approach, we tend to believe that everyone else must operate as we do. Detente and talk of "convergence" have made Americans more prone to discover similarities between themselves and the competition, and so to classify the Russians not as an alien breed traveling a separate route, but as fellow men sharing many of America's values (despite some divergences in manners, tastes and style). Because we visualize the management of foreign policy within certain limits of duration, tempo and coherence, we assume that the Russians do likewise: the old images of the sprinter versus the miler, the poker player versus the chess player, spring to mind. Fundamental disparities, both in motive and *modus operandi*, may be fatally blurred by our predilection to play the game as if the opposition has tacitly accepted the same set of rules, not bothering to check whether this is indeed the case. Lacking a common frame of reference, the results of encounter may be disastrous.

Yet, if any conclusion is to be drawn from Trofimenko's analytical design, it is that he does not reason as an American scholar would in a comparable situation. He is committed to the proposition that the march of history follows a fixed track and that permanent forces shape the destiny of nations; past, present and future are, to Trofimenko, organically connected segments in a pattern of linear growth. His concept of the world simply makes no sense to a "mainstream" American, accustomed to functioning in a random landscape. Trofimenko is an influential member of the Soviet hierarchy whose book is intended to be and is an input into his country's foreign-policy planning. I am sure that he means his opinions to be taken seriously in that context, even though, *mirabile visu*, the message is couched in systemic terms and zeroes in on long-range objectives — to the dismay of those tuned in to a different wavelength.

Remember, too, that such a mode of thought is indivisible: if Trofimenko portrays America's foreign policy record as a unified whole, he is almost certainly going to view his own country's diplomacy in the same light and, in fact, to map his strategy on how the USSR ought to deal with the United States on an identical grid. When the pitch is that American conduct can be predicted, a logical corollary is that an effective counterplan covering an analogous time-span is both feasible and mandatory, forcing the Soviets to project their own policy alternatives in order to keep pace with how they are convinced their rivals will fare.

Logistical considerations reinforce temperamental preferences.

Current sentiment among American international-relations experts exudes skepticism about the possibility of calculating very far ahead, given *inter alia* the speed of scientific and technical change which, in turn, revamps existing capabilities, dictates new priorities, and thus requires sweeping periodic reappraisals of the established agenda. Again, these intimations of imminent mortality, as it were, do not seem destined to impress the Russian observer of the global scene who, as does Trofimenko, skips the ephemeral ingredients to dwell on the enduring elements. The validity of the respective positions on this question as well as on the previous one cannot be empirically verified, for they are essentially articles of faith that must be accepted (or rejected) at face value. For practical purposes, however, what is important is not whether these theories happen to be "true" or "false" in some objective sense, but whether they affect human conduct through the power of whatever alchemic properties they possess. Clearly, Trofimenko's example attests to the potion's potency, no matter how loud the chorus of dissent from our side of the fence.

An objection of a more prosaic kind still remains. The Russian political elite, it is contended, is essentially career-conscious; i.e., it comprises individuals whose prime concern lies in the advancement of their own earthly interests. The leaders seek dynastic success in order to bolster their authority and enhance their historical status, and, thus, by bidding for temporal victories, they strive to demonstrate the superior wisdom behind their policies. The drive to achieve immediate and tangible results presumably supersedes any aspiration toward the attainment of indistinct or remote goals and reduces all human endeavor to mundane proportions. In an eclectic environment, the argument makes eminent sense, and one would have no quarrel with it as an adequate representation of how the system actually works.

However, in a situation where, by definition, the propriety of every action is supposed to be judged by whether or not it serves to move mankind closer to its ultimate destination, the equation does not fit so neatly. Instead of measuring gains and losses on a purely utilitarian scale, an additional yardstick is said to apply, where a public commitment is professed to be the vindication of an articulated code of transcendental values, thus leaving the door open to fierce debate over the orthodoxy of certain intermediate steps from the standpoint of their effectiveness in contributing to the realization of those absolute principles. Where debate is stifled, as it was, for example, under Stalin, any deed is presumed to be consistent with

liturgy. The Soviet political scene no longer suffers from terminal paralysis, however, and polemical exchanges within inner circles over tactical choices now appear to be rather frequent. On such occasions, invoking the scriptures to justify partisan advocacy of a particular line of conduct or, by the same token, to defend a given stratagem from criticism must be a fairly commonplace occurrence. All of this adds a unique dimension to the Soviet *modus operandi*, making it quite distinct from the *ad hoc* method employed in the United States.

A few concluding remarks are in order. *First*, Trofimenko's position can, on balance, best be described as that of a "hawk": he tends to emphasize American preoccupation with military force, and he anticipates Washington's readiness to resort to arms in the conduct of its foreign affairs unless prevented from doing so through confrontation with an equal (or higher) quantum of Soviet power. To Trofimenko, the international game is, by virtue of the American phenomenon, primarily a power match compelling the USSR to follow suit out of an instinct of sheer self-preservation.

Second, with the sole exception of post-World War II megalomania, America has, in the author's estimate, shown commendable "sanity" in exercising its power options (which, of course, also suggests that the USSR can afford to, and indeed must, respond in similar fashion for everybody's benefit). A rampaging America might do mischief to the entire community with its neuroses; but for the most part, the United States has observed the rules of normalcy, and others, including the USSR, have been able to avoid reciprocal excesses.

Third, when Trofimenko attacks the United States for its post-war bout of "irrationality," he is pointedly condemning only Washington's appetite for "global hegemony" (seen as unrealistic because of assorted systemic defects that cripple U.S. capacities) and its dependence on brute force alone to fulfill that extravagant ambition. A regime not genetically handicapped and with a knack for exploiting a wide range of political, economic, ideological and military advantages might well succeed in a comparable enterprise. The fact, then, that Pax Americana is branded a dangerous lunacy does not at all mean that a bid to engineer a Pax Rossica would, to follow Dr. Trofimenko's reasoning, necessarily be adjudged either impracticable or undesirable. Calling America crazy for seeking to upset the traditional international order is not synonymous with embracing the status quo, for under Soviet auspices, the operation would, *eo ipso*, assume a complexion sufficiently different to render the project both feasible and justifiable.

publications received

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Annual Register: World Events in 1976. Edited by H. V. Hodson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 541 pp. \$37.50.

Approaches to the Study of International Relations: A Select Bibliography. Compiled by Jason E. Mandlowitz, Arpad Abonyi and Pradip Shastri. Ottawa: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1977. 85 pp. \$2.00 (paper).

Beyond War: Selected Readings from the War or Peace 1976 Symposia. Edited by Joseph S. Clark and Marilyn K. Roper. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 1976. 481 pp. n.p.

The Changing United Nations: Options for the United States. Edited by David A. Kay. New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1977. 226 pp. \$6.50 (paper).

The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy. By Mostafa Rejai. New York: McKay (distributor: Longman, New York), 1977. 194 pp. \$3.95 (paper).

Conflict Through Consensus: United Nations Approaches to Aggression. By Julius Stone. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 234 pp. \$14.50.

The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era. By Coral Bell. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 278 pp. \$12.50.

Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials. By P. J. Boyce. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 289 pp. \$19.95.

Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach. By Christopher Clapham. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1977. 184 pp. \$18.00.

The Future Global Challenge: A Predictive Study of World Security, 1977-1990. By Neville Brown. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977. 400 pp. \$19.50.

The Giants: Russia and America. By Richard J. Barnet. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977. 190 pp. \$8.95.

Guerillas and Terrorists. By Richard Clutterbuck. London: Faber & Faber (distributor: Merrimack Book Service, Lawrence, Mass.), 1977. 125 pp. \$8.95.

Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross. By David P. Forsythe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. 298 pp. \$17.95.

Individual Rights and the State in Foreign Affairs: An International Compendium. Edited by Elihu Lauterpacht and John G. Collier. New York: Praeger, 1977. 743 pp. n.p.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources. By Paul W. Blackstock and Frank L. Schaf, Jr. Detroit: Gale Research, 1978. 255 pp. \$18.00.

International Organizations in Their Legal Setting: Documents, Comments and Questions. By Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr. St. Paul: West, 1977. 1,016 pp. \$18.95.

The Marshall Plan, 1947-1951. By Theodore A. Wilson. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, no. 236, 1977. 64 pp. \$1.40 (paper).

Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives. Edited by Daniel Druckman. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977. 416 pp. \$25.00.

Organizing for Peace: A Personal History of the Founding of the United Nations. By Clark M. Eichelberger. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. 317 pp. \$12.50.

The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought. By F. Parkinson. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977. 248 pp. \$14.00 (\$6.95, paper).

Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U. Thant, 1968-1971. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 709 pp. \$37.50.

Race, Conflict and the International Order: From Empire to United Nations. By Hugh Tinker. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 157 pp. \$16.95.

Radical Visions of the Future. Edited by Seweryn Bialer and Sophia Sluzar. Boulder: Westview Press, 1977. 197 pp. \$15.00.

Les relations internationales dans un monde en mutation / International Relations in a Changing World. By the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977. 434 pp. \$41.25.

The Relevance of Liberalism. Edited by the staff of the Research Institute on International Change. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 233 pp. \$15.00.

Repression and Repressive Violence. Edited by Marjo Hoefnagels. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1977. 194 pp. gld 37.50 (paper).

Roll Calls and Sponsorship: A Methodological Analysis of Third World Group Formation in the United Nations. By Frans N. Stokman. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977. 338 pp. \$34.75.

Simulated Worlds: A Computer Model of National Decision-Making. By Stuart A. Bremer. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. 249 pp. \$15.50.

Sources of Contemporary Radicalism. Edited by Seweryn Bialer and Sophia Sluzar. Boulder: Westview Press, 1977. 396 pp. \$15.00.

The Statesman's Year-Book, 1977-1978. Edited by John Paxton. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 1,572 pp. \$22.50.

Strategies and Impact of Contemporary Radicalism. Edited by Seweryn Bialer and Sophia Sluzar. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 356 pp. \$15.00.

Survey of Research on Transnational Corporations. New York: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1977. 531 pp. \$20.00 (paper).

Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations. Edited by Sidney Tarrow, Peter J. Katzenstein and Luigi Graziano. New York: Praeger, 1978. 328 pp. n.p.

Towards a Renovated International System. By Richard N. Cooper, Karl Kaiser and Masataka Kosaka. New York: The Trilateral Commission, Triangle Paper no. 14, 1977. 68 pp. n.p.

Understanding Conflict and War. By R. J. Rummel. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977. 200 pp. \$12.95.

Unofficial Diplomats. Edited by Maureen R. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 268 pp. \$15.00 (\$5.95, paper).

The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System. By Robert L. Rothstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 384 pp. \$16.50.

Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies. Edited by Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978. 256 pp. \$15.00 (\$7.50, paper).

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Appropriate Technologies for Developing Countries. By Richard S. Eckaus. Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1977. 140 pp. \$6.25.

The Development Models of India, the Soviet Union and China. By Theodor Bergmann. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum (distributor: Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.), 1978. 255 pp. \$22.00 (paper).

The "Dollar Drain" and American Forces in Germany. By Gregory F. Treverton. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978. 226 pp. \$12.00.

The Economic War Against the Jews. By Walter Henry Nelson and Terence C. F. Prittie. New York: Random House, 1977. 269 pp. \$10.00.

Economics and Foreign Policy: A Guide to Information Sources. By Mark R. Amstutz. Detroit: Gale Research, 1977. 179 pp. \$18.00.

Equality and Free Enterprise. By V. S. Vartikar. Waynesburg, Pa.: Kitaab Press, 1977. 136 pp. \$6.00.

The Famine Business. By Colin Tudge. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 141 pp. \$8.95.

Food Crises and World Politics. By Dan Caldwell. Beverly Hills: Sage, International Studies series, 1977. 82 pp. \$3.00 (paper).

Food Policy: The Responsibility of the United States in the Life and Death Choices. Edited by Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1977. 344 pp. \$14.95.

Global Fracture: The New International Economic Order. By Michael Hudson. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. 296 pp. \$12.50.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

Income Distribution and Growth in the Less-Developed Countries. Edited by Charles R. Frank, Jr., and Richard C. Webb. Washington: Brookings, 1977. 641 pp. \$9.95 (paper).

Inside Foreign Aid. By Judith Tendler. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 140 pp. \$3.45 (paper).

International Human Rights Kit. Edited by Robert Woito. Chicago: World Without War Council, Midwest, 1977. 192 pp. \$3.00 (paper).

Issues and Prospects for the New International Economic Order. By William G. Tyler. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1977. 195 pp. \$17.00.

Keeping Kennedy's Promise: The Peace Corps, Unmet Hope of the New Frontier. By Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 153 pp. \$10.00.

Law of the Sea: Conference Outcomes and Problems of Implementation. Edited by Edward Miles and John King Gamble, Jr. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977. 425 pp. n.p.

The Law of the Sea: Issues in Ocean Resource Management. Edited by Don Walsh. New York: Praeger, 1977. 268 pp. n.p.

Managing International Economic Interdependence: Selected Papers of C. Fred Bergsten, 1975-1976. By C. Fred Bergsten. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1977. 317 pp. \$20.00.

The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate. Edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977. 390 pp. \$9.95 (paper).

New Means of Financing International Needs. By Eleanor B. Steinberg and Joseph A. Yager. Washington: Brookings, 1978. 256 pp. \$11.95 (\$4.95, paper).

Oil and Regional Development: Examples from Algeria and Tunisia. By Konrad Schliephake; trans. by Merrill D. Lyew. New York: Praeger, 1977. 203 pp. n.p.

The Picture of Health: Environmental Sources of Disease. By Erik P. Eckholm. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977. 256 pp. \$3.95 (paper).

The Politics of International Economic Relations. By Joan Edelman Spero. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 326 pp. \$12.95 (\$5.95, paper).

Problems of World Modeling: Political and Social Implications. Edited by Karl W. Deutsch, Bruno Fritsch, Helio Jaguaribe and Andrei S. Markovits. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977. 423 pp. n.p.

The Quest for Oil. By W. G. Roberts. New York: S. G. Phillips, 1977. 157 pp. \$9.95.

Radioactive Waste: Management and Regulation. By Mason Willrich and Richard K. Lester. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1977. 138 pp. \$13.95.

Rays of Hope: The Transition to a Post-Petroleum World. By Denis Hayes. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977. 240 pp. \$9.95.

Regimes for the Ocean, Outer Space, and Weather. By Seyom Brown, Nina W. Cornell, Larry L. Fabian and Edith Brown Weiss. Washington: Brookings, 1977. 257 pp. \$9.95 (\$3.95, paper).

Resource Management at the International Level: The Case of the North Pacific. By Oran Young. New York: Nichols, 1977. 252 pp. \$16.00.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

Scarcity, Energy, and Economic Progress. By Ferdinand E. Banks. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1977. 200 pp. \$18.00.

Scientific-Technological Revolution: Social Aspects. By Ralf Dahrendorf et al. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977. 200 pp. \$12.00 (\$6.00, paper).

Spreading Deserts—The Hand of Man. By Erik Eckholm and Lester R. Brown. Washington: Worldwatch Institute, Worldwatch Paper no. 13, 1977. 40 pp. \$2.00 (paper).

The Twenty-ninth Day: Accommodating Human Needs and Numbers to the Earth's Resources. By Lester R. Brown. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978. 363 pp. \$11.95 (\$3.95, paper).

The United States, OPEC, and Multinational Oil. By Frank R. Wyant. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1977. 214 pp. \$18.95.

The Vast Majority: A Journey to the World's Poor. By Michael Harrington. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977. 281 pp. \$9.95.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Environment. By the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. London: Taylor & Francis (distributor: Crane, Russak, New York), 1977. 95 pp. \$12.95.

World Food Prospects and Agricultural Potential. By Marylin Chou, David P. Harmon, Jr., Herman Kahn and Sylvan H. Wittwer. New York: Praeger, 1977. 316 pp. n.p.

MILITARY AND ARMS CONTROL

Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices. By John Lehman. Beverly Hills: Sage, Washington Paper no. 52. 83 pp. \$3.00 (paper).

Arms Control and Disarmament: A Bibliography. Compiled by Richard Dean Burns. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1977. 430 pp. \$39.75.

The Development of Naval Thought. By Herbert Rosinski; ed. by B. Mitchell Simpson III. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977. 139 pp. n.p.

Ethics and Nuclear Strategy? Edited by Harold P. Ford and Francis X. Winters. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977. 246 pp. \$12.95.

Iran's Military Security in the 1980s. By Shahram Chubin. Santa Monica, Calif.: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Discussion Paper no. 73, 1977. 57 pp. \$2.25 (paper).

Military Expenditure Limitation for Arms Control: Problems and Prospects. By Abraham S. Becker. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977. 352 pp. \$17.50.

The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972. By Ernest J. Yanarella. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977. 236 pp. \$17.25.

Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945. Edited by Gerald Jordan. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977. 243 pp. \$17.50.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

NPT: Current Issues in Nuclear Proliferation: A Selected Bibliography. Compiled by Susan Ridgeway. Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University, 1977. 57 pp. \$2.50 (paper).

Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Arms Transfers: The Missing Link. By Richard Burt. Santa Monica, Calif.: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Discussion Paper no. 76, 1977. 31 pp. \$2.25 (paper).

Peace, War and Defense. By Johan Galtung. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers (distributor: Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.), 1976. 472 pp. \$20.50 (paper).

The Role of the Bomber. By Ronald W. Clark. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1978. 160 pp. \$14.95.

The SALT Era: A Selected Bibliography. Compiled by Richard Dean Burns and Susan Hoffman. Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University, 1977. 43 pp. \$2.50 (paper).

Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. By Richard K. Betts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. 292 pp. \$15.00.

Soviet Air Power in Transition. By Robert P. Berman. Washington: Brookings, 1978. 82 pp. \$2.95 (paper).

Strategic Disarmament, Verification and National Security. By the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. London: Taylor & Francis (distributor: Crane, Russak, New York), 1977. 174 pp. \$16.50.

Strategies, Alliances, and Military Power: Changing Roles. Edited by James A. Kuhlman. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977. 372 pp. \$32.50.

U.S. Overseas Bases: Problems of Projecting American Military Power Abroad. By Alvin J. Cottrell and Thomas H. Moorer. Beverly Hills: Sage, Washington Paper no. 47, 1977. 68 pp. \$3.00 (paper).

War: Controlling Escalation. By Richard Smoke. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. 419 pp. \$18.50.

War, Strategy, and Maritime Power. Edited by B. Mitchell Simpson III. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1977. 356 pp. \$19.50.

Weapons Standardization, "Offsets," and Trade Liberalization in NATO. By Charles Wolf, Jr. Santa Monica, Calif.: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Discussion Paper no. 75, 1977. 18 pp. \$2.25 (paper).

Women and the Military. By Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach. Washington: Brookings, 1977. 134 pp. \$7.95 (\$2.95, paper).

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA. By Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1977. 276 pp. \$12.95.

American Foreign Relations, 1975: A Documentary Record. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam. New York: New York University Press, 1978. 641 pp. \$26.50.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

A Bibliography of Works on Canadian Foreign Relations, 1971-1975. Compiled by Donald M. Page. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1977. 300 pp. \$9.25 (paper).

Canadian Cultural Nationalism. Edited by Janice L. Murray. New York: New York University Press, for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1977. 139 pp. \$4.95 (paper).

Command Decision and the Presidency: A Study in National Security Policy and Organization. By R. Gordon Hoxie. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977. 505 pp. \$15.00.

The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance. By Douglas S. Blaufarb. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1977. 356 pp. \$12.95.

Culture and Diplomacy: The American Experience. By Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 361 pp. \$19.95.

Morality and Foreign Policy: A Symposium on President Carter's Stance. Edited by Ernest W. Lefever. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University, 1977. 76 pp. \$3.00 (paper).

Options for U.S. Energy Policy. By the Institute for Contemporary Studies. San Francisco: ICS, 1977. 309 pp. \$5.95 (paper).

Quest for Equilibrium: America and the Balance of Power on Land and Sea. By George Liska. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 254 pp. \$14.00.

The Shadow of Pearl Harbor: Political Controversy over the Surprise Attack, 1941-1946. By Martin V. Melosi. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977. 183 pp. \$10.00.

The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy. By Laurence Stern. New York: Times Books, 1977. 170 pp. \$10.00.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Alexander Gumberg & Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1933. By James K. Libbey. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977. 229 pp. \$13.50.

A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR. Edited by Tõnu Parming and Elmar Järvesoo. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 432 pp. \$22.00.

Communism and Communist Systems. By Robert G. Wesson. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978. 227 pp. \$7.95 (paper).

Eastern Europe's Uncertain Future: A Selection of Radio Free Europe Research Reports. Edited by Robert R. King and James F. Brown. New York: Praeger, 1977. 359 pp. n.p.

Europe and the Communists. Edited by V. Zagladin; trans. by Victor Kuzyakov. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977. 286 pp. \$2.25.

The German Democratic Republic: A Developed Socialist Society. Edited by Lyman H. Legters. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 285 pp. \$20.00.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

Grundelemente der Weltpolitik. Munich: R. Piper, 1977. 395 pp. n.p.

The Kremlin and Labor: A Study in National Security Policy. By Roy Godson. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977. 79 pp. \$3.25 (paper).

Leninism and the National Question. By P. N. Fedoseyev; trans. by Vic Schneerson. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977. 540 pp. \$4.00.

Leon Trotsky. By Robert D. Warth. Boston: G. K. Hall, Twayne Publishers, 1977. 215 pp. \$8.95.

Manipulating Soviet Population Resources. By Jeff Chinn. Holmes & Meier, 1978. 163 pp. \$22.50.

Modern Hungary: Readings from The New Hungarian Quarterly. Edited by Denis Sinor. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. 424 pp. \$17.50.

The Officer's Handbook: A Soviet View. Edited by General-Major S. N. Kozlov; published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force. Washington: GPO, 1977. 358 pp. n.p.

Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States. Edited by Archie Brown and Jack Gray. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977. 286 pp. \$24.00.

Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia. By Gerson S. Sher. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. 360 pp. \$15.00.

Purgatory of Fools: A Memoir of the Aristocrats' War in Nazi Germany. By Tatiana Metternich. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976. 285 pp. \$15.00.

Russia and the American Revolution. By Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov; trans. and ed. by C. Jay Smith. Tallahassee: The Diplomatic Press, 1976. 425 pp. \$29.70.

Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History. By John Lewis Gaddis. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978. 309 pp. n.p.

Russian Law: Historical and Political Perspectives. Edited by William E. Butler. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977. 266 pp. n.p.

The Samizdat Register. Edited by Roy A. Medvedev. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977. 314 pp. \$10.95.

Social Security and Medicine in the USSR: A Marxist Critique. By Vicente Navarro. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1977. 149 pp. \$18.00.

Soviet Agriculture: An Assessment of Its Contributions to Economic Development. Edited by Harry G. Shaffer. New York: Praeger, 1977. 166 pp. n.p.

Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual: 1977. Edited by David R. Jones. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1977. 277 pp. n.p.

Soviet Aviation and Air Power: A Historical View. Edited by Robin Higham and Jacob W. Kipp. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 328 pp. \$25.00.

Soviet Economic Policy: Income Differentials in USSR. By Vinod Mehta. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1977. 134 pp. \$7.50.

The Soviet Economic System. By Alex Nove. London: Allen & Unwin, 1978. 339 pp. \$23.25 (\$10.95, paper).

Soviet Foreign Trade: Purpose and Performance. By William Nelson Turpin. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1977. 172 pp. \$15.00.

Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol. By Ronald J. Hill. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 226 pp. \$16.95.

The Soviet State. (Second edition.) By Ellsworth Raymond. New York: New York University Press, 1978. 462 pp. \$15.00.

The Soviet Union, 1975-76: Domestic Policy, Economics, Foreign Policy. Edited by W. Berner *et al.*; trans. by Hannes Adomeit and Roger Clarke. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978. 308 pp. \$18.50.

USSR Facts & Figures Annual: 1977. Edited by John L. Scherer. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1977. 320 pp. n.p.

Yugoslavia After Tito. By Andrew Borowiec. New York: Praeger, 1977. 122 pp. n.p.

Yugoslavia After Tito: Scenarios and Implications. By Gavriel D. Ra'anana. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 206 pp. \$14.50.

WESTERN EUROPE

Agropolitics in the European Community: Interest Groups and the Common Agricultural Policy. By William F. Averyt, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1977. 128 pp. n.p.

Amerika und Westeuropa. Edited by Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz. Stuttgart: Belser, 1977. 406 pp. n.p.

A Bibliographic Guide to Spanish Diplomatic History, 1460-1977. Compiled by James W. Cortada. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977. 390 pp. \$25.00.

British Foreign Secretaries Since 1945. By Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury. North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, 1977. 267 pp. \$14.95.

The British People: Their Voice in Europe. Westmead, England: Saxon House (distributor: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass.), 1977. 207 pp. \$16.00.

Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945-1976. By Geoffrey Pridham. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 371 pp. \$19.95.

The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact, 1869-1971. By W. David McIntyre. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977. 596 pp. \$25.00.

The Construction of a European Community: Achievements and Prospects for the Future. By Pierre Maillet; trans. by Marcus J. Hurt. New York: Praeger, 1977. 185 pp. n.p.

Cyprus: The Unfinished Agony. By P. N. Vanezis. London: Abelard-Schuman (distributor: Transatlantic Arts, Levittown, N.Y.), 1977. 141 pp. \$9.75.

A Dictionary of the European Economic Community. By John Paxton. New York: Facts on File, 1977. 287 pp. n.p.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

Ethnic Conflict in the Western World. Edited by Milton J. Esman. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. 399 pp. \$17.50.

Europe 2000. Edited by Peter Hall. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 274 pp. \$15.00.

The Finances of Europe. By Daniel Strasser. New York: Praeger, 1977. 299 pp. n.p.

The Foreign Policies of West European Socialist Parties. Edited by Werner J. Feld. New York: Praeger, 1978. 149 pp. n.p.

The French Communist Party in Transition: PCF-CPSU Relations and the Challenge to Soviet Authority. By Annette Eisenberg Stiefbold. New York: Praeger, 1977. 155 pp. n.p.

French Politics Today: The Future of the Fifth Republic. By Neil McInnes. Beverly Hills: Sage, Washington Paper no. 51, 1977. 72 pp. \$3.00 (paper).

The French Polity. By William Safran. New York: McKay, 1977. 332 pp. n.p.

Intellectuals and Decolonization in France. By Paul Clay Sorum. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977. 305 pp. \$16.95.

Italy at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1976. Edited by Howard R. Penniman. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 386 pp. \$5.75 (paper).

New Trends in British Politics: Issues for Research. Edited by Dennis Kavanagh and Richard Rose. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977. 254 pp. \$11.95 (\$5.95, paper).

A New World Role for the Medium Power: The British Opportunity. By James Bellini and Geoffrey Pattie. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (distributor: Seeley, Service and Cooper, London), 1977. 121 pp. £4.25 (paper).

Party, State, and Bureaucracy in Western Germany. By Kenneth H. F. Dyson. Beverly Hills: Sage, Comparative Politics series, 1977. 72 pp. \$3.00 (paper).

The Permanent Alliance: The European-American Partnership, 1945-1984. By Geoffrey Williams. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977. 407 pp. \$37.00.

Political Consultation in NATO. By Roger Hill. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Wellesley Paper no. 6, 1978. 143 pp. \$3.75 (paper).

Possibilities of Civilian Defence in Western Europe. Edited by Gustaaf Geeraerts. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1977. 172 pp. gld \$35.00 (paper).

Robert Delavignette on the French Empire: Selected Writings. Edited by William B. Cohen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. 148 pp. \$13.00.

Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe. Edited by William E. Paterson and Alastair H. Thomas. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 444 pp. \$19.95.

The Spanish Economy, 1959-1976. By Alison Wright. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977. 195 pp. \$24.00.

Tariff Preferences in Mediterranean Diplomacy. By Alfred Tovias. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 153 pp. \$13.95.

Technological Decisions and Democracy: European Experiments in Public Participation. By Dorothy Nelkin. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977. 114 pp. \$7.95.

Turkey, NATO and Europe: A Deteriorating Relationship? By Nuri Eren. Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Atlantic Paper no. 34, 1977. 54 pp. \$4.00 (paper).

ASIA

Australian External Policy Under Labor: Content, Process and the National Debate. By Henry S. Albinski. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977. 384 pp. \$22.00.

Australian Government Today. (Twelfth edition.) By Geoffrey Sawer. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press (distributor: ISBS, Forest Grove, Ore.), 1977. 142 pp. \$4.00 (paper).

China and Japan, 1949-1976. By R. K. Jain. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1977. 336 pp. \$10.50.

China and the Major Powers in East Asia. By A. Doak Barnett. Washington. Brookings, 1977. 416 pp. \$12.95 (\$5.95, paper).

China and the World Since 1949: The Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution. By Wang Gungwu. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 190 pp. \$16.95 (\$4.95, paper).

Chinas Aussenpolitik. By Peter J. Opitz. Zurich: Interfrom, 1977. 112 pp. n.p.

Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977. By Robert G. Sutter. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 176 pp. \$15.00.

Chinese Perception of the World. By G. W. Choudhury. Washington: University Press of America, 1977. 105 pp. \$5.50 (paper).

Ethnic Plurality in India. By R. A. Schermerhorn. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1978. 369 pp. \$12.95 (\$6.45, paper).

The Far East and Australasia, 1977-78: A Survey and Directory of Asia and the Pacific. London: Europa (distributor: Gale Research, Detroit), 1977. 1,251 pp. \$66.00.

Fifty-five Days: The Fall of South Vietnam. By Alan Dawson. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. 366 pp. \$12.50.

Japanese International Negotiating Style. By Michael Blaker. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 253 pp. \$15.00.

Japan's Public Policy Companies. By Chalmers Johnson. Washington and Stanford, Calif.: AEI/Hoover, 1978. 173 pp. \$3.75 (paper).

Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China. By Peter R. Moody. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977. 342 pp. \$14.95.

Philippine Policy Toward Sabah: A Claim to Independence. By Lela Garner Noble. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977. 267 pp. \$10.50 (\$4.95, paper).

Political Change in Japan. By Taketsugu Tsurutani. New York: McKay (distributor: Longman, New York), 1977. 275 pp. \$12.50 (\$6.95, paper).

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

Post-Mao China and U.S.-China Trade. Edited by Shao-chuan Leng. Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1978. 156 pp. \$9.95.

Pursuit of National Interests Through Neutralism: India's Foreign Policy in the Nehru Era. By Sauripada Bhattacharya. Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1978. 280 pp. Rs. 60.00.

Revolutionary Ideology & Chinese Reality: Dissonance Under Mao. By Paul J. Hiniker. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977. 320 pp. \$14.00 (\$6.95, paper).

Socialist Society and Free Enterprise Politics. By Robert G. Wirsing. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1977. 214 pp. \$11.00.

The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy. By Claude A. Buss. Washington and Stanford, Calif.: AEI/Hoover, 1977. 152 pp. \$3.75 (paper).

U.S. Strategy in the Indian Ocean: The International Response. By Monoranjan Bezboruah. New York: Praeger, 1977. 268 pp. n.p.

The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy. By Selig S. Harrison. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1978. 468 pp. \$15.95.

LATIN AMERICA

Agrarian Reform Under Allende: Peasant Revolt in the South. By Kyle Steenland. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978. 241 pp. \$5.95 (paper).

Brazil's Multilateral Relations: Between First and Third Worlds. By Wayne A. Selcher. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 301 pp. \$17.00.

Contemporary Venezuela and Its Role in International Affairs. Edited by Robert D. Bond. New York: New York University Press, 1977. 267 pp. \$15.00 (\$6.95, paper).

The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule. By Christopher Mitchell. New York: Praeger, 1977. 167 pp. n.p.

The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II. By Michael J. Francis. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. 304 pp. \$15.95.

Mexico in Crisis. By Judith Adler Hellman. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978. 229 pp. \$15.75 (\$7.95, paper).

The Panama Canal Controversy: U.S. Diplomacy and Defense Interests. By Paul B. Ryan. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977. 198 pp. \$5.95 (paper).

Revolution of Being: A Latin American View of the Future. By Gustavo Lagos and Horacio H. Godoy. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1977. 226 pp. \$14.95.

Surrender in Panama: The Case Against the Treaty. By Philip M. Crane. New York: Dale Books, 1978. 258 pp. \$1.50 (paper).

The Truth About the Panama Canal. By Denison Kitchel. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978. 240 pp. \$8.95.

Views Across the Border: The United States and Mexico. Edited by Stanley R. Ross. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978. 456 pp. \$5.95 (paper).

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Abba Eban: An Autobiography. New York: Random House, 1977. 628 pp. \$15.00.

Arab and American Cultures. Edited by George N. Atiyeh. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 236 pp. \$9.75 (\$4.75, paper).

Capital Investment in the Middle East: The Use of Surplus Funds for Regional Development. By Ragaei El Mallakh, Mihssen Kadhim and Barry Poulson. New York: Praeger, 1977. 194 pp. n.p.

China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? By Selig S. Harrison. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 317 pp. \$10.95.

Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf. Edited by Mohammed Mughisuddin. New York: Praeger, 1977. 192 pp. n.p.

Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976. By William B. Quandt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. 313 pp. \$14.95 (\$4.95, paper).

Egypt, 1798-1952: Her Advance Towards a Modern Identity. By J. C. B. Richmond. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 243 pp. \$15.00.

In the Direction of the Persian Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. By A. Yodfat and M. Abir. London: Frank Cass (distributor: Biblio Distribution Center, Totowa, N.J.), 1977. 167 pp. \$19.50.

The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East. By David Hirst. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977. 367 pp. \$12.95.

The Middle East and North Africa, 1977-78. London: Europa (distributor: Gale Research, Detroit), 1977. 936 pp. \$54.50.

La pénétration allemande au Moyen-Orient, 1919-1939: Le cas de la Turquie, de L'Iran et de L'Afghanistan. By Antoine Fleury. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977. 432 pp. \$32.50.

The Politics of Defeat: America's Decline in the Middle East. By Joseph Churba. New York: Cyrco Press (distributor: Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis), 1977. 224 pp. \$10.00.

Quest for Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. By Bernard Reich. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977. 495 pp. \$24.95.

The Real Suez Crisis: The End of a Great Nineteenth Century Work. By Jacques Georges-Picot; trans. by W. G. Rogers. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978. 200 pp. \$10.95.

A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962. By Alistair Horne. New York: Viking, 1978. 604 pp. \$19.95.

Superpower Intervention in the Middle East. By Peter Mangold. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 209 pp. \$17.95.

Twentieth-Century Iran. Edited by Hossein Amirsadeghi. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977. 299 pp. \$21.50.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

AFRICA

Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1976-77. Edited by Colin Legum. New York: Holmes & Meier, Africana, 1977. 1,209 pp. \$55.00.

Africa South of the Sahara, 1977-78. London: Europa (distributor: Gale Research, Detroit), 1977. 1,183 pp. \$63.00.

Conflict and Collaboration: The Kingdoms of Western Uganda, 1890-1907. By Edward I. Steinhart. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. 311 pp. \$18.50.

Conflict in the Horn of Africa. By Colin Legum and Bill Lee. New York: Holmes & Meier, Africana, 1978. 95 pp. \$5.75 (paper).

The Foreign Policies of African States. Edited by Olajide Aluko. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1977. 243 pp. \$9.00 (paper).

The Foreign Policy of Despair: Africa and the Sale of Arms to South Africa. By Agrippah T. Mugomba. Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1977. 355 pp. n.p.

A House Divided: South Africa's Uncertain Future. By John de St. Jorre. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977. 144 pp. \$4.00 (paper).

The Last Caravan. By Thurston Clarke. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1978. 286 pp. \$10.95.


Primitive Government: A Study of Traditional Political Systems in Eastern Africa. By Lucy Mair. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. 244 pp. \$10.95 (\$3.95, paper).

Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya. By David K. Leonard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. 297 pp. \$19.00.

Secret Weapon in Africa. By Oleg Ignatyev; trans. by David Fidlon. Moscow: Progress Publishers (distributor: Imported Publications, Chicago), 1977. 189 pp. \$3.50.

Southern Africa: The Year of the Whirlwind. By Colin Legum. New York: Holmes & Meier, Africana, 1977. 72 pp. \$4.75 (paper).

South West Africa-Namibia. By Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann. New York: American African Affairs Association, 1978. 37 pp. \$2.50 (paper).



**Announcing a
New Quarterly Journal
of Public Policy
Published by
The Heritage Foundation**

Policy Review

- 1. Summer 1977:** ROBERT MOSS (*The Economist*) The Specter of Eurocommunism; KENNETH W. CLARKSON & ROGER E. MEINERS (*The Law and Economics Center, The University of Miami*) The Spurious Increase in the Unemployment Rates; PETER BAUER & JOHN O'SULLIVAN (*The London School of Economics and The Daily Telegraph*) Ordering the World About: the NIEO; JOHN HOWARD (*Rockford College*) The Responsibility of College Trustees; STEPHEN HASELER (*City of London Polytechnic*) Visas for Soviet "Trade Unionists"?; DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (*U.S. Senate*) The Most Important Decision-Making Process; ROBERT L. SCHUETTINGER (*Policy Review*) The New Foreign Policy Network; ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG (*The New School for Social Research*) A Note on the Sentencing of Criminals.
- 2. Fall 1977:** WALTER E. WILLIAMS (*Temple University*) Government Sanctioned Restraints That Reduce Economic Opportunities for Minorities; COLIN S. GRAY (*The Hudson Institute*) The End of SALT? U.S.—U.S.S.R. Negotiations; DANIEL ORR (*University of California, San Diego*) Toward Necessary Reform of Social Security; ROBERT CONQUEST (*The Hoover Institution, Stanford University*) Why the Soviet Elite is Different from Us; CHARLES LONGSTREET WELTNER (*Atlanta Judicial Circuit*) The Model Cities: A Sobering Scorecard; JULIAN AMERY, M.P. (*House of Commons*) The Crisis in Southern Africa.
- 3. Winter 1978:** ERNEST W. LEFEVER (*Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University*) The Trivialization of Human Rights; T.E. UTLEY (*The Daily Telegraph*) A Reappraisal of the Human Rights Doctrine; R. DAVID RANSON (*H.C. Wainwright and Co.*) Toward A Broader Picture of the Budget Deficit; ALFRED E. KAHN (*Civil Aeronautics Board*) Airline Deregulation: Getting From Here to There; E.G. WEST (*Carleton University*) Tuition Tax Credit Proposals: An Economic Analysis of the 1978 Packwood/Moynihan Bill; KENNETH L. ADELMAN (*Stanford Research Institute*) The Runner Stumbles: Carter's Foreign Policy in the Year One.

Subscriptions: \$12 for one year, \$21 for two years and \$30 for three years; add \$5 a year for foreign air-speeded delivery.
Policy Review, 513 C St., N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202 546 4400).

CONTREPOINT

REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE

Directeur: Patrick DEVEDJIAN

No. 25

1978

SOMMAIRE

Politique et Idées

Eugène Ionesco

Kostas Papaioannou

Jacques Ellul

Georges Henein

Alain-Gérard Slama

Ricardo Paseyro

Sur la crête de l'histoire

L'économie du léninisme

Les chrétiens et le socialisme

De Saint-Just et Hegel

Considérations sur la droite

De la nouvelle censure

Littérature

Bernard Frank

Soldes

Recherches

Henri Polge

Gascon et français

Correspondances du monde entier: Etats-Unis (Mario Maurin); Thaïlande (Christophe Babinet); Italie (Alfredo Cattabiani); Portugal (José Martins Garcia); Espagne (R. P.)

Chroniques: Théâtre (Dominique Jamet); Danse (Chantal Cinquin)

Livres par: François Fejtő; Jean-Louis Jacquet; François de La Saussay; Stéphane Rials; Louis Rougier; Anne-Marie Supervielle

Le numéro: 30 F

L'abonnement: 100 F

4, rue Cassette 75006, Paris, France

Politique Etrangère

la grande revue des questions internationales

SOMMAIRE

(43ème année) No. 1—1978

David ALLEN et
Roger MORGAN

Les élections directes au Parlement européen: le dilemme
britannique

Jonathan STORY

Le printemps de Madrid

Philippe RONDOT

Le président Carter et le Proche-Orient. Un an d'efforts
pour la paix

Jean-Pierre COLIN

Les Etats et la violence

Prix de l'abonnement

France 90 F

Etranger 175 F

Adresser les abonnements au **Centre d'études de Politique étran-**
gère, 6, rue Ferrus—Paris 75014—C.C.P. 1865-41 Paris

SPRING 1978 • 271

The World Today

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems

Recent issues include:

Gebhard Schweigler

Carter's détente policy:
change or continuity?

**Louis Turner
and Audrey Parry**

The next steps in energy
co-operation

Sydney D. Bailey

The UN Security Council:
evolving practice

Sam Younger

Ideology and pragmatism in
Algerian foreign policy

Anthony Delius

South African alternatives

Annual Subscription: £7 post free (USA \$20 by accelerated surface post)

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the
Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW100DD
(Tel: 01-450 8080)

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALI

Anno XXV

Marzo 1978

No. 3

SOMMARIO

Lo Stato sociale moderno e i suoi nemici, GIOVANNI DEMARIA

An Extension of the Tinbergen-Theil Framework to Problems of Federal Finance, P. BERND SPAHN

Satisficing and Monopoly Profits, HOWARD S. DYE

Composite SDR as a Pivot for Exchange Parities, JACOB S. DREYER

Economic Structure and the Conduct of Monetary Policy: Lessons from Ghana's Recent Economic History, OSCAR T. BROOKINS

Bandwagon, Snob and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand Revisited, PANAYIOTIS C. AFXENTIOU

RECENSIONI (BOOK REVIEWS)

Articles in English, Italian and French. Summaries in English and Italian. RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE is a monthly, published since 1954 under the auspices of Bocconi University, Milan. Editorial and administrative offices: Via P. Teulié 1, 20136 Milan, Italy. Annual subscription: L32,000. Back issues available.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

An interdisciplinary journal devoted to the investigation of development and the factors contributing to political change, social welfare, and economic growth within the Third World. **SCID** features articles on militarism in the Third World, dependency and development, planning and bureaucracy, developmental politics, class and stratification, rural-urban dichotomies, and developmental economics.

The highest quality scholarship from experts in a wide range of fields appears in the publication. In 1976-77, for example, the journal published articles by *Ronald H. Chilcote, Susan Eckstein, Cynthia H. Enloe, David Felix, R. Kenneth Godwin, David M. Landry, William T. Levine, Liisa North, Karen L. Remmer, Sergio Roca, Hyman Rodman, Peter Simmons, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Nadia H. Youssef.*

Forthcoming in 1977-78

The Foundations and Governments of Developing Countries

Frances X. Sutton

Policy Options for Small States: Kenya and Tanzania Reconsidered

Susan Aurelia Gitelson

The Web of Exploitation: State and Peasants in Latin America

Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares

Dependence, Government Revenue, and Economic Growth, 1955-70

Richard Robinson

Canada's Gain from Third-World Brain Drain, 1962-73

Swee-Hin Toh

Socioeconomic Change and Political Continuity in the English-Speaking Caribbean

George L. Beckford

Domestic Politics, International Linkages, and Military Expenditure

Kim Quail Hill

The Use of Specialists in Policymaking in Yugoslavia

Bogdan Denitch

Published three times annually at Rutgers University

Subscription Rates \$15 per volume year, \$25 for two years, \$35 for three years, \$10 student rate per year. Foreign \$1.50 per year extra

Mail prepaid orders to

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Transaction Periodicals Consortium

Rutgers University

New Brunswick, N.J. 08903



LATEST PUBLICATIONS

from the Atlantic Council of the United States

"The Growing Dimensions of Security", Atlantic Council's Working Group on Security. 90 pp. \$5.00. December 1977.

"What Future for the UN? An Atlantic Dialogue", Atlantic Council's Working Group on the United Nations. 40 pp. \$2.00. November 1977.

OTHER RECENT PUBLICATIONS

from The Atlantic Council of the United States

"GATT Plus", Atlantic Council's Special Advisory Panel to the Trade Committee, 1975, 98 pp. Out of print.

"Beyond Diplomacy", first Interim Report of the Atlantic Council's Special Committee on Intergovernmental Organization and Reorganization, 1975, 87 pp. \$4.50

"World Energy and U.S. Leadership", Harlan Cleveland, 1975, 21 pp. Out of print.

"Financing Free World Energy Supply and Use", John E. Gray, 1975, 38 pp. Out of print.

"Alternative Energy Sources for the United States", Richard J. Anderson, Peter L. Hofmann and Sidney E. Rolfe, 1975, 19 pp. \$1.00

"Nuclear Fuels Policy", Atlantic Council's Nuclear Fuels Policy Working Group, 1976, 136 pp. Out of print; available in Westview edition

"What Is the Soviet Navy Up To?", Vice Admiral Julien J. LeBourgeois (Ret.) 1977, 15 pp. \$1.00

"Detente: The Continuation of Tension by Other Means", Timothy W. Stanley, 1977, 15 pp. \$1.00

"Improving NATO Force Capabilities", General John W. Vogt (Ret.) 1977, 12 pp. \$1.00

"Harmonizing Economic Policy: Summit Meetings and Collective Leadership", Atlantic Council's Working Group on Economic Policy, 1977, 24 pp. Out of print.

The above policy papers are available prepaid from the Atlantic Council, 1616 H St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20006

"Nuclear Fuels Policy", Atlantic Council's Nuclear Fuels Policy Working Group. 1976, 136 pp. \$5.95

"The Future of the UN: A Strategy for Like-Minded Nations", Atlantic Council's Working Group on the UN. 1977, 58 pp. \$3.95

"East-West Trade: Encounter and Accommodation", Atlantic Council's Working Group on East-West Trade, 1977, 194 pp. paper \$5.95; hard cover \$15.00

"Nuclear Fuel and American Foreign Policy", Edward F. Wonder, 1977, 72 pp. \$3.95


"The International Monetary System: Progress and Prospects", Atlantic Council's Working Group on Monetary Policy, 1977, 86 pp. \$3.95

"The U.S. and the Developing Countries", Atlantic Council's Working Group on Development Policy, 1977, 175 pp. paper \$5.95; hard cover \$14.00

The six policy papers listed above may be ordered from Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colo. 80301.

Phone: (303) 444-3541

This Publication is Available in MICROFORM



**FOR INFORMATION
WRITE:**

University Microfilms International

Dept. F.A.
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
U.S.A.

Dept. F.A.
18 Bedford Row
London, WC1R 4EJ
England

SPRING 1978 • 275

Coming Up in ORBIS . . .

SHELDON SIMON on Security Cooperation
Among the ASEAN States

HARRY GELBER on SALT and the Strategic
Future

G. PHILIP HUGHES on U.S. Theater-Nuclear
Forces

LEO ROSE on the Superpowers in South Asia

HOWARD H. LENTNER on the Global
Implications of Canadian Separatism

MICHAEL J. BRENNER on Carter's
Nonproliferation Strategy

Indexes. ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Current Contents*, *Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences* and *ABC Pol Sci*. Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life*, both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts*, published in Paris by the International Political Science Association. ORBIS is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents*, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh.

Microfilm and Microfiche. ORBIS is available to subscribers on space-saving microfilm and microfiche. As begun with Volume 7 (the Spring 1963-Winter 1964 issues) for microfilm, and Volume 1 (1957-1958) for microfiche, each volume of ORBIS is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year. A complete backfile of microfilm, Volumes 1-6, is on one reel, priced at \$24.00. Please address inquiries direct to distributors. For microfilm: University Microfilms International, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. For microfiche: Johnson Associates, P.O. Box 1017, Greenwich, Connecticut 06830.

Reprint Editions. Back issues of ORBIS, Vols. 1-15, are available from the Kraus Reprint Company, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y. 10546, at \$574.00 for the fifteen volumes, clothbound, or \$484.00 paperbound. Kraus per-volume prices (paperbound) are as follows: Vols. 1-5, \$21.00 each; Vol. 6, \$35.00; Vols. 7-9, \$48.00 each; Vol. 10, \$62.00; Vol. 11, \$16.00; Vols. 12-13, \$32.00 each; Vol. 14, \$16.00; Vol. 15, \$42.00. From Vol. 16 on, single issues and complete volumes are obtainable by writing to the ORBIS Circulation Manager. Complete volumes are \$20.00; single copies are \$5.00. Outside the United States, please add \$0.50 per copy. Reprints of articles published in ORBIS, as long as they are available, are \$1.00 each. (Bulk-order prices provided on request.)

Information for Authors. *Manuscripts:* (1) Authors should submit an original and two clear copies, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if return of the manuscript is desired. (2) The entire manuscript (*including footnotes and tables*) should be typed double-spaced. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page. Tables should be typed on separate sheets, and all internal rules should be omitted. Articles that do not follow this format will be returned for re-typing. (3) Care should be taken that footnotes contain complete bibliographic information. For the proper footnote form — and all matters of style — please consult the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago Press). (4) The title page should include only the article title, author's name, and a fifty-word biographical statement (positions held, area of specialization, publications, and research-in-progress). *Figures:* (1) Illustrations should be submitted as glossy photographs. The ideal sizes are 4-3/8" x 7" (full-page) or 4-3/8" x 3-3/8" (half-page), but in no case should photos be larger than 8" x 10". Prints should not be stapled or clipped, and author's name, figure number, and top of figure should be marked lightly on the back. (2) Legends should be typed double-spaced on a separate sheet. (3) If an illustration has been published previously, the author must get permission to reproduce it. (4) ORBIS will prepare maps and graphs for authors if they cannot provide camera-ready artwork, but some production costs will be passed on to the author.

Design: William B. Bird